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\L1ST 



THE 



S MADISON, 



[lOCQMKNT*,- 



RD ..— -/' .' 



THE FEDERALIST 

A COMMENTARY OH ^ 

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UN/TED STATES 



Br 

ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, 
and JOHN JAY 



IDITGD, WITH NOTES, ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS. 
AND A COPIOUS INDKX 

Br 

PAUL LEICESTER FORD 

£dair ef PampUtU and Essayi an tit Censli^n!^ 




NEW YORK 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 
—2 






•••■■■ 



ConrRtOHT. iM- 

BBNRY HOLT A COb 



115033 



THI UVHKOK COHrANT »■». 
HAHWAV, K. J. 



THE RIGHT HONORABLE JAMES BRYCE, M. P., 

who has so ablv and brilliantly 
continued the wokk begun by 

The Fkdskalut, 

this edition 13 dtoicatbd. 



ifl 



CONTENTS. 



Editor's iNT^ooucnod vii 

'Hamilton's Syllabus OF "The FsDESAL^T," . . zliii 

Madison's Account or " Thb Pbdualist," . , zliz 

Editor's Table of Contests of " The Federalist,." li 

Hamilton's Table of Contents of "The Pedebalist,''* budii 

Hamilton's Preface to " The Fbdebalist," . Izxvii 

The Federalist; i-SBS 



Apfendix 

Articlib of Con federation, 1781 

The Pedekal Constitution, iTSr-ifB^, 

AMENDKBNTS THERETO, itS^-iBta 

AMENDUENTa PROPOSED BV MASSACHUSETTS, 17BS, 
AMENDHIHTa PROPOSED BV SOUTH CaROUKA, 17U, 

Amehdmehts PROfosED Br New Hampshire, 17BS, . 
Amendments Fsoi>09ED bv Viroinia, 17U, . 
Amehdhehts Proposed bv New York, itIS, 

AHENDHENTS proposed bv north CAROUNA, ITtt, 

Jefferson's Opinion oh a National Bank, 1-791, 
Hamilton's Opinion on a National Bank, 1791, . 
Kentvcey Resolutions or ij^s, .... 

VmoiNiA Resolutions or 1791, 

Jefferson's proposed Louisiana Ahebdnent, itaj, 

ABSTRACT OF DECISION IN CASE OF UaRBURV VI. HADISON, 1803, 

Amendmrbts proposed bv Hartford Convention. 1S14, 

MISSOURI Compromise, tim. 

South carouna obdinahcb or Nuluficatioh. iiji, 
Jackson's Nulufication proclamation, igjt, 
abstract of Drrd Scott Decision. iSjt, . 
South Carouna Ordinance of Secession. iB6a, 
south Carouna Declaration of Independence, iMa, 

Crittenden's Ahenokents, laei 

Peace Conference amendments, iUi, 
Constitution op the Confedbbate States, iMi, . 
act Creating Electoral Commission. 1877. 
Abstract of Decision in Third Legal Tender Case, itti. 
Index 



589 i 

vA 
ta 
«3> 
SlJ 
«]3 
«U 

e» 
646 
ej. 
e»s 

<79 
M4 — 

«8e 

6H — — 

l»7 m. 

es« ~. 

<41 ^ 

TO*-*, 

711 — 

7" 

716*' 

718.* 

7» 

T3> 

73« 

739 



INTRODUCTION. 



. 



Tkx constitution of the UnileJ States has been the sub- 
ject of great and often inordinate cuiogy, much as if it 
contained within itself some potency or charm, which 
gxTC to it especial, even magical, powers for the attain- 
ing of good government. As the Germans worship the 
concept of "the state " as something more and better 
than the people, so the constitution has been accepted as 
the spring of all our freedom and success. Ycl a very 
limited study of history serves to prove that liberty and 
good goteniment have been obtained by certain other 
nations posiiessing no such riimlaiiientat contract, ami 
that still others, closel y conforming their constitutions 

gorerffpittpt jp thffiry buLiLLyaiuiy la. (aa- In short, a 
written constitution is nothing but ink and paper, ex- 
cept (or what the people it nominally controls add to il.' 
Over and over aga in our gQver nmcm,bas b « « » aagedicQin 
coniplete-breafcdown only bv a n absolute disregard of 
ibc.cumUtmlQa.-aad-niost_of t he yery m en who framed 
[.hc-CPrnpacL would have- tcfuMxl- to sign-it, -could_UiCJL_ 
bate {yEcse5flLiJACVi::n(ualdc\:fiIopm.cn_i^ 

Wliat then, it will be asked, is the use of a written con- 
stitution, when it can be so disregarded and so extended? 
II a government grows atid changes with the nation 
it pretends to control, why seek to bind the people at 
all? Why attempt to limit the power of the newest 
law of Congress by the oldest law of the nation? In 
Great Britain tlie government is checked only by public 

' " 1 h^'li otth Monutquieii, ihit a govcinnienl miiil be iitleil ta 
■ nailno mucli u a cnat to Ih* iibliviiliiat ; •nd conw|ne'<ily tlial what 
may he i^ood ■! Philoilctphia. nuy l>e bod at Pari*, and ridknloqi ac 
P«icnbnr^." — //umi/tim, tjgq. 




1 



Vtll 



tNTRODUCTlOlf. 



[ 



opinion, and the latest act of p.-irltanieiit is the Uw of the 
land. Is not the latter more free than the (ormef ? 

More free but less stable, wc ansircr; more power to the 
majoritjr and less privilege to the whole people. In this 
condition rests the great distinction of the constitution 
of the United States. History has often recorded the 
grant of rights or privileges to subjects by kings or \>J 
aristocracieti or by minorities.' liut the federal compact 
was the first deliberate attempt and as&ent of a majority to 
tie its own hands; to give to the niinorily guarantees 
of fair and eifual ire^ilment, without which democratic 
gorcrnment is well-nigh impossible, save when developed 
along the lines of socialism. Our state governments, 
in which few such guarantees have been succe%s(ully 
cvolvcO, have again and again oppressed Ibc minoriiy;- 
but, with hardly an exception, the national government 
has been true to its purposes. Where ihc state govern- 
ments have been unchecked by the national; where they 
have had omnipotent powers, they have directly or indi- 
rectly robbed classes of their citiiens for the brtiefit of 
other classes and committed other wrongs in the name 
and by the will of the majority. Not long sinc e New York 
state, one of the fairest and leas rpron e to discrtmlimton 
in the Union, by law has decreed that a minority of 
-H? "^!!?^!^ shaTTDc maoe to contFIPMe. by trt<ai's"'t>f an 
iilBert^n ce tag, the Larger |i;irt of the govcrunieni 
revenues; so in Great Britain the majority have success- 
fully, through a graded succession tax, placed undge 
burdens upon the minority; and in neither have the 
minority the slightest recourse, unless that of expatriation 
can be considered such. B ut in otfT lut JoBo l gov ern- 

taticinat bate beHH li' f", ^njl 
nic tax of 1H94, the ma\nt\\.y 

minority, wlute excmjutng 
annulled, because it was iincon- 



t'nJ ment the most ditttinct linii 

TBi\ -friieii ivimimy, la Ujl ifiJTi 

'V "endeavored to tax the 
^themselves, the law was aor 



Emselves, 
stitutionaL. 
This gnar^intee to the minority Tn the Tederal i;r)nstitu 



■ InuanccJ In Magn* Clutu uiii ibc Ficucll Bill ol Righb at 17S9. 



I/fTRODUCTlOff. 



IX 



tion is one of the most remarkable examples of self-con- 
irol in history, and constitutes its chief claim to prc- 
ecnineacc. The explanalioD of its origin can only be 
otjtained by a history of the years preceding its framing. 
In the colonial period Ific U vr-making power in the 
provinces was placed in the h and* of nottular asNemlilies ; 
the ex ecution of those la ws, or their negation, in the 
hand « of col onial governo rs appointed by Great Uritain, 
with a si;<:<iH d relo by the king in <-ouni:i l; and the con- 
struing of those laws was confided to judges , likewise Tor 
1 lie' most part named by the sovereign, with a final appeal 
from the local courts to the count of the Privy Council. 
Thus the people were from early times a ccustomed to 

t po pular Ic^islaiicm. ronlrollciJ first bya neg^ ^^ye of the ir 
lucal executive ami courts, an d ultitnately by a suprem e 
nnlX I ; . , i| I -tiirts. The laws of- parliament 

urerr-xii; a i;>>luni<il staiiite, the king's veto killed a law 
iuientidd to by the king's governor; and the courts of the 
Privy Council reversed the decisions of the provincial 
eotwts. 
The American Revoltitinn destroyed this system and 

, hrnught into existence in its stead government by 
I'lpuUr committees or conventions; and as the cities 
»efe mostly loyal to the crow n, and during the war 
were largely held by the British, — ihuS excluding their 
utizens from influence in these popuLir bodies, — the pro- 
visiimal Rovcnu nents were noo^rolled b v the l;r; ■n; 

classes. Remembering with hatred the alien i ,1 

the popular will which the king's negative and courts had 
so often, and sometimes with cruelty, imposed on the 
pf'iplc. when these representative bodies came to frame 
new icovernments they practically lodged all powers in the 
Ir.'liii.itivi' ilcparlificpt, — h jtbcrto the only one whic h 
nat cd to th e jieople's will,— and made the 
exc'.mivc :itid judicial branches its creatures. 

Unchecked by the balance usually supplied by mann* 
taijuring or commercial lntcre.sis, the landholding 
cUft.<«s, by their legislatures, in turn unchccke*! by co- 
nrdinale departments, ran riot. Taper money and tctidct 



i 



INTROOVCTlOft. 



laws robbed the creditor, rcgrating and anti-monopol]r acts 
ruined the trader. When the weak slate (jourts, tnic to the 
principles of justice, sought to protect the minoniy, the 
le^iitlatures suspended their sitting,' or turned the judges 
out of office. The itencfal Kovernfflent, 4;;illc<l into csist- 
ence by the ar ticles of confederati on^ which had been 
modeled on the Bntavian and Helvetic constitutions,' was 
but a l eyislativc dependent of the s tate legisbi tires, with 
scarcely a shadow of executive or )iiclicial power, and was 
therefore equjilly impotent to protect. For the moment 
a faction of agriculturists reii^ned supreme, and to the 
honest and thoughtful, democracy seemed to he digging 
its own griivc, through the ap[>arcnt inability of the 
m^iority to control itself. 

Fortunately injustice to, and robbery of, feliow-citiiens, 
eventually injure the wrong-doer as well as the wronged. 
A time came when tlic riaims of the creditors Had been 
liquidated atMl the goods of the traders had been con- 
fiscated, and the former refused further loan* and the 
latter laid in no new stocks. The capitalist and the mer- 
cbant were alike ruiited or driven from business, and it 
wa^ the landholder, unable to sell, to buy. or to borrow, 
who was the eventual su&crcr. Such was his plight (hat 
he could not in many cases sell eren enough of his 
products to get the money to pay his annual taxes,* and 
this condition very quickly brought home to his own 
instruments of wrung. doing, the let; i statu res, the evilft 
they had tried to f.istcn on the minority. Taxes were 
unpaid, and, except where the conditions were factitious, 
the 5tate treasuries became empty. Finally, in an 
attempt to collect the taxes in MasMchusetts, a formi- 
dable revolt of tax-payers against the stale government 
was precipitated. Everywhere the state legislatures bad 
become objects of contempt in just so far as they had 

< Inuffonl addrtB ot John A'Um*, i;^;. 

* " Wlitl Diinitieii of £n« caillr hatv rriiint«(t tron Ihb rily \H\ 
fi'ik) In l!i« <i»iilry fnr ■rinl nf boyenr Wlul eieal •^iwnlltiM 
lulled ind irtim iTimuniM illll lie OhIcu hi ihc ilorr-. ' Tv, bow mnd 
beliin ill* ' '' >• ■«" (0'<i ■"•t wlieal -'>') lamlier 

t»lw!l)' t»lln njoj, »" ■■ famfilth n /. ^ow," yj. 




fNTRODUCTION. 



Zl 



finned against 0las5es of citizens, and the people were 
tbrcatcnccl with a breakdown of all sovcrnmcnt, by the 

I misuse of majoritjr power. It Has been the fashion of 
httiorians to blame the Congres.8 of the Confederation 
with the ills of 1781-1789, but that was an honest, and, 
when possible, a hard-working body, and t he rcj^l cul prit 
<QiL.not the impotent shadow of national 2t>v<^'''>'»o^ 
posscssins almost no powers for good and therefore 
Karccly any powers for evil, but t he all-ponerful ut ate 
I cj-iitla tare s which proved Again and again, as Jefferson 
Jsscrtcd,TKSr •' one hundred and seventy-three despots 
would surely be as oppressive as one." ' 

y^ The revolt of Sh ^iys. and the less a([);res5ive but uni- 
versal discontent a gainst the state government s were 
protests too loud spoken not to warn the legiKlaturex of 
their own peril, and in a frightened, half-hearted way, they 
one hy one gave their consent to the asscmbtinR of 3 con- 
vention to plan such changes in the articles of confed- 
eration as should at least give to the >i tatc government* 

I n ational protection from their own citizens .' Accord- 
ingly, in Jnnc, 1787, a body of the most earnest and 
nperienccfl mi-n gathered in I'hilaili-ljiliia and set about 
the task of framinj; a new national {government. 

Not a.fcw of the members of the federal convention 
luid been sufferers by (he injustice of state laws,* and 
tliejr were prepared to apply the knife deeply to the 
nulady of the body politic. Indeed, those who had but 
a (cw years before started out as strong democrats had 
rc-acted. Dr ead of the people and dread of democrat ic 
g overnmen t were felt by all those who did not draw th« 

'"NMmoii Vit|;iiii>,~ 15;. 

* ll VIC (rar thai Shaft's remit would uprvnil to within die boHcn of 
il> tjwa aat« Uut modi! die New Vcwfc Icfpilnlure vole the cill (or Ibc 
h>l«nl c/iiiveiulon, and (he fhcbl It ^aie MuiichuwIIt vnu ihc csme 
Uu ItM ■Mcnt (i( bcf in until) 10 witil 11 liml Dq;ail(e>l bul a few inontlu 
brfurw. 

* A> an «Kunple, Waihinijton had boiuti am) inail(^g» ti> "nifh 
^lo.uuo " nsid ofl in dtprcciucd paip«r monejr. worth at liiiws ai litUe 
■1 ; ''1 I3 tlic (xnuiid, and wbcai be atlcndcd the ledcral coiiTcntlaa. be 

-1 lor twii jieati' Uics tliniugh liavfiig been uuaUe to lell the 

I I kit (arm*. 



I 




XII 



tlfTRODUCTIQlf. 



distinction between popular control and majoritf contfol, 
between limited and unlimited guTcrnmcnls. 

From this fear of pupubi^^ nd o f state g avc rnments. 
qualified by the ncccssityof framing a Kovcrnment which 
should be based on both, came certain cluu&cs of the con- 
stitution the convention framed, which made it the instru- 
ment it is. The Icsislaturc or C ongress was split into 
t wo bodic K. that eacli miglit act as a cl ieck on the othe r, 
and strong P3n^i:uiive and iiidii-i:il dcpaUiacntt were 
created, armed against the legislative by the once hated 
royal powers of appointinenl, veto, and annutmcnt, that 
Ihcy mi);ht maintain their independence of the law-mak- 
ing branch, and even limit its power. Having split the 
Congress, the lower branch w;i5 given to ilie people, while 
the upper was given to the state legislatures, llius oppos> 
ing a barrier to the will of the state governments in the 
House and to the will of the people in the Senate. Not 
daring to trust either people or legislatiirek to <-hoose a 
president, a select body of citifcns was created, to whom 
the choice of that official was assigncil, thus making a 
second defense from the populace or state legi»btures. 
To the President was given the appointment of the 
judiciary, thus removing thai dep-irtmeni, by a second 
selection, three degrees from popular choice or influence. 
Roger Shcnixan's plea to the convention that " the 
people should have as little to do as may be about the 
guvernmeut" seemed fulfilled. 

But the minimizing of popular c ontrol was only half 
the restraint that the convention had to create. The 
power.t of the state IcgisUtures, as the toots of_^the 
majority, muB.t be also curtailed.'^r Ihcy would en. 
croach on the general government as they had on their 
own. The law s of (''■■ "^'i'"' w.-»c hm.!.- i. il.j. ij>r|i-|. 
mcnt laws once were, -cr 

power was swept (rum Uit .Male;.: llity muii! kciiii no 
troops or navy; they could not coin money, emit bills 
of credit, or poss tender laws; they coutd not enatU hills 
of Attainder, tx fcH fatU laws:, or laws impairing the 
obligation of contract. Such were the chief limitations, 




INTRODVCTIOH. xiii 

bot many minor ones )(ircll<r(l the list. The dread of the 
legislative branch was so strong that Congress itseK, 
balanced and checked though it was to be, was restrained 
iTOin certain legislation. The misuse of power by tbe\ 
uatc iGtci&lalures had ended, as it always does, in \o&% \ 
of power. 

To ask a majority to limit their law-making ability,! 
both in their state and national legislatures, &o that they 
canld no longer abuse the minority, and to aiik them tj> 
part wiih the direct delcg:ition of three-fourths of the 
generai govcrnmeat, was a daring proposition. The 
nate officials, as the creatures of the Icgislatufcs, were 
oaUintlly oppa^STTToit; while nothing but {he previous' 
abuses from which the country was still suffering noi^d 
e%-cr have made it possible that the constitution woulij 
have beeu accept29~by the majority; and even those 
wu-e in<iuflicicnt to make the people take the new cunsti- 
tBtion readily.' Much argument and many devices were 
Medcd in most of the states to obtain its ratification. 
To aid la its adoption The FederalitI was written, and 
o( that nine-months' campaign it was a distinct factor. 



! 



i; • * 

How far the government thus drafted and thus com- 
mented upon has fullillcd the intention of the men who 
(tamed it In the federal convention and the predictions 
nf the men who analyzed it in The h'ederaiiu, could be 
reviewed at much length, but only a few results need 
be touched upon. 

There can be no question that the national govern- 
ment lias given to the minority a greater protection than 
ft has eiijaycd anywhere else in the world, save tn those 
cuontrics where Ihe minority is a specially privileged 
^slocracy and the right of suffrage is limited. So 
absolute have property rights been held by the Supreme 
Court, that it even, by the Dred Scolt decision, in effect 
made the whole t:onntrf a land of slavery, borause the 

' lehfl qhtincr A>lui» ulil ilui ilie cuHitiiulkn ir« " nuutecl ftoa 
Uu £riD>liii( DpreHiiyof* feludint nallon." 



u 



XIV 



ISTRODVCTlOlf. 



slave was property, ami the nglitg of property were 
sacred. Once only, by the third Icgal-lcndcr decision, 
has the court markedly failed in the chief purpose for 
which it was created, and this failure is tlie more ex* 
traordinary, for none knew better than the judges that it 
was to prevent just such outrages as fiat money that the 
Rational government was created, and that the very 
words "legal tender," except as applied to intrinsic 
money for commercial and legal convenience, are a lie 
and a fraud, through which someone is to be robbed. 
To allege that the " right to make notes of the ((overn- 
meni a lega) tender" has been deemed "one of the 
powers of tioVerei]£nty in other civilt:ced nations," which 
were the grounds on which the decision was based, was 
to place our natioiud government on a par with those 
which have notoriously been planned for the benefiting 
of some at the expense of others, and to destroy the 
very pledge of justice that the majority gave to the 
minority in i;SS. The prtdc ol ttii« country has been 
that elsewhere the majority or the minority, depending 
on the degree of power enjoyed by each, has abused the 
other, but that here they were e<|ual before the law. 

In its secondary function, of protecting the minority 
from the state legislatures, the general government, 
wherever it possessed jurisdiction, has been equally 
successful By the eleventh amendment the power of 
citizens to sue a state in the national courts was furbid- 
dcn, and this has allowed state governments to repudiate 
and in other ways rob, as of old, but wherever the juns* 
diction of the Supreme Court has reached, it bus honestly 
and fearlessly protected the minority from the majority. 
This has at moments produced intense feeling against 
the national judiciary hy the stales, and between iSi8 and 
183a a long scries of legal conRicis took place, leading 
to many protests by the slate legislature-!. But though 
the slate governments successfully resisted in a few 
cases tiic mandate of the court, the adv.-intage was only 
temporary, and to-day no «utc dares to resist, however 
much it may question, a ilecision. 



1 



WTRORUCTtON. 



XV 



Turning from tlic question of liow far the m»n pur- 
pose ot the national KorerDRicnt lias been achieved, we 
meet the qocstion of how far the constitution has fulfilled 
ibe intcotion of its frumers, as regards tlie government it 
cstubUsbed. 

Tlie object of the framcrs was to create three separate 
and distinct departraienls, so balanced as tu powers .iml 
force that they should be safe from each other. Time 
kas shown that they suctwdcd In 1801-03 the Icgis- 
Utivc and executive branches united in an attack on the 
judiciary, retnovin){ judges appointed for life, and even 
suspending the silting of the Supreme Court, but with- 
uut permanent results, and the judiciary maintained 
its power and independence. During the Civil War the 
PrcstdcDt by his assumption of " war powers " rc<luc«d 
the power of Congress materially, but uheii ilie necessity 
V4S passed, it was found that the legislative branch 
htd lost no real prerogative. In 1867 Congress sav- 
agely attacked the President, but the Executive influence 
ind strength suffered no diminution. 

By the division of the Congress into two chambers, 
Ki that both a majority of the people and a majority of 
the states should be necessary for legislation, it was 
tiupcd that both the people and the state governments 
would be protected from national encruachmeni, and lliis 
end has been realized. Its secondary purpose of act* 
ing as a check on hasty and unnecessary law-making 
has likewise been fulfilled. At moments the diverse 
composition of the two bodies has resulted in material 
tttugrccnicnls, which have produced angry controversies. 
Fur tlie time these have put one of the branches out of 
public favor, and usually this has been the Senate— which 
vas inevitable, since its very purpose was to check the 
will of the majority of the jwoplc. Eventually, however, 
Kcofxl has always been obtained, and in looking back 
wer a hundred years of Congressional legislation the 
dingrecmcnts are found to liavc luuJ very little influence 

L ai Dor history. 

I Both Houses of Congress have made continual at 



xn 



INTKODUCTIOK. 



tempts to rob the President of the power of appointment, 
and whenever that official has been the " favuritc son " 
of pohltcal machines, or hati sought to indiience the 
action of Congress on legislation, they have to an ex- 
tent succeeded; so far indeed as to lead members of 
Congress to this day to assert the right of eelccting local 
officials; but whenever the President lias been a man of 
strength, he has refused to recognize this claim. Such 
action has usually produced antijuthy in Congress to the 
President, and the Senate has sometimes, in irritation, 
negatived Presidential nominees, but otherwise the legis- 
lative department is helpless, and every President who 
has selected his own officials has added distinctly to his 
popularity with the (>eople, if not with the politicians. 
Fortunately the steady extension of the civil-xervice 
laws promises shortly to remove this bone of contention. 

Though the fathers' fear of a coalition of the small 
states in the Senate has not been realiied, something 
akin to it lias developed by the rapid admission of new 
states. Asa result, by "bolding-up" or "dickering" 
over legislation, the senators of this coalition of small 
stales, though representing an inconsiderable minority of 
the whole people, have succeeded in placing laws on the 
statue books that were not for the best interests of the 
country. This evil is purely temporary, and will pass 
with the growth of population in the new states. 

A second defect in the Senate, due to the fact that it is 
a delegated tK>dy, and therefore not directly responsible 
to the people, has been its tendency to extravagance, 
and in this body all class legislation, whether bounties, 
(wnslons, protective duties, internal improvements, or 
railroad grants, Rnds its warmest advocates, if not its paid 
attorneys. This has produced a constantly recurring dis- 
cussion as to whether it would not be best to make it a 
directly elective body by the people of each state. 

The method of choosing the President has proved 
hopelessly inoperative. The wish nl the frnmrrs was 
that the electoral college should select a president for 
the people, hut the people would none of it, and hare 




HfTRODVCTIOtf. 

wways insisted upon voting for a president and not for a 
proxy. The result has been that the president, being the 
only part of the ){overnmeDt for whom the whole people 
rate, has absorbed by far the greater part of govern- 
mental popiilnrity, and is to-day. In most people's minds, 
(lie dominant flgure in the national government. Ccr- 
uinly the past goes to show that popular choice has on 
the wlwle been safer iltan selected ehoice could ever 
have bten, for the Presidents chosen by the people have 
been successful, while those brought forward by politicians 
have been failures. Another illuminating fact is that the 
Vice President is always the choice of the politicians, 
the people taking little interest in the selection of that 
official; and his almost invariable failure is equally well 
known. 

As the method of choosing the President has proved 
wholly inoperative, so too it has proved markedly inef- 
llcient. Twice it has broken down to an extent lliat has 
threatened the safety of theKovernmenl, and twice it has 
placed in office men not fairly elected, thus defeating the 
will of the people. The Klectoral College hiis loKt its 
object, and only endangers the country in every Presi- 
dential election. An amendment to the constitution, 
doing away with it, and making the President elected by 
the people, is the most necessary revision the compact 
needs. 

The President Iia« not, as even the convention feared 
lie might, endeavored to make himself king or dictator; 
he has not even made any marked attempt to perpetuate 
himself in office. In moments of necessity he has over- 
ml'Icn the constitution and usurped such powers as he 
dermeJ ncrtsmiry, but never with the object of personal 
aggiaodizemeoi or injury of the people. Nor can there 
be any question that the Presidents who have so acted, 
tiave done it with reluctance, and were the Hrst to end 
the exercise of such extra-conKtitutional sway, when the 
conditions allowed. If American democracy had done 
nnUiiug else, it would have proved its right to fame by 
Iht fact that il has choKcn twenty Presidents, not one ot 




XVIII 



INTRODUCTION. 



vhom has attempted to subvert the uoveniment or \t> 
overrule the will uf the people in any cs&cniial point. 
This is the more remarkable us five o( these I'residents 
were chosen because of conspicuous military service. 

But the dixtingushing feature uf the American gorcrn- 
ment has been the judicial department. At moments its 
jtidgcs have cast impartiality behind them, and de- 
scended into the political arena. At other times the 
Supreme Court has shovn indecision or instability. It 
has been "packed" to secure a particular verdict, and 
has rendered the desired opinion. It has put itself so 
out of accord with public sentiment that its decrees were 
successfully overriden or disregarded by the Congress, 
by the President, by the state executives and courts, or 
by the people. It has been temporarily the must hated 
feature of our government, and a recurring popular cry 
has called for its curtailment or alteration. But in the 
main it has ;idmirably fulfilled its purposes. So far from 
graipin); power, it has constantly soughi to differentiate 
federal jurisdiction from that of the states, and though 
its influence is widening, it is because Uie necessities of 
national development require iL Because it is the one 
ultimate court in the world which is allowed to annni as 
well as to expouiul a t:tw, it stands as the greatest pro> 
tector of the minority now known; and because this 
power has in the main given justice as well as legality to 
its decisions, the court has won an enviable reputation 
for fairness, and consc<|U(-ntly a respect nowhere else ob- 
tained. No matter how unpupular its decisions may be, 
they are submitted to without question. " Wc shall abide 
by the decision," said Lincoln, even in the heal of the 
Dred Scott excitement, "but wc will try to reverse it." 

The greatest test of the success of the fnimrrs is in be 
fotind, however, in the general rather than in the govern- 
mental history of the constitutional period. Within that 
time our territory has been more tlian tripled, and our 
states have been mutiplied by over three. Our popula- 
tion has grown fnim three to seventy million, .inil we 
liave received foreigners in such numbers that some of 



INTRODUCTlOiT. 



XU 



these nationalities now exceed the whole number of 
AaiL-ricaos at the time the Constitution was fnmed. 
We have fought a war with the most powerful nation of 
Europe, and conducted within our own borders the 
longest great war since the Napoleonic epoch. Yet to- 
day our people are a.% free as they ever were, our govern- 
loent as eflicieni, and though the conslituiion has many 
times been overridden or disregarded, with scarcely an 
exception the ending of the crisis that led to such action 
has been followed by a contraction of powers to consti- 
tutional limits. After a hundred years of testing the 
aaiional government stands to-day as the only one which 
has existed for a century without changes that were in 
effect revolutionary, and it is the only one able to en- 

r force its laws on seventy millions of people without 
creating within itself a spirit of rcxistaiicc and revolt. 
Vet the federal constitution would have failed, as every 
Eovernment must fail, but for the faculty of self-govern- 
nent inherent in the people it nominally governs. Of 
what nsc would cunstittitiotial guarantees to the minority 
be, if the majority chose to disregard them? Of what 
use would a supreme court be, if its decisions were not 
ac(]uiesced in? The constititutiun is alterable, the Su- 
preme Court or the limitations can be amended at the 
ttill of the people. The constitution has been overridden, 
the people have disobeyed the laws. The success of our 
iBtiooal government is due, not to its principles or struc- 
e: it is due to the fact that it gives to the majority 
ihe right of governing the land provided their laws shalt- 
be equal in operation, and that with this degree of power 
the majority has been content. It ie, therefore, but one 
exprension of what \% the cardinal element of good 
government: a self-controlled people, given to excess 
In neither law-making nor in law-breaking. 

♦ 

On September 17, 1787, the federal convention, after 
nearly four months of anxious work, completed the fram- 
'va,% of the compact since known as the constitution of 



iJ&i 



( 



\ 




XX 



WmODVCTIO/f. 



the Upited Staten. and forwarded it to the Continental 
Congress, accompanying the instrument with the request 
that the proposed pliin of government might be submitted 
to conventions of the people in the Tarious stale*, for 
their discu^ionand ratification or rejection. The result 
of this recommendation was almost to turn the country 
at large into u vast debating society, and for nine months 
public speakers, pamphleteers, and newspapers declaimed 
and argued. Probably in no other time or country have 
the princijiles of government ever been so universally 
and elaborately discussed. 

Even before the convention had made the result of its 
labors public, it was notorious that a large awl powerful 
party in the state of New York was prepared to oppose 
whatever that body should submit. In the instructions 
of that state tu her delegates to the federal convention, 
an attempt had l>een made to insert a restriction thai 
any alterations made in the articles of confederation 
"should be not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the 
constitution of this state," * a motion lost by but one 
vote, and the instructions actually adopted only modified 
this limitation to the extent that the Nkw Vork delegates 
were restricted to "the sole and express purpose o( 
revising the articles of confederation.'" When there- 
fore the convention, discanling the old government, set 
about the framing of a new one, two of New York's three 
delegates, Robert Yates and John Lansing. Jr.. with- 
drew from the convention on the grounds that the body 
had wholly exceeded its power, and united in an open 
letter of protest to the Governor of the state, George 
Clinton;' and though the third, Alexander Hamilton, 
refused to be Iwund by their action, and eventually 
signed the constitution, his act unquestionably tran- 
scended his powers. 

Lines were therefore already drawn, when on Septem- 
ber J7, 1787, the constitution was publi^^hed in the New 



■ .Motlaa of Robcrti Vatts. lounial ol Senate, 

•BIIIU4, it. 137. i/M./.. 480. 




WTRODUCTIO^V. 



Vork press, sod how well pre[>arcd were the opposition 
(nr "Anli-fcdcralisls " as tlicir opponents promptly named 
(liem), is proved by the fact tlut, on the very day of its 
publication, there appeared in the New York journal, 
the organ of the "slate machine," a letter sigoed 
"Cato," sharply and ably attacking the proposed govern- 

[Ueut, written, as was very cjuitkly known, by no lesxm^n 
than GoTcrnor George Clinton himself. From that time, 
till the meeting of the Assembly tn January, 1788, gave 
otlier occupation, Clinton continued the attack in a 
series of letters o»cr the same pseudonym." More 
dangerous still was another series, under the pen-name 
of "Brutus," begun a little later* than (hose of Cato 
and far exceeding them in both ability and number, 
■ liich were notoriously written by Robert Vatcs, judge 
of the state supreme court, and one of the delegates 

nwho had withdrawn from the federal convention. 

"These two writers were re-«nforccd by a host of minor 
scribblers. ^ 

Hamilton was too warmly in favor of a strong national 
government, w<is too powerfully committed to the pro- 
posed constitution, and held too ready a pen, to allow 
these attacks to go unanswered. But three days after 
the publication of the first letter of "Cato." a reply to 
a, under the signature of "Oesar,"' appeared in the 
papers, keenly personal ' in character, and virtually 
warning the " A nti- federalists,*' that they could " take " 

[the " proflTercd constitution," or run the risk of seeing 
gOTcrnmcnt forced upon them by an array. Furilier- 
more, "Cato " was told that, " in his future marches," he 
wauld very probably be followed by "Cjesar." 

The want of political tact thus shown, typical indeed of 
Hamilton through all his life, was eagerly seized upon by 
" Cato," and in his second letter he cleverly animadverted 

' RqidMed In FoH'i " Etw;* o" ^^' CoiMliiutlon.'' 

• fftw Yrrt fenrtt-d. Nonrtnbn I, IJ87. 

' Rnxinted in Konl't ■■ Eaap on the Coortitmicm." 

* Wulriiuion nmipUin«l in Noretnlwr. 173?. tlul "1 Iiivb lunUir 
•en mc [puliliuilionl llial tt DM tAMfcucJ lo ili« |>uuaia ol the 



ZXII 



INTRODUCTION. 



on these impcnous and ill advised w^ming^. and closed 
by telling "Cxur," in turn, that no notice would be 
taken to whni he might in the future write. To thin 
"Cxsar," replied in a second letter, in which, as if 
he had not done harm enough, he went to the lengths 
of writing that " 1 am not much attached to the majesty 
of the mHllitudt," and therefore " waive all preten- 
tions (founded on such conduct), to their counle nance." 
Hut even the author seems to have felt lltat he had 
begun his appeal to the people amiss, for at the end he 
gave notice that "Ca;sar" would not reply further to 
"Cato." 

This did not mean, however, that Hamilton rcsifined 
the field to his adversaries, but merely that he intended 
to change his ground. **Sim:e my last," he wrote a 
correspondent (presumably Washington), "the chief of 
the state party has declared his opposition to the govern* 
mcnt proposed, both in private conversation and in print. 
That you may judge of the reason and Jairtuss of his 
views I send you the two essays, with a reply by 
'Ctcsar' On further consideration it was concluded 
to abandon this personal form, and to take up the 
principles of the whole subject These will be sent you 
ax published, and might with advantage be repuhlished 
in your gaieties."' Nor was it only his frii-nds who 
knew of this change of plan, for the organ of the Ami. 
federalists promptly announced that, "n writer in the 
state of New York, under the signature of 'C«sar,' 
came forward against the patriotic 'Cato.' and en- 
deavored to frighten him from starting any objei'tiiinK, 
and threatened that 'Cato* would be follnwed by 
'Caesar,' in all his marches; but wc find that as soon 
as ever 'Cato' came freely to discuss the merii of the 
constitution, 'Caesar' retreated and disappeared; and 
since that a publication nndcr the signature of ' I'ublins ' 
has appeared in that state." 

To write such a treatise nn the "prindples uf the 



' See Ford's " Eaap on the Coonitulai,'' 845. 




tffTRODUCTIOIf. 



wbole subject," was a task of no little bbor, but to 
write it in tlie few monthit before Uie assembling of the 
New York state conTention (if not before the elections 
for members of that body), aivd so that it might at once 
begin the work of counteracting the influence of " Cato " 
and *' Brutus," involved a rapidity of composition to 
which Hamilton himself was unetiual. He therefore 
sougbt the assisunce of two others in the undertaking' 
and secured the aid, first of John Jay, then Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs', and second of James Madison, a 
nctnbcr of the Continental Congress from Virginia, who 
had recently distinsuishcd himself in the federal ton- 
TciitioD by his able elucidations of the general theory of 
fjovcrnment; a form of study in which Virginians had 
aiready made themselves famous. To Jay was assigned 
the discussion of government in its relation to foreign 
affairs, and to Madison Wiis apportioned the historical and 
■ beorelical part, with an analysis of the general powers of 
the new government; Hamilton taking himself the ex- 
■iiiinatioa of the defects of the confederation, and the 
riposition of the proposed constitution in deUil, for 
nth of which he was peculiarly fitted. 

KTcn thus divided, it was a dtfRcult task to produce 
the weekly late of essays alternately published in the 
tmitfenJent Journal and the Dttily AJvrrltur; and the 
Dere magnitude of the labor can best be understood 
Hben it is noted thai ** Brutus," the ablest writer in the 
Dppo«iiion, wrote only sixteen letters, while eighty-five 
appeared over the name of PubUus, the periods of publi- 
cation being almost identical. 

The last letter of "Cx-«ir" was published on Octo- 
twr 17, and on O ctube n^j; '• T/ie J-'eJeralilf, No. i," 
addressed to the "The People of the SUte of New 
Vork," over the pen-name of " Publius," was printed io 

*"Tbe midenaMnf was profMned by AIe»ii<lor Hamilton to June* 
. wUli > rti|uekt In )»iii him noA Mr. )t,y in nrtyin); it int» 
{AfaJiijH in a ff"" f^t^ft " '"*' /■'tJ^rtiHil,") •■ U w«« 

Uti tall tiv Jay. Ilamill an<l mjwK. The inopouj came 

flu two loitner. — jt/tfjitfw lajifftrten, Auput to, ijSS. 




£y 



XXIV 



mTRODUCTlON. 



the /nJepfitJent Journai.' This announced itstlf as the 
initial number of u series of cssay» on tlie pruposed con- 
Utlution, and briefly outlined the intended scope of the 
work. Id eight]r-livc letters, published in the suvcecd- 
ing jCven mo nths, thi^ t^isk was completed. 

The nurlccd excellence of the letters of "Pablius" 
attracted insunt attention, and led to the republication 
of the earlier numbers in the larger part of the American 
pre&s, even the jVrtrr Yark Journal, the organ of the Anti- 
federalists, being finally forced to print (hem for a time.' 
The'demand indeed was sufficient lo produce the prompt 
advertisement of a collection of the scries in book form, 
and it was published while the conxtitntion was still a 
matter of delxite. 

That Tht Ftdtralht produced any marked influence 
at the time in leading to the acceptance of the new 
government is questionable, (or it was a moment of pas- 
sion, rather than of reason, and the followers of Clinton 
were too bound by scllish interests to let abstract reason- 
ing really influence them. A good Federalist could only 
say of the work of "Publius" that "he is certainly a 
judicious and ingenious writer, though not w<-ll calculated 
for the common people."* As for the A nti- federalists, 
they made no pretense of regarding the arguments. 
" 'The Federalist,' as he terms himself," wrote one, "or 
' Puhlius,' puts me in mind of some of the gentlemen of 
the lung robe when hard pressed, in a bad cause, with a 
rich client They frc<iuciitly say a good deal which does 
not apply; but yet if it will not conirince the judge aiid 
jury, may perhaps, help to make them forget some part 
of the evidence — emturrass their opponents, and make 
the audience stare." ' 

The New York elections for delegates to the state 



' tl hu bcvn MUDd by Ri«a rbJ ItMine tkat iK« cMfy l«n«n wtn 
si2n«<I " ACiluen oj hvw Vock." Thkit *n errer. the nalyaMnt llw 
paeudiMfoi bciuK In «• aiivarlitaunenl o( th« linL collNUd eiliiivii. 

' ll nnnlcd Uir.c a peliiion fn>ni ihlnr uibtcrlhen Ihal ibe p«t>*f vouM 

*. bmiUT 14.178&, 



tUTkODUCTtOH. 



XXV 



convention well proved that "Publius" had written in 
nin, for only one-third of the men chosen were Fe(ter;il- 
ista — making the contest on« of the inost crushing 
defeats ever experienced by the Anti-CHnton party. 
Nor were the members of the convention when met, any 
more open to persiiaston thnn the people had been. *'I 
■teal this moment," wrote one, " while the Convention is 
ia Committee and the little Great Man employed in 
repeating over [';irts of Puhlius" to write; and another, 
when an Anli-federalist was charged with having "com- 
piled" bis speech from the New York papers, replied 
liut "if so, he had as much credit with me as Mr. 
Hamiltoa hxA, for rtlailittg in Convention, Publius." 

But if the masses were held to the democratic party in 
the state by the argumcnt» of "Calo" and "Brutus" 
and were deaf to the reasoning of " Publius," there was 
a Irmil to what they could be made to accept. That the 
federal compact robbed them of power, and was a 
"g'ddcd trap," leading to consolidation and to eventual 
tyranny, they bad strong reasons for believing, but when 
the sutc machine, triumphant in «)uiping public opin:on 
10 this extent, went one point further, and advanced lite 
•(lea of separation from the Union, which indeed was the 
laHtcal outcome of a rejection of the constitution, it was 
DDt followed by the rank and file. In the history of the 
United States disunion has been often talked and some- 
times attempted by political leaders, but not once have 
the masses accepted it. The onljr serious endeav or _to 
liteafc up the countr y whktTSas ts er twrx^tteA wa*jnj> 
— Vim" " here those '>iro dlg uld have be en the controlling 
ekiteM were chiedv slaves, unable to maliJOhc^nHucnce 
ajMiwer; and even there, in the mountain re^oiBrw'i*rc 
the plain American resembled his more northern coun- 
tryman, disunion never prospered. From 1771I, if not 
earlier, the leaders have upheld or denounced a united 
ewinlry, according to their selfish or sectional views, but 
the anspeakiiig masses have felt, what it took statesmen 
rears In learn, that there was but one people and one 
nation, be tlic states thirteen Of thirty. In 1788 the 



XXVl 



LvrxoDvcnoff. 



majoritj" might vote against » frame of government; they 
could Dot be brought to vote against the Union. 

But another and more concrete difficulty existed to 
obstruct tlie plans of the Clintoninn IcaderK. The Antt- 
fedcralisis were a landholding and therefore an up-state 
party, while New York City and its immediate vicinity 
were controlled \>y the commercial and mechanic c)a»set, 
so strongly federal in their feeling that at this very elec- 
tion for the convention, though the opposcrs of the con- 
ittituttnn had won nverwhctmingly elsewhere, j'et in New 
York City the FcderaliHls drove the Anti-federalisu from 
some of the polls by force, and even where this was not 
done the vote stood as (en to one for their ticket. " Reject 
the constitution," threatened the federal leaders, and "a 
separation of the Southern District from the other parts 
of the Stale . . , would become the object of the Fedcr* 
alists and of the neighboring Slate*.*" This would not 
merely exclude the inKind part of the state from the Union, 
it would shut it out (rom the sea. Worse still, it would 
lose to the country sections their share of the large 
revenues arising from the imposts on the rich commerce 
of New York City, and as this revenue was a principal 
reason for the refusal to join the Union (because of its 
necessary transference to the general government), the 
certain loss of it by a secession of the City removed a 
powerful motive of the Ami federalists for opposing the 
constitution. 

This danger of division, therefore, made the triumph 
of the Clinton party more apparent than real, and not 
daring to reject, nor willing to accept, the opponents of 
the constitution could only adopt the policy of delay, 
hoping that enough states wnuld reject the new govern- 
ment to prevent its orgnniEation. Having postponed 
the stale convention as long as possible, to gain time, it 
was next proposed when that body had met that Ibey 
should t;ikc a " long adjournment as the safest and most 
artful course to c/Tect ilicir final purpose.'" But as state 
after state ^-^ — ■■■' ''i" -"--•■"ition such action became 



' lUulbam u 



*au, 




extreme, and in place of it a plan of conditinnat 
cnUments was bruuglit forward, by which the stale 
oo«iltl later withdraw from the Union. Rather than risk 
hinlicr contest, this compromise was at Rrst favorably 
recetvcil by tlie Pederalistn; the one side bopinjt that the 
new Eovcrnmcnt would prove so great a failure or so 
hard a master that a favorable opportunity would come 
(or rescinding the ralifi cation, while the other foresaw 
Uat, a ratification once obtained, there would be liltle to 
"fear in the future." Hut while this compromise was 
siill in embryo news reiiclied the convention that both 
Kew Hampshire and Virginia had ratified the constitu- 
tkm, making ten states in all, and itisurinf; the organixa- 
uon and trial of the new government. The Federalists 
Uierefnre became less yielding and finally wrung from 
liicir opponents an nnconditional ratification. What the 
irj^ntncntx of " fublius" could not bring to pass had 
been extorted frnm the majority of Ihc state by the 
majority of the states and a minority of its own citizens. 
But it TA^ Ftderaiiit was an uninfluenttal factor in the 
Mtual struggle for ratification, it was because of the 
Mture of the contest, and not from want of ability. It 
IS true t hat serious defccts,_ duc to the circumstances of 
lis production, arc obvious. Although intended to be a 
tyMematic work on republican government, tt was evcn~N 
Dtire a plea far the adoption of this particular constitu- f 
iKin, and therefore had quite as much of the legal brief 
as of the phi!o*<ipliical cummentary on gorcriimeu!. j/" 
So t one of the author s of Tht FeJtrtUt'sl entirely approved -^ 
of tbe constitution, bnt none the less they were called 
upon to defend i^ I'nJ^S: _ " In some parts," wrote Jef- 
ferson, immediately after its publication, "it is discover- 
able that ihe author means only to say what may be best 
mid in d«f£nse of tbe opinions in which be did not con- 
ear," ' proving that some of the arguments were so half- 

'" TliuHiEb cairied <m in concert, ihc wtitcniren not mui unity tctponu- 
lila (umtitlw hlem af toch olh«r : there Ixine wldom limo lor even ■ 
psiiMl III tin pieces tiy *iij bul the Htilec. (icfoie ihcy were wjnled at 
Tkr )ircu, utitl Hiiiiciinia \uuA\y lay tba wriur liiiiiwit." — AtitdittH u 
Jt/truM, Augtitt la, ifSSs 




XXVIII 



WTftODVCTlOlf. 



hearted that the author's true thoughts stood revealed. 
As essays intended to combat the letters of " Cato " and 
"Brutat," frequent digressions and repetitions were made 
to disprove such postulates of those publications a» were 
found to influence the people. Written especially to 
influence the voters of the slxte of New York, its refer- 
ences to lociti circumstances, ami especially to the state 
constitution, were constant. Furthermore, the nork was 
'written with tlie utmost haste by three men, with lew 
opportunities to consult, leading to frequent duplicaiion, 
and to some inconsiKiencies. *' The haste," wrote one of 
its authors, " with which many of the papers were penned 
in order to get through the subject while the Constitu- 
tion was before the public, and to comply with the 
arrangement by which the printer was to keep his paper 
open for four numbers every week, was such that the 
performance must have borne a very (liferent aspect 
without the aid of historical and other notes which had 
been used in the Convention, and without the familiarity 
with the whole subject produced by the discnisiuns 
there. It frequently happened that, while the printer 
was putting into types parts of a number, the following 
parts were under the pen and to be furnished iu time for 
the press."" "The particular circumstances," wrote 
Hamilton, in the preface of the first collected edition of 
Tlu FtJeraliil, " under which these papers have been 
written have rendered it impracticable to avoid viola- 
tiuns of method and repetitions of ideas which cannot bat 
displease a critical reader." 

Yet despite these adverse conditions, the Writers of 
Tkt Fedtraiisi produced a work which from the moment 
of publication lias been acknowledged to be at once the 
ablest commentary on the federal constitution and one of 
the most solid and brilliant works un government ever 
written. " It would be dilliciilt," wrote a critic ' in 1788, 
"to find a treatise which, in so small a compass, con- 
tains so much valuable political information, or in witich 



' Mailitnn, In pil'«i ■ntttli-tl ' 
* h'ttib WclMct in AndrifiK 



irdi, 178a. 




t.vritoDucrjotf. 

the trae principles of republican government are tinfolilcd 
with sHch precision.*" This was ecUoed in 1S30 by one 
of uur ablest jurisls,' urhu declared "There is no work on 
the subject of the constitution, and on republican and 
federal gorernment generally, that deserves to be more 
thoroufchtjr Studied. . . I icnoir not indeed of any 
work on the principles of free f^ovcrnmcnt that is to be 
compared, 10 instruclion, ami tntritisic value, to tliis 
»n»all and unpretending volume of The FeJrratiif, not 
rren if we resort to Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavcl, 
Uimtesquieu, Milton, I.ocke, or Hurke. It is equally 
•dmirable in the depth of iu wisdom, the comprehensive- 
nest uf its views, the sagacity of its rcUcctions, and the 
Icirlessness, patriotism), candor, «implicity, and elegance 
with which its truths arc uttered and recommended." 
Mure ret:ent)y the historian of the Supreme Court, after 
tUting that Tfie Ft-ieralitl " has h<?en iteriously and 
itferently called the Bible of Republicanism," added 
"that for comprehensiveness of design, strength, clear- 
ncK, and simplicity, the book h,is no piirallel among the 
■niin;i;i of men, not even excepting or overlooking those 
ut Montesquieu and Aristotle." * 

A« certain defects in Tht FtJtralia resulted from its 
hriuff written by three men, so this circumstance in time 
l>nidur.cd a controversy as to the exact share two of its 
auburs bad borne in the undertaking. The question 
been needlessly complicated by the use of much 

terial which had really no bearing on it, or which was 

valueless as evidence. Diso.irding all this, the dispute is 
rptaced to the problem: did Hamilton, or Madison, 
vrite Nos. 49 to 58 and Nos. 63 and 63? 

That cither ntao should actually b<;)icvc that he wrote 

^Jttfmnn pro*Kiunc«i) ti " ibF t>oi cammeoUry nn Ihc priacijiln of 
W0IM wtiich IlU em liei^n wrilten." — Litltr A> Madmn. iVVivw- 
%. 1788- 
I'J"'*" Kent kn "Co)nineiilaiia~i, a4i- Suwy. too. »peikt ol II ■» 
M iaomipataUlt cinnniciit*ry." 
'Canon'* " HhIwj of the Su['rcnie Cmtri." 



xxt 




IMTRODUCTION. 



twelve essajrs which he did not mny at first sight i*. 
impossible, but a recurrence to the circumstances at the 
time they were written proves that it was possible for both 
bone»liy to err. The essiiys were penned by men who had 
been reading the same books and listening: to the same 
debates. Necessarily, therefore, their minds for the 
moment were saturated with the ume material. The air 
was tilled with certain principles and facts, which were 
UM:d by both men, as well as by many others, and for 
this reason, any attempt to argue the question from mere 
similarity of thought, as is done in the special picas of 
John C. Hamilton in bis edition of The t'eiieralisl in 
behalf of his father, and of Professor £. G. Bourne in the 
AmtrUaH Hisloruai Review for March, 1897. in behalf 
of Madison, are, so far as they argue from mere resem 
blance of idea, valueless as real evidence. From the 
letters of "Brutus," the great opponent of " Publius," 
could be selected a scries of extracts that would go far to 
prove (hat he was the writer of the disputed e^sayt of 
The FederaiiU. Undoubtedly, too, there was some con- 
sultation between the wrif rs uf " Publius '* with inevitable 
mutual coloring, and the letters were written with such 
haste that no one essay could especially impress itself on 
the mind of the writer, llul an even grcalcr cause than 
this matter of "stock " phrases and exchange of ideas. 
for the confusion and resulting contradiction of the 
writers, was the fact that both Hamilton and Madison 
were members of the conventions in their respective 
staicc to discuss the constitution, and in their speeches 
necessarily went over the same points thai tiad beer 
discussed in The Fejeraiitt. Mention has already been 
made of (he fact that flamilton was charged with " retail 
ing" Publius to the New York state convention, and a 
reading of Madison's speeches in that of Virginia shows 
that he, too. m«<lc large drafts on The FtJeraliii. When, 
■^therefore, the moment came tJial its writerx could look 
fpver the collected edition, it is not strange that mnch 
pf it read so familiarly to rarh that he honestly thought 
[jimself the writer. Granting the possibility, therefore, 




WTRODUCTIOif. 

tliAt txith men could be misled, the question becomes 
nuL what each author thought, but purely what other 
evidence than their opinions goes to prove. 

Before tlismi&iiing this question of memory, one fact 
of value cannot be omitted. Madison set out for Virginia 
three days after the last essay in dispute was published, 
«as quickly engaged in the heat of party strife tend- 
ing to obscure his memory on the question of author- 
ship, and making it improbable that he could give the 
volumes of The FtdtraSist, when they presently appeared, 
any careful examination for some time. Strange though 
it may appear, Madison apparently possessed no copy of 
the first edition, having presumjitivcly given away all 
those sent him by Hamilton. On the contrary, while 
Uadison was engaged in occupations likely to make him 
forget or confuse the part he had borne tn the under- 
taking, Hamilton was revising the newspaper articles 
lad seeing them through the press for the book edition. 
There is not an essay in the collected edition of 1788 in 
vhich he did not make from ten to twenty verbal correc- 
tions, implying careful study of the text, and as this 
revision was done within two months of their appearance 
~ui the newspapers, and before Hamilton had confused 
Hatters by " retailing " Publiiis in the New Vork con- 
vention, it is obviuus that he refreshed his memory in a 
<r^ roost certain to Ax the authorship clearly in his 
■ind. 

These facte being considered, it becomes of importance 
lo find what is the earliest date at which each of the 
Uisputants asserted his claim of authorship. So far as is 
known Madison's was first noted in a copy of the edition 
of Tkt FtJtraliit printed in 1799. or eleven years after 
the appearance of the essays. Hamilton's earliest state- 
neat was made to Chancellor Kent, and as he is spoken 
(4 in the memoranda as "General Hamttton " it must 
have been made while he held that rank, or in the years 
rj^Sor 1799. Thus botli assertions practically rest on 
eqoal ground, so far as time is concerned. 

but one piece of evidence deserves mention, because It 



kxxii 



tNTRODUCTlOfr. 



seemed at one time to threaten that Ma<]ison's claim was 
to be lost by default. Humilton's litit w.is ptiblisticii in 
a widely read periodical in i8o;, and the edition of The 
FrderaiUf printed in iSio' gave further currency and 
authority to Hamilton's view by ascribing the numbert 
according to one of his statements. Vet not one word 
of denial was publicly made by Madison, or by any of 
his friends for him, until 1817. It has been urged in 
expkination that Madison's official positions prevented 
his entering into a controversy, but an adequate reply is 
furnished by the fact tlut throuf;h his friends t)ie Secre- 
tary of State and President conducted several newspaper 
controversies in these very years. 

Another point worth L-onsidering is the fact (hut Ham- 
ilton held by far the readier pen, and as the originator 
of Uie series undoubtedly intended to take the laboring 
oar. Madison was the last one of the three to join in tlie 
undertaking, and in the first thirty-six e.tsays he wrote 
but two cnitrcly by himself, the remaining three in which 
he bore a part having been begun as well by ftamtlton. 
With this in mind let us consider the circumstances that 
mark a peculiarity in Madison's chief share in the work. 
At No. 37 Hamilton for the time being cea^ted all work, 
and Madison took up the task and wrote twelve consecu- 
tive essays, immediately following which come the twelve 
in dispute. The question naturally arises why Hamilton 
should suddenly transfer to Madison the continuance of 
the series, throwing upon him all the work, and the reason 
is not far to seek, No. 36 of The FeJtralitt, or the last 
of Hamilton's contributions, was published on January 8. 
On January 15 the New York state supreme court 
began its winter term, and Hamilton as a busy lawyer 
was called upon to attend it.' Furthermore, on January 



'Onr fact o\ ialrmt in iM* •dkion li iW ll c>na Havillop u the 
■ulhut u( No. S4, tliiu khu*ing tint Ibm rnu ■ iUI " ta bi* um 
hiiidiiriiing" ir: Fiiiiencc il ihai tine, whkih [unctinl (lis atnious oior 
be tnailc I >t< IM, 

'T)ui >: .'.'*■ Haiiiilton ta nincli *)cua|Mtloii m lu (otM hin 

to iiiijwnu '11^ »'-''• nil Tki F/ti/mtitl i% proved in ■ leori (ram hitn ii> 
M*ili(on m April, 17S8, when ka tmiM. "U oir raipicioat ut tli* 




XXXIII 



1 1 the New York state lesislatarc assembled, and 
Hamilton, who was a canilidale for membership of Con- 
pvss, wax itiTolvcd in a political cami^atgn akin to the 
mcxlera seoatorial election. These joint occupations 
aecesnrily made such drafts npon his time that he could 
not continue The Feiieraliil, and that there should be no 
break in it Madison assumed the entire task of carrying 
ti on. The term of the court ended on January 25, and 
iw February 3> Hamilton was elected to the Continental 
Cungress. We therefore have the choice of inferring that 
Hamilton at once resumed hits work ' on The Federalia 
or else that he rc&umed it when Madison went south.* 

Turning from these extraneous facts to those which 
can he drawn from the essays themselves, the first point 
deserving consideration relates to a condition implied by 
jornt authorship. A moment's thought will suggest that 
swurk produced in this manner must force upon each 
■filer a little difficulty in maintaining in a nominally con- 
Mcutive worit an appearance of homogeneity. Where an 
euay was to follow one written by the same author 
Kiguence was possible, but when it was to succeed one he 
I>m1 not written or read, the task was not easy. Ncces- 
urily then, one would expect a certain disjointedness of 
nnnectiun, and this is the very thing discovered on ex- 
unintng the points where a new writer assumed the pen. 
Thus No. to, by hfadison, is an essay on faction, yet 
liiough the preceding letter was on the same subject, it 



Madinm begin hit wulli«m 



«llwt b« tiekl b« mutt be too iMiich eacB£t>l to make > rapid progmn 
N«tul fmuim. The Conn o( ChsnMiy >n<] Ibc Ciicuii Court txt. now 
uiUh.*' TuibIiik Io Tkt FtJnaliit vir. lind u lliit ver^ point a 
pa at am 1*0 tnonlttt in ilm pabtkalioii i>\ * nnmbor. 

' Ho. 48 <ra> pabibhcd on Pcbruary a 
imntjau Mardh 4. 

'A *«rT valoible pdece ol cvlilence on Ihti i)YieiUa«i o( *uthonhip ku 
hon Inuitil Iraia "sf^t by tli« niiiikkc* oi llamlJiun'i iwo cdiion in 
■Uwliac ■ papn fiiinlol in btxh editkinv *i > " Brier ul Atl^ment on 
lA* ConctitutioB o( the Unitnl Stata," though the manuKripl ej the 
W<t Ihmc na beiidiog wtuiioct-ei. Stmdj o( 11 xhould hara clearly 
■iMMail Uui it ia a pcelimiaaiy outline o( Tif FfJfralisI from the 
piU Ihal Hamiituo au IniimiptMl ill hi* cc«ipo«iIlaii by hit le|[«] ftnd 
pkUod occitniiimt. anil it wai pmnniably drawn up a* a guide iot 
' HadiKiB in Ua couttnuMiM d the t«ih. St*/*tt. 




-Ob 



tXXtV IffTSODUCTJOlf. 

docs not contiDue the first, but is a distinct essay. 
Fwtlowing this are three essays «n tlic defect* of the 
confederation, by Hamilton, and then comes No. 14, by 
Madison, which is really a continuation of No. 10, and is 
therefore an absolute break in the subject of both the 
letters which precede and follow iL If the authorship of 
these six numbers were not known it would be possible 
to decide, from internal evidence, at what points a dif* 
ferent writer undertook the labor. Nor does the obvious 
difference between a man opening an cs»y which follows 
one by himself or one by another, fail to show itself at 
every change of writer that is known to have occurred. 
By examining the opening phrases of Nos. 10, 14, tS, 
ind 37, in which Madison began his contributions, the 
disconnection with the preceding numbers is obvious, 
and the same is true of Nos. > and 64 in which those by 
Jay began. But most marked of all are ilie opening 
sentences with which Hamilton resumed his part, and as 
I hey arc of value, in the present consideration, they are 
quoted here; 

6. " The iMt three numbers of this work hare been ilcdicated to 
an enuin«raiioii of ilic d^iif-en". . . 

1 1. " The importancr t>f the union in a comtncricil liKhl". . . 

I J. "In tlw course of the preccdmg papers, i have en- 
deavored", . . 

3t. " Having, in the last three nurobers, taken a summary re- 
view" . . , 

Here, then, in three cases, are evident attempts to 
attach new subjects to previous essays so as to imply a 
sequence that was absent in the subjects and treatment. 
With this as a clew, if we nin through the letters from 
Nos. 37 to <S3 (after which there is no dispute^, but two 
natural breaks are to be found — at Nos, 47 and %%, which 
sererally begin : 

47. " Having reviewed ilie general form of the prapotcd 

govHTimeni" . . . 
(3. " From the more genera) inquiries pursued bi the preceding 

four last papers "... 




INTRODUCTION. 



xxnv 



I( the analogy of the previous openings is allowed as 
evidence, it is at one of those two points, then, that we 
4honld conclude tlut a new writer Itad begun. 

With these facts to work upon, an examination of the 
five essays, Nos. 47 to 51, shows them to be .1 discussion 
of the apportionment of the powers of government 
among the three departments. The general extent of 
these powers had been already discussed in the immedi- 
ately preceding nnmbers, and a more minute survey of 
their relation to the three departments is the subject of 
the remaining essays almost to the end. They can, 
tiiercforc, be considered as t>eIonging to cither. From 
Mddisnn himself, however, we get a clew, for in No. 41 
he distinctly assigns them to the second series.' But 
whether this is accepted as proof, an examination of tlie 
fire forces the inference that they were all written by one 
■nan. 

The authorship of Nos. 37 to 4S is given to Madison 
by every known list, so it is difficult to avoid con- 
cluding that the apparent break between Nos. 46 and 
47 * merely represent the beginning of a new subject by 
the same pen, and not a change of writer. Kunhcrmore 
we have the excellent authority of James Kent for the 
(Utcment that " Mr. Hamilton told me that Mr. 
Madison wrote 48 and 49, or from Pa. loi to ti2 of 
Vot ad," No. 50 was almost surely written by the 

' " The connilstion propotcd by Ihc conrenlion may be coniidcrcd 
■ndcr two (rneral polol* ol viov. The Pint tetilet to the iium or 
fnalltf <A jiowsr which W vrali iii the govern iiienl. indiKlliiR llic cc- 
urunU Isipuied oa llie slUei. Tli« Secoiid, to ihe patticuUt itmcliire 
il tfce Korenincal, ind the dultibuttoa of iKis power, ■mnag id >ever«l 
bnacbcL 

'' tjiidcr (lie Tint view of the tubject ■<"• Imporuint '(imilona srlu: t. 
WWllwr «)]r poll tA llic powen InniFrtieil l'> llie Kfiieral (^vrmment 
be OHiCceMary or inpcoperf 3. Whetber (he entite mus of ihem he 
^neetoui to Ihe portion ol juritdit^tioo left in the ieTc^dslat«a?"— 
'One curloui (*et, to wtikb utenlion Ivm never been ctltetl, telhai 
trf\<x. in hi« " No Vinw of lh« Cooxiilution (1813)" dWidca Ihe a»- 
thnohip %\ No. 46. pving No. 47 and all that follmr to Hamilton. Y«< 
tluHeh be wai the friend awl correipowUal (A Madiw>n. and thouEh thii 
boaft vaa a wsll-knowo one lo the lalur, neilhei publicly nor priraiely, 
•» far M it known, dU ktMliwci comet Taylof's eonvlitiioa. 



XXXVl 



IffTSODUCTlOH. 



same lund which p«nncd No. 49f >ncl No, 51 vas cer- 
tainly composed by the writer of No. 50. ]n addition 
these essays discuss the powers from the purely histor. 
ical and theoretical standpoiot, views for which Madison 
had strong predilections. A candid survey of the facts, 
therefore, will, we think, lead every unbiased student to 
a.uign them to one author, and the balance of evidence 
certainly points to James Madison.' 

But (he same internal evidence shows that with No. 51, 
a minute and homogeneous examination of the structure 
of the government is begun, in which the three depart- 
ments arc analysed point by point. That one man wrote 
Nos. 5a to 5&, thai a second contributed Nos. 59 to 61, 
that then the original writer resumed his work in Nos. 
' fi< and 63, and that finally tlie task was again assumed 
by the second writer, and completed by biro, the essays 
themselves give no evidence. With the exception of the 
insertion of one essay (No. 64, on the treaty-making; 
|tuwer of the Senate, which was given to Jay, because of 
his diplomatic experience), it i.s difficult to resist the con. 
viclion that the whole remainder of the letters arc the 
work of one writer and one prone to take the practical 
rattier than the theurelical view of things. 



' Otic rather slnf uUr piece of evUence canlradktoty to ike kbore oon- 
cliuluM it fnrnlUieil t>y the oompanilive length of th« dJIIctciit nun. 
When •ii*Biinin(; in lt»c ncwipipm, ihe i»i|>Tnal l«il o( Tht FrdrralitI 
my Mtentioa wai calloil to the (kI thai Ihe Idien oontribiilfd by 
llkmilloa rarely OTertna • column and a ttatf, u-hile lh«ae bf Madbon 
. ■cldooi Ailed les ibtn three colamni. t iheiefoee c>te(ull)r oliMaMd 
jthe Icagiba of eaeh man'a viirk. (i> find tbat the avenge tcn^tk at the 
HUtf MMty* nM)M>lioaBl>)y «rnllni by llamlllun It iSoa wonb ; of |Im)w 
nrtainly wrillen by Maalbun. jooo wunli. Miduoo wrota In llie un- 
doBblcd nuinbrn (No. iu, 14, 37-4^.} but Iwo cnayi of lev lh«> aioo 
word*, Mtd IlamiitoMbBloace wrote one of jooDiroadi. cxccplinlfcelBti 
fiv«, when aa evident aUeujM wnt made to Golth the uriet up quickly. 
T««tinR N«. 4q to 58 and N<h. 63 and 63, the avmc* IcHfih 1> (omid 
to be 16OU Honlt. No. 47 comlainx s;oo iloidt ; RO. 48, iBoo; No. 
'49. l6ou vranli : No. jo. 1100 words: No. $■. iBooKordi ; No. 51. I7i» 
word*. It H n«e>l!eu to aild. 10 anyone who hai limbed tlie stitinci 
u( the two men, thu the diHerencei between tKo two ilyle* In iIim toy 
mi'Hl it arnit nollwalil*. Maillwn ii wmdy and Memi 10 ba** Utile 
ability to rtjirra «n idea with limily. ilaniiltiNi 1* diitcl ami cuiBpact 
to au eiteot ahkli nude him ■ faiBou& di»(l>niaii ■■ fab day. and few 
men have ercr equated bim 111 bit power of stating « ll>in| Uncty. 



IN TRODUCTION. 



xxxxw 






Examining Nos. 5a to 58 and 62 and 63, in detail, we 
find icvcral small facts which throir light on thc»qucstion 
i?f authorship. In Nos. 53. 56, 57, 58, and 6j, arc cita- 
tions of examples In English history, like references 
beiog numerous in many of Hamilton's essays, but only 
two passing references to Great Itritain arc to be found 
in any of those written by Madison.' The same differ- 
cnce is noticeable in the papers prepared by the two 
imtcrs for use in the federal convention — Hamilton's 
"Brief" of his speech, and Madison's "Notes," the 
&rst citing British example frequently, the latter not 
once.' 

In Nos. 53, 54, and 56, are paragraphs discussing taxa- 
tion, and the first and last of these letters also discuss 
(he militia, both of which subjects ifamilton had famil- 
iarized himself with, and which he had made his^ own 
topics in the earlier essays. 

No. 54 is a discussion of slave representation, written 
inminally from the Southern point of vicur, but really 
from the Northern. Not once did M;idi»im allude to this 
famous clause in the Virginia convention, but Haniiltun 
spoke a r^sum^ of this essay in tliat of New Vorlc. The 
cAUse for this is obvious: the"fedcral number" needed 
no defense in Virginia; in New Vork, the contrary was 
true. But an even greater reason (or Hamilton's taking 
up this particular point was the fact that on February 
7, 17M. there had appeared in the New Vork Journal 
a letter entille<l "The Kxprisitor," siivagcly attacking 
the »lavc compromise and charging of Hamilton himscll 
thai "The delegate from tliis state acceded to it alone 
in the part nf this state." and adding, "I cannot help 
thinking it a most daring insult offered to the freemen 
freeholders of this State, besides being an unparal- 

]ed departure from his duties (» this staleas well as to 
the United States." Necessarily this atuck could oot 

> I llMil bc>« Itic r^vini^ ill No. 47. liciABtR trmii wliit liai •liFUir 
iJKvirn \\vn n'-mlHr* cinnot Im poiilitfly aurilwit to Madimo. 
'If iiAry (wlw, |)rep»r«l for um in the Virpni" 

cOBif I eiini|il«, but Inn 'Ktt. kftei TKt FtinaX\i\ 



5 




be disregarded, and the impersonal reply to it io No. 
54 was published exactly one week later, on Febru- 
ary 14. It seems almost conclusive under these cir- 
cumstances that it was written by Hamilton. Another 
opinion in thi» number furthers tJiis probability. The 
writer praises the " federal number," on the grouitd 
that it introduces through the slave a partial reprc- 
senution of properly. This was a favorite idea of 
Hamilton's, for which he had spoken in the federal 
convention, and for which he praised this clause in 
one of bis speeches tu the New York convention. To 
this idea of property reprcsenution Madison was abso- 
lutely opposed. 

In No. 53 the writer is in doubt as to the term of office 
of the colonial assembly of Virginia before the Revolu- 
tion; a fact so notorious in that state that it could not 
have been unknown to Madison. 

In No. 63 the writer praises the British House of 
Lords; something Madison would not have done. Ham- 
ilton, on the contrary, had been most open in his admira- 
tion of the British government, and so admired iliis 
particular branch of it that he had but just modeled the 
Senate in his proposed constitution ns closely upon it as 
he could. This essay, too, devoted a paragraph to the 
Senate of Maryland, which Hamilton had already noticed 
with some attention in his "great "speech in the federal 
convention. 

In Nos. 54 and 57 the mention of local circumstances, 
of New Vork stale, of New York city, and n( Allnny 
county, points to the knowledge of Hamilton rather than 
to that of Mndison. 

Finally and most conclusiTe. in the republication in 
t;&$of the letters in book form, Hamilton inserted in 
the newspaper tcit of No. 56 a paragraph relating to mili- 
tary aifairs, and as he was scrupulous, in correcting the 
numbers not written by himself, his change tu 

merely verbal improvcmrots, thi;^ . > .imiiunis to an 

assertion of authorship within two months of its writing. 
Stripgcly cooxxgii, in the edition of 1818 in which "the 




INTRODUCTtON. 



XXXIX 



Kuinbcrs written by Mr. Madison "were "corrected by 
himself," this in&crtion of iiumilton's w.is retained. 

From ttu; preceding facts, in which, so far as possible, 
ill evidence thai is of valac has been included, without 
legard to whether it told for or against a particular man, 
it appears that Madison probably wrote Nos. 49 to 51, 
and Hamilton N'o». 51 to 5S and Nos. 61, 65, of those 
essays of which we find their teslimuny in direct contra* 
diction. Accordingly they are in this edition assigned 
as above, but since the evidence cannot be termed con- 
clusive, a question mark has been placed before the name 
attached to each disputed number. 

But to whomever the disputed numbers areasugned, 
or whether they arc left in doubt, the value and power 
of Tfu Ftderalist were due to its undertaker, and not to 
his assistants. It Is asserted that Hamilton requested 
the insertion of the sentence in the preface of the edition 
of i8o3 to the cifcct that the contributions of Madison 
»nd /ay were "not unequal in merit to those which arc 
tolely from the pen of General Hamilton." In this 
opinion Hamilton was probably singular, for the few 
essays of Jay. and Madison's dry-bones on long dead 
canfcderacics, and his "theoretic "arguments, would have 
long since been forgotten, but for their inclusion in the 
essays written by Hamilton. No one who has carefully 
fcdd the essays can fail to agree with George Ticknor 
Curtis when he asserted tliat "it was from [HamiltonJ 
that The FeJeralisI derived the weight and the power 
which commanded the careful attention of the country," 
and with the Hon, James llryce, when he wrote: "Of 
these writers Hamilton must be deemed the leading spirit, 
oiH merely because he wrote by far the larger number of 
trttcrs, but because his mind was more independent and 
more commanding than Madison's." 



The FtderalisI has been many times reprinted, and an 
etalinratc catalogue of these editions is given in Ford's 
"Dtbhugrdphy and Reference List of the Ilistory atid 




INTRODUCTION, 

Literature Relating to the Adoption of the Constitution 
of the United States, i;8j-ij88/' Briefly, a collected 
edition of the newi[>apcr articles, a» revised by Hamil- 
ton, was printed in 178S, and a reissue of this was made 
in 1799. In iSoi a new edition with a preface by John 
Wells, who was slightly assititcd by Hamilton, was issued, 
and this text was ag^in priiitcd in iSio and 1817, both 
the latter editions addinj; (he names of the authors from 
"a private memorandum" in Hamilton's ".own hand- 
writing." 

In iSiS an edition, with a preface by Jacob Gideon, 
was printed with Madison's authofity, "the numbers 
written by Mr, MiidiMtn corrected by himself," and with 
the assiKtimcnt ol authorship according to his views. 
Other editions of this text were printed in iSai, i8j6, 
tSjt, 1837, 1843, 1847. 1853, and 1837. In the e«litionof 
1831 a brief and very inadequate index was added. 

In 1863 Mr. Henry B, Dawson reprinted in collected 
form the uriginal newspaper test, to which he added a 
learned, though biased introduction. There have been 
several reprints ol this, but with the suppression of this 
introduction. 

In 1864 Mr. John C. Hamilton edited an elaborate 
edition of Hamilton's revised text of 1788, with an intro- 
diKtion written from a Hamillonian point of view; of 
Uiis edition there have been several rci.i9.ues. 

In i8$6 Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge reprinted the text of 
Dawson, with one or two slight modifications, and with 
an introduction rather favorable to Hauiiltou. Ue also 
Included the index printed in the edition of 1831. 

The present edition is designed primarily (or the use 
of students, though it is hoped that certain new and 
improved features will make it the most serviceable 
as well for the lawyer and jartst. Fur the first time 
Hamilton's prcUtninary outline of The FeJeralixt is 
included, and from the earliest e^lition his table of COD> 
tents and his introduction, omitted in recent editions, 
have been added. In addition a new table of contents 
lias been prepared, giving fuller treatment, and this has 




i 



rNTR0i>VCTlOX. 

Been repented iit tht beginning of rach essay to facilitate 
quick reference. The date of publication of each nuni' 
ber, with the name of the newspaper in which it appeared, 
his been for the first time obtained ;ind prefixed to each 
essay. Where, in the edition of 1788 the number was 
cfaanjced from the newspaper text, the latter is added, in 
brackets, that the endless confusion hitherto arising from 
tbis contradiction may be henceforth avoided or under* 
iwod. All text of Tht FfJeralht which relates to lh« 
pu-ety temporary issues of 17S8, and much of the histori- 
cal part, both of which are now of sliKhi value, have been 
printed in smaller type. Fur the bcnclit of the student, 
the text bus for the first time b<;<^n annotated, both with 
I view to making obscure allusions plain, and to the 
daddation of the text that intervening history has made 
puuible. 

To the text of Tht Federaiist proper there have been 
added in the Appendix the articles of confederal t ion and 
the constitution, and to the latter arc appended references 
In the di-cisions of the Supreme Court bearing on each 
tiatise, with three of the most important decisions in an 
abridged form. All important amendments since pro- 
posed have been included in the belief that in them arc 
best expressed the points of friction overthat instrtinient. 
For this same reason are included the opinions of 
Hamilton and Jefferson on a national b^nk, the Virginia 
and Kentucky resolutions of 1798, the South Carolina 
Onlinancc of Nullification and Jackson's Proc lama lion of 
■831, the South Carolina Ordinance of Secession ami 
Declaration of Independence, the constitution of the 
Confederate States, and the act creating the lilcctoral 
Commission. 

Finally, for the first time Tht FederalUt has been 
thoroughly indexed; an addition which leads the editor, 
from personal experience of the previous difficulty of con- 
sultation and use of the work, to believe that no book 
Dtmaal importance has so needed such an improvement. 

Paul Leicester Ford. 



SYLLABUS OF THE FEDERAUST.' 



A. t. A republic, a word used id various senses, has 
been applied to aristocracies and monarchies. 
I. To Rome, under the kings, 
a. To Sparta, though a Senate for life. 

3. To Carthage, though the same. 

4. To United Netherlands, though SUdt- 

holdcr, hereditary nobles. 

5. To Poland, though aristocracy and mon- 
archy. 

6. To Great Britain, thouji^h monarchy, etc. 
A^in, great confusion about words democracy, 

aristocracy, monarchy. 

1. Democracy defined by some, Rousseau, 

etc., a government exercised by the 

collective body of the people. 

a. Delegation of their power has been 

made the criterion of dcmoc- 

racy. 

I TUi pajiCT hai been (vinltd in both edltjoot o( lh« «-rituiB> of II«m- 
MM* " Biicf of Ari^menl an the Coulliutlon o( ihe Unllcd SiMo." 
dynlit. howrvni, iiKlicxict th*l It 11 a (iKlimintty <nill!n<o( Tit Ftitr- 
^ilirt . tran No. 39 to Ihe end. A> ilreaily mrntinncd in the Ininxluction. 
IW htfblBlns ot the lern of ihe New Vurk Saptrme Court o oipelteil 
HMMJion I* cewe letpporarily hi« work on Thi Ftderiihsi\i\%ii No. 16. 
Md bt ||>rabablr drew ibl* up u a guide loi MadiHin. who *t thai 
fttM aicaaiail the ta>ii. ud vho elotoly lotlowed in ilic sui;i.-ni]m{; 
' VMp Ibe leqofxcr hne ovilined. Bf mertlgr trampwinji: Ihe bii pu<- 
ttoMhcmitnl " Powern" iiid '* MiicelUneom Ailvanogei" so that ihey 
pieoade lh*l heatlcd "Renew." we have Ihe amnKeBwlit of Ideu 
utMfdiii The f'tJ/rahii. Th« nylloinn i» eM«>ci»lly MhwWein »leir-^ 
<d Of tiipete ova ike BUthanhip, lor it <t«ym hem lAaio a tin* HanUl- ) 
tn drew between the '■ Pomen" and (be " Review * ol Ihc lhi«« 
dtfarumia, ibe fafltar being; evidciillT tioniodcied bj hin w one *yik 
iwlc whide. A oompariBon of No. 99 wiih "A" and "B" revrJ* 
he* ti/jmn^\j Madimn absorbed the syllnbus tn IhU numhci, aitd oa 
Alt hn been Ihe MMt quoted ol all Ihoae fiQin Madi»on's pen, th«> 
■EWCE of hU idtai panc»e* unch Inlercst. 

aliW 



xiiv 



SYLLABUS OF THE FEDERALIST. 



a. Aristocracy has beca used to designate 
governments, 
a. Where an independent few pot- 

seiiscd sovcrcignt}'. 
h. Where the represents (ivcs of the 
people poftsesscd it. 

3. Monarchy, where sovereignty is in the 

hands of a single man. 
fy*General idea — Independent in his 
situation, in any other sense 
wuutj apply to State of New 
York. 

4. Democracy in my sense, where the whole 

power of the gOTcmment is in the 
people, 
a. Whether exercised by thcmsekes, 

or 
b- By their Representatives, chosen 
hy ihem either mediately or im- 
mediately, and legally account- 
able to them. 

5. Aristocracy, where whole soTereignty is 

pcrmanenily io the liands of a few for 
life or hereditary. 

6. Monanrhy, where the whole soverciuniy 

is in tlic hands of one man for life or 
hereditary. 
T. Mixed gdvernmetit, where tliese three 
principles unite. 
B. I. Conse^ttener, the proposed government a rtprtitntn- 

t. HouM of Representatives directly chosen 

by the people fur two years. 
», Senate indirectly diL^en by them for six 

years. 
j. President indirectly chosen by them for 
four years. 
gy*Thus legislative and eieeuiirc 
representatives of the people. 



SYLLABUS OF THE FEDERALIST. xl» 

4. Judicial power, representatives of the 

people indirectly chosen during good 
behavior. 

5. All officers indirect choice of the people. 

^^"Constitution revocable and alter- 
able by the people. 
I. This representative democracy, as far as is con- 
sistent with its genius, has all the features of 
good government. These features: 

1. An immediate and operative representa- 

tion of the people, which is found in 
the House of Representatives. 

2. Stability and wisdom, which is found in 

the Senate. 

3. A vigorous executive, which is found in 

the President. 

4. An independent judiciary, which is found 

in the Supreme Court, etc. 

II. b. A separation of the essential powers of gov- 

ernment. 
Ascertain the sense of the maxim. 

I. One department must not wholly possess 
the powers of another. 

— Montesquieu. 

— British government 

III. Departments of power must be separated, yet so 

as to check each other. 
I. Legislative. 
3. Legislative executive. 

3. Judicial legislative. 

4. Legislative judicial. 

fejf"All this is done in the proposed 
constitution. 

I, Legislative in the Congress, 
yet checked by negative of 
the Executive. 
>. Executive in the President, 
yet checked by impeach- 
ment of Congress. 



XIW SYLLABUS OF THE FEDERALIST. 

3. Judicial check upon legisla- 

tive, or interpretation of 
laws. 

4. And checked bf legislative 

through impeachment. 
D. I. Can such a government apply to so extensive a 
territory? 
Exaggerated ideas of extent. 
N. 45 42 

S. ^ 31 

14 II 434 



973 764J4 mean 868>^ by 

750 
Great Britain. 
II. Despotic government for a large country to be 
examined. 

REVIEW. 

I. Full House of Representatives chosen every second 

year, etc. 
II. Senate for six years by Legislatures. 
Rotation every two years. 
Probable increase. 

III. Executive. Manner of appointment 
Compensation. 

Negotiation of treaties. 
Nomination of officers. 

IV. Judicial power. Constitution of judges. 
Extent of powers. 

Inferior courts. 
Trial by jury. 
Criminal cases. 

POWERS. 

I. To provide revenue for the commoa defense. 
II. To regulate commerce. 
III. To declare war. 



SYLLABUS OF THE FEDERAUST. 

IV. To raise and support armies. 
V, Admission of new states. 
VI, Disposal of property. 



zlvii 



MISCELLANEOUS ADVANTAGES. 

I. To prohibit importation of slaves after t8o8. 
II. Account to be rendered of expenditure of moneys. 

III. No state shall emit bills of credit [pass no bill of 

at]tainder, tx-pesf facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts, or grant title of nobility. 

IV. Definition of treason. 

V. Guarantee of Republican government. 



MADISON'S ACCOUNT OF "THE FEDERALIST." 

The following memorandum complies with Mr. Pauld. 
ing's request of the i6th instant' 

The papers under the Title of " Federalist " and signa- 
ture of "publius" were written by A. H.,j. M.and J. J. 
in the latter part of the year 1787 — and'the former part 
of the year 1788. The immediate object of them was to 
Tindicate and recommend the new Constitution to the 
State of N. Y. whose ratification of the instrument, was 
doubtful as well as important. The undertaking was 
proposed by A, H, (who had probably consulted with Mr. 
jay and Others) to J. M. who agreed to take a part in it. 
The papers were originally addressed to the people of 
N. Y. under the signature of a "Citizen of N. Y." This 
■as changed for that of " Publius," the first name of 
Valerius Fublicola. A reason for the change was that 
one of the Writers was not a citizen of that State: 
another that the publication had diffused itself among 
most of the other States. The papers were first pub- 
lished at N. Y, in a Newspaper printed by Francis Childs 
at the rate during great part of the time at least of four 
nombers a week; and notwithstanding this eicertion, 
ihey were not compleated till a large proportion of the 
States had decided on the Constitution. They were 
edited as soon as possible in two small vols, the preface 
to the ist vol : drawn up by Mr. H bearing date N. York 
Mar 1788 — In a publication at N. Y. in 1810 entitled 

' Sent hf MadUon lo Paulding with the following letter : 

•' MONTP". July 33 riBiSl 
"D«Si« 

1 tetum 70UT copr of Gideon's Edition o[ the FedeTolist. with the 
WMonndam requested in your note of the l6th. I shall lake a pleas- 
uc io addine any other circumstances which you may wish (o know, and 
Intf be able to commuDicate. • ." — GoiTOK. 

xlia 



1 MADISON'S ACCOUtfT OF THE " FEDBRAUST." 

"the Works of A. H" is comprized an Edition of the 
Feditn in which the names of the writers are erroneously 
prefixed to a number of the papers. These errors are 
corrected in this edition by Jacob Gideon j"" wViO assigns 
to the several authors of the papers their respective 
shares in them. J : M. 

MoNTPEUKK July aS, i8t8 



CONTENTS. 



(i 



HAMILTON. 



INTRODUCTION. 



DliJitjr of tb» Union— loefficienc)- o( confeduratioii— CApftcity 
«f ftaah for Mlf-garemnient— Oppusitioa of state officials to new 
cooiliiuticiD— HuneM differences of opinion— Political into1«r- 
mot — Chorgea and countcr-c ha recti — Fiiblius » suppocier of thi* 
ro^KMcd constitution— Outline of tbu Fedenlitit—NMliana] senti- 
MBBt for Uoion. i 



/ 



NO. 



■d 



THE VALUE OF UXION. 



JAY, 



*y 



Necessity of goveroment— Theory of scpaiato confederacies- 
Geomphical and racial homogeneity oi the United Sutes— 
loMMlenc]? of the articles of cDnfedcralian— The federal conven- 
IIm— Consideration of the conMitutton — The Coogross of 1774 — 
Univenal belief in the necessity of Union— Projoct of »ep«rate 
MBtoderacieo. 7 

SIO-A^ JAY. 

XDVANTAGBS AND NRCESSITV IN RELATION 
TO FOREIGN POWERS, q 

Safety of public opin loo- Public safety a common end— Canses 
•( war— Treaties and comniefci- as eunscs— Kflicieot national \i' 
fMeniment will ■ecwe services of aWest men— A supreme gov. ..V 
•nment necessary in construing treaties— Union a chock on in- ( \, 
; jiliCioe is the states— A nalionnrjcovcminrnt less llltcly to alTord 

CMcaoMs til vrar — Indian wars caus4>d by the &lftlt.-ii— Neigh bor- 
( cwmlries aiid cunsei)ueat border wars — Advuulage of na> 
bceal guvemment in n^pitiating iritfa foreign pun-cis — Greater 
night of the Union likely to secure belter tcnns, . . is 



»0. 



s 



RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN POWERS. 



JAY. 



Hotires of war — Rivalry wilh France and Britain in fisheries 
— CcainietciBl rivalry «rith Europe— China and India Irnde — 
K^lry with F.i:rri[>rAn c^'Innics — Exclnsion from Mississippi and 
St Lawrence — J^^iiituiy of RiiTO|kc — Indncemcnis to war— .A 
iib;^B govnrnmuiil uKcioary fur ttufcty— AdvAUlages of nAtional 
(mennnent^MititiaaDdnaTyuf Greai Briluiii— America divided 
■te independent governments — Atiiiude at foreign govem- 
«M». 17 



lil 



Eff/rOXS TABLE OF COf/TBNrS. 



NO. s. JAY. 

PROJECT OP SSPARATB CONPEDERACI8S IN 

RELATION TO FOREIGN POWERS. 

QuMn Addc'* letter on union of BngtAnd mnA 5kaUand— 
Exampl«uf Ufoat Britain— DlvliiUin of Uh united StjU«»— RmuIU 
of HcMTUtH voufederacicd — Inuvitabl« }enloiis]r— Tb« " Noilliern 
Hive —Similar coofc(lcr*cif*—Kolly o4 mere nUuinccs ^d tre Ki- 
tes — Coruinty of nppcdlft to Europe 91 

NO. 6. KAMILTO>:. 

SEPARATB CONFEDERACIES SURE TO END IN 
DISSENSION BETWEEN STATES, f 

Certainlv of intcft>lat« contMiU — Cauia of lioAiltitjr among 
natioDii—war* pnxliicetl by p«r«xinnl ittllu«ac«— Alleged pacilk 
genin* of republic*— Republics us much addicted to war a« nan- 
archies — Kxnmplca of Sparta. Athens, Rome, Carlhaicc. Venice, 
llollanil. and Britain — As many popular as royal «arti^\V«.Ta 
bvtwtwii Prance nud England— No r«naon to expect cunlialiiy 
betwR'n the Mttles if Keparated— Vicinage constitutes nations 
natural enemies 17 

NO, 7. HAMILTON. 

CAUSES FOR DISSENSIONS BETWEEN STATES 

IP SEPARATED. 

Territorial dispute*— Public territory — Wromini; conlrorcnjr 
— ^Vvrnwat dispate— Compel JtiotH of conin>en.e->|ii»urimlna(lug 
eomnMrcial regulatlona— The New Voik ImpoBla— The natio«i3 
debt— Dilficnl ties of appottiooing de)>t — Laws in violation of 
private contracts— Example of Khodc Island— Domestic and 
totcign altiancc»-^crtsinty of European entanglements, . 3) 

NO. 8. HAMILTON. 

CONSEQUENCES OP HOSTILITIES BETWEEN 

STATES. 

War between the states partleularly disttesaiag— Lack of stand- 
ing armies and fortified pasts— Necessary introductioa of stand- 
jni; armies— Compctilifin tictwccn the states in armatncnis — 
Example of Greek rrpublio — National dancer unduly magnifies 
mllitST)' power at mrii its— Eiample and pecnlLnr 

felicity of (iri-at ll:r v of the ttniled States— 

NeedlcaiiH!%fi of cilcn-.i . . , _..[jblishmrnts, . , 41 



\ 



■^ 



HAMILTON. 
UNION A SAFEOUARD AGAINST DOMES- 
TIC DISTURBANCES, ,- 

Example nf Greek and Italian retmbllcs—Argumpiils against 
repntilican g'lvrniment ani] civil lllieny— Imjinivemenls iii the 
art of goTcmmKoi — Advanlages of exenited territory — Opinion 



EDfTVS'S TABLE OP CO.VTE.VTS. 



Hil 



(oBtMQoleu — Nocctsity for stihdlvUion iinpli«il in Mrmtcs- 

n^vlvw — PmloTaliinlion ao cxixiilienl for th« cxtc union of 

^^reninwnl— ^JnoUtion from Monlcwiuicu — Innccuralo distinc- 

Uon bMweea coitfedvrntion ami consi^idnlion—liRrtnilltiii r>( a, 

cnofiHlvraM republic — Pcdcrol character of prupusvd cuDStitt)- 

Uon — Lyctan coDfcdcracy, . . . ... 4} 

MADISON. 
"THE UNION A CHBCK ON PACTION. 

Tendency of popular jgov«nim«ots to faction— Complnintit of 
iajoctiCG and initamlitjr va xUtc KovcrnmcntK— ricfinltion of foe. 
liiiD — Rcmctly nl faction — Ccrtailnioni of liberty— Causes of 
tadiou iniiatoinmAii — Opposing In tvrvstH — LvEi^Uition by muior- 
'«j akin to i[itL-rcM«<l ja'Jgmenl* — Claaa kKi«atton— Control of 
tactioD— .MmoHty inrasioii of rijthta — A pure democracy unable 
Kb cMltral faction — A remedy in reprcsciitntivc covcrnmcnt — 
DiSantKa between a demncincy and a n-puhlir — .Xilvandigvs o( 
a de1egat«d uti'itutn b-Kty— buburiunly of Urge ov«r StniUI 
RpuMica- tiieater prvportiOB 01 fit charact«ir&— AilruRlofle of 
fieatcr number of electors— Nece^ty of acquaintance nitli local 
tircinnvtancM — Hupiiy comtrination trf national and IixfAl govcrn- 
rnaox^ in tlic I'niipii Sinips— Greater tnrrilory and population 
permitted bj- r«pultH<.aa itian by democratic Kovernnient— Km- 
bem ewcatially local —Ad van tn^c of Uoimi orer Stales to- to 
bcal pirviadiccK and KlienieE of injuKtkcs— The Union a remedy 
tor dUMM* most inctdoat to republics, . . . . M 

NO.fii. HAMILTON. 

trriLITY OF UNION AS REGARDS COMMERCE 
AND A NAVY. Q 

Adreaturons ooflinierclal character of America — Comnivrclal 
faiaaxj oJT Europe — A nalionai cummerciul policy nevcasury (o 
tonaler^^' p""-.pe«n restrictions— niscriminnUon nxainsl Ureiit 
Britai:i linieDt of n federal navy— The trnilc<l States 

liMy ■•■ ■ the arbiter of Kuropo in Amoric* — Dimininn 

lartain lu taukn our commerce a V^Y — Separation -will enable 
oiarilinte nations to preacribe tlie eonditions of our political 
nid«Bcc — National cotnmercial nghtt which iritl be luit by a, 
fisolntjaa of the confederacy— Tne iMheries — A navy n frreut 
■atlMia) "lb; — ■ ^■i'-p of the snitth, middle, and New RnKiaml 
•tUaaLn iv 1 ■ »tratnc'l intercmirse bolwccii the states — 

Datikeliliodi i-iterslate commerce without nnitv— Ascend- 

iiCT tn Ameniau alluir^ — Enrojwiin domination of the vroiW— 
BcBam'a aod Ruynal's theory of degeneracy in America, 64 

NO. It. HAMILTON. 

PTIUTT OF UNION AS REGARDS REVENUE. 

Commerce the ^reat iwurce of national wealth— Commerce 
Mteatial to asr^cullure— Tiucs must be proportioned to the 
fnantity nf money- -Small revenues of Germun empire~P<iwrty 
ntrtate treasuries— Taxation in Great Britain ~Duliei the main 
di^ilraco in Americ*— Unpopularity of excise and direct taxes 



liv 



BDITOKS TABLE OP COKTENTS. 



—Duties bcrt levied In- general government— Stale imposts will 
rc«ult in >.miig];linK — K«vwnu« patrols of France— DBiUcftlihood 
oC smtiggliuK uoiler luitional s"VvrumcDt— LJi<iadvAiitafi« ot 
Britain as rcunnjit smuggling — State imposts'— PreiK'b ana Eng* 
Usb dutic* — Revenue from nnScnt «.piritii — National existence 
impoMible wiihowt rawn tie— Necessity ira impMU*— Uopopu- 
Utritj of oxcU«6 «nd direct taution— Without an imjxwt, t«u)S 
will chiefly fall on land ^t 

NO. ij. HAMILTON. 

ADVANTAGES OF UNION PROM THE STAND- 

POINT OF ECONOMY. 

Smaller expense of civil list— Civil lists of separate confed- 
eracies — l^xaniplo of Great Britain — ProtMble lliius of dIvUiuD 
of proponed oonfoderacies— A nonliem anil a, Mnitbem It 
— Potitioa of PennsylviiniB- Greater economy of one 
eracy 



NO n , MADISON. 

OKJRCTIONS TO THE EXTENT OF TERRITORY. 

An tmugtoary difficahy—Confnsion of a republic with n dcmoc* 
rocV'-Error nt celebnued aulhor»— SliKht value of example of 
early republics — Early republics only (Icmocracieii — MechaoKal 
power "f reprc!«ntat>i>ii — Nntural limit of a democracy— E»- 
perieiMu In teprcMutatioa uiMler tlie confederacy — Dinietiftiotia 
of tbe United btate*— Size of Enropean countries — Limited jariit- 
diction of general goremment — vnlne of Kuborditiate govern- 
ment* in reiBiion to «ie of tcrrilor)'— Bvcttttuil f(r<iiri)i n( Union 
— Internal improvements facllitAted — I'h* more distant tbe stale 
llie greater the need u( tiaiioaal gm-ernment— Wanting against 
tiiooe wbo favor diiitinion, 8i 



HA>llLTON. 

DEFECTS OF TUB PRESENT CONFEDERATION 
IN ITS DEPENDENCE ON THE STATE A 
GOVERNMENTS, 

The insufficiency of tbe ronfedcraliOD a self-fivtdcnt truth— 
Sketch of exUfiriK Tintiunal homilia lion —Con iradlctory ctiDdnct 

of OppOSetS < -tit.ili.^. — V^.,^^;y ..f fy jfi^ypfumnyl thai 

Htlil trt fff' .lis— A MnmntenI acting on (be stale 

f;oveTnn>entiii':>ri]iTi..r uvi an nntance -Epidemic rage in Etirop« 
at toagnc* — A league vnriiii a confederate govt ni rot m in 
Americn — riitini.ii..., tu-rsi'^^n & guremrr^-"" ^■■'«^" n'' i' ■^'ate 
and oil- ' ' .lis— Common to 

obtain .. . . 'vadv. OriRii: 'O. 

triftignl tciiflcEicy c>i all v«ii: .1 lawb uiil ui>t be 

enforced by itaie gnvcnir>' n id the thirteen 



etatee— ImpoteiKe 
■bOu. 



of tbe (-•■iiijTcM— liMi'ipi" of 



the variio* 
8t 




SD/TV/tS TABIB OF CONTElfTS. 



It 



!«). rt. HAMILTON. 

DEFECT OF THE CONFEDERATION IN ITS 

INABILITY TO COERCE. 

TlM oaly constitutioD&l rvmcdy Against delinquent st«tes Is 
(woe- Impoa&ibility of coercion— ^}-nipalliyb«twi:ea the UJiteti — 
PiQbaUe appeal oi .itiatci to foreign nations — A probable div 
lohitioa of the Union— I.' nil kcli hood ai Ktatcs xupportinK a 
ntiotwl Kiwemmcni — Certain defeneration Into a military 
daqtotiiin— IfflpoMititlity of ocrvinK tli<^ laTS*rst*I^~M"i'''>'>' 
coercion « signiil for civil war— Tbe now govemmeni niufcl 
extend to citizena — State renisuincc of nntioonl law — The dis- 
tiDctioD iKtwcen nnn.compIiAni.iG and active Rsistaitcc — The 
nes constitution puts^tale TC>>islanee in its true light — Employ. 
mtiU of 8Ut* ageiities by lutiooal goveraineot— No form of gov- 
tmaeat safe from revolution t/b 



HAMILTON. 
OF THE ARGUMENT THAT A 



REFUTATION 

GOVERNMENT BASI^D ON INDIVIOUAI.* 
WILL BE TOO I^OWEKFUL. 

Oalikelihood lliat the nn I ional government will ftbsorb the 
reiidiury a\ith«rity— Objvtib of national am bi lion— Local con- 
Rms not alluring '>bj4.-cts of general jurindicti on— Easier for the 
Kates to cncroacb on the natiotinl authoritlci; — Greater populArity 
it (tate givvcmmcnt — Tendency of mankind to neighiinrhooa 
lOtacliment- Lncal juttice tbe moat attractive source of p^ipular 
obedieticei and altachoieot^Tbe national govemmcnl \v»& 
IsunediaLely connected with the people -'Example in feu<lut 
thne* — The straggle between king and baron- Example of 
danahtp in Scotland— Stale governments compared with feudal 
tamnM»— Local govemmonls certain lo posseu tli« confidence of 
the people, loj 

XO- i8. HAMILTON AND M^piSON. 

EXAMPLES OF GREEK CONFEDERACIES. 

-Tbo Acluean 
. log 



Ainidiiclyantc coondl. its power* in histocy- 
"*«««w 



SO. iq. HAMILTON AND MADISON. 

EXAMPLES OF MRDI-F.VAL AND MODF.RN CON- 

FEDERACIES. 

Tlie German empire— Example of Poland— The Swi«s con*' 
tedoacy. . 114 

X(l K. HAMILTON AND MADISON. 

EXAMPLE OF THE UNITED NETHERLANDS. 

Natufe dI government — Hutorical illuntrations- The preMBt 
BWdltMB, . , iiq 




iTi 



ED/rOR-S TABLE OF CONTEXTS. 



KO. SI. HAMILTON. 

SPECIFIC DEFECTS IN THE CONFEDERATION. 

No MnctJoD oj laws— No niutoiil piaraiitve ol sUle Kf>v«ni- 

national {juaiiintce — System of quouw and its unfairnnK— DtRi- 
Gulty in finding a baslii of laxation — COnipaiiMin bciwcen t!ic 
fiUtoft in respFCl to wciillh — Cwinplcx Mxiront of wealth aod 
taxable ability— Inequality of tuxation am* to d«(itroy ubm>o— 
Tli« tuUional ftuvcnuneDt muM raiu! its own t«v«tiau— Ten- 
dency at taxntioD to dixlhlnite iltclf~Taxi>« on nilictcs of 
coDSiimpilon prescribe Iboir own limit— Dim i tic tinn bclw««n 
indirect and dinct laxva— Difficulties involved wiUi dlroct 
tax«» taj 

KO. ». HAMll-TON. 

DEFECT OF THE ARTICLES OF CO.VFKDKRA- 

TION AS TO COMHF.RCE. ARMV. STATE 

EQUALITY. JUDICIARY. AND CON- 

CRESS. 

Want of pnwcT to rcjiiilntc commerce— Commurvial treaties 
Impowtblc— ^cMrAto pmhihitionK of certain states — Iirtlalino 
between the I iiited Stated — Commerce of Gcinuinv— Quotas 
of soldten— Competition and teMiIIa in expciue uud l>ountie»— 
Equal suffraKe of the «tntes a j^at evil— Acid c<>nlradict» a 
ftindatnenlnl maxiin of republicali |;ovcTTiincnt — Minority kov> 
ernmuni— Resulting evils in cuugresi — A cIikIc '>n };ix>d legisla- 
tion as well OS on wid — R«»ult as to (urci^i nfltiuiiii— Republics 
■nbjccl to foreipi corruption— One advantage of muiiuiuhr — 
Example of United Ptovinccn — Crowninx delect nf the confed- 
eration a want of judiciary power— Ncccwuty for a supTcme 
tribune— Tltlrtevo aepaiale courts an imjKJultnlliy—Evllii ol a 
single aaaembly or ooogieia— Tlie con federal ion ratified by the 

PtOt 



statei, not by tnc people, iji 

HAMILTON. 
NECESSITY OF A COVERNMENT AT LEAST 
EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE 
PROP0SF.D. 

Objects to be jwovided for by national Government- Annie 
and nccts — Coailitioti mtdcrprcDent confederation— Vain nrojcct 
of le£i<1ntin|[ upon Ilie atalcfi- Laws must bo extended to 
iodivuliiiU cititimi^TIie «ts«nttal jMilnt In a campnnnd govont- 
menl a diw-Ttminaliuu of pwvet — rleeU and armies froon ibis 
point of view 144 

NO. w. HASrtlLTON. 

POWERS CONFERRED BY NEW CONSTITUTION 

IN RERARD TO NATIONAL FORCES. 

AIleKod wont n( nropcr pmrisMO anient the enatenee nf 
Mandln]; amiios In tima of peaf«— R'^ ■•( ibc loewlatlvo 

auibority lu regaids nultiary cat.i > an nnbcaid of 



EDITORS TABLE OF CONTEXTS. Ivii 

ptlnciplr— Where the on^tltiiliun vr^ltt c>?ntrul— Clauwa in lbs 
Kate conktitnUons in tcgari! lo a stiindin^ ormy — The ftaine 
diBse in tbe Articles of Confcdotntion — l>anKcr« threatening 
AB>»ric«— NeocsKity for Western gnrrisonB—Bniish and Sp.inith 
cdoitlM— Protocttou of nary yArda and arwioaU, . ijo 

HO. «5. HAMILTON. 

NATIONAL FORCES COMl'ARED WITH STATE 

FORCES. 

K«c«S9lly of Rational conli«>) of unny and navy— Siluatioa <A 
tt«tc» aa regards foiciKn cncmieK — Critical position of New 
Yorlc — Slate K^vcmmcnlii itatiinLl rivnlH of the nBtionnl— Like- 
Uipod that the people will support th«ir local fcnvcrnment — f 
Tb* ftateft r«Htrainea from aianuing forces — Want of <leliiiliioi) 
(a proposed Dcgativ« on standin}; armies— Inipossibility of a, 
ww^irncy Iwiwcoa the esctutivc and the leRislalive depart- 
meats— Actual effect of a prohihition on Klanditt); nrmies — 
laadeqaiwy of the militia— Recent experience of i'ennsylvanift 
■nd HaWAdiiiMttA— Experietico of the L««;ed«Mtiouiaii&. 156 

NO. 16. HAMILTON. 

ABSURDITY OK RESTRAINING THE LEGISLA- 
TIVE AUTHORITV AS TO NATIONAL 
DEFENSE. 

Popular revolutions not able to apportion power and priv- 
flq(e— Tlw rasli^aint on leKi^lnlurcs as to defense In the state 
coastitntious— tiencral decision of America opposed to snch re- 
maint — flistory of tbe rvslrictiun on ilandins army in Great 
Bnum- Pmcnt condition in that country— An hereditary 
[ -l standing omiics in America — The .tintc cnnKti- 
tn Peonsylvani.i and North Carolina conMitu- 
tiii;)i - t'<i>.'iiTiMi appropriations under th« new CMiMitniion for 
■my - Abscrdity of tne peediciions of Uie wbversion of the 
Elwity of Amcriui^lnipoesbility of greatly aogmelitinfc the 
trToy-^I)an);rr from the executive — Danger all the greater in ■ 
diwnlted »tatc. lOa 

HO, n. HAMILTON. 

IHPOSSIBtLITV OF A NATIONAL GOVF.RSMENT 

WITHOUT A NATIONAL FORCE. ' 

AtkgMl 4ialncUqAtiML.oL-tlu people to federal nutbority— A 
pttf^S"?.!.:""' io a goyn fiiaieot proportioned to its good- 

Dcs^nr lu : kennoSd tlij^ the genera) government will 

he netlcr a.....::.. ...:ed than thoae of the Mates— Eepecial value 
dfth*! national senate— Greater power of tlie nation in coniroll- 
mg M-djll'in and fnctton — (iovenimcnt should bo felt by citizens 
-Certainty that a unhxi will need to employ force less often 
(ban setiarate confederacies — Tlio cenornl ^vcrnmenl able 10 
" •- iTdiiuiry legal proc«iiM»— Peculiar advantage sDjoyed by 

iiallaws, 104 



Ifiii EDiTOfrs tabls of contents. 

NO. aa. HAMILTON.' 

CONDITIONS WHICH NECESSITATIS A 

NATIONAL FORCE. 

InRurrecUon* a auklAdr inseparable from the bodjr politic— An 
Intuirociiod a duigcr in all Kuvcmmeni — Esperiooce of Mxim- 
cbnaetls KoA Peacisylvsniii— ri'ew York vs. Vermobt— Separnto 
confed«racies *nbjcct to utme condiiiotis tu the Union— A fuU 
anitwer in objection ix that the power is in the handc of the repre' 
soniAttvca of (lie people — CoTt*in eucccM of popular r«st«t«ncc lo 
u&urpatiou — A(1v«iDt«);e of large tetriUwy and ul stalv guvern- 
nwDls — ItnpoBibility of u large sttUKling wnny, , 174 

NO.»9 [J5l. HAMILTON. 

THE POWER OF REGULATING THE MILITIA. 

A naiurkl incident tn common defenie — Uniformity in the 
mltilia beDoAclal — Limilcil powers of national eovernntenl eon- 
cemias stat« force*— Coo t«ntioo CMic«mliig pent eem/taiui— 
Abnuraity of the mititia proving a danger if contruUrd bj 
Kcneral {[OTCin me nt— Certain grievance of frequent mililary 
oxoTcues— AilvanMKe of Kclect corpt— The states certain to imv* 
Ik preponderant infttiencc over the m ill tta— Example of publtca- 
tioni )if:a>n.it the coo adtutian— Exaggerated ■ujoE^^^ionK con- 
ccminj; miEUw: of mi li tin— Conduct of militia in case of at- 
tempteil dcspotbni- The general government alone able to 
uM the luilitia to protect the states. 179 

NO.Rii (»9l. HAMILTON. 

MNERAL POWER OF NATIONAL TAXATION. 

National needs for revenue — Money the vital nci^l in govero- 
meiii— Kvila resiiltiiig from lack of revenue— K mi miile of the 
Turkish Empire — Example in breakilovm of confpdrrntir.n — 
RevemM tuitimited under Articles of Confederation— P. rroiM'i>iit 
prtBciples to that compact — Consequenc*^ of the KyMeiu— A 
rvneay in *l>andrinment of quotas and '■ iis — The wished- 

foe distinction Ixtwwo inicroal and f ■ 1 vp> — Tlie ftmda- 

mental pnropk- of nattoual govemnnruL- i j.t- resoitttcs of a 
nation equal to its necessitieo— Proportion to supply the delitiuti' 
eics in eiteninl taxes by rcqnisiUon— Result of limited laxa- 
lion in times of «-nr— The Rational government should pussen 
an unrestrained power of taxation— The pomr of taxation 
a certain meaiu of borrowing, ...... 187 

NO. ji (30I. HAMILTON. 

UNLIMITED NATIONAL TAXATION NOT A 

ROAD TO DESPOTISM. 

P rlttcl ptes of hif^C applied to the nece««ily of a genenl power 
of taxation — RetopituIaUiiti of llie uecrsailr of unlimited natljidBl 
revenne — View hi the a{>poaeoift ni the ooostitntmn— Ve^-MttT 
nt revenue for local adminiatratiiMa^— Pmbahle u! J) 

taxau>jn by luttioBa) gotvrDBMfll- InprolMWlii: :i 




BDlTOfrS TABLE OF CONTENTS. \\X 

Menl aoverDincDl— Why not in stale gorernm«nte n 
I>itpa«itiOD of tba ctAt« gowrnoivnift to cncroucli on the 

ilitii; cnn piwirv» lh> Mriiiililwiitm 
^ovcrntncDt 193 

)W. J» [ji], HAMFLTON. 

DIFFERENTIATION OP POWERS BETWEEN 

NATIONAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS. 

WITH ESPECIAL RESPECT TO 

TAXATION. 





10. jj [31J. HAMILTON. 

TAXATION CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO 
GENERAL POWERS. 



I 



/ 



ttiot the Slates shmild posiesj iDfJcpcniipnt objects 
—The federal constitution only u pnrliAl union 
— Tfaee cases of alieaatjoti of state <iover«igiity—Exc Insure \«^i- 
fabaa by national i^ovOTnmont — Throe insUnces of such pinvcr— 
Vvmtt it taxation a concurrent rtKht— A ilouble lax a iiuesti»n 
li aqwdiency and am of inability— CoDcurrcnt jurisdiction 
nulls fnm tne division of tbc sowrciK" power, 197 



I 

^1 ItwgeMTsl clauses sources of unD»cxury alarm— Dcfimtton 
^g M pM w r— The svrccpins clatiMS c bailable with tAutolof^. but 
1^ fWectly harmlcni— Rcnuin for their introduction — The national 
tHtTBtuent necciuiarliy itoown jndg« in law midclng— Supposed 
oMcimvuion of state sovereignly— Nature of laws considered 
■ KK«rd to supreme law— A nalional luw not luprcmc when a 
mpuiaa— Tn« pow«r of the states as to revenue. . . soi 

». M iial HAMILTON. 

TUE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION IN TAXA- 
TION OF THE STATES AND NATION. 

Tbc itates will retain nbandant sourceii of rcvonuo — An txam- 
Tfcrf co-ordinate aathoritjr from Roman hwlnrj-— Th« wanu of 
BtitaU will reduce thcmsrlves to very narrow coiupau— Neces- 
■Cf to prorlde for more than existing national exigencies of 
Wi«Ml The nation muxt be in a poiiiion to protect itsolf— The 
MMw ol war rciKH in the human brcAst— Wnr cxfieiiKCti of 
tvMoenmrvd with expensefi of civil list — Especial illustnitiDn 
» tilt Britain— Example of Uevolutionary debt— Amount 
^tM for expense of states— Possible partition of revenue be- 
Mw dales anil nation— Ext citinl and internal taxation — Con- 
niMal liKtUoa the only admiuibtc syslem, ao6 



^WO. H ())]. HAMILTON. 

H AHSWBRS TO OBJECTIONS TO INDEPINITB 
^m POWERS OP TAXATION. 

^BASniitatiion of taxation will retult in undue burdens on portic* 
^pbob^ecta — A restriction to duties would result In thctrinvrvoie 
^^1*M U^jufioaa ncccw— High tlutl«B produce amugghng, undue 




Ik ED/ro/rs table of co.vtbnts. 

r«varinE of raanufacturins; cta«us. and cpprcMion of the mer- 
G bant— Payment ai dutic« lalU ii|kio both mIIct and buyer— Cmi- 
Kideration of tho nuwim that the c^nstimer pays the diilies — Hlt;h 
dntles Mtlain to be attended willi iii«qualily— An eqiudtuitiofi 
only to be ubtaiDed by exciaei — S])eeiaJ intcFtrKl of Xeyr V«rk~- 
Tbe deetM for reventMi likely to limit cxceu in duties— JConxidvr- 
ation of th« objcctioo that the Houkc of R«prc»cntativ«s Is tuO 
amoll — Actnal reprvMotMlon of all classes purely visionary— 
lDt«r«Ua «f mecluinics and maoufMctmers— Of the kutned pn» 
fcaakMia— Of the landed intemtv— Taxation of land— The rci>r»- 
sentative body will be cbtctly c<>mpo«c<l of landhnldcni — Mutiuil 
interest of all datscs — RospoRsivcncMof reprvMnlalivos lopubllc 
opinion— Ex leu&ive InfurmaUon Deeded in tli« bnaineM of tiun- 
tion — The matt productire ayatem oi fioasces ti the least borth- 
raaoDM 3I> 

NO. j6 [Mj. HAMILTON. 

TAXATION CONSIDERED MORE ESPECIALLY 

AS REGARDS INTBRNAL TAXES. 

Taxaiica for ibu benefit of indivtdtiats~-LitIlB affinity between 
varioiudouciof society— A tMTtion ihnt the nation caanotcxct- 
cIm: the power of LaxatloQ with BflvnntAtfc — The uunc power in 
tile slate leg i slut urcs— Usual method of uying lues — Internal 
taxe» divided into direct and indirect— Indirect taxes are duties 
and eadMS on aniicl«)i of eonsumptioti— In layine tbe«e taxes the 
phactpal object should be to avoid objects already taxad by p«r- 
licular states— Tlie objection to direU taxes— Method of laying 
land taxes— The natiim can use the method of each stale — Direct 
taxes must be appottioned by population— The atnue of direct 
taxes Movided against with };uar<tod circiinn^pcetion — Propositwo 
that tne nation shall cutlocl all intoriial Iaxck by requisition — 
IraponsibiUty that the revenae laws of nation and statcft nrlU 
clash— A small land tax suSicMnt for lb« states— Specters raised 
out of this pnwer of internal taxation- Double sets of tax coUee- 
tors— Prr. bat. lu Mnploymcnl of state officials— Unlikelihood of 
<loubIe Uxalion— Poll taxes tlq 



MADISON. 
TIES OP THE CONVENTION IN FRAU- 



wn 17 L^l 
DlPFlCUi; 

ING A CONSTITUTION. 

Difficulty of discusaiBE public measures in the liffiil Ki>iril— 
Predetermined friends and enemies— The Federalist addmssod 
to neither, but to those who wish merely the happiness of the 
counlrj-— Norelty and dillictiltie* of the worii ]»o4nted out — The 
consliiution of n«*»sity not perfect, but the vonvention worked 
without pftTiy fcclin{£, and all were finally satisfied, . at? 

NO. jB [}7l. MADISOS' 

INCOHERENCE OP THE OBJECTIONS TO TUB 
CONSTITUTION, tf 

Alt C' ' 'n and consent tillherfo framed 

by inoi^ : n in the new eyvtein ariM (fom 




EDITOies TABLE OF CO/fTEffTS. 

eipcricncc^Thp preftcnt slIiiAtUm o( Amvrica — ExtKlinR 
v'.U Oiown.Hiid tite (utility of tti« ot>}ectioosaiKlreinodi«S(if tli« 
D(>{)o&iiioii 137 

j9), MADISON. 

CONSTITUTION STRICTLY REPUBLICAN. 

Only a republican KyxUitt posMlilc for America — Tho principles 
U rFpublitiLH K<>v«riimeat ihuwu by examples— Tliu prop<iM:il 
cDQ&iiEulioD coQfurtni to Ui« stuiitluril— I'ruofs at tbi» from ili« 

firovsioiuof the conMi tutUHi— Neither wholly nuiooal nor wboUy 
ederal 34s 

SO. 40 l3<»). MADISON. 

THE RIGHT OF THE COSVEKTION TO FRAME 

SUCH A CONSTITUTION, 

Tbe Mutbonty under which the conveation acted examined— 
Ptopcr ev«n to have cxccc<Icil authority, froRi conMclciatton of 
datf — Consiitiiiifln merely ii'coinmcndcd— Noitcwiily (oraradkal 
Aug*— W bulb er iliv cuaveuiiuu escevdett its puwcrs docs not 
*SmX Ibfl queiitiuii of ratlfiuition 151 ■ 



MADISON. 
BE VESTED 



Wfew OP POWERS SUPPOSED TO 
IN THE UNION. 

Tbe quality of power conferred — Not ffreater than it ihotild be 
— tWnefal objcciinnE oiwideicd — ^Tlic objects nf the powcrii con- 
brt«il~DcciHriiiK w.ir and Kr.iiilltig letters of marouo — Provld- 
IhK umiies and tleci5 — ki.-^H latino iind culling OUt tne militia — 
Levfing taxes and borrowing money 160 

" 4t f40- MADISON. 

POWERS GOVERNING INTERCOURSE WITH 

POREIGX NATIONS AND BETWEEN 

THE STATES. 

Illation of inlcrtonrsewiib foreign nations — AmbaMadior*, 
», and Ireulies—l'niiisJimenl of piracy, felonies on tbe bigb 
. and oSentcK aauinat tlie laws of nations— Regulation of 
(erreignmramerce— Tue Minction of the tlavc trade— Objections 
« ilwt point coniidered — Mainiennncc: of harmony and prop«r 
iat«i«uun« anmng th« ulates — InteiHtaiv cuniinerce and ibo 
ladtaa trade— Coinage of money— Punishment of count erfe iters 
— Staudanl of vrcignlx and measures — Not urnltiAtion— Bonk- 
UwH—Rutc lor pyoving public iLcis—Posiroads and po«t- 
. - *7" 



4S l«al- 



MISCELLANEOUS POWERS. 



MADISON. 



Icdloneowi powers— CopyiigbtK and patents— The federal 
-■Puoishmeni of treason- Aan 



fmission cif ncwstatcK — tiovcm- 




SD/rOK'S TABLE OF COAfTEiVTS. 



m«nt of unjtoriea aad control ol public property — tinitrantjr to 
every ttat« of u republican form of goveramenl— Protection of 
Hate OKwnat inva«on uid i^ataxt domestic vial«iic«--AMUini>> 
tion at p«rin«tit of aatstAiicllnK <Icl>tti— AtneadnMnu t« t&e 
coitstltutfon— Tli« ostabilshmeDt of lhi« Kovemntonl on tbe 
adlwivnoe of nine states— Obj«Ction tlml this is u Tiol&tMMi of 
the ooofedemtioin— Kctationi Detwe«D ratifjring uatcs and tboM 
wbtcb rcfnitc to nuify 380 

NO. 44 U3l- VADISON. 

RESTRICTIVE POWERS ON THE STATES. 

PotbidiUnic tbe eitnbtishment of trcoties and alliances between 
the states — iMUc of letters of marque— Coinuee of moncv — Issue 
of bills of cTcdji— ERiabliKhmcnt of nny lexiu tender other tbnn 
goM and silvot — Hilts of ait-iindcr'-Kx-poBt-facta Iaw-6 — Law* 
inipairiug uon tracts— Till i- 3 of nubilH)— Impoaitioo of duties on 
exports and imports— The power to make lUl laws neccsiary and 
proper to carry the precedinj; powers into execution— Keccssitf 
at Much a power — Prohibition of the cicrciM of any powers not 
WptMaty dekgalcd— Pusitiru eDumeratioD of guurral powers 
- delegated — Negative enumeration by specilk'ation of reserved 
poacTs and by si lenc«— Remedy for an abuse of this K<"i«ntl 

t lower — Tbe supremacy of the const itu I ion. the c<> 11 stitui tonal 
&wa. and treaties— Oatli of state and federal officers to supw^ 
constitution —No port of tbe powers delegated nnneceaswj^^H 
improper 'IP 

NO. 45 l44l- MADISON. 

THE WHOLE MASS OF NATIONAL POWER IN 

RELATION TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS. 

The t)«w constitution not dangeroua to the state sovemtatiiu 
— Tendency in Goufed«raci«s is to weaken ibo central power- 
State governments will have mure iiUluence among the people- 
State governments are essential parts of tbe federal government 
— The officers of the tJniled States are less namoTOUsjhan those 
of the Ktal<M — The reserved powers are relatively greater than 
those delegated — Proposed ctiangv consists less lu giving new 
tluui in strengthening old powers, 303 

NO. 46t4i]. MADISON. 

TUB RELATIVE IS-FLUESCE OF TUB FEDERAL 

AND THE STATE GOVERNMENTS WITH 

THE PEOPLE. 

* 

Federal and state governments only different agents of the 
unne const It lie uts— The first altacfament of the peofde will l>e 
to the stitte Kovemmonis — Popularity will oome to the federal 
government only if it ti better adniinislered— Objectkxi on acure 
of federal militniy power anawered — Concluding remarks an the 
proposition itiat the powers of the Union vrilt tie aangeroiu to the 
■late gmrern men ts , sio 



EDirOKS TABLE OF COffTESTS. 



\%»\ 



SEPAB 



KIADISON. 
SEPARATION OP THE DEPARTMENTS OF 
POWER. f;/ 

Thf tratim that tb«re should be icparAte Mid dittinct depart- 
n; .idcfcd— This maxim true — ThcDcwconntilution docii 

11. II It — Tile views of Mont<tsq»icu— Thv provi&iooft of 

Iha vtuuMin ttlate coast ilutions »a this [Kiint exanined, . 314 

jn ■' tirl MADISON. 

UKANS OP GIVING INDEPENDENCE TO THE 

DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS. 

PniTi-r* rj ntie department, it is coticcdwl, should not be ox- 
' <tiwllier — Our department ^luuld uot have an ov«mil- 

III- I. f ovrr another— Stviirily aaainit the invasion of one 

dq>>niiHiiit by Hnntiief. considcicd— The tendency o( the Icgis- 
UtivE to abKnrbthe othcrdcp.'knmcnis>~Aii itisianceof encroach- 
nwais in Virginia— Exp«>rien<.-e t>t Peonaylvanla, . jjj 

SO. ¥t (4*]- PI MADISON. 

PROBABLE EXCESSIVE INFLUENCE OF THE 

LEtSISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. 

Protpriely t>l a well-defined mode of appeallug to the people — 
A laSicient remedy— Very dangerotu and n»e1esi if too fr«- 
qiicatty applied— Reasons for Iliis— When such appeal* ate 
■uoful— Renuulu on occAxlooal appeals to the people. . 534 

SO. 50 [«]. PI MADISON. 

PERIODICAL CORRECTING OP INFRACTIONS 

OF THE CONSTITUTION. 

Tbe meritx and di^udvantugeii of short and long intervals — 
Kcaniplc of Pennsylvania jjV 

.]. [7] MADISON. 

OD OP BALANCING THE DEPARTMENTS / 
OP GOVERNMENT 

Hades of obtainiiij; niutuid checki and balances — Advan- . 
tases oi the federal Kovcniment In aecoiing the rights of llie "^ 
people — Divinion of the delc^Atcd ]>owcr« — DifTetcal iatcreits 
•moDg tbe people 34* 



1 






[?] HAMILTON. 
HOUSE OF 



"0. w (ii). 

QOALrPICATION ANDeTERM OF 
REPRESENTATIVES. 

Bteclors — Tbe qualifications of tbe members— The tem o( 
ttteo— Hicnnial elections — Vulitc of frequent elections — Terms of 
Mrvfee in other Rovcmnicntii— In EnKlitnd. Ireland, and in the 
American coloniM — Riennrul electioDA not dangcrouo — Reasons 
(w Uiia dntwn boax the uutuie and position of Coajp^ss, . y\i 



- - ' ^ - 



Ixiv 




EDlTOirS TABLE 0^ COHTBNTS. 



NO. 5J (»»1. n HAMILTON. 

TERM OF HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVKS. 

Objection thui when anntial rlwllons riul lyrnnnv beKi&s. 
answ«r«il— Bknniul «l«i:ttotift n«c«Mary «nd uuful— Obj»cti»iia 
to unduly sh<irt (enmi— Biunntnl electkMW umilul adiI wife, . jjj 



NO. S4 [SJl. 
RATIO 



OF REPRESENTATION 
BRANCH. 



PI HAMILTON. 
IN LOWER 



Numbers tli« proper stArtdanl far represent at Ion — Slav* rvpr*- 
nenlulioa— Ubjectiuii lliut sUvt-* do not cnlcr into loc«i rei>rci*D- 
tstion.conciderod— Tbcriglit uf rciitcMQtatiuiiof propcTtvus well 
as n«r«on«— Volc« in ConjjtcM iJioulil Ixt prMionioned to Uie 
wedth of tfa« Males — No indtiueroent for (iiNityIng Ihe consiM. 
u it i« the basis of taxatiun as well as reprtseotatiuD, . 360 

NO. SStMl. I?] HAMILTON. 

Size OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 

ImportftiKO attaclwd to thU siibjctct— Difflcnitjr tA d«tenn[D- 
in^ tliu proper nnraber — Sninll at^tea require aiuolter ration — 
Ltmilctl puwen tA Onsrvos do nui denuiiiil n nuioerau* repre- 
lentBtion— Voriotu objections conudered and anawcrcd— Source* 
of dangwr ctiDsidered jM 

NO. j6 [sij. PJ HAMILTON. 

KECES.SARV KNOWT.RDfJK IN THF. REPRE- 
SENTATIVE CONSlUKKEI) IN RELATION 
TO THE RATIO OP REPRE- 
SENTATION. 

Objection Ilial Congress will be loo small to know the in- 
tcrrsu and wiclies of its constituents, ronsi'l-T-^ -The reprc- 
fioiitStirc mielit to Icimw tl>c iniercstK of ! iiicniH— 
Ob^ts of iedcral l«(p»I«iion~A few n-y ■■-.-us wdl 
bo t>uiricl«Dt— Taxslloa— UtlitU— TtM Mpen«iw« vl GrMt 
Britain, 37s 

NO. .7 Is5J. PI HAMILTON, 

UNLIKELIHOOD THAT THE HOUSE OF REPRE- 
SENTATIVES WILL ELEVATE THE FEW 
ABOVE THE MANY. 



Thta nbjocthxi, in prinriplif. ttrai-s 

clasw w— Sccuri tifr^ ti> 
Provisians ivt eleclin£ rncmifc:*, . 
IhoM <rf KtAta nAcMs— The reUtivi 
ciM BO reasaa ("■ \""'.-"al of stole -.. 



nf rtprcflUt- 
Jcen bam sU 



systno— Tbs dt>' 
Bu< Mutaiasd b]- 
iKoa, tbcsuto. 



*! i!ip root 

1 taken 

r.rs. c mU Mgrate^^- 

I luaiiftcatians, Uko 

•f ibe oonMitiMa- 



:ti«r rMEooAbta iwr' «dniMiU»— I 
• sm^as f iu<& Hwose of Cwciwnuns 





Ei)/7V/fS TABLE OF COKTEffTS. 

NO. 58 [S7l. (?) HAMILTON. 

FUTURE AUGMENTATION OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES. 

The state constitnlions (.■ompared on this point with the oa« 
ptupascil — Tb« practice of the stntc eoi-tmmcnts — Tlicorganii- 
abOD of ConKTME will induce wjiirhfiihM-ss— 'llic large slates will 
OMttrul the «in«ll — Ob)ocIiunB that tlic Senate will pievcQt aug- 
Biititation aiiHwercd — The toiiilituliouul motucc of rcfuriinx 
•milics by the House— Kca-sons against a numerous House — 
Objection to a majoTit)' bcin|[ n quorum, coostdcTcd, . 383 

KG. sq \ii]. HAMILTON. 

THE NATIONAL REGULATION OP ELECTIONS. 

Kreiy govemnietil tiiu»l liare the tntJins of self-preierva- 
lina— IHSereut dcpotiilarics of this power considered— Exact , 
dwracler and o-ctcnt of this power — If this power be not K'vea. ' 
ifce fc'i iiment will be nt Ihc mercy of the Mate govoro- 
tMuls- '. uf wK-preM'ivation in the state tfovurnments 
ttiaipairi"!— uujectioii that tiiepowcruf the staieKiu the election 
<<*etiators i» equal 1 v dunffcrous, contidered— Reason* for tbi« 
iciantw« of power— Objection thnt the interests of ench state will 
taiB utffictoiil Mi-unty aKmnHt the nbuM of the puwcr !•> oonlrul 
the election of membcts by the state govcroments, con- 
inkred, . 391 

SO. 6u (wl- HAMILTON. 

NECESSITY OF SUCH NATIONAL CONTROL. 

Otjedion that t>\- this ]>owcr CongreM may pmntote the ctec-^' 
tiMiMa (avorile cLissand exclude others, confddervd— Reason 
Ivdisminiiig this objectMn, enumeruted J97 

KO. 61 ttoj. HAMILTON. 

ADVANTAGE OP THE POWER IN SECURING 

UNIFORMITY IN ELECTIONS. 

Obioclion that there stiotdd be a provision that all elections 
Amu be held within the counties where the electors live — 
Socb a provtsiwii harmle** And oAerK no security— This nrnvtsion 
ctaDpared with tliow of State coDHtituIionft— The probnbllity that 
lh> power of ConKTvsit to 5x u uuifonn day f»T i-lucllons will be 
»ny important- The want of an^- pmviiioai in the constiluiion 
htnKmcIi a day, coiuidcicd — Concluding renuicks on the general 
•o^ect, 404 

BO. to. m HAMILTON. 

THE CONSTITUTION OP THE SENATE. 

QoalificatiaiM of Maalor»— Appointment of (enatorii bv &ta(e 
hftilitares— Equality of reprcieotatioii in Senate — Mixeif char- 
Kitt u( (adaTat eo^-cmnieni requires a mixed representatuMi— 




Ixvi EDITOSS TABLE OF CO/fTEKTS. 



R^nal r«pr«sen(atloii in Senate a rccognUlon of conifol^t^ In 
tlic states— 'ni« number ot MHuion and the term (or whicb tliejr 
are elected— Need of Kuch an up|ier botue an a setuTily agaiiut 
improper 1cgii>Uiion»Af;ain!it uic inlirmtty o( faction— Agmtut 
JKnoraot logJHlation— Against mniability in its cnuneilK frwn 
livqueDt cbaagM of member*— Dangers of socb mntnbUlty, 
enuraerated 40S 

NO. 6J. PI HAMILTON. 

TERM OF APPOINTMENT OP THE SENATE. 

Prevents a wttnt of a duo senw oi national character, and of a 
due responjiitiiiity— A di-fense aealnst lemixn'ary eiron and 
delaiKMis— Ilisiur)- sbovr* no long-lived repubRv wiihout a S«fi«ie 
—DiffiTunco between the aDcitnt republic* nnd the United Statru 
— Atlient, Cnrttuige. Spartit. Kocnc. l>ctc — Objection that the 
Senate will ncqulrv a d« nacrous nro-emlneiKe, consiiiiivd — Such 
a reMiil I ni possible— Senate ot Maty\aiuX — Britl^i f'ailUmeui — 
SiMrtu. RiHDv. Curtilage— Tbe controUiog infinunce o4 lb« Houmi 
of RcptcsentutivcK 41b 

NO. 64. JAY. 

TREATVMAKINO POWER OP SENATE. 

Tbe treaty-mailing ]xiin:er~linpOTiaiice of this p(»rer—PTOj>ert)r 
mted in lae Scnntc— A pi>pu]nr body not lit For thi* paver — 
Rea)>on»'>ObtcctionH to Ihu> power in tlic Senate conaideTed. and 
rea»na for tJieir rejectloB, oQaiBorntcd- The roaponsibltily ol 
aeaalora. 416 

NO. 65. HAMILTON. 

IMPEACHMENT POWER OP SENATE. 

The nppointmonl of public oAKcrs — Tbe authority to sit ax a 
court in the trial of im|>rachmcnt«— Difflwilty of forming such a 
court— TItu Minaie miru lit for such a tniiit- The plan otdelega- 
tinK this oulboiity lu the supreme ctrart. considered and rejected 
—The pri>pricty (if unitioK the Mipn:mc court in this power with 
the SetinSe. corinidercd ftiw denied— The propriety ot giving thi« 
niilhi<rity ('■ oilier por»<)n« diEcnnnccted with anv dcpArlmcnt of 
the gi'vi-nimcnl. cdnsiilcrcd and lUjnsi-d— Even if Ihis power in 
Itie Senate ii not desirable tlie cunstii-.ition sIiuuliL not be 
rejected 433 

NO. 66. HAMILTON. 

OBJECTION TO IMPEACHMENT POWER OF 

SENATE BECAUSE A JUDICIAL POWER. 

Objection that it unites lefcistntlve and Judicial functions — 
This same pravisiun in contibluliiin of New Veirk — That it tin- 
ilaljr occumuUtri w..-^-i-t'i-\ ihc Senate, and tends totlie cxtahliab- 
ment of an aris; i.e nenale will judge too leniently 
olBcets f or wbobc 11 bac voted— Thai the tenatorv 
may be called iipcu lu U) tbemaelvvs fotr a corrupt use ut tbe 
tinty>nu)cing power 4 



ED/rO/rS TABLE OF COUrSAfTS. Ixvu 

KO. 67. HAMILTON. 

THE EXECUTIVK DRPARTMRNT, 

DiScoUies in coitstitntiun — l^xsRgerulion u[ povnn — Miarep- 
naenUtton conccmiDg vocAncim in Senate bf Catn. . . 447 

SO, 68. HAMILTON. 

METHOD OP APPOINTING THE PRESIDENT. 

Tlie ooly pari nf tlio c-inxtilution not comlemnod by it* oppo- 
Wilts — It IS well guarded— Devi tabic to-havc tile sctiae of the 
praptc in Ibo choice— Desirable that the choice should be mmie 
uy competent pcnHinK. tui in the lilectoral CollcKC ; to avoid 
tiannlt and diEurtlcr: lo uvutd intrigue and corruptioo: lu main- 
loin the Presidi^ut iiidi.-|>vuilcnt of all but the people — Alt thcM 
mitaaiaaci here combined— Choice will leldom fall on one dot 
qulUlM — Ttic chotcc of a Vice Pmident by the people. coDud- 
•rtd Mid spjiroved, 45) 

ttO. 69 HAMILTON. 

COMPARISON OF PRESIDENT WITH OTHER 

EXECUTIVES AS TO POWERS. 

A single penon— Cotiipiared vritii th« kins of Ur ual Britain and 
the governor of Nfw York— Elected for Smr yti^n. and i» re- 
tlipblc — Purlbrr coitipanii'm wilh the same executives — Liable 
bi tmiWAchnienl. removal from ollicc. and panishRieat by civil 
la«— Camparird ufiitiii as above, aod also with governors of 
Uaqrland and Di-bwarv— Veto power-' Compared again aa 
above and al»u with tiie tfovcmorof Massachuielts— Commander- 
B-tfalcf of the army- an<r navj- of the United States— Compared 
tgain as abov«. and also wttli the K'^veniors o( New Hamp- 
<ktt« and UaMacIiD-Hjiis— Pardoning ptJ^ver— Compared asabora 
— Tnaty-raaking p'tvrer — Compared as above— General iwiriow 
tad comparison of t-K«cntivc jKiwcrs, ..... 457 

XO. JO, HAMILTON. 

ADVANTAGE OF SINGLE EXECUTIVE. 

A yigo»oii» esecutfvc coii&ititent witli republican government— 
fflurt cBCstitnto* a proper cxeculivc — irnity— Reasons for (hi* — 
Vettnif; cxecuuve authority in two or more magistrates— Re- 
XrataliiK tlin executive by a council — Ob;MUons to plurality and 
(MtDvl Djr council cnumcraled 4fi6 

XO 71. HAMU.TON. 

PRESIDENTIAL TERM OF OFFICE. 

It ofTerts hit firmness in action — More interest in what b 
Hnna- - cxccutii,-e should not be siilj«OTTl«nt to popular 

■npni. I lie of the legmlalrre— lndcp«adei>c«o( dopan- 

*Wi "! n'.n-'.iiiment neceMiiry—ShortncM of term wMI lenaeii 
i*d«peiid«ave — Tbe proposed terra of four jreara considered. ^^% 




Uviil EDirOKS TABLE OF CO.VTEMTS. 

NO, 71. IIAUtLTOf 

RE-ELIGIBILITY OP THE PRRSIUBNT. 

Diiralion In oIIIcq affecU stability of lul ministration— Head* al 
dopiMrtrnvBt depeD<tont oo ox*cuttv« and will cbaag* wttti tilnt — 
Ke-«Ufnbility til oxecntiv*— I'ho oppiMitiou lu it CMialdcred— A 
limit of « *ingl« Icrrn would dimiaish induce mcntii to gvod be- 
havior, iiKMttSB tcmplaliiiiis to miu^ondncl, jirevcnt experience 
in titc office, deprive tlic cixiiilry in i;mcr](ciicic> t>f the ncrviccs 
<rf iho b«at m«n. snd acX «> a cvnstiiiillonal borric'r to Mabilily 
of aUmiaistration— The !iuj>poai.il advAciiugt-H uf a Hiugluierm, 
cuiuidcrcil~Tbc pcopk- ihould not be pievcntod from chooctinK 
mon of experience 4S1 

NO. 73. UAUILTON. 

PRESIDENTIAL SALARV AND VETO. 

Without suitable prorision the i-st-coiive will be at th« metvy 
of the le){iKl>tiirG, ami the iiidi-piMi<ii-ncv iif the executive iboiild 
not bo impoirud — The veto pi<wcr— Ki-awwi* for and ta 
eniina«taU'<l and cuntuder*)! — The roto power im>1 absolul<>— It 
ulrend)- exiaX^ iu New York and Musacbuwlls, . 4S8 

NO. 74. IIAUILTON. 

PRESIDRNTIAL COMMAND OP NATIONAL 
FURCKS AND POWER OF PARDON. 

Command over army and navy and milrtia— Power lo conanlt 
executive ofliciids— Need of the paidonina pnwcr Sp e cial oon- 
nideralioD of the pardoning pon-cr a-^ rceardx trea-ion— Adv*ii> 
Uec of prompt UKe of pArtfoD— lnci<lcni of Ma«i«ac:husett« — Lew 
of lime if paraoniDg power were vested In leji^i&lature, . 496 

NO. 7i. HAMILTON. 

PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN TREATIES. 

One of the best feature* of the constitution— Object i op thU 
II combiner Ibo excctitlve and legli-lallve dci>artnieni« cvaaid- 
ered— It is a prop*.T combination— ReasuiiH Uit ili>» — Houite of 
Reprwsentativm cannot properly be admitted— Objectton to re- 
quiring only two'tbirds of Kenatorx present. . . 499 

NO. Tb. HAMILTON. 

PRESIDENTIAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT. 

Ad excellent feature— This power ■■--."—,•-•' l-p cxerciced by th* 
people at Istkc — II irlll cauM a Ir .c ol duty in th« 

cxocuiive— <)b>ectloa to lt» beliiK : '•> the PreatdcDt 

ulunv — Ifp may be urinnilcd t>y tienuie- ".v u( Senate 

a cliock vo favDiitimi— Ubjrdion lliat i' - til may Ihua 

control Senate, i.'onudcted— Whole bodyol ^'('llaU- ijuiiwt be cor- 
rupted— I'lotcctioa of vuiulilutiuu. ..... tos 




BDrrOlf'S TABLE OF CONTKNTS. 



ixix 



no. 77. HAMILTON. 

APPOlNTMIiNT TO OFFICE AND REMAINING 

, POWERS OF PRESIDENT. 

I 

«Th« concMTTOiKC ni the Senate necessary to dJSpUcn as wfll 
ItD app>>int — Objecttoos M to undue control of tliv Scnati- hv 
t President, or iImj rw«ne. considerwl— C<iniputi.-d wiili sys- 
■ «{ appaitilnicnt ia New York— A ppuin ting power iJiualil be 
MrtCAlctl to a council nr shored in "V the Ilouxe — Po«r«r to 
■KiDniti4:at« information to ConKrvnii — To recommend ntcamrvs 
la CoogTCM — Tu eoovuiir nnv »n- both branclws (i( Congress^ 
T* adfoam CungrvKi — To nr<.-i.-ivi.> jtinbaMUiilors and other public 
niatecTs — To ciecutc the laws o( Ihc Union— To commiwion all 
44lc*n ot lh« United States — Concluding remarks on the 
aacotivc, S>i 

^O tH _ HAMILTON. 

TENURE OP OFFICE OP JUDICIAL DEPART- 
MENT. 

Uodv of appolntmcat— Tenure— Need of complete independ- 
■iK<i— AutIio«ity 10 ptonoiincv un tbe conatltiitioniillijr cu tbo 
kwi — The legislature itiould be the judge of it* own puw«rs — 
liitsrpretatioa trf the laws the pecaliar province of the jiidicinry — 
Need of indepeiidciKv on thi« ;tccoiinl— Inilcpcndcncv required 
(dc jodtciary kk euaidiuut of tliv coniililution and of privalu 
tigfats as w«U— WtMlaon oi icqntring good behuviur a>i tlie 
ttaiir* Sf7 

HAMILTON. 
SUPPORT AND RESPONSIBILITY OP THE 
JUDICIARY. 

A fixed provision for the support of the Judiciary iieocisarv to 
Ukif iftrtcpondence— Respoimbility of tnc juditiarj-— Juuge* 
lislitc to impeachment — Cannot be made removable for inability 
— Rtaions for Ihift— Comparison willi confttitutton of New 
I'o'k S»7 

NO. to. HAMILTON. 

EXTENT OF THE POWERS OF THE JUDICIAL 

DEPARTMENT, 

Tu triutl COMK the judicial autborilv ouj^ht to extend— Tc> oJI 
tiwa which ariM frnm duly eiuiclvd laws of the Union: which 
MOtem the execution uf tbe proviiuuiisof tile conxlilutiou; in 
wUcb the United State* itaporty; which involve the peace of the 
Uniaa in fortttgn relatioDR, or when two states, or a slate and the 
(itlmuaf anctbvrstate. or tbc citixenonf different state«. are 
iwrties: which origlnAlc on hlgli soasor ar« f>i Admiralty juriMlic- 
tian: in which state tribunals canjioi be suppou>d to be impH- 
Cattd^To whnt caics authority of ittdiciary will extend under 
inpasnl constitution — Statement ol constitationol prov-lsions — 
IWH piovtfltoiin conform 1*. what Ihc powere of the judiciary 
«4(lit to b»^t>roprlcty of dalvg:ating vquily jurHdiclioD. . jjo 



Iix 



EDITORS TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



NO. Si. HAMILTON. 

DISTRIBUTION OF THE AUTRORITV OF THE 

JUDICIARY. 

Propriety «f estnbUshinic one coart of fltiAl and luprente }it- 
rUdtCtioo— Propricly n((lcIrg»linK}udt<;i4Uj)ulbority ta ndiMind 
d«paTtiiienl~ObJc^-tiurt>> lr> ilii» c'utiudetml — Tl)i» dcleijaUon nf 
aaUiority scvuros more completely the acpuratiini o( the judkiMY 
from tbe legislature, recojtiiixcs nwirc fullr Ihc principle of good 
behavior lu n tenure, mcutvg scrontcr IckqI nbtlity, and removes 
the judiciary (rum |i«ity Mrife— The oxtLmplc oi <«riain of tli« 
btatvti— Thul »o k-^Nlature vuii rvL-tUy^iHVidal nitsiakuK «xccpt 
lu to futiiic at-lion. and the dmiger irf eticronchnninU by the 
judiciary nn the IcKiiilatUTe, connidcrcd— I'r«ipriely(]<i.onsIi(u(tttg 
inferior courts — Kcljcf to miprcinc c->urt — .State count not fit for 
thift— Advaotagp of dividing Umlcd Slater into judicial districts 
— Manner in which uutliority Hhould be dislritniled — UrtKinol 
jnrisdictioi] of mipreme court — Original jurisdiction of inferior 
courtii— Appellate jurisdiction of supreme court. . sjS 

NO, U. HAJIII.TON. 

SOME MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS REfiARD- 

ING JUDICIARY. 

Tlie jurisdiction of the state courts on federal niieKlionK — 
The state cmirts will retain nil that is not exclusively d<i I CKOlcd — 
Decision of caiiATs ariAing f loni a jMirticuliir r«)(nluli<i)i mny be 
delegated by Coagrt-ss excliuii-uly to supreme court— RelatiOD 
between stale and federal courts wlicn they have concur- 
rent jurt«diclion— An appeal will lie from stjitb courts tn th* 
supreme court— The appelate jtirisdldiuo of the inferior federal 
courts. sso 

HO. 8]. HAMILTON. 

TRLKL BY JURY IN RELATION TO NATIONAL 

JUDICIARY. 

Objection that there is nu provision In tbe prowised cotisH- 
lutton (or trial by jjiry in civil coses considered— Tn»c niennitte 
ai maxims on which this objcdioo rests — Importance »( richt 
ol trial by jury considered— Criminal i ' ' i .*8C8 — Jurysystem 
in different states — Difficiiltv of e-' ' ii ceiicrat rule — 

Impropriety "f sm-h m Eeni>ral mle ;;, .. ;. cimc*— The piopiv- 

Mtion of Mass3c)iiuett.i -Tlic pnivi.iions ff the Ncsv Vorii consti- 
tution—The propntition that the iury system shouid be es;ah!ished 
in nil coses whatever— Concluding remarks, . %%% 



NO. 84. 



HA.MILTON. 



LACK OP A BILL Of RIGHTS. 



BUI of riglita— Liberty of the pre**— Seat n( eovemmeni lad 
remnte— More pmvisioa fur delit> ilua to iho t'iiil<-<t Stales — 
AdtUtional ex|i«nsc»o( nuw systinu— CvnclmUng rvuiuks, . jOf 



BDITOlfS TABLE OF CONTENTS. Ixxi 

SO. fl HAMILTON. 



CONCLUSION. 



Hasner in which subject has been discussed — An appeal to 
the reader to weifffa the matter carefully and act coDScientiously — 
Confidence of Pnbliiis in the arguments which he has advanced — 
Tbeconceded imperfections no reason for delay — Extent of them 
euKKemted — The constitution not radically defective— Rights 
tad interests of the people safe under constitution — Not per^ct, 
bot agoodplan — The state of the country forbids delay in vainly 
seeking a perfect plan — Difficulty of having another convention— 
Easer to core defects by amendments after the adoption — No 
ptuican be satisfactory to all the states— Supposed obstacles in 
Ibe way of malting subsequent amendments considered — The 
M>e with which a federal convention may be called to make 
inendmentA — Conclnsion , . • S^' 




I 



HAMILTON'S TABLE OR CONTENTS. 



t. lotroduL-lton i 

•'II. CoDcemiDK dangers from lotciga force and inJln* 

eiw* 7 

Til. The same subject onntlniiuil il 

•4V, The same subi«Gt continued 17 

■V. The same subjfct continued m 

JVI. Concerning dangers from war between the state*. 17 
*VlI. The subject continued BDd parlicillar <-«U*M 

J enunicriitoil jj 

VIII. Tbe eilui'lH of interital war in pruduciiit; standing 
armieii and other institutions unfriendly to lilv 

^ crty. 41 

jlX. The utllilj- of th« Union a» a safeguard against 

domvslic' fuctlon and insurrection. , -47 

X. The snme subject continued J4 

XI. The utilitj- of the Union in respect to Comni«rca 

and a navy 64 

Xll. The uillilyof titc Union in respect (o revenue, . 7a 
XllL TiMt same subject continac<l, with a view to 

economy 79 

XIV. An objection drawn from tlw extent of country 

ansn'CTcd ti 

,XV, Coticcrning the defects of the [msent confedera- 
tion, in rclntion to the principle of IcjpRlalioo 
for the statrs in tiieir collective canacitles, . 87 
3EVI. The same subject contlnacd, In relation to th« 

sainc princtple -96 

XVll. Thu subject continued, and llluntrated by cxaro- 
ptcs to sfaow the tendency of federal KOvcrn- 
ments. mtbcr to nnarcbv among the members 
than iyntnny In the heaa. ..... 103 

XVIII. Tlie subject continued, with farther etaroptes. . loS 

XIX. The sublet continued, with farther example*. . ti4 

XX. The subject cotilinuod, with farther i:xnmi>)cs, . 119 

XXt. Further defects of the (>r«seni constilaiiun, . . laj 

XXII. Ttie same subject continued and concluded. . 131 

XXIII. The necCMily of a government, at least equally 

energetic with the one propoMd, , 144 

XXIV. The miDJoct cnntinuctl. with an answer to an ob- 

jection cnncernJnt; standing; armies, , , . 150 

XXV. The subject continued with the umv view, . . 156 

XXVI. The ut^ect continued with the same view, . . ifri 

XXVII. TIm subject continued wKb the same riew, . . 169 




Isziv 



xxvrii. 

-—XXIX 
- XXX. 

xxxi. 
xxxii. 

XXXIII. 

XX XIV. 

XXXV. 

xxxvt. 

XXXVII. 



XXXVUI. 
. XXXI X. 



XL. 

XLII. 
XUII. 
XLIV. 

xuv. 



XL VI. 

XLVII. 

XLVIII. 

XLIX. 

L. 

LI. 

LIL 

LIIl. 

LIV. 

LV. 

LVl. 

L\ni. 




HAMILTON'S TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Pmom 

Th« MBi* «ubj«ct ooncludftd, . .174 

CufiMrolns th« niilitU IT9 

Cooceming tJuutiiMi 167 

The same mbject continued trfi 

The Mine subject (xntinucd 197 

The haino s«bie«l continued aot 

T\\i! same aubjeci i:ciuUBti«d k>6 

The name subject coBtinaed aij 

The li^uiie subject concladed 319 

CoDccming llic difflculticH wlikh the oonvenliMi 
nm^t IiAvci oxporioDC«)d In the (ornuillon nf a 

proper plan si7 

The subject continued, nnd th« incohereiKe of 

the objections to the plan exjKMcd. . . 137 
Th» con(<^irmily of the pfnii to republican priii. 
cipks ', All objoctton in rvaooci to th* powers 

oTlbe coavx-nlion. uxaniineu 14s 

Tbe ume objection furthei examined. . asz 

GoiKira) view <4 the powcnt propiwed to be 

i-os(»d in the Union Mo 

Tlio same vivw continned *7i 

The some view vontinn^d aSo 

The satite view contmned and concluded. . . s^ 
A further discustJon ot the Hippomd dMigor 
from th« power! of the Unioa, to (he state 

gnvemnMnts 303 

The subJACt ol the lust pinper rcmmed ; «ritb an 

exunilnnllon of the coinparalive mean* of iti- 

fluence of lite federal and state gowminvnts, jio 

The meaning of the maxim, which requires a 

separatioa of the clepurtmcnts of powers, ex- 

uninvd ftnd nscertftined 314 

The same Mibjvct continued, with « view to tbe 
meana of giving efficacy in practice tu that 

maxim 317 

The siunc subject continued with tbe «une view, 334 
The same subject ctintinued with Ibe sanvc view. 339 
The same anbjMtconiinucHl with (lie samcvtow, 

and caocludcd. J43 

Codceroing the Iluiue of Repmcntatives, with a 
view to tbe qualirtcations of the ckctcirs and 
elected, and (he llrao of service of Ihc tnent- 

b««. M« 

The same TObjcct continued, with a view of the 

teem of service of the members, _ 353 

The same subject continued with n view to tbe 

ratio of ivurct<:ni4(lon, jto 

The tiame subject ci'iiitnued in relation to tbe 

toUl number of the body 366 

Tbe same tinbje«t conttnura iu relation to Ibe 

same point 373 

Tile *am« subject continne«l in relation to the 
iin)ip<H*d iciiilniK-y of Die plan of the convMi- 
Uoa to elvviiiu the few above tbe many. . 377 




ttAAItLTOffS TABLE OF COKTE/fTS. 



\%xv 



LVin. The same nubjccl cnnlinued ta reUttoo to llw 

future augmentation at tbc mctnbciK, . . }S) 
LIX. Conccminj; Uic rcjfuljitinn of cicclioax. • • JQi 

LX. Ill c Mini V st)l))oct uonliiiiml »7 

LXl. The lUiiTie a.abjC[^t continued ;in<I codctndcd. . 404 
LXU. Coacenijiis the cutiiiiiuliuti cl tbc Senate, wilb 
Kganl 10 tlic qiialiritatiouE of the mcnibcr&. 
Ih« mitniivr of appoint j 11 1; (hcni, tttc oifiialjly 
of reprcMBiatKiii. the luimlivr ol Ihv svuAinre, 
and the dtiiativii of th«irappuililmeDtit, . 408 
LXIIl. A (urthiT view <if the conslilution of the Senate, 
in rcKonl to the duration of the oppoiniment 

of it» n>«iiihcrs 416 

UUV. A Iiiriher view vf tlic constitution of tlioScnJitc. 

in n-j-iinl to Ihc ytwcj o! tnuktng Irealie*. . 4J6 

LXV. A further view of tbc cousiilution of tl>c Senate, 
in relation to its capacity a* a court for the 

trial of impeach men Is 43) 

LXVI. The uni« subject coiiiinued 440 

LXVII. Concerning tlie constitution of the President : 
A gron attempt to miHcprMcnt tliiii port at 

Ihc jilBii detected 447 

Un'lll. Tti« view of tlie coDBtilutlon of the President 
continued, in relation to tbe mode of appoint- 
ment. ... 4$i 

L.XIX. Thi! Mime view contintic-d, with n mmpariEOR 
betwi^iin tlie Presidvui mid the king of (Jreat 
Britain on the one hand, and the governor of 

New York on the other 4S7 

LXX. Tlie «amo view continued in relation to the 
unity of the exccmlve. and with on exsmlna- 
tion of the project of au executive council. . 46^ 
LXXl. Tbe lutme view continued, in regard to tbe dura- 
lion of the ofBcc 475 

LXXIL The Munc view continued In regard to the rc- 

eltgibillty ot Um Prt-siilcnt. ... 481 
ULXllI. Tbe uaan view continued, in relation to tli« pro- 
vision concerning tuppvrt. and the i>owcr of 

the negative 48$ 

LXXIV. Tbo name view continued, in relation to tho 
commanil of Ihc national foroes, and ttw 

IMWer of pardoning 496 

LXXV- Tbe same view continued in relation to the 

power of mokinii; trcaiiet 499 

LXXVL Tlic tam* view continued in rrlnlJon to the ap- 

poiaiment of the ofhcen of the f;ovcraiiicflt. joj 
LXXVII. Tlic view of the constitution of Ihe President 
concluded, with a further consideration of the 
power of appointment, and a conciw: cxarni- 
luilion of hh) retti.-iininK powers. . . jii 
LXXVni. A view "f llio coualitulioii of the judicial depart- 
ment, in relation to tbe teniiro of good be- 
havior, , . jt7 



IxsTi 



HAMILTON'S TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



LXXIX. A further view of th« judicial department, inre- 
tatton to the provisions for tne support and 

responsibility of the judges ja? 

LXXX. A further view of the jadicial departtnent, in re- 
lation to the extent of its powers, . . . $30 
LXXXI. A further view of the judicial department, in re- 
lation to the distrilmtion of its authority, . %it 
LXXXII. A further view of the judicial department, in 

reference to some miscellaneous questions, . 5SO 
LXXXIII. A further view of the judicial department in re- 
lation to the trial by jury, .... S55 
LXXXIV. Couceming several miscellaneons objections, . 569 

LXXXV. Conclusion S8i 

Articles of the new constitution S9> 



K" 



PREFACE. 



It is supposed that a collection of the papers which 
have made their appearance in the gazettes of this cit3r, 
under the title of The Federaiisl, may not be without effect 
in assisting the public judgment on the momentous ques- 
tion of the constitution for the United States, now under 
the consideration of the people of America. A desire to 
throw full light upon so interesting a subject has led, in a 
great measure unavoidably, to a more copious discussion 
than was at first intended. And the undertaking not 
being yet completed, it is judged advisable to divide the 
collection into two volumes, of which the ensuing numbers 
constitute the first. The second volume will follow as 
speedily as the editor can get it ready for publication. 

The particular circumstances under which these papers 
have been written, have rendered it impracticable to avoid 
violations of method and repetitions of ideas which can- 
not but displease a critical reader. The latter defect has 
even been intentionally indulged, In order the better to 
impress particular arguments which were most material 
to the general scope of the reasoning. Respect for pub- 
lic opinion, not anxiety for the literary character of the 
performance, dictates this remark. The great wish is 
that it may promote the cause of truth and lead to a 
right judgment of the true interests of the community. 

Nkw Yobk, March 17, ij88. 



txivii 



THE FEDERALIST. 



INTRODUCTION. 



Hamilton. 



UtitUf t/ ikt Umm — Imrfiiimrf #/ imfrdtrAtieK—CafoHlf •/ 
tnfli /tr ulf-givtrHmnt — Off<>iititn ■>/ ifdUV afiiiAh la HnB imililH' 
mtm—lhmiil Jt^titHUi •// afimaii-'I'alHifdl inliiiraHit—Charps anJ 
ituultr fhargtt — PttliHi a sufprrur tf tAe frofritJ tfHIlittitiftt—Out- 
liiu *f Thi f-'tdtT^Uil—Naiifiiat utitimint /or Vm»n. 

Tt lAe PevfU e/ the State of Neai Yark; 

After an uuequivocal experience of the inefficiency of 
tbe subsisting federal government, you arc called upon 
to deliberate on 4 new Conf^titutiou for the United States 
of America. The subject speaks its own iropurtance; i 

mprchcnding in its cunsctiiienccs nothing less than \ 

ic exi>itence of the UNION, the a^ety and welfare of 
parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire 
in many respects the must interesting in the world. It 
ha& been frequently remarked that it seems to huve been 
rvcd 10 the people of this country, by their conduct 
example, to decide the important question, whether 
ties of men arc really capable or not of establishing 
'good goTcmmcnt from rejection and choice, or whether 
they are forever destined to depend for their political 
constitutions on accident and force. If there be any 
tnith in the remark, the crisis at which we arc arrived 
may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that 
decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part 
we «)ull act muy* in this view, deserve to be considered 
as the general misfortune of mankind. 

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy 
to thoM of patriotixm, to heighten the solicitude which 




\ 





^^ 



1 NATUHE OF OPPOSITION. |jr«. I 

all considerate and good men must feel for tlie event, 
Happy will it be if uur choice sliuiilO be directed by a 
judicious estimate of our true interests, unpcrplcxed and 
unbiased by considerations not connected with the 
public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be 
wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered 
to our deliberations atfects t oo many pnrlint'" 'nivr'"'i 
innovate* upon too many local institutions, not to in- 
volve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to it« 
merits, and of views, passions, and prejudices little favor- 
able to the discovery of truth. 

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the 
new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be 
fM dislinguished the obvious interest of a cer- 

■•. W tain class of men in every State to resist 

all changes which may hazard a diminution of the [xiwer, 
emolument, and consequence of the offices tlicy hold 
nnder the State establishment;' and the perverted 
ninbitiiin of anolticr class of men, who will either hope 
to aggraridtze themselves by the confusions of their 
country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects 
of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into 
several partial confederacies than from its union nndec 
one govcnirocnt. 



I No lalxteiil objetxion to the coaolilution plsvcd v> lilal ■ p>tl in iha 
ilni«l« lor aHoiilioD u Ihii oppasition d wiut in nuikni parUim 
would be naltnl ihc vutun MUb " ucfalnct." The Revoluilonaty Wat 
■mt Uic >iiti-n|u«nl jcan ul anardiy, hyilriTinc liit" cillc <ir i . i uli- 

iii)- lliT ):«iil[y >n<l ll>« vonamcnial i:!^*^*, Iiad ii:ii»lrrml ki- 

itDJ ia each iLitc lo tbf miall liadbuldon. riiFir f Mul 

been Umasly deiuociaiK ; inilccd wku. io-daT< "v>' i ' 'I - )«• 

IbiiiC 1 aoafiit iu«ive]-caf\ bul tivcii liiiired by mii^h i Mi' i ufu. 

liuKk a\ I»|>cr miHwy, htij- niid ImlerOawk, nol u^bri t(|;il •Ictlun 
dcxiltricil (o (sv>ii llicin ami I»«I<1 Uirii iiiip|<Or1 lo Itir ilonilnnsl (laity. 
Thu unjiM Unitini' »[ otic doNt at llx cxpttiM! of otbrn (lie tuntlilalliiB 
ucamBMl lo end. an-] wiili ie, of orcvuiiy, the poitit <>( ilie madiinB 
len'l-"- '■-■ — ' *— *> "'■ •■-■■* I- ■T'T -..-.... ... .1 (,... ihoM! {» 

(III .o : aiiil 

ll..<r ■■,. . ,-|lil,-Uy 

hi Ma»achUHltt, IIbmucIi mi ir^ 

kii >ui>pon oj Ikr [0111411 ulitfn \•^ r;:iirii l"( ll" I <■( 

■dtnliialMii to lliai Dlike i wliilc SjhiucI AiUdu j .ir) 



ftialUnl 



FAIR OPPOSITION. 



It is not, howtrcr, mjr ilesign to dwell upon obsfrva- 
tioire of thU n;tture. I am well aware that it would be 
di«n£enuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition 
o( any set of men (merely bcoiuse their situations might 
tnbjcct them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious 
»ic«». Candor will oblige us to admit that even such 
men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it can- 
not be doubted that much of the opposition which has 
made its appearance, or may hcreafit-r make its appear- 
ance, will :«prin(r from sonrces, blamrlrss, at least, if not 
respectable— the honest errors of minds led astray by 
preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed 
anil so powerful are ihe causes which serve to ^ve ft 
(lite bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, . 
sec wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the 
right side of questions of the first mas;nitude to soriety. 
This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a 
lessou of moderation to those who are ever so much per- 
wailed of their being in the right in any controversy. 
Awl a further reason for caution, in this respect, might 
be drawn from the rellectiim that we arc not always sure 
(bat ihoMe who advocate the truth are influenced by purer 
lirinciplcs than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, 
iwrsona) aniniosity, party opposition, and many other 



wii- nil* mmK tl^fpttnl In \\tt\t next ttMlim*. bol raatnl lo 1» inipar> 
'• ' I i 1-1 I'lc Win irf [>*mocr«cy lo poit«» in tSol. la 

I iwily, aflCT twelve yean of pr«ilic«lly uncnu- 
t».'-- 1 {' <>■ I. a.\ '.'III.-: Iic^^ lo wane, wm lorccii lo uw (xudulciit iiuait« 
It keep lueK ill jHjitet la l^rfl, iiiJ al llic iK«t <)n(<oii WM rnlirrly 
4ltulKt. Ill fciiniylvaiiia (tiR u!lni-(lriiiM:ralic (otly wu prixnpdy 
nrttkrovn. In Vlrcloii I'lirkk Hroty wnsdrii-m iritn iriiremenl. Mid 
•t l«« (ictMii ncicr •Kniii ctfTCOed tnateiinl poliii.nl influence. In 
iwl la ociy lUle ilir jit-ic^ion of the ledcint (cmiiliiition n)xrkc<i iha 
■rOBpi oiuHnh>ii oi ilkjij )VMraiice of LCfiilii men liiilvdu )inimiiiciit 
oiMtiltn. (SwK.tJ'. '■ K>i-iT^.™ilieC««Mliliiti'>n."]>. i;6,iii><l"ri!nn' 
■(Inni* aiul llir Kr.tmil ( Hi^.tilnlioa." p. ll ) Nci ilid ihk vitil 
inil.iri.L v 'if niliiiiiiil •« i\\U p^<lilks<fHl nilh thu vuiiBC of the " Anli-< 
I* ilie iniHl cenaiii mcilkoik In tliU day ul <l«fealin|; in 

!!tTrfilT>F " li«inc tbe iniriXloii inin i Male polHiril ixiiiictt 
'I al. Km matt itian lull of th« wnnurninp of 

ti iIkwI lh[«ii|;li i-okIfM-i Xtrt coalrol oj tli« nanal 

Er'i.t.ni.'Tii. mil iiir m \ie-d"iniT>int-piiity Icjilen of lo-dny JrcM notti. 
E » uiucb as a Oi«t)ily fouglii iiBtiooal ^kciion.— EulTOK. 




LIBERTY AND DESPOTISM. 



or*. 1 



motires not more laudable than thcM. are apt to openle 
as well upon those who sup|>orl att tl)o»e who oppose the 
right side of a question. Were there not crcn these 
inducements to moileriittnn, nothing coutd he more ill- 
judged than thai intolerant spirit which has, at all times, 
characterized political parties. For in politics, as in 
rettjpon, it is e()aall)r nhsurd to aim at making proseljrtes 
by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured 
by persecution. 

And yet, however jugt these sentiments wilt l>e 
allowed to be, we have already sufiicieot indications that 
it will happen in this as in all former cases of great 
national discussion. A torrent oT angr^ and malignant 
passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of 
the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that 
they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their 
opinions, and to increase the number of their converts 
by the loudness of their decUmalions and the bitterness 
of their invectives. An enlightened leal for the energy 
aiKl efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the 
offspring of a temprr fond of despotic power and hostil 
to the principles of liberty. An overscrupulous jealousy 
of danger to the rights of the people, which is mor 
commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will U 
represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait 
for popnbrily at the expense of the public g'wd. It will 
be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual 
concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm ol 
liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and 
illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equall; 
forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to th 
security of libi-rty; that, in the contemplation of a Muni 
and well-informed judgment, their interest can never 
scpanted; and that a dangerous ambition mnre nflei; 
IutVs behind the specious mask of leal for the rights o 
the people than under the forbidding appearance of ica 
for the firmness and efficiency of goverameni. Utstor 
will teach us that the former has been found a muc 
ffore cetjjjo 0»d i" llicimcBdwiUon of dcspul 



»»nt— ] OUTLIHE OF FEDERALIST. S 

the latter, and that of those men who have overturned 
the liberties of republics, the greatest number have 
began their career by piying an obsequious court to the 
people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants. 

Id the course of the preceding observations, I have 
had aa eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon 
funr guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, 
to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost 
moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than 
those which may result from the evidence of truth. 
You will, no doubt, at the same time have collected from 
the general scope of them, that they proceed from a 
source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my 
countrymen, J own to you that, after having given it an 
attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your 
interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the 
safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your 
happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I 
will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation 
when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my 
convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons 
on which they are founded. The consciousness of good 
intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, 
moltiply professions on this head. My motives must 
remain in the depository of my own breast. My argu- 
ments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. 
They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not 
disgrace the cause of truth. 

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the follow- 
ing interesting particulars: — The uiiiity of the UNION to 
your polilieal prosperity — The insufficiency of the present Con- 
f titration to preserve that Union — The neceaity of a govern- 
*M/ at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the 
'Itainment of this object — The conformity of the proposed Con- 
tlitution to the true principles of republican government — Its 
nalogy to your tnon State constitution — and lastly, The addi- 
li**al security which its adoption will afford to the preserva- 
*•* */ that species of government, to liberty, and to property. 

Id the progress of this discussion I sha.' endeavor to 



UTILITY OF VmON. 



DTfcl 



give a sattsfactorjf answer to all the i>lii»;tion)i which 
xhuU have made Iheir appearance, Uiat may seem to have 
any claim to your attention. 

It ntay perhaps be thought stiperfluous to offer argu- 
ments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, na 
SwVo*. doubi, deeply engraved on the hearts of the 
Bud IS great body of the peo[^e in every State, and 
one which, it may be imaijiiicd, has no adversaries. But 
the fact is that we already hear it whispered in the pri- 
vate circles uf those who oppose the new Constilution, 
that tile thirteen States are of too great extent for any 
gciieral system, and that we must of necessity resort 
to se]>aratc confederacies' of distinct portions of the 



*Tliii Iheorr fA <e|iaraie contcderaclef. an llie |>raaiM) thai ih* ^reat 
terrHoty tomyiivt^ in ibe Union ««b ioo vjiit atxl mo diflcrtsltf circvm- 
uaDced lo nikt a ecuerxl eovemnKnt pouiblc. noi held \,j Many men 
Kt • llicoiy, who iiuiK- llie l«M w«rc milllD); tii illdOfil (he riiicriaieiil. 
Tile impcniilitlil)? nai lhcrf;(ote lli« ciiiilnili'in i>f llitn* iri'iKnnl lo (be 
coiHlidiiion. lucb u U<ort:e Clinion and I'ltfick Hriirjr. nixl Wwxt. c*o 
be liille iloulit thil line noulU hare jui,iilieil fbcii imJivlioti bai fot 
th« L-h*ai;iMl cnwIilHin ctcaleil by ilie rallnmt aiul llie lelFj^ph. With 
caih wctiiHwl CKintrotcnr llic )>[»(rI Itu [ra|>tKa[«l, mul Ilia wi'lion 
tlul liu felt ifX''"'^ ''^' Ihmltnril. or nllriiiplnl, la (r^in iIkII into 
■ ic|iame nail»n. Thui in iSoj nhrn ih< naT)(;aiion of ihe MiHiiaip[>l 
mu clowd Ihe Wntem Main Kiiouslv plannctl > leptiRlioa Uata ilio 
Union. Ijilf:i, witrn llie iwicliaw nl I.oultiana hail iciiuvixl ihr 
Wnltrn i;ti»*imc-T. lli« New Kn^Und leailm cndrari'iP'l !■■ furni a 
wpUktc confctlcracy in llw Nnrtli. I1i« Sla<r<>latrt' (Jonvnnlino d< 
l8s« ihrealclioi to tatm ■ Suullicm confcdetacjr. > projctl rcjliiej leii 
y«>n. Ulcr. In cubiaie tbc pin itai lli.il ihc icclHiiial inicFciu wcte 
Ion iliMinct lo alliiw ol one eo*'"'<nenl. allliouch it tiiay l>r taitllr 
BUuttlcil thai ihv M^-linnnl ditlilKlitnih in lltr ttntcinlurt brrn m ctesler 
llun the KCiional ■liffmiKot in f<«h &lale. Thr IdciciI irtiili olMce* 
lion was »eiy nell ikeuhcil by JrHtraoii, wben id 1708 ho Wrote 
" Bal if on a lcn>p>-iify minritorily o( tkc one paily. tt - ■'.-■ i \a 
rcwwl lo atciuMHi ol Ihi^ (inuio. r»i foloal i^oiniimcni til. 

If 10 rill oumclvn of Itic [irrMOl rale >il Ma»«i-l(ii«rtl« a:..' ' ir.ii(. 

weliteak the llnion. nil 1 the cvilsin)) ilierc? Su|-p»w tWfiew tni'lancl 
lUles alone cut oft. will oui naintc be dunged? A r« we not aaen ulU 
to Ihe tuUlh of lli.it. and vllh sti tlir i-dulooi nf men f I DiOKiJlaltly. 
«w vliati tec a friiiitylvania and a \'itj;li-.ia piaity atlx In tl>c trtidnair 
(onfoiUtacT, and llif (inblir mind oill Lvdl^nclnl with the wnir ituly 
ipirit. VTut a ipime, 100. will ihe one paty have in ihnr haniii. h.y 

e4«frjBllv Tiirrari-ELin.- I^i' .-.lf>i r \\\\\ mhI'w ri-r 1 <li. <4i npi 3 At-\ di^r «i(l 

]• : 1 1 uad 

N.. .ih* 

Ttl'tlil'^iUliMA >i| li.i .i: l;m> iiUlcs, dK-l IJiE) H'i4 EOJ Ljr l.JtUillg IlltV 

tktii iinijileaniu." — f;i>lTO». 



CONSTITUTION OR DISUNION. t 

wbolc* This doctrine will, in all probabilitjr, be 
gradoally propagated, till it has votaries enough to 
countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be 
more evident to those who are able to take an enlarged 
view of the subject than the alternative of an adoption 
of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the 
Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining, 
the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and thel 
probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed] 
from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute! 
the subject of my next address. 

FUBLIUS. 



H0> 2i f/HdrfrndtHl Jemmal, Oclobw 31, 1787.) J^y- 

THE VALUE OF UNION. 

/ftrtttitf »f gtvernmmt — Theory ef separate eeH/ederaeies — Geegrafh- 
ietl amd ratial ksmegituily of Ike Uniied Stales — Inefficiency of the 
aicUt tf cettftJtrBtien — Tht Federal Convention — Coniideralion of Iht 
avIitmtitH — TJU congress of ITJ4 — Universal belief in the ntassily of 
Ijiutm — Prtjett of separate confederacies, 

Tt Ikt People of the Stale of New York: 

When the people of America reflect that they are now 
called npoD to decide a question, which, in its conse- 
qoences, must prove one of the most important that ever 
engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a 
nry comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, 
will be evident. 

Nothing is more certain than the indispensable neces- 
lity of government, and it is equally undeniable that, 
whenever and however it is instituted, the people must 
cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it 
with requisite powers. It is well worthy of consideration 
therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest 

* The nme Idea, tncini; the ■rpimenls to their consequences, is held 
■■t fd icTaTB] of the late publicitioni against the new Constitution. — 
foBUm. 



8 SEPARATE CONFEDESACIES. »•.! 

of the people o( America that they should, to all ^nenl 
purposes, be one nation, under one federal government, 
or tlut they situuld divide tliemselres into separate con- 
federacies, and f;ive to the heat) of each tlie same kind of 
powers which they arc advised to place in one naiiunal 
government. 

It has until latelf been a received and uncontradicted 
opinion that the prosperity of the people of America 
depended on their continuing firmly united, and the 
wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest citizens 
have been cunstanlly directed to tluit objecL But putiti* 
cians now appear, who insist that this opinion is errune* 
ous, and that instead of looking for safety and happiness 
in nniiin. wc ought to seek it in a division of the States 
into distinct confederacies nr sovereijjntics. However 
extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it neverthe- 
less has its advocates; and certain characters who were 
much oppij&ed to it formerly are at present uf the num- 
ber. Whatever may be the arguments or inducements 
which liave wrought this change in the sentiments and 
declarations of these genilemen, it certainly wuld not 
be wise in (he people at large to adopt these new politi- 
cal tenets without being fully convinced that they are 
founded in truth and souikI policy. 

il has often given mc pleasure to obKctve thai tiuiependeni 
America was not emiiiMMnI uf deiache*! and dislani tcrritorrrs, but 
thai one <smneclc(), fcrlik. wtdt-spreddi'ig country wns tlie por- 
tion of our wMtein mki* of libirny. Proviifence hiu in a p;i(iicular 
m»rni-r blrs*nl il wiih s rariny of soiU nnd ptoiJiKlions, and 
w.'klcrcd il ivilh tnnitm»ntilc itreanii. lot Ihv ilFti)*ht ami acctinimo- 
H.ilinn 111 its inh.il>iMntv A viCT&vnn of ii.ivi;;able wjIfts tnritit 
a kinil ol chain luumt ill Iwidcrt. a* if to t>iiiil ti ii>];rihcr ; witile 
■he moti acAi\t rirrn In the world, tunnitic at convcnrriil <li)u 
lances, prcscnl then) with hl-^hwn)'s for ihc rasy comniiinicaiiau 
ol Iriendty aids, anil the mutual Iranspurlallun and exchange at 
thfrir ranou* c<immoilliic^ 

With equal (ileuuiF 1 \\a\t so often taken notice Iftal ProvW 
dence hai l»p»:n |i1caml in girc this niw ronnpcfeil country la one 
uniieii pe<>i>le— a people ik-sccnikd from (he tame anceiiorst 
■peakiiiK the siune Unjpjage. jfivlcnuit; Ihc «amo religiMi. alladml 



im 



NATIONAL SENTiMBNT. 



Ill ihe Mine phnttples o( Kovemment. voy similar rn (heir raunncra 
and cusiaiiM. and who, by lUcir joint couniels, Atms, anil cfTofls. 
tgtnins lUk by side throughout n long iitiil liluudy war. have 
■oUy etuhlttbcd general libcny and in<lepeiidciicc. 

This country und thi» people seem to liave hccn made for each 
oihci, and it appears a* if il was the de-sign o( Providence thai an 
feibetilaace m proper and coiivenieitl lor a batid <i( lir«ihi«n 
■uied to each other by the sirongcst lie^ should never l>e split 
MO a number o( uiuocUl. ^e^ous. and alien sovereign lies. 

SMiilar KRlimcnis have hitherto prevailed among all orders and 
ilmomirutknis ol men among its. To all Eeneral purpoMS we 
U>e uiufiKmly been one people ; each individual ciiixcn every- 
where enjoying the urne national ri};hts. priWlc(;ev^nd ptolccdon, 
A» a sUion we have matlc peace and war ; as a nation we have 
nnquished our common ciieiTitrs ; us a nation ivc liAve [orme<l 
■fiances, and made treaties, and entered into viirious compacls 
Urfoonvenlions with (oiet)[n stales. 

A strong sense of the value and blessings of union 
nducctl tlic peuple, at a very early pcrioO, to institute a 
fcdenl goveriinient to [>rc!(erveaiid {>cr|)etiuite it. They 
lonncd it almost as soon as they had a political exisl- 
tflce; nay, at a time vhcn their habitations were in flanu's. 
■hen man]' of their citixent were bleeding, and vrhen 
t>K progress of hostility and desolation left little room 
lot th<ise calm and tnatiirc inquiries and reDcctiuns which 
BUH ever precede the formation of a wi&c and well- 
tuUnced government for a free people. It is not to be 
■oodered at that a government, instituted in times so 
uuuspictous, should on experiment be found greatly 
deiclcnt and inadequate to the purpose it was intended 
Id answer. 

This intelligent people perceived and regretted these 
defects. Still continuing no less attached to union than 
ouDored of liberty, they observed the danger wlitcli 
muaediatcly threatened the former and more remotely 
lilt latter; and being persuaded that ample security for 
U)(i) could only be found in a national government more 
•isdjr framed, they, as with one voice, convened the late 
ciKiTentton at Philadelphia, to take that important sub 
|ca under coasidcraUon. 



10 PKOPOS£D coysr/rvr/OA\ 

This convention, composed of men who (J^csKcd the 
conTidcncc of the people, and many o( whom had become 
Sat highly distinguished by their patriotism, 

>•.«. virtue, and irisdom, in times which tried the 

minds and hearts of men, undertook the arduous task. 
In the mild sea^tn of pence, with minds unoccupied 
by other subjects, they passed many months in cool, 
uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and Tinally, with- 
out having been awod by power, or influenced by any 
passions except love for their country, they presented 
and recommended to the people the plan produced by 
(heir joint and very iiniiniinuus eouncils. 

Admit, for ko h live foci, thai rliis pUn it only rtccmmmdfii, 
not impo&ed. yei let it be icincnihcred ttiai it is neither tecom- 
nieii<te<l to Ninit npprolMiioo. nor to Miiu( repTDJMl'xMi ; hut to 
th.ii sedate an<l CJin<tid consideration which tlic nuignilude atxl 
iniporiance oC the xubjcci (leinamt. and whkh it certainly ouslil to 
reccirc. But (hia(i!( was icnmilccd in the [orr;;o<ng numlfcr of 
this paper) i.i more to be wishnl ihnn rxpcctrd. that it may 1>e 
M) coiiMiieml nnd examined. fclijMrrii'nce o%\ a foinicr occnsion 
leiichcs \n noi in be loo Mngiiinc in Mich Ivopc^. ll a not yet for* 
gotten thai wcll-grauoded apiirelxnsions o( imniineni donger in- 
duced the people of Atnerici to form the nicinanibic Conj;ress of 
I7?4. Tluit bixly recommended ceil.iin mc.iiures lo their coitttit- 
oents. and the event proved their wisdom : yei it is fre»h in our 
niemortes Iiow soon tlie press begin to teem willi pamphlets and 
weekly jwpers atpinil ttwise very nieiiwirex, Niil only itianyof the 
nfficcrs of i>inTr>in>rnl, who obeyed the dictates of prnonnl Inter- 
est, but others, (tijin a iniUaken eSilimate of conscijueiKe^, «t llie 
undue inRucncc of foitiH-r ntt.ichmmiv o( uihosc ambition aimed 
at objects which did niH coTre!b|Kincl with the |>uhbe y^ooA. were 
tndefaligaMc in their cffoils to pcrsuatic the pcop4e to rejecl the 
adiricc of that patriotic Congress. Many. in<leed. were deceived 
and deluded, but the great mnjority of the people tcasonnl and 
decided judiciously; jnd happy ibey arc in rellectiftg Ihut they 
did so. 

Tliey considered ihni lit* Coni;rcss was composed of many wiM 
and eapefienced mm. Tli.il. being convened from lURcnnil pari* 
of the couniiy, they hrouglii with them and comniunlcjted to each 
other a Tariety nl ukIuI infurmaiiun. Thai, in the ruutse nt ihe 
liroe ihcy passe«l Ingelhrr in inquiring iiiin and diKusfing the true 
Ifllemts tii their cwmtry, tttey must hafc acquired very acmniic 



fcll 



BELIEF IN UNlOtf. 



II 



kiMwtedge on tfut head. Th.il tticy were hulivirluiilly inleresied 
mihepuMiclibcriy ADil prospLTiiy.Aod ihcreforelh^i il wsnol less 
thai iitclin^tton than th«ir duty lu reciMunieitd only buch iTicasui«> 
u. alter llie mu&l mature deliberation, ihcjr really ihoiighi prudent 
and wlvlsablc. 

Tlia«and similar considerations (hen induced lbc[Mopleto re1]r 
fjrMtlj on the judijnienl nnd tiilcsrity o( the Congress ; and they 
Mok itwir advice, net willisl ending the various arU and ci:deavon 
UKd Id ileicr litem from it. But if ihc people at Urge liad reason 
M confide in the men of llut Coiit-rcss, (ew «1 whom had been 
hilly tiled or gencrnily known, sliil greater tc.uon have tlicy now to 
lapcctlhe )u<li(mcnl and advice of the convention, for it is well 
Uown tlul some of the iitott diUingaithcd memlicts nf th.-il Con- 
(teu,«rtio hare been since liied dnd justly .approved For patriolisni 
uA ablHlles. and who have grown olit in acqulrint; political Inlor- 
iLiiion, were at^o inctnlicis of tills convention, and carried into it 
ttttr accii mutated knowledge and experience. 

It » worthy of remark thai not only the (Iritt, but 
nery t»iccee<linK Congress, as well as the late cooven- 
iKrn, have invjrtatily joined with the people in thinkiii;; 
ibt the prosperity of America depended un its Union. 
To irrcscrvc and perpcttiatc it was the Kfot object of the 
prople in forming that convention, and it is also the great 
object of the plan which the convention has advised them 
lo adopt. With what propriety, thurefwre, or for what 
{ninl purposes, .ire attempts at this particuLtr period 
aaile by some men to depreciate the importance of the 
Union? Or why is it suggested tlwt three or fotir con- 
Icdentde^ would be better than one? I am persuaded in 
■yovn mind that the people have always thought right 
M this subject, and that their universal and uniform 
.ittichmenl to the cause of tlie tJnion rests on great and 
»!^^;hty reasons, which I shall cndc.ivor to develop .icul 
eipiain in some ensuing papers. They who promote the 
Idea nf sulratituting a number of distinct confederacies in 
the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly lo 
ftimee that the rejcctinn of it woitlil put the continuance 
of the Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly 
VMhl bn the case, and I sincerely wish that it may be as 
tlearly (Dre»cen by every good citizen, thai whenever the 



la 



KF.SULT OF DISUNION. 



na.8 



<liH»olution of the Union arrives, America will have 
reason lo exclaim, in Ilic words of ttit pticl : " Farr- 
WELL! a LOMC FaREWRLL to all UY Gftr-ATMRSS." 

PIIBLIII& 



No. 3. 



ilmitff4nljfmrm*t, Konabtt j, i^j.) 



Jay. 



ADVANTAGES AND NECESSITY OF UNION IN 
RELATION 10 I'OREIGN I'OWERS. 

Saftty af fnHit tf^aiim — PuUit to/tf^ a i-ffnoHUi tiut — Cumin ff 
tt»r — TitaUtl and <«tHmirt< ai tatiui — k^dtnl tatitttal /^turamtm 
nil} nturt irrviifi t/ »Uiit mfa — A itiprtrnt gt'tmtmtnl nnrnaty m 
t^nilrtiimg trtaliit — Vnhtimehfd m injitilitf »« tht SluUi — A Hiiltonat 
gatfinfuit hit likely la affant/uil ftuiri r/ Hiar — Indian xnirt tatittd 
iy ikt Statti — NtigkkariMg taMntrin and ifnir^iml tvriltr -nKiri — 
AJlwIaft f/ mMitaal gatftrtuHtnl in Htgttialiitt reilk femgn favftri — 
Crtaur ntigkt af Iki Uaint likily Is n\ure itlUr ttrmi. 

7> ike PtfifU of Ikt Siaie k/ New York: 

It is not a. new observation that the people of any 
country {if, like the AmeHoaiifl, intelligent and well- 
informed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many 
years in an crnincouit npinion respecting their interests. 
ThaL<:on];iilcration naturally tcitds to create gre.it respect 
for the high opinion which the people of America have so 
long and unifnnnir eniertiiined of itip importance of their 
continuing firmly united under one federal Kovernmeni. 
vested with sufficient powers for all general and nalioual 
purposes. 

The more attentively I consider and investieaie the 
reasons which appear to have given birth to this opinion, 
the more 1 bcci>mc convinced that ihey arc cogent and 
concluitire. 

Among the many objects to which a wise and free 
people find it necessary to direct their attention, that itf 
providing (or their sa/etr seems to be the first. The 
io/tty of the people doubtless has relation to a (treat 
variety of circumauncey and considcraiionit, and coa- 



hfi 



CAUSES OF WAJtS. 



»3 



quently affords great latitude to those who wish to 
ne it precisely ami comj)rchiM)StveIy. 
At pre&ent 1 mean only lo consider it as it respects 
security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as 
well agAinst dangers from /ortiga arms and injiuenee, as 
froai dangers of the Hit Hud arising Trom domestic 
Gutscs. As the former of these comes first in order, it is 
proper it should be the Rrst discussed. Let us therefore 
proceed to examine whether the people are not right in 
their opinion iliat a cordial Union, under an efficient 
national Kovernmcnl, aSords them the best security that 
can he devised against Aotti/itia from abroad. 

The number of wars which have happened or will 
happen in the world will always be found to be in propor- 
tion to the number and weight of the cruises, n-iiclher fro/ 
at [n-etended, which //v;v>if'^ or invite them. If this remark 
lie jusi, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many 
jutt causes of war are likely to be given by United 
Amrriea as by dimnited .America; for if it should turn nut 
that United .-\merica will probably give the fewest, then 
it wilt follow that in this respect the Union tends most to 
pttterve the people in a state of peace with other 
ntiritu. 

The/*i/ causes of war, for the most part, arise cither 
(mm violations of trealies or (rum direct violence. 
America has already formed treaties with no less than six 
fareign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are 
miritimr, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. 
She lias also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, 
Uhl Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in 
xlditiun, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to. 
Ii is of hi^h importance to the peace of America that 
4lie ')bsen.'e the laws of nations towards all these powers, 
»»J to me it appears evident that this will he more per- 
icilj and punctually done by one national government 
ihiii it rniild be either by thirteen separate Slates or by 
' ur distinct confederacie*. 

--:■- when oucc an efficient national government is 
ntablished, th« best men in the country will not onlj 



I4 ADVA}iTAGRS Of GF.yEXAL GOfP.KMfMByT. r»».1 

consent to serve' but also will generally be appointed to 
maii;igc it; for, although town or country, or other con- 
Itiicted iiiAuence, may place men in St;ite assemblies, or 
senates, or courts ol justice, or executive department*, 
yet more general and extensive reputation for talents 
and other qualili<-4itions will be necessary to recommend 
men to offices under the natioaal government — especially 
^s it will have the widest field for choice, and never cxpe> 
riencc that want o( proper persons which is not uncommon 
in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the 
administration, the political counsels, and the judicial 
decisions of the national government will be more wise, 
systematical, and judicious than those of individual 
States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect 
to other nations, as well as more nt/e with respect 
to us. 

Becjiufte under the national government, treaties and 
articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will 
always be expounded in one sense ami executed in the 
same manner— whereas adjudications on the same points 
and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four con- 
federacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and 



' For Iho Gni (urtir jon of national (pvtrnincnt, IhU pmlictioa wat 
wel) t«>1a«1, llw ililcM nam at both partict wllh lorrriy an (icEpUnti 
banc periMMnl oAk«decktn uid officvJioMen. Since 1830, liowcver, 
ihc KTMc M Men hoMiuE ol&ce lui \yj no in«aiH rcptncniKl ihe blfrheu 
moral at liilEtkttuil (nrce in (he cMnniuiilj, anil ihoac (ew who aai* 
wma tTpu(aii'K) In iilih«r caireorj'. ttivo tardjF hrcn tltotea tiECsnw 
of Uiai totKt, but bale dcicl<>|«? il aft(t nkiiion. In Bn^'t Am^ritan 
Cfmmvatrralii (ii J7) an iDlctrilioi; ciliaptti ti derolM 10 " Vlhf (lie 
Bcii Men da not go iuio poliiici." and doubtleti tad> tcaioa h« bttngt 
(otBanl lias liad ili dtkiini-i dcicncnl iBlliiienw, bal ihcf bf no mcana, 
cvni In lli«ii li>lal. ei[>Iain llie «nunial)r, foi crcij ciukC be ftodt <raa M 
infliirniul In i;6i|, ot iSoi. u In 1997. Other wnicii have arvail aa Iht 
eiplanaiinn Ih* dei-cl'ifnicel at (h« nnmiD*l>n|; |idnttile> and connn* 
■iont, coiucidt^l with ihe decline of Ibr Amtiican tialtunan U«diKm'a 
preddcwv, 1819-1837), Uit however ■ppafCDtlr M(ii.lactor]r iliii may 
■^ijwar. Ine Inltiiluciiiin of tliae aiclhodi aouaily oieani a litlleHag of 
mndilioni, l>ir tlia Mnill niHU.«c« awl contitye* itiey uiperMiltd <r«« 
lar more »niet ami far leu In be tv«cIi*<1 ty public nianiuti thm 
refslul; (ondui'Ifd puinurioi anil coniraitlioia. atnninU n* wkich arc 
publUliBl in itic nevit|iipen. Knil mhkh Jiaie cren been coni[<ell«d %u 
aplieat liclore Uic (.i-'Uilt. 

Thut Ibr main icaKin tot tlUt loircnnf of the lUnilanl nuit bi Mni^t 



*n 



LOCAL INPUENCRS. 



«5 



Uut, as well from th« variety of independent courts and 
judges appointed by ditTcrent and independent govcru- 
mcnls, as from tlie different local laws and interests 
wliicli may affect ai>d influence them. The wi^oni of the 
conyention, in committing such questions to the jurisdic- 
tion and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible 
only to one national government, cannot be too much 
commended. 

Because the prospect of present loss or ndvanluge may 
often tempt the eoverning party in one or two States to 
swerve from good faith and justice; but those tempta- 
tions, not reaching the other States, and consequently 
having little or no influence on the national government, 
tlie temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and jus- 
tice l>e preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with 
Ilritain adds jcreat weight to this reasoning. 

Because, even if the governing party in a Stale should 
be disposed to resist such temptations, yet, as such temp* 
^lions may, and commonly do, result from circumstances 
peculiar to the State, and may affect a great number of 
the inhabit.-! nts, the governing p<irty may not always be 
ablr, i( willing, to prevent (he injustice meditated, or to 
punish the aggressors. But the national government, 
not being affected by those local circumstances, will 



in (OHM mora prmMiaiM and anivvml cnunlaoo. and Ihe obvUnii inRa- 
tmx atipnn to b« ihe devclopnenl o( comniunicaiion. ntilch hu 
thanked ilic TeprFtFntBtiTc agent from a man acilni; at iniiiec Tur hit 
oMiaiuiiUj lo tlxal u( 1 man merely volliij at « (iiuty fur his <liiltict. 
Wbn Ptniilciil Wailini^loii wit lalloil upun lo tign or veto a hill, he 
waa cemp«ll«d lu ad wiiImiii any Inie knowldgc of plllilii; «|iiiiion : 
i»^y die rreiHeot tan Hirccly btoIiI knouiiicthe populai beni. and 
ihnau always tein(>tcd lo kt il lic>coi»i<lcr*liati in hk autfiin. In 171)7 
ybm voiara « a Mni^nntional dl^icicl knew pntlitally iioiliing uf vrlut 
lia—ptr aJ In Cun^nw unlil tlmr reprnniialive ttluninl Irom ili« 
wwi oa anil Ttpottnl to thcBi ; t>ow a concrcuinan'i dnk may lie 
KlUnd with prMntini; Icttcn ani) ifl^erann fiom conililnenH tlte A*y 
alter die mcie icpunint; ol a btll. TbU it la eflwi 10 nuke oAce- 
boMan, like the iiKmbcn ol the uld Vceiieli p«itianienl. Ihs nioi* 
ticinmof e<]i('li, nil>rr tlian tnnlcn ; and a» men of iptcial abtlilv 
«iB alavyt act imlepen'lenlly talhei than re prncntu lively, asd as MKM 
aUktrnereaanlriinp'ict teparaiioiii Ixhii the avcii^e intl ihcrrfore (iMn 
ika Rwjoriiy. ibelt lef lual 10 mcIe ofiice oi theli ntlnuon Irhb It, k a 
\a^aX reMlL— tntroit. 



i6 



V/OtnXCE VSVAtLY LOCAL. 



(K«.3 



neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor 
want power or inclination to prcrcnt or puoish its com- 
mission by others. 

So far, therefore, as cither designed or accidental viola- 
tions of treaties and the laws of nations afford yir// causes 
of war, they are less to be apprehended under one gen- 
eral government than under scTcral lesser ones, and in 
that respect the former most favors the u*ftly of the 
people. 

As to those just causes of war which proceed from 
direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to 
ine that one good national government affords vastly 
more security against dangers of that sort than can be 
derived from any other quarter. 

Because such violences are more frequently caused by 
the passions and interests of a part than of the whole; 
of one or two States than of the Union. Not a single 
Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggreKsions of the 
|)resent federal government, feeble as it is; but there are 
several instances of Indian hostilities having been pro- 
voked by the improprr conduct of individual Stales, who, 
either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish otitenses, 
have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent 
inhabitants. 

The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, 
bordering on some States and not on others, naturally 
confines the causes of quarrel more immediately (o the 
borderers. The bordering Stales, if any, will be those 
who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick 
seiiKC of app;irent interest or injury, will be most likely, 
by direct violence, to excite war with these nations; and 
nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as a 
national government, whose wisdom and prudence will 
not be diminished by the passions which actuate the par- 
tics immediately interested. 

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given liy 
Ibe national governmeol, but it will also be more in ibcir 
powrr to accommodate and settle Ihrm amicably, They 
will be more temperate and cool, and In that respect, as 



bfi NATION CAN MAKE BETTER TERMS. 17 

well as in others, will be more in capacity to act ad- 
Tisedly than the offending State. The pride of States, 
as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all 
their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correct- 
ing, or repairing their errors and offenses. The national 
government, in such cases, will not be aflfected by this 
pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor to 
consider and decide on the means most proper to extri- 
cate them from the difficulties which threaten them. 

Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, ex- 
planations, and compensations are often accepted as 
satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be 
rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or con- 
federacy of httle consideration or power. 

In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended 
Louis XIV., endeavored to appease him. He demanded 
that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, 
accompanied by four of their senators, to France, to ask 
his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to 
submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any oc- 
casion either have demanded or have received the like 
humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any qx.\xx powerful 
oatiota? PuBLius. 



No. 4- UnJi/HulmlJaurMMl, NoYimbcrr, i;B7.) Jay. 

RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN POWERS. ^ 

Mtthm a/ mar — Rivalry with Franu and Britain in Jiihtrits — Cem- 
mrrcial rivalry with Europe — China and India trade — Rivalry vrilh 
Eur^an taloniei — Exclusion from Mtisisiipfi and SI, Laiereiut — 
JtaUmy ef Eurtft — tudiufments lo mar — A single govtrnmenl nttes- 
lary for safety — Advantage! of national government — Afili/ia and 
navy if Great Britain — America divided inle independent governmenli — 
Allilude tf ftreign governments. 

To the People of the State of New York: 

My last paper assigned several reasons why the safety 
of the people would be best secured by union against the 
danger it may be exposed to by j'usl causes of war given 



I« 



MOTIVES FOK WARS. 



(KB. 



/ 



to other nations; and those reasons show lliat such 
causes would not only he more rarely given, hut would 
also be more easily accommodated, by a national govern- 
ment than either hy the State guvernmeiits or the pro* 
posed little confederacies. 

But the safety of the f>eoplc of America aKainst dangers 
Uom/^reiga force depciidx not only on their forbearing 
to give jHtt causes of war to other nations, but also on 
their placing and continuing themselves in Auch a situa- 
tion as not to iwiu hostility oi instill-, for it need not 
be observed that there atv fretfndeJ m well as just causes 
of war. 

It is too trtic, however disgraceful it may be to human 
nature, tliat nations in general will make war whenever 
they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, ab- 
solute monarchs will often make war when their natiu(» 
iire to get nothing by it, but for [lurposes ami objects 
merely penuimd, such as a ihiist fur military glory, re- 
venge for personal affronts, ambition, or private com pact* 
to aggrandize or support their particular families or 
pariisans. These and a variety of other motives, which 
affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead liim to 
engage in wars not sanctified by jni^lice or the voi^e and 
interests of his people. But, independent of these iu- 
ducemcnls to war, which arc more prevalent in absolole 
monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there 
are ollters which aNect nations us often as kinj{S; and 
some of them will, on eiamination, be found to grow out 
of our relative situation and circumstances. 

With Ftjinc« and wllh Briiain wc arc rjcaU in the fUlienes. and 
con sii)i|ily their maikt^ls r.bcspirr thiiu ibcy cjo tlienifirlvcs. nol- 
wiihfl.-iniliiig .iny rffoTts >■> prevent ii by boumles on ibdr awn or 
dulteji on (uiFt^n fisli. 
[ Willi ilirin niul Wllh most olhrr Eiitopcan nxlioni wp air livnll 
fin itHvijjuhuii (iiiij il>e cji tymy irjilr ; .ind we Hti.iii ilrvctvr oi*l- 
sdves il we luppiHc thai any ul ibem will tcjoKe in lecr ii tloumh; 
(or. as OUT catrjing limle rannul incrmne wiihowi in iome degree 
itimlnMhuig ilielra. it i* mme llicir intcreM, and will be more ihebr 
policy, lo mirata iKiin in firomuir h. 

Id the trade lo China and India we iiueiJere with more lliaa 



JBALOaSY OF FOSFJCX NATIONS. 



«9 



uiic nAltofi. inasmuch »,% il enable* uc lo parUkc in oilvAnlages 
which Uicy liad in a tnannci aionupolitcd, iirld iS w« llici«t>)' sup- 
ply uiumIvcs with comnvoclMlcs which wc uw'd lo purchnsc Irom 

llieRl. 

The culcnsion ol our own comnicrce in ou» oivii vcmcIs cannot 
five plcatuic to any nutionx who pcisMss urriiurii'ti on or ncjir thi« 
coniiaetti. bec^utc the chrnpncM \\\A excellence of our jitoduc- 
lK>i» attdeU lu Uie circmnitanL-e of vicinitir. und the enterprise and 
AJiJrcs^ t>J our mcrchaiiK and ii.-ivigiiioTK.Kill |[iv« us a K^euter 
Uun: in the udvanlnges wliich lliusc leirilorici iiHoril, than con* 
w»l« with ihe ivixhir\ or policy nf (heir rcrtpEclirc luvcicrgiiv 

Spain rliinki ii coiivciiienl to shut the Mississippi ' ng^iinii us oit 
one si'lc. 3n<) Dritnia rirliidrK ufi (rom the Si. Lavrri^iice on the 
g^ otticr ; nor nill eilhtr ol ihcm pcimit the other waters 

■«. II. which arc tieiwccn thrm and ux lo become the meant 

of RuitunI inictcoiii^e snd traffic. 

f rum ihrse and Mich like coiiinteratioii^ which initfht, 11 con- 
tfsiciit with prudciKc, be more amplified 4in<l <lelailcd, it u eaxy to 
va ihui )F.)lousics and unrasincMcs in.iy gmdunllir ktide into ihe 
mlnilt and cahineli of oilier njliuos, aivd ihnl we aie nut lo expect 
tlul Ihcy ihould regard our advanceinciil in iiiiinn, in power, anil 
cwunpiciice 1>y hiod *Xi'^ by lea, with an eye ol indiftcrcnce and 
CMiKposure. 

The people of America arc awate ih.il liiduccroeni^ lo war 
may arrjc out of the»e ciicumiianccTC. as well as (rom uthcn not 
aif otifious al present, and that whenevei such inducements may 
faul 5l llnte anil up|iurtui)ily lof operation, pretenses to color and 
iniilyilirm will ihx be winiing;. Wisely, ihcrefiHe. do Ihey con- 
vAa iwicni and a kimkI naiional govcrnmciii ai necesinry to put 
uA keep tlKm la tuch a utni\ti,tn as, in^lcid ■>( im'ilinf; war, will 
•n»l to reprc^t atiit diiciiurngc il. Th.il Mliialion oniisit in the 
I'c Male of ilrfcnsc, and [iect-M.iiily dqH'nds on iho 
.1. ihe aiiitu, and ihe rewurceft of ihe counirj-. 



vetihe nivigilian of the MJBdaippi wu one of ihe 

■ n% ol polilin [rom 17S3 iiulil llt« purchase of Louiii«na 

•An. The culici il«|^ <i( llie ili>)>ule *ie lirill wilh in 

I > '' L'uited Suieii ami K^in in i;')0" (Hmoldyii, iSqO), 

' '■'^■■tBlion* ore pren at larue In Ailami' " llisloty n( the 

i~ UncD *t*i» ill naTi[;>li«nbe««ineaqu«ilion of national 

oj the tnoiivci for rnlMinE the Mceulon o( Ihe Soalh bdiift 

' Ihc Norlhweit ■ouUI be nci:luilcil InMii itie noulbetn )iatl of 

. ! Ihnt Irom ■ {nx rninnre lo lli« Cinii '<f Mckiiw. and ncit 

'" Lii ,j)ituf e ai iha Contcfrntt eiii>i)>1 Ihe control of the Miutnlpfn 

fwatd titt creaieu coot«>l of the Ciiil War.— EblToa. 



I« ADfAA'TAGE:! OF ffATlONAL GOVERNMENT. {»•.« 

As (he safety of the whole is Ihc interest of the whole, 
and c^nnui be provided for without government, cither 
one or more or nuny, let us inquire whether one good 
govcrnmenl is not, relative to the object in question, 
more coni]>eteiit thun any other given number whiitever. 

One government can collect and avail itself of the 
talents aiMl experience of the ablest men, in whatever 
part of the Union they may be fuuniL It can more on 
uniform principles of policy. It can harmonise, assimi- 
Uite, an<l protect the several parts and members, anil 
extend the benefit of ii» foresight and precantions to 
each. Jn the formation of treaties, it will regard the 
interest of the whole, and the p;irticnlar interests of the 
parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply 
the resources and power of the whole to the defense of 
any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously 
than Stale governments or separate confiHlcrafies can 
possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It 
can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by 
putting their oflicers in a projier line of Kuhordinatiun 
to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate 
them into one corps, and thereby render Ihcm mnre 
efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four 
distinct, independent bodies. 

What would the militia of Uritain be if the English 
militia obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch 
militia obeyed the Rovcrnmcut of Scotland, and if Hit 
Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales? Suppose 
an invasion: would those three governments (if they 
acrccd at all) be able, with all their respective forces, to 
operate against the enemy so effrclually as tlie single 
government of Great (tritain would? 

Wc have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the 
time may come, if wc arc wise, when the Heets uf America 
may engage attunli'in. But if one national government 
had nut so reijulatcd the navigation of Britain as to nulte 
it a nursery for seamen — if one national goi-ernment ha<i 
nni called forth all the nalinnal means and materials fo' 
forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would 




MUTUAL STATE AID SOT P/tOBABlE. 



ruvcr have bccD celebrated. I.el Knsland have its 
nvigation and fleet — let Scotland have its navigation and 
leet — let Wales have iu navigaition and llect— let Ireland 
hare its navigation and fleet — let ilio«e four of the con- 
stUnent parts of the British empire be under four inde- 
pendent governnicnis. and it is easy to perceive how 
$oon they would each dwindle into comparative insig- 
nificance. 

Apply ihe^c facts to our own case. Leave America 
diridcd into thirteen or, if ynu please, into three or four 
independent governments— what armies could they rais* 
and pay — what (leels could they ever hope to have? If 
QDc was atiitcke<l, would the others Ay to its succor, and 
tpend their blood and money in its defense? Would 
there be no danger of their being Hattcred into neutrality 
by its spcciotu promises, or seduced by a too great fond- 
bKss for {trace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and 
B|r«(«ni ufeiy for (he sake of neighbors, of whom per- 

■ lups tliey have been jealous, and whose importance they 
1 are content to see diminished? Although such conduct 
I Mould nut be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural, 
r The history of the statcit of Greece, and of oiher coun- 
tries, abounds with such instances, and it is not improb- 
able that what has so often happened would, under 
cimJIjr eircamsianccs, happen again. 

But iilmil thai they miifht be willing lo help ibe iiK-aded Slate 
or luiilrdrracy. How, nod when, and in wlui piopnrlion shall 
ii-(i if mm and mone)- be aHortltHl? Who sli:ilt coin m anil I he 
■'■ '., anil from which n( iKrin th*ll he twcive hn onfcis? 

^'- -nide ihe lerni!! uf (icace. and in ca^<eu( diipulcn what 

•nipre ihaTI decide belnccn them and compel ac<|ilirt<:rnce ? 
V^ikiiu didirullies and iiiCMiivnienccs would be inseparable Irmn 
Muh a «iuui>oii ; wfaercit one govcmnient. iiv;iiching oi-cr Hie 
(oicnt and common inlcttsts. and conibinlcig and direcdng the 
(■•wm ami res(Min:» of the whole, would be tree from all lltese 

■ tDilurtatwiiniiv \ni\ conduce far more to llie wfrij- of the people. 
P But whatever tnay be our situatiun, whether firmly 

tailed under one national government, or split into a 
nuobcr of confeileraeies, certain it is that foreign 
ibUou will know and view tt exactly as it is; and tltey 



u 



.dB&. 




IS 



CONDUCT OF FOREIGN NA TIOXS. 



Ilt«.t 



will act toiv;ir(l us accordingljr. ]f they see that our 
natiunal govcrtimeiit U L-ffii^icnt and well ailminiitercd, 
our trade prudently regulated, our militia propcrly 
organixed and disciplined, our resuurccs and finances 
diiKreelly managed, our credit re-«^ull1ished, our people 
free, contented, and united, they will be much more dis- 
posed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resent- 
ment. If, on the other hand, they find u& either destitute 
of an effectual government (each State doing right or 
wrung, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or split 
iuiu three or four iudcfx-n'lent and probably discordant 
republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, 
another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps 
played off against each other by the three, what a poor, 
pitiful figure will America make in llieir eyes! How liable 
would she become not only to their contempt, l)ut to 
their outrage; and how soon would dear-bought experi- 
ence proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it 
never fails to be against themselves. 

PtiHUUS. 



No. 5. 



tfitAftminU JtMrtml. Wa n itf ra> ir*t.> 



Jay. 



PROJECT OF SEPARATE CONFEDKRAriKS, IN 
RKLATION TO FORKION POWER. 



Qtitm Annt'i ttlltr an anttm »/ KHglaiiJ mJ SerihtmJ—Eramftt ■>/ 
Crrai HrilMH — Oifiiiim 0/ the United SluUi — RrimUt »/ iiftmlr fit- 
ftdiraiui — liifvitahU fiaiimij — T^ " N^rt^rti //itt" — Aani'iir iv»- 
//Jirafifi—Ffify 0/ mtre MUatnti and trratUt — Ctruinty d/ affmli u 
£itnft. 

To tkt Pffiple 0/ Iht Stale 0/ iXew York: 

Uucen Aiidc. 10 lier kller of (he isi July, 1706, (o the Scotch 
P3lliiimcnt, mjkck some ubMrrvutiuiii un the iiiiputtance of Ihc 
Urn'oK then (ortning hctwrrn Rii^Uiiil aixl Scoit.-inil, which mcru 
ouf >tt«nlkKi. I shall prcicnt Ilie {lublic with one ur iwu rilta^u 
from it : ■■ An entire Hnij perfect union will In- the soiki found^linn 
at huling pc.ice: Tt uiU »ccure yuur rrlinion.lib-nty. anil propcrtj; 
rrmoTe llw 4iuiiim)lii's jii)i>ii);M younclvc*. aiitl tlic jiudiniiia und 




SEPAKATlOy WILL END /A' CONTESTS. 



n 



dfcrvnccs bclwixl our luro liingdoms. It muM incresM jrour 
ttrenjjih, liches. and i(n<l«: nn<\ by ihU union Ihc whole iiUnd. 
bring joined in Affection and free from all apprcli«nsions o( di(* 
(ocnt intercsi, will be enaUfd to rtsiti ail its tntmies." "We 
OHMI MTnrttly leconiiiiend lo you cjilmncss and uiianiniiiy in this 
(icai an<l wci^'ily ^iff^iir. ihul the union may lie broiif;hl to a 
ktppy coiKluHon, being ihe only tfffitHiif way to secure our 
piwint and fulurc happinevt. -Aa<X ilf.s^ippoint the dctignt of our 
iiul your cncmiec, wim wrill doubtless. »n litis occasion, mt fktir 
alHijtt ftideavars to firevrnt or dtlay Ikh um'en." 

It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness 
and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad ; 
and that nothing would tend more to secure us from 
ttietn than union, sLrcngtb, and good government within 
oursclvi-s. This subject is copious and cannot easily be 
exhausted. 

The hitiory of Great Rrilam is the one with whl(^ wc are In 
geneial the best acijuiiinlcd. and it gtvet us nuny tiielul Insonv. 
Wi" OMV prtifir by llirir experience wtthoui paying Ihc price whieli 
it c-ost iti«ni. Alllimi^i it seerns obvious lo common sen m- I h at 
the people (A Mich an inland should be hjt one nation, yet we fi>i<l 
lliat lltey were (wT age* diritled into Ihree, and Ih.il ihow; three 
werealino«l cnnslanlly rmhroileil in quaireU and war* with one 
aiitiihrr. Nulwilh standing their tnie inlerrU wiih respect to the 
coMliaetual nations was iMiIly ihe same, yei hy the aits and policy 
sihI pni'iicert o[ ihasic natTons, their mutual jealouues were per- 
pnnally krpi iiiflametl. and for a long snies o( years ihcy were (ar 
n|iire inronvenieni and ttotiblesoiiie than tliey were useful and 
•Mixling lo each other. 

Should (he |ieupk of Aniciica divide I hen i selves into three or 
four naIton% n'oiihl not (he !>amc thing happen ? Would nol sim- 
ilar ^.4l<>ii^i*->> .-irise. and lie in tike tiiannei c'leiished ? Instead ot 
thar lieiiig " ji>rne<l in afleelion " and free (ron-i all apprehension of 
'fltfetmi " inlefes>»." envy and jealousy would s«on extinguish 
omftdence anil affeedon. and (he partial ir.icrt-sit of each confcd- 
naiT. Imiead of ihc general interests of all Ameiica. would be the 
II ' ■■ ol their policy and purtuils. Hence, like nio*l other 

1 I. 'lions, they would always he either involved in dispones 

anil wai.or live la the constant apprehension of them.' 



"Pk* rrtult* <■( ihvlw'o wore well »lirtclie>l in I.IbcoIo'* insnpinl. 
ha nfnic. *' Phrucally ()<eakin|[, *e mnni't Mr|>aralD. We ainni't 
It reapcftm wuimu TiaM each other, not build a> impwMble 



»4 



fXBQOAUTV OF STATES. 



iir«.B 



The ino»t Mnguine atlvocntes fwr Hir« or four confed- 
eracies cannot reasonablf suppose Ihai (hcj would long 
remain exactly on iin rqiul footing in point of strength, 
even if it was possible to form thein so at first; but, 
Admitting that to be practicable, yet what human con- 
trivance can secure the continiiiince of such equality? 
Independent of tlicisc local circuinstanccit n*hich tend to 
be][ct and increase power in one part and to impede itn 
progrcKS in another, we must advert to the cRccts of that 
superior policy and good niaitagement which would prob- 
ably disiingui§li the government of one above the rest, 
jind by which their relative equality in strength and 
consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be pre- 
Humrd that Ihc same degree of sound polity, prudence, 
and foresight would uniformly be ol>served by cacb of 
these confederacies for a lung succession of years. 

Whcnercr, and from whatever cause, it might happen, 
and happen it would, that any one of these nations or 
confederacies should rixe on the scale of political impor* 
tance much above the degree of her neighbors, that 
moment would those neighbors behold her with entry and 
with fear. Both those pasKtnns would lead them to coun- 
tenance, if nut to promote, whatever might promise to 
diminish her importance: and would also restrain them 
from measures caleulaled to advance or even to secure 
her prnsperiiy. Much time would not be necessary Jo 
enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions. Stw 
would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her 
neighbors, hut also to feel a disposition equally unfavor- 
Mc to them. Oistnut naturally creates distrust, and by 



wall Iwlwcvn thrtn. A kiivband «nd arite nuy Ik iHiruticnl. anil gotial 
o( the imwiKe an-l lieTcuHl tl« Roch of eadi och« ; lit ihr ififfMcnl 
Mill at mil miintnr >-innuit <k> iliK. y-— .-r-Tioi hut remaui l*or to 
larv ; ■■«1 iiitrtiniir>c, ciii.er Kiiilcal>:i niM omlimie LetwctB 

tttnii. It U iKMkilil*, Itrm. t» maka Ti . rignr mm ■dT «nta) iw ) M 

e« nnn qilidaiiiTii afln' wpintiun ihaa bdnni ? Can alirnt vak* ma- 
tin caiifT ihiti fit-'ili lift mile !>in? Csfi irt^ii's W mon fohU»1lf 
•«('ii Sufl^He you po 

lo " Liucli Im on liulh 

tjilc\, iTiii HI' ;- . :, 1 iiu ;r»iJ- '![;"' i^K^ '"' "'"lUml ipmlionaM 

la tcmudl tni'T *pi» u|iiin f4«.~ — CnnuK. 



iff 



AUBNATlOlf OF STATES. 



n 



aothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily 
chanecd than by invidious jealoui^icti and uncamdid tm- 
|iuut]i>ns, wticthcr expressed or implied. 

The North \i generally the region of strength, and 
many local circumsUuceft render it probable that the 
mast Northern of the proposed confederacies would, at a 
period not very distunt, be tinqucslionnbly mure furmi. 
dable than any of the others. No sooner would this 
become evident than the Norlhem Hive would excite the 
same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of 
America which it formerly did in the souihern parts cif 
Europe. Nor docs it appear to be a rash conjecture that 
its yount; Nwarmx might often be tempted to gather 
honey in the more bloominji; fields and milder atr of their 
luxurious and more delicate neighbors. 

Tbey who well consider the history of similar divisions 
and confederacies will find abundant reason to appre- 
hend that those in contemplation would in no other sense 
be neighbors than as they would be borderers; that they 
would neither love nor trust one another, but on the con- 
trary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual 
injuHey; in short, that they would place uscjtactly in the 
situations iu which some nations doubtless wish to see 
«», i\%.,f0rmi<iiihle dhif toM<h 6ihtr.' 

From these considerations it appears that those gentle- 
ncn are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances 
oflcnsive and defensive might be formed between these 
confederacies, and would pruducc that combination and 
ttniim of wills, of arms, and of resources, which would be 
oci^nsary to put and keep them in a formidable state of 
defense against foreign enemies. 



' The irnth n\ Ihti lie* vu well liutlcMted by llie alllluilc ol th« coun- 
vj iben BMHI rftvrtndilc In i», ibe t'tmdi (^vrrnmrtil unliiig to il» 
ll inwii I II agnita u fultnws : " 1 lliink ta you do, llml ihr prF^mlion 
*f IW Coa||Ttsi oniikl mil ut. but what pcrhjpi iiiiu ui bciio ii ihit 
IW Uaitcil K<Blc< should not »C(|uiie the giolitical a>ii(i(lenc« oX Hliich 
Ihtf >rctu»cep«lble." (To Fienelt Ch*r|-^. July »i. ijSj) " II siiili 
Ftiacr thai llie URlIed SUtet tlvotikl (r<iu>ii in iWir pmpnl Mile, 
triiiui \\ Ibpy ihmM aogairr llir political cnnrittmcf of which th«y ite 
MwapiHib. they woitlil teon »tnuir« a force or a powvt which ihry would 
Ih wy Msdy to aboM." (To Mouciicr, ScpiciBb<t 17, ^^i',.) — Eoiios. 



s« 



BtVALRY OF CONTIGUOUS STATUS. 



[*«.« 



When did tlie independent ttlales, into wittch Brituin 
iivX S])um VTL-re formerly divided, combine in such 
alliance, or unite their forces agiiinst » foreign enemy? 
BmITm. The proposed confederacies will he dUlintt 
lud IS. aiitWHS. liiich of them uroutd have its com- 
merce with foretgnem lo regulate by distinct treaties; an<] 
as their productions and commodiliejt are different and 
proper for different markets, so would iho&e treaties be 
essentiiilly dtiTiT<-nt fiilTcrent commercial concerns must 
create different interests, and of course different degrees 
of political attachment to and connection with different 
foreign nations. Hence it might and prodiubly would 
bappcn that the foreign nation with whom the Souihfrn 
confederacy might be at war woidd be the one with 
whom the Xort/um confederacy would bctbc most desir- 
ous of preserving peace and fricndslitp. An alliaitee so 
contrary to their immedtale interest woidd not therefore 
be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and 
fulfilled with perfect good faith.' 

Nay, it is far more probable titat iii America, as in 
Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of 
opposite interests anil iinfrirmlly passions, would fre- 
ipicntly be found taking different si()e&. Considering our 
distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these 
confederacies lo apprehend danger from one another 
than from distant nalinns, and therefore (hat each of 
them should be more desirous to guard against the otiicrs 
by aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against for- 
eign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here 
let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive for- 
eign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our 
rnuntry, than it is to purxuadeor compel them to depart. 
How many conquests did the Romans and others make 



' 'Die >|<(wah nr ihe Cnnlnlenllr Sl>lt*to CrcM Rttlnlii ■nil Fnuite 

lUltTIti: the <■■■:' "■■- -r- ' • ■' ■'- -' ■>. ■ ■■-'■ 

(>i>t»llr mil- 

tWiwn hy Rii' , J 

imdil fnltow w^a any tirauniiu' hiKlconlnlcnuiciDnlhBtDnlinidt.'— 



6t1 division leads to foreign HOSr/tlT/RS. 8? 

m the characters of allies, and what innovations did tl»cy 
ander the Mine character intr'Kluci: into the governmcnt!i 
oi those whom they pretended to protect. 

Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of 
America into any given number of independent »over- 
ci][ntic& would tend to .secure us agiitiisl the hostilities 
and improper interference of foreign nations. 

FUBLIUS. 



No. 6. 



(/■lA'/m/'Br Jbarm/, Nmnbtr 14, ittj-t 



Hamilton. 



SEPARATE CONFEDERACIES SURE TO END IN 
DISSENSION BETWEEN STATES. 

C/rlntHly af inUritait ttnUlU — C^mti 1/ keilility am»ag •tali^ni 
— W'ari /mfiu/J if fm^mtt infilunif — AUrgtJ ^<ifi{ gtniui if re- 
fniSti — ftrfiubUii di iaH<-il a4Ji<u4 ta aar ai m^nartMii'-'Esamflfi 
tf Sfirta. AlluHs. Kamf, Carlkagr, fmict, IMitirJ. tiud BritaiH~As 
mtmy fffiiliir ai reyal van — IVan Amwvu Fmact and Engt^ad — 
AV uatan la tMfttt irrjiidilf i^lvitit Iki ilaUt if ttfarettd — Viet- 
HOft aiufUtUti itaficHi HtlU")! numnt. 

T« the Pt^ple of Iht Stalt 0/ Ntto JVi.- 

The three last numbers of this paper have been dcdi- 
Oled to un enumer;ition of the dangers to which we 
iDuld be e.iposed in a state of disunion, from the arras 
arts of foreign nations. 1 shall now proceed to dc- 
ate dangers of a diiferent and, perhaps, still more 
ming kind — those which will tn all probability How 
dissensions between the States themselves, and from 
>)vinatic factions and convulsions. These have already 
En some instances been slightly anticipated; but the; 
Iciervc a more particular and more full investigation, 
A man must he far gone in Utopian speculations who 
can seriously doubt that if these States should cither be 
■ttolly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, 
the sulnliviKions into which they might be thrown would 
ftave frequent and violent contests with each other. To 
presume a want of motives for such contests as an 




tS 



CAVSSS FOX WARS. 



iir«.i 



/ 



argument against iheir exislcncc, would be to forget 
iliai titcn arc ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To 
look for a continuatiun ol liannuny between a number of 
independent, unconnected SQverci{;nlics in the same 
neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course 
of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated 
experience of ages. 

TIm causes of houtility among nAlion* are innumerable. There 
aie some nhich h.ivc a i;<;ncr4l and ^Inio&i coii&ljni opcrjiibon upon 
ihr collective bodia u( nucicty. Of tilts description are Uiejove 
o( power or ihe dcsiic of pre-eminence and dominion^liie jcnl- 
Du*y oI i)o«-*r. or the ilevre o( equalily and safety. There arc 
others whirh h.ive a more c Ire u ill KnEeul bough Jin rqunlly oprra- 
lire influence wiihiii their sfihercs. Such are the riv.iUhips and 
compciltions ol commerce briwecn commercial nations. Atid 
there iite others, not leia numerous than cither of the furmet, 
which take their origin cniircly in piivate pasuoiis : iii ilie attach- 
nients. enmities, intcreMs. hn|>cs, and tears of leading individuab in 
(he cninmuniiies of which d>c)' are members. Men (A this class, 
whether the favoriles of a king or o( a j>eople, have in loo many 
Instances abused the confidence ibey possrsted ; am) ;is)>uining the 
pretest of some (ndtlic tnuiive, \x»ye im>i st^inpled lo sacrifice 
Ihe nnlional tranquillity lo pc(«inal advantage or personal grat- 
ilication. 

TIk cctcbtated Pericles, in compliance with the reseniinenl of ■ 
prasiilutc,* at the expense u( much of Ihe btooij and ircasute of 
hit countrymen, attacked, vaivquislied, and deployed tlie city ot 
the Sautttint. Ttie same luan.Mimulaicd by pciraie pique against 
the Mtx-'frnsiiiHiA another nation of Greece, or lo ai'oid a 
proscciilion with which be w.it ihiralennd oa an accomplice in a 
suppnse<l llied ol Ihe staLuiiry PtiidM^.! or lo get lid ol the acciua- 
ttons prep;irc<l lo lie hiriiiK'il nj^lnst him (or divti|uting the funil* 
o( the stale in the purchase o( impul.arily.i or from a coml>in:ilK>ti 
al all these causes, was the ptiniiiive auihor of that f.-imnus and 
fatal Mar, disiinguisliol in the Grecian annab by the name o( the 
Pthfranntsuin war; which, allcr various vicissiluilcs, Inicnnls- 



• Aifual' : "''' " Pl«t«reh*» Lite of Ptficlet."— PirUJVs. 

J/W. — PLBUI*. 
J /*iy.— f'UBUU*. 

% UiJ. nndiaii wM tiinpcApd lo hs»c uolcn Mwnt pnblii: eoM, wiili 
tW roiiniianro nl I'ericW. tor lh« rmbclliiliiDeiit of iba s1ai«c ol 
hiinem. — pLSUDk. 



anriltN) 



eEXSO.VAL INFLUEKCE IN WARS. 



*9 



sitMit, and (encM-ab. (eimiiuiled in ihc ruin of the AtbenUn cotn- 
BMMiwcalih. 

Th« atubitiotu cardinal who wai prime RiinistcT (o llmry VIIU 
penixuing his vanity to upjrc loihc Iripk crown.* rriicrtjincd 
bopa a( siKcectlinic in l)i« ac4|iiisiiion ol ilut spkntliil ptiie liy 
thc inAucnce o( thr Rmpcror Ch.irlcs V. To srcurc lite favor aiii) 
intnest ol lhi> entcrpriving and powerful (nururcli. he iircdpilatCTl 
Eitgland into » war wiih t'raiicp. contrar) lu the pUin<-t.l rliclmcs 
%i pulley, and at (he )u£.i(d of ihc s.ifciy arid inikpeiulcncc u 
well vi the km;;ilom over which )ic presided by his counscU. >1i of 
Europe in i-eoerjiL For if there ei'cr was a aoveieisn who bid 
laif lo rciUiie ilie profcci of uni<renal inniurchy, it was (he 
Kraperar C'tarles V.. of whoM intiiguct Wolscy was at once (lie 
imlrurncnl and the dupe. 

Ttir inHucnce whtch the higntryof one female.t (he petulance of 
Mother,* and Ihc <;al>al& o( a third.) tud in the eonieinporarr 
policy, trniicnis. and pacificjillonx. of a considerable pari of 
Evrope, arc lopioii (hat have been (oo often descanted upon not to 
bcfeiiCTally known. 

Toinuhiply eumplct of ilie agency ot perirf>nal coiiiideratioitK 
in tlie production of great national events, eiiher foreign or 
dcnnestK, according (o ilieir direction, would be an onnecctsar)- 
w4Mc ol lime, Tlione who have but a superfidal acquaintance 
"ilk ihe M>ure«s from which il>ey Jire to be drawn will themselves 
wollect a variety of insi.itices; and those who have a toleral>le 
luKmledge of human naitirc will not Mand in need of such lights 
lohnnihfii opinion eithei of tlic icalily or extent of that -iK'ncy. 
Petlapt, liowever, a rcf<-rcnce tending lo illu»lraic (he general 
|>niKiple, may with prujiriely be made to a caM which has 
Im lately happened among ourK-lvet. If Sbayt had noi 

*'* been a detfieratt drtlcr. i| is much lo be doubted 

'*Vibti Maciiarhii-ieltii would have been plunged into a ciril war. 
But tK>lwit)i$t;indtng tbe concurring testimony of cx- 
ftfieoce in this particular, there arc still to be found 
titwiury or designing incn who stand ready to advocate 
tile paradox of perpetual peace between the Stittcs, 
ihuugh dtsmemlicrcd and alienated from each other. 
Tbe genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit 



• Worn hy tli« Pope*,— Pi'W.ttt». 
lM»r. 'ir Mi>nlcm>».~rt:iI.litV 
jDaehesol Mnill><>rr<u|;h.— IVUItiS. 
SUine. de rompadoar.— PURUVK. 



30 



REPUBLICS NOT PEACEFUL. 



(ir«.l 



/ 



of commerce hati a tendency to tioften (he m^nneis of 
men, and to extinguish those inflanimablc humors wbicfa 
have so often kindled into irars. Commercial republics 
like ours will never be <)isi>oscd to waste themselves in 
ruinous contentions with each other. They will be 
governed by mutaa) interest, and will cultivate u spirit 
of mutual amity and concord. 

Is it not (wc may ask these projectors in politics) the 
true interest of all nations tti cultivate the s.imc benevo- 
lent and philosophic spirit? If this l>c their true interest, 
have they in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the con- 
trary, invariably been found that momentary pa^sio^5, 
and immediate interests, have a more active ainl itn* 
pcrious control over hum.-in conduct than general or 
remote considcratiuuK of policy, utility, or justice? 
Have republics in practice been less addicted to war tlian 
monarchies? Arc not the former administered by men 
as well a« the latter? Arc there not aversions, predilec- 
tions, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitionit, that 
affect nations as well as kings? Arc not popular assem* 
blics frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resent- 
ment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and 
violent propensities? Is it not well known that their 
determinations are often governed by a few indiviiln^ls 
in whom ihey place confulcnce, and are, of course, liable 
to be tinctured by the passions and views of those in- 
dividuals? H-1S commerce hitherto di>nc anyibing more 
than change the objects of war? Is not the lore; of 
I wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that 
of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars 
founded upon commercial motives since that lias bccutne 
the prevailing system nf nations, as were befnre occa- 
sinned by the cupidity of territory or dominiim? Has 
not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, adminiv 
t(re<l new Incentives to the apjietite, both for the one 
and for the other? Let ejiperiunt-e, the least fallible 
guide nl human upinioos, be appealed to fur an answer 
Irt th^M- tninitries. 
Sp.-uta, Athens, Rome, «Bd Oinh>i;e Mere all tepuUicsi twool 



HwUtM) 



CO.VMEJtCB A CAUSE FOS WAJt. 



ii 



them. Alliens luid C.irth^gc, oF lh« commercial Icinil. Yet were 
tbcT OA olicn unbailed in wnrs, oSeiislve ariil ilvfcnsiie. an llie 
neighbohng nionarcliics of the &an>c iim«^. Spuria wns link 
beltei' than a wclI-rfKuUted camp: and Kuiiie ttm never salcd o( 
KXmn'fft and cnnqurxt. 

Canbage. ihouKli a commercial repubttc, u-as ihe scgrcuor in 
the orry war that ended in her destruction. iUtinit>;)l had carried 
ber arms into l)ic licaii of Italy and to the gates o( Rome, before 
Sdpio, in turn, gnve him an ot-crthrow in the icrritotiei ol 
Carthitge, and made a conquest of ilic commonwealth. 

Venice, m l.iler tinier ligiiTcd more thin once in wars of am* 
IniiDn. till, hecomiug ,in nlijiTct of terror lolhooUici Italian stairs, 
Po|>c Jutiax II. found nie-nns lo accoinpliiU llut formidable I i!:igue,* 
Mrlitch gave & deadly blow to the power and pndeot this haughty 
republic. 

The province* of Hoil.ind, till itiey were overwhelmed in debt* 
and lujic!). took; a leading and con»picuou> pad in the war» oi 
Eulopr. They had furiou* contests with ICn^Und (or the 
iloniiniun of the Ma, and were among the most perscveiint; and 
uiwu Implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV. 

In llie govemmtnl of Britain the rcjiri-scnlalivei of Ihe people 
compose one branch of llic natiotinl Irgiil.-ilurc. Commerce has 
been for agei llie predominant pursuit of that country. Few 
awinoii. acirenhclru, h.ive been more frequently engaged in war ; 
»•) the wan m whicli th;il kingdoni has been cngagrd have, in 
numerous inttanccx. proceeded from (lie people. 

Tlierc have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popnlnr 
u royal wara. The cries of the nation and the importunities of 
ihiir reprc«eniative« have upon various occasions dragf^d their 
taonarehs into w.ir. or continued them in it cunirary to their 
iiKlinaltons. and sonKtimcs contrary to the real intereslx of llie 
a.tle. In thai memorable 41rut;gle (or tupeiiorily between the 
tiYil hnu«e« of Austria and BaurtoH. which so long kepi Europe 
flame, it i« well known that the anilpaihies of the En^li^h 
nst ihc French, seconding the ambition, or ratlier the avarice. 
Vkx hvorite leader. t protracted ihe war beyond the limits marked 
iHii by sounil policy, and for a coniiderable lime iu oppositton to 
the news of ihe court. 
The Hrara of tliete two la»t -men tinned nattons have lo a great 



*Tbc l.r«(^« of CMibfay. comprehending the Emperor, the King ol 
>, ikii King o( Amgon. >iu1 nwni <A tbc Italian princes uiil tlitt«. 
1inji>s. 
\ Tbc Doke of Uarlboro«sh.— Pti buv). 



3> 



STMTBS JfOr £XE.VPr PROM tVAKS. 



ur*.» 



niMisure grown out of commerei.il c«n«i(I«rallons — ibf <l«irt of 
su|>|)lanling and ihe (carol beiog uip|»lanted. dilwr in pailicular 
limnchrB of (nflic or in ihc gcncinl advaiiUgvs of ir«de and 
itari|;ation.' 

From this suinmary of what has uken place in olhcr 
countries, who&e situations have borne the nearest resem- 
blance to our uwn, what reason can wc have to con5de 
in those reveries which would seduce us into an cx|>ecta< 
tiun of peace and cordiality ttctwcen the members of the 
present confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we 
not already seen enough of the fallacy and cxtravanaace 
of those idle theories which have umiiNed as with 
promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weak- 
ncsscs, and evils incident to society in every shape? Is it 
nut time to awake from the deceitful dream uf a gulden 
gye. and to adopt as a practical maxfm for the direction 
of our political conduct that wc, as well as Ifac other 
I inhabitants of the globe, are yet" re mote from the happy 
' empire of perfect wiulom and perfect virtue? 

Let the point of extreme depression to which our 
national dignity and crcilit liave sunk, let the inconven- 
iences felt everywhere from a lax and ill adminit* 
tratioD of government, let the revolt of a part of the 
State of North Carolina/ the tate menacing disturbances 



' In tb« lext of ibe cdltioni of 1801 uid 181S, the loJIouini; mddltloiul 
wntoDcct ocvui >i lliii |<otni - " uvi ioatctitna, cien the inotc Oil|«IJB 
deiirc of ibuint; in thf roinRirtl'n of altirr naliont nilhovl llw^r ronsrat. 
1'he lut WW biit l<ro bclwtcn Btilain knd S)«in spnii); from ibc 
•ttcnipu ul i]i« EnBtiib mecchantt 10 inowralc Mi UlkH timJc nith (he 
S|i*iiiih M11111. TJicte unJuuIJialile prnclii-c* on ikttr Mrt ptoduccJ 
wifritiet iiB iheiwtt ei llw S)>aDt«r<ktnwan)ihF«ab)eRiim l-re*l Briliin 
wlitcb <KfT iui| iiiaifv iuthtilialij*-^ IvrCHJaM; tlirv ci«i:il<J tlir hiViult tA ■ 
]«■ teltlUliiin bmI uric L-liargral<lF u-iili intiiinianiiy «iul i-iurllf . Many 
of tbc Giiulitli "bu U'cic lakf II on lh« Spanish i-kmI but icnl to di|t tu 
the muick ii( PatDu ; unil by Ibc iiuul iMiauivu ol n tptril uf rFHtntmedl. 
Ilie IniKKCBl were, attci ■ wlillc. coiiIouiuIhI ii(ih tb« fii ' ')^- 

criniinatu piiinliRieni. I'lie c<iui|>lalai( ci the innchaxi ■ 

*iaI«M llanie thmngkoul iha ntH'--' 'I'n^ v.i.>« ■(■«( \m^i . -: ■■- il-* 
llosK of CumiBaiu, Kliirh ti:- ftxoa llinl tHuly lii iha 

miiiitln- I itxtti ■'■( tti'Tiul V. . I .1 wu mtacd, iiliidl i* 

in ■ ■ I bI! iliT iliijr^oi iLu tint twtuitf v«an hcfoK 

h«ii .,i.iii(ciL|itcuUou*ol ihniniBt bciwtrtal fwLMj." 

— tl>|l<-K 

*Sm Rifluaj'« "Ancoliol TranaB**," anttnriun. tSj).— Eotro*. 



H««UtoBl NEIGHBORHOOD PKODUCBS EFMITY. 33 

in P«nns3rlvania,' and the actual insurrections and 

rebellions iu Massachusetts,* declare- -\ 

So far is the general sense of mankind from corre- 
sponding with the tenets of those wrho endeavor to lull 
asleep our apprehensions of discord and hostility betvcen 
ihc States, In the event of disunion, that it has from long 
observjtiun of the progress of society become a sort of 
aiiom in politics, that vicinity, or nearness of situation, 
cunstiiutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent 
writer expresses hiniMlf on this subject to this effect: 
*■ Neighboring NArroxs (say^ he] are naturally enemies 
of each other, unless their common weakness forces them 
to league in a coNrRDr.RATivK RKfCiiuic, and their 
constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood 
occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which dis- 
poses al) stiitcs to aKar.iiidir.e themselves at the expense 
of their neighbors." * This passage, at the same time, 
points out the kvil and suggests the KEiiEur. 

PUBLIUS. 



No. 7, 



(/inA/riHlwr/iwf **/, Nftvcmbn ir, 17(7-) 



Hamiltoiu 



CAUSES FOR DISSKNSIONS BETWEEN STATES 
IF SEPARATED. 



Ttrnteriat diifutu — Ptihiii Itrriltry — Wyvming tmtrntrty^ t'tr. 
■nf iiipulr — Cfrfttilitni 0/ Cfinntrtt — Oiieyimiiuttiai; nunmtnial 
ttptlanrai— TAr JVf» Y«ri im^il— Tkf iMA'iMm/ <htt—Dipiulliti c/ 
•tftrtining 4thi—L4»i in vi*iiliim »/ /•ritnU tSHfratlt — JExamfJr 0/ 
fLsit li/iimi — ff^nuttie aitJ /ifffigH olliaucti — Cttlatntj! t/ Eartfte» 
"dsitilimtnU. 

/;■ tkt Pe»fti of Iht Stale of Nev/ Ytrrk: 

It is sometimes asked with an air of seeming triumph 
what induceiMcnts could the States have, if di^uniird, to 
make var upon each other? It would be a full answer 

'Fidi" Pilndim dn N^furiitiuttt," pii TAbli^de M>l>ly.— I*UliUi;i. 

'Stc Hiti'n " Krtaf of iTitl* in llir Srreiilrfii T<>wii&lil|i» ol Ihc 
"■Hly iif LiiiL-me ■■ (irilli li<iiilk>|>>a)>li)r> : Hnrriiliiirn. 1879 — t%nlTfi>. 

' A Imll lintofy nISluri' tcbcllion will )ie fomiH in Minnt'ii " Hi«1o()i 
>i the tBUurcOtMi in MEbudtuMiU" ; Wotcaiet, 1787.— EorrOR. 



34 



TEXX/TOJttAL DISPUTES. 



III0.I 



to this question to say — precisely the !uinie inducements 
which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the 
nations in the world. Hut unfurtunatcly for (is, the 
question admits of a more particular answer. There are 
causes of differences within our immediate contcmi>la> 
tion, of the tcfitleiicy uf which, even under the restraints 
of a federal constitution, we have had sufKcienl expert* 
cncc to enable us to form a judgment of what might be 
expected if those restruintx were removed. 

Territorial disputes have at all times been found one 
of the most fertile snurccs of hostility among nations.' 
Sm Perhaps the greatest proportiiin of vntf. ihui 

Bo, ». have desolated the earth have sprung frwm 

this origin. This cause would exist among us in full 
force. We have a vast tract of unsettled lerrilory 
within the boundaries of the United Slates. There 
still arc discordant and nndccidcd claims between 
several of them, and llie dissolution of the Union would 
lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. 
It is well known that they hare heretofore had serious 
and animated discussion concerning the rights to the 
Iand.« which were uni;ranted at the lime uf the Ri^vulution, 
and which usually went under the name of crown lands. 
The Slates within ihe limtls of whiisc C'ilonii>I govern- 
uients they were comj'rised have claimed Ihtm :is llieir 
properly, the others have contendi-d that ihc rights of 
the crown in this article devolved upon Ihe Union; 
e«[»ecially as to all tliat pari of the Western territory 
which, cilhtT by .Kiiial |>ossession, or through ihr snl*- 
mts<^ion of the Indian pruprielors. was snbjccied to ilic 
jurisdiction of the King; of Great Britain, till it was 



'Tfi ilt-ncuii lnjto Ihc liiB|; tlram;lc ovur ilur |>ai>tii: lomliry, twclnning 
long prior tollir Kcrolution bwI conliauol nniil thrri^l of lb* Ciiil Wa, 
wlildi WB in Uulli. UmIc Iron lemtKirary iiiil Ick-jI ilitaciFcnxnit*, l>y| ■ 
«iruxt^ ol the vatiflui (Fclicuix ol [hr Union In maiiillin 1 bilnBc* M >ntcr> 
nl ticltnen llie SufTli uiil Sixiih. ur K114 *■■<! VV«i. winili) r«t|uiitlMloo 
iiiui'Ji 4)x|i:f. An nnlliii* l>i*('i>T n lirttlUnllv |!iwii In \VeII1»i:'ii "Tha 
|jn>l i'<Jili<* cti ill* IJoilcl SlJi "' 'in 

Sua'*" lluloryof i|i« l.ii»l Qn '■. 

1SS6), anil Biiwh milerul in nl- — . l 1 — ; , ^ J...1.11I 

in Duaal<lu»'» " IIm PuUle Donuiu " (WuhlogUiM, tSSj) ■— EuntM. 



HtsUUml 



FV81IC TERSITOSY. 



35 



rdinquUhed in the lr«nly nf peace. This, it hits been 
said, was at all events an acquisition to the Confederacy, 
by compact with a foreign power. It has been the pru-. 
dent policy uf Congress to appease ihis controversy, by 
prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the^ 
United States for the benefit of the whole. This has 
been so far accomplished as, under a coiilinualion of the 
Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable 
termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the 
Confederacy, however, would revive this dispute, and 
would create others on the same subject. At present a 
large part of the vacant Western territory is by cession at 
Icaxt, if not by any anterior right, the common property 
of the Union. If that were at an end, the States which 
made the cession on a principle of federal compromise, 
rould be apt when the motive of the grant had ceased, 
reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other States 
would no donbt insist on a proportion, by right of 
re(ireseutation. Their argument wguld be that a grant 
once made could not be revoked; and that the justice 
>f participating in territory acquired or secured by the 
Mnt elforts o( the Conrederacy, remained undiminished. 
If. contrary to probability, it should be admitted by all 
the States, that each had a right to a share of this corn- 
toon Kiiict:, there would still he a diRiculty to be sur- 
^nountcd as to a proper rule of apportionment. IJitTcrcni 
rinciplcs would be set up by diifercnt Slates for this 
purpose; and as they would affect the opposite interests 
of lite parties, they might not easily be susceptible of a 
pacific adjtistment. 

Ill ilic w.iie firlil o( Wcstcni tcrriiory. llvrretore, wc prrccivean | 
ample iheaier (nr tioMile jirrrrnsloits, wilhuul any uiniwre or com- 
mon (imIcec la tiilrrpoK between (lie contcn'ling paillcv To 
m»un ftnm the pail U> the fulure. we shall luve [-Mid giouml to 
■pprrhrnil ihal llu; (word would somciiin«« l>e appealed to a> the 
■riiiler nf iticir ilifterenc«. Tlie tireuniiLancti of ibe dlipuie 
belnrecn Conncctkui and Pcnnsrlvnni:!, respcfiing the land at 
I'oiiish u« n«i iki l>e lancuine in expecting xn osy 
I u( sitch iltffrrfcicev The .micles of con(f«lriiUion 
Knidie (Miiics 10 submit the nvaiici' lo the decision oJ a Icderal 




36 LASO DISPUTES BSTWEEN STATES. W*.* 

Cfturt. Ttie subiitlK^ion was madf, and ih^ crnirt ArcHlrA in (avor 
o( Pennsylvania. Hut ConnFCtictit gace Strotig inOiculioiii oi 
dim i iff anion wilh that dclermiii^itton ; nor tliit «hc njipear lo 
be entirely miKiieil lo it. nil, by negotuiiton and maiiogemeni, 
MRielhing like an equivalent wus found (or the Iom she aU|i)iOMd 
heraelf to liare su&iatncd. Nothing here said i» intcntlriJ to coi;- 
vey the ilij^lucti censure on the conduct a( ihul Smie. She no 
doubt atTiccrcly believed herself to huve been injuied by ilw 
decixion : and .States, like individual, acquiesce wilh great reluct- 
ance in dcicrniinalioiis to llieir ■ I luul vantage, 

Thoie who h.id an oppuriuiiiiy of !ieein|i the JiiMile of the 
irnniaclions which attended ihe progress of the conirovetsy be- 
tween thii State ami ilie district of Vermont, can vouch ihe <>pjio> 
silton we experienced, as well from States not inlerrtlcd a» froni 
tho»e which were interested in llie claim ; arid can altcsl Ihe ilangcr 
to which the pCiAce of the Confetleracy ini|{ht have been exposeil, had 
/ tlinSlaieaiicm)itcdtoasscil itstighisby force, Twomoii)csi)fc- 
j ponderatnl in that oppoiiiion : one. a jealouty entertained of our 
'• (uiure power : ami Ihe oilier, ilie inlere« of cerlain indiviitunU i 
^ inHnrnce in the neighboring .Slates, who had obtained granil 
bnils und'.T llie aciu.dgovemnien(i>f that district. Even iheSraies 
which brought forward claims, in conlradiclion to on rt, teemed 
moie solicitous to ditinemlic-i this Stale than to esljbllsli tiKJt owl 
pretensions. Tlicse were New Hamp^iire. Maviachusrits, and 
Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions, 
diicorered a warm leal for the independence of Vermont : and 
Maryland, till aUrmed by tlic Appearance of a connection beiwecB 
Ciiinada uiid that Stale, enteied deeply into tlie same vkws. 
Tliese being small Stairs, s.iw with an unfriendly eye the pers|>ec- 
I live of our growing greatness. In a rcWew o( these transaciioncj 
we may trace some of the causes which wuuhl lie likely in embrol 
the Sinies with each other, if it should l>c tiMir unpropitkMis destiny 
to become disunited. 

The coinpetitin»<t of commerce would be another fruit- 
ful source of cuntcntion. The States less favorably cir- 
cumstanced would be ilcsiroiis of escaping from the 
disadvantages of local situation, and of .tliaring In Die 
advantages of tiicir more fortunate ndgtibors. Each 
State, t>r teparate confederacy, would pursue a system of 
curomerctal policy peculiar to itself. Tiiis would occa* 
sion distinction*, preferences, and exclusions, which 
would beget discontent. The babits of intercuursei uo 



SunHsoB] 



COMMERCIAL RESTRICTIOHS. 



the tuiis of equal privilescs, to which wc have been ac- 
customed since the earliest settlement of the country, 
would give a keener edge to those <:au8es of discontent 
liijtn iticy would naturally have independent of this cir- 
cumstance. Wt shoutil ^ rfitity to Jenominalt injurie% thosf 
tJarngs whuk Teere in reality the jushfiabit acts p/ indrfendent 
Si/eereignlies tenutiHas a dittiwt iitUreit. The spirit o( 
eDtcfprisc, which characteriies the commercial part of J 
Amerioi, has left no occasion oT displaying itself unim- 
proved. It is nut at all probable that this unbridled 
spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of f 
trade by which particular States might endeavor to' 
secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The 
■ nfrsciionsof ilirsc regulations, on one side, the efforts 
to prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally 
lead to outra(;es, and these to reprisals and wars. 

Tlie op poi tunnies nhicli some Stales wmil<l have of rendering 
mFicts tiibuiaiy to Ihem by commercial regulations ivould be 
g«« impaiienlti' subiiiillcd to by the lril>ul--iry SUIev Tlie 

la-lS> relative »ilu.tlron of New Yorit, Conrif<:iiciil, and New 

Jeney, w«Nili) aftntd an example of Iliis fiintf. New Yoric frum V 
ihc oecCMtlies of mrniic, nuivl Uy duties on her ImputlaiionSf 
A grul part o( xhfie dutin inusl bt puul by Uic iiifiiitHliints of 
the t»o other States in ilie capacity ot consumers o( wliai we 
import. New York would ncitlier be willing nor able to forego 
tMt adi'aniage, Hl^^ citiicns would nut coniciil that ,n doly puid 
hy them shinild be remitted in favor of ihe ciiinrns of her ncigh- 
hnrs; nor woald it be practicable, if there were not iliis impcdi- 
inmi In the way. to di^tingiiisli the ciiMomers in our own markets. 
Wouiif C'lntirrticut and New J^r^'T '""K submit to br la»eit hy 
Nrw Viif k (or her exclusive brnrfii? ShouUI wc he long pcrmilleil 
(<i tonun in ih^ <|(it«l and umhslurbcil enjoymrnt of a mctropoliK, 
(rnm the possr^ton of which wc dcriveil an ^ulvaiilaj^e so odious 
'u uor neiglilMrs. and, in their opinion, so oppressive ? Shmild we 
\k Me to preserve ii against the incumbent weii;hl of Conitecticut 
(HI dM* one side. an<l the co-operating pressure of New Jersey on 
the other? Ttioe are questions tliat teiaerity alone will answer in 
the afbrmaiive. ' 



' A lUEe part of the Eitfopewi caorft e<»n<iinied In Ihe northern put of 
)<«* Imey, an'l of llie vnttra p«tt( iil Connceiltul and Mauoclniieiii. 
*tn uuportcil l>T No York menhinlit and tha* paU tlie •lutia Uvied 




38 PUBLIC t)RBT. m».1 

The public debt of the Union would be a further cjiise 
of collUion between the separate Sutcs or conrcilvructcs. 
The apportionment, in the first instance, and the pro* 
greK*ive extinguishment afterward, would be alike pro. 
ductivc of ill-humor and animositjr. How would it be 
possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfac- 
tory to all? There is scarceljr any that can be proposed 
which is entirely free from real objections. These, as 
usual, would be exagtl^ratcd by the adverse interest of 
the parties. There arc even dissimilar views amon^ the 
States as to the general pniu:iple of discharging the 
public debt. Some of them, cither less impressed with 
the importance of national credit, or because their citi- 
zens have little, if any, imme<liate interest in the qu(-«- 
tioo, feel an indifference, if not a rcpu£uaiK!e, to the 
payment of the domestic debt at any rate. These would 
be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution. 
Others of them, a numerous bwly of whose citin-ns are 
creditors to the public beyond the projiortion of the State 
in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenu- 
ous for some equitable and effective pnn-ision. The 
jiroitrastt nations of the former would excite llie resent- 
ments of the latter. The settlement of a rule would, in 
tlie meantime, be postponed by real difTereiiccK of opinion 



br the Hair of Nrw York. As ■ rmll fl vu alt«gn1 ijial New Yutk 
drew iMo ill pnlitU* parte rroia ConDrditut alone • fca'lT *■><" *«rioa«I]p 
(■llniMled 11 bdmea fiuo.uoo »aA taoo.ooa. In tit? •amr nuiuier 
NcHI""! ''"ici ■ " tritiule " UH (lie cbleni |>ul M^ <" < Biilli 

Nt* JoMy toA CnsncLiiiiit. ihttefotf, wrrc "srmli : nl ■mtv 

ftmofi); llic iinl lo idupl the CHnlitulton. wIiiIf ihc S: ^< <ik 

and Rhode IiUikI wct« cotnMHiBdinK); nmngl^A. - •> 

VaA WH lisBlly lotMd VMta Wiltollun bj Ihe ihirtit . i nl 

i:!iit>ct Ihit illhcr th*i) fofCgo Ihr tirt<rfii>. ij ||ii, tnalCi ti-Hain lu \m 
kffMleJ hy ff.lrral Onlict, Ikry wniiH n.skr N»Tf Vnrii titj a le^vnriv 
klaie and Ihnn join (lir IfaiiMi : >nil Itho^ IiIuhI .inly uwiiint alieii 
the paBDoc ii< a feikral revenue bill iniamj her liiu a\ ihc irailc ol 
OmMCtkut. In the unc nunncr vrrj larlfl I>i1l itui hai niailiTillr 
Mxod one pari o( Ihc conmry (nr (he lirivfn n\ ■■■tihn hat alwayt 
ulrrcd ■!> teiHiuiul tll>rce)iii|; (llir nunl miiiMr iT».Mi.[; being Ike 
•tleRi)il of Snuth rarntim to niillily Ihe UrilT n; t>conie lUeh 

a losrce of iliwnnlenl tn Ihe Sonltiem Matei M ' .an InwnloM. 

in Ihe conuliuiioo i.t ih* Southern Couicdencj, ul t. jUL^lbltldn ei tfl 
jiioteoiie tuci on Imjuiu, — l:i>mK. 



BuUUmI apportionment of public debt. 39 

and affected delays. The citizens of the States interested 
would ctamor; foretgn powers would urge for the satis- 
faction of their just demands, and the peace of the States 
would be hazarded to the double contingency of external 
invasion and internal contention. 

Suppose the difhculties of agreeing upon a rule sur- 
mounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is 
greal room to suppose that the rule agreed upon would, 
upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some 
States tlian upon others. Those which were sufferers by 
tl would naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. 
The others would us naturally be disinclined to a revision, 
which was likely to end in an increase of their own 
incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible a 
pretext to the complaining States to withhold their con- 
tributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the 
non-compliance of these States with their engagements 
wiiuld be a ground of bitter discussion and altercation. 
If even the rule adopted should in practice justify the 
equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payments 
on the part of some of the States would result from a 
diversity of other causes— the real deficiency of resources; 
the mismanagement of their finances; accidental dis- 
orders in the management of the government; and, in 
addition to the rest, the reluctance with which men com- 
monly part with money for purposes that have outlived 
the exigencies which produced them, anti interfere with 
the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, from 
whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, 
recriminations, and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing 
mure likely to diitiurb the tranquillity of nations than 
their being bound to mutual contributions for any com- 
Dan object that does not yield an equal and coincident 
henefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite, 
that there is nothing men differ so readily about its the 
payment of money. 

Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount t 
to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citl- / 
UBS are injured by them, may be con»dered as another 



40 



LAWS VIOLATING CONTRACTS. 



{■«.T 



probable suurce of hostility. We are not authorised to 
expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would 
preside over tlie k-gisladons of ttie individual Sutcs 
hereafter, M unrestrained by any additional checks, than 
we have heretofore seen in too muny instances disgrac- 
ing their several code*. We have observed the disposi- 
tion to retaliation excited in Connecticut, in consequence 
of the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of 
Rhode Island;' and we reusoiiubly infer that, in similar 
cases under other circumstances, a war, not ai parthmeai, 
but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches 
of moral obligation and social justice. 

The probability uf incompatible alliances between the 
dlRerent States or confederacies and different foreign 
nations., and the effects of this situation upon the peace of 
the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some pre- 
ceding p:ipers. From the view they have exhibited of 
this part of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, 
that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble 
tic of a simple league, offensive and defensive, wonld, by 
the opcr.ition of such j;trriug alliances, he gradiully 
entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European 
politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of 
the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to 
become a prey to the artifices and machinations of 
j>owi!rs equally the enemies of them all. DiviJf ft imf^ra * 
must be the motto of every nation tlial either hate* of 
fears us. f Publiits. 



' Divide mill oomrauid.— PimLirs. 

f In orilcT tttii the wlinlc wlijci'l if llci* papm in>* *s uxm *s pool' 
bk bp bill ticfKcc iKr piihlic. ii it (■rnpntnl tn pahl'ith ih*m (om Hmn ■ 
wcEh — ail TuOiLiir in th« Ncv Votk Paittt and on ThumUj' 1» die 
Ptiify AslttTiiitr. — Piintms, 

' Khodc tt-'inil, by (itum tA p«|>eT vtimty and tender Imti of iinu.™! 
dfnnviiy, bad eniuaed t^nakiil (wldic and ;i4ivate repuiilMTM fWZXue 
nrt^TBWw. IVtednt, rn>T><lcn<:r, IJSJ. »■'! Ptitlct'k " Aacount o( the 
raper M.mcy'AT'RIi-rio l^lnril." Pt"*i4e»Cr. iSRo). int Ib rctalUlkm 
Council icut pUM"l ■ Ijiiir fmbidilinK iti coiiRi to try (VMS of RbOdc 

libnil ctcdiUtn «£*■»( Connecticst deMon.— Eoiros. 



BwatM) WARS BETWEEN STATES. 41 



No. 8. (New York /Wf^f/, Novcmbei ss, 1787.) Hamilton. 

CONSEQUENCES OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN 
STATES. 

War ktliettH tht sfalti partitularh Jitlrtiting — Ijick of ttfinding 
mrmiti and fortifitd posti^Neciisary introduelien of tlattding armits — 
Cfrnftlilien bitvKtti thi statu in armammti — Examf let of Greet refui- 
litj — NalioHal danger unduly magnifiti military fewer at exfenie af 
tivit — Exampit and fteuliar felieily ef Great Britain — Similiarily ef 
tht Unittd Stain — NeedUssnets af extensive military establishments. 

To tht People of the State of New York: 

Assuming it therefore as an established truth that the 
several States in case of disunion, or such combinations 
of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck 
of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those 
vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity 
with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neigh- 
boring nations not united under one government, let us 
enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences 
that would attend such a situation. 

War between States, in the first period of their sepa- 
rate existence, would be accompanied with much greater 
distresses than it commonly is in those countries where 
regular military establishments have long obtained. The 
disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent 
c£ Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty 
and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of 
the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests 
impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation 
which used to mark the progress of war prior to their 
iotrodaction. The art of fortification has contributed to 
the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled 
with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct 
invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three 
frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's 
country. Simitar impediments occur at every step, to ex- 
banst the strength and delay the progress of an invader. 




4» SAFETY A DiRECTOROF NATIONAt. CONDUCT. fWa, ■ 



Formerly, an invadinK army would pcm*irate iiiiu tlw 
heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as iiUetli- 
gence of its approach could be received; but now n com- 
paratively small force of disciplined trotipN, acting nti the 
defensive, with the aid of posts, is able lo impede aud 
filially to fniKtrale the enterpriscK of one much more 
considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of iltc 
globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and 
empires overturned, but of towns tukcn and n-ukcn; of 
battles that decide nothing; of retreats more beneficial 
than victories; of much effort and little acquisition. 

In this country the scene would be altogether rcvcr&cd, 
The jealijusy of military establishments would {Mistpone 
Ihcm as long as possible. The want of forlilications, 
leaving the frontiers of one State open to another, would 
facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little 
difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Con- 
quests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be 
retained. Wa r, the refore, would be desuliiiry and pred- 
atory. PLUKoeit and devastation ever march in the 
train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals woDid 
make the principal Rgure in the events which would 
characterize our military expluiis. 

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I con- 
fess, it would not long remain ». just one. Safety from 
external danger is the most powerful director of national 
conduct. Kvcn the ardent love of liberty will, after a 
lime, give way lo its dictates. The vinleni de.tirurtion 
of life and property incident to war, the continual effort 
and alarm attendant on a slate of continual danger, witi 
compel nations the most attached to liberty to report for 
repose and si-curity to institutions which have a tendency 
to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more 
safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of 
being less free.* 



'Tlir prctcnt irmanienli oF E]uit<[ic «ie « poinlci] iBtuncc of Ibe Initli 
of thit iJn. aiii) II l> la tic iiiHeil Ihil ocry aiUtlltoii lo Ihein U lirn^hl 
■Iwilll. mil through ■ny Inciriatti |itobiiliilil)> nl Hit, Iml rnlinlj' ihriiu|*li 
nuiuil cnuUlioa. Tbc ti»th am tiaa be prurcd [icj^iiiveljr \if die |«ct 



HwUlM) SrAA'/>/A'G AKMIES. 43 

ThcfnsiKulions chiefly nllutleit lo ate staxiunc. akmies and 

Ihe ct>rn3fior»iicnt oppetidagcs of mililniy csublishnicnls. Stanil- 

^_ -- i"g ariiile*. It ib Mid. are nol provided ag.iinsl 111 the 

U,M,41, "^^ CunMiluiion : »nA \\ is llierclure iiiferrrd tI1.1t 

•4,71. ilicf nuy exist under it." Their exi.tiencc. howevei, 

from the i^ry tettns cH ihc propociiion.ls, at mou. prohieniaticnl 

ami unceTUtiii.' iltit sundiiig armies, it may be replied. muM 

laeviMhly fcxhIi troti) a diuoluiion ol the CanCedetiicy. f'(et|ueiil 

mu anil coosiaiil ajuprehension. which require a st;iie of as coti- 

luni prepLariirHm, will infalhhiy produce them. The weaker 

Slater ur tun (olcractes would first h;ive recourse lo tliem. to |)iii 

tilem»lveA upon an equality with their inoic poleni neighbors. 

Thry wuukt ritiic.ivot to supply the liifcilorily of popul.ilion and 

retourecs by a more icKular and effcciivc tysirm »l defense, by 

■bstiplrncd troops, and by forlificjitiotis. They woulit. at Ihe tame | 

time.be necessitated tu iilrenglheii the cxcciilii-c arm of g(n<err.' 

mmi, in doing whidi iheir const iluiiotis wraultl acquire a pn>- 

gnuire liircciion toward iiiunaichy. It is of (he nnture of war lo 

.dcnxK the oicetltive at the e«pensc o( the lesbUlivc uulhotity. 

The cxpe(|i<'nit which have been mentioned would soon f;it« ihe 
StMo or eofifcdcracics that made useol iliem a superiortly over 
Ur ndglibtin. StnaU Mates, or slaiei of leu natural urenglh. 



Ibalihe Itiiileil Slslo army in 17115. when we vcre ineaoccilliy ttrong 
vfritnrtlf p^^'f-fntiicnU piivtchhAii^ I'aniblii ami )-riiii>ijuii, wai nearly 
1'" — --i -r-iimmly wie wiMiet (« every 1 JOo «f itilmbrtanlv. while in 
I . ICC vtth Canada aiialmmt <«rl>in factc-i. and uilli the luli- 

"I 1 "enk power on our southern (roniicr. tmr ainiy nunibrieirl 

'«-. is.ouOi or apprciiimalcly one 10 ei>ery 3S00 nf liiliiliiiaiiix. And 
iW iiiii ilnreaio o( ntlio it not nicnrly dnc lo "nr Inininll.nniii poiition 
»>k««B by Ihe umiev <A the taps Him lu Ihe loulli ol \vt. nhiie domci- 
■■'■adlareienpeare arc far leu lecuie. Tho» Moiiio Mi cbIIc<I upon 
■a ■liitaln ( iS^) an amy tA over 50.000 men actually K-rvinc, wilh 
MIC than dnahlE that numlici in her cnnlivc rrtctvc. anil Hiaiil |l8'/>) 
Uan aitny of nearly aj.ooo ni«n willi a rrw-fvc "( cjii.-il mk. Nolli. 
•■{ CM hetter prove Ifint lh« ilan'linc armtei of tn^day are jii do )eni.e 
Ik icbJi of paiiieulnr fotat oJ )t>>*erninent, hut are merely the kacn- 
fa •>( tj;lven aai-Miil of nuiihcKMl in<I inouey by each coiinlty. in abuilule 
nintntlie inlrrim ao-l rileiifir<laiii;eti wilh which cuh ik ilirratenrrl, in 
<''ct Ibal life. piio|>«fty, and wnimeKe, may hare their neiTrary 
•"ariiy.— EtMtoa. 

*Thl« ntifcclUin wlU be fully eiatnincd in itt proper place, and (1 «UI 
WitKTon thai llie only oatatsl prccaulloa which could have Iven taken 
^ iltii rihircl hak Ircea taken ; anil a much heitci ooc llian ii lo be 
' ironuilnti"n lh*[ hu lieen heretnfiptr framed in Amelka, 

a II eontnin no |-Tiiird at all on ihii object. — I^tni.tl'i. 

Ill 'Tir (rii o( irto3 : " Ihu inference, from the vefy form ot ihe 
inpMuion, ti, at bett. proUonatival awl unictiaiu.'' — Euirot. 



/ 




44 IKDUST&Y INCQMPATiaLE WtTtt MIUTAKISM. 



under rigorous goirc*nmcnt«. and wilh Ihcassistanrc of dlsciplintd 
armies, have often Iritimptieil over large stales, or stiles o( graaler 
jutural strength, which have hccn (ksiiiuic t)j ihckr ailvanljign. 
Neither the pride nor ihi; safciy of the nvorc impoitani Staien or 
confederacies would permit tliem long lo submit to thi« monifying 
and advenitiious »iipcrioi'iiy. They would quickly resmt to mean* 
limiUr to (hose by which it h;>d l>een effected, to rcintiair ihcm- 
sclvcs in their lost prc*cin<nenc«. Thus we sliouhl, in a link lime. 
tec eslJiblished in every putt of Ihis country the i-ime engines of 
despoiiMD which hHvc been the scourge of the Old WoiM. Tliu 
al least, would be the natural course of (hiiigs ; an<l our reasonings 
will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as tliej' )ue accom- 
moibted (o this stand a rI. 

These arc not vague inlerenc*"* drawn from supposed or specti- 
latiic (lefecls in a ConMituiioii the whole power of which b lodged 
in the hands of a people, or their rcpresirniatives and delegates, 
but tbey are solid conctiuions drawn from llie nalural and neces- 
sary progress of human .iSairs. 

It may peili.tps be ^ked by way o( obfecikm to tliis. why did 
tlOl standing armies spnng up out o( the contentions which so 
«ften dblcatiied the ancient repulitics of Gieece? Different 
answers, nqually satisfactory, may he given to this queHton. The 
kndasltious habits of the people of the [ireseiit day. absorlted in (he 
pursuits of gain, and dcrolcd to the inipiovemrnts of agricnliurc 
and comnttrcc, are iucocnpaiibte with the condition o( a iiatt»n of 
soldiers, whkh was the tiue condition ol llie people of ihOM 
republics. The means of revenue which hare been so greatly 
multiplied by the increase tA gold and silver and of the arts of 
industry, and t'le science of finance. whMh (s the offspiing tA 
modern tiii>es, concurring with the habits of nations, have pro- 
duceil an entire revolution in the s)i.iein o( war, and have ictiilcicd 
ilisciplined armies, distinct from the body Of ibe ciliiens, the 
insepiinbic companions of fmnieni lioslility. 

There is a wide difference, also, between military 
esuibliihincnl& in a country seldom exposed by ilssitaatlon 
to internal invasions, and in one which is often subject 
to them, and nlways apprehensive of thetn. The rulers of 
(he former can have nn gond [>releil, i( Ihcy are ever v> 
inclined, (o keep on foot arinics so numerous as must of 
necessity be maintained in the latter. These armies 
being in the first case, rarely, if al all, called into actiritjr 
for interior defense, the people ar« in no danger of beti^ 




BFILS OF MILITARY SUPHEMACY. 



45 



bruken to military suborclination. The laws are DOt 
accustomed to relaxaiioits in favor or mill tury exigencies; 
tbc civil state tcotains in full viicor, neither corrupted 
nor confounded with the princti>Ie$ or propensities of the 
other Ht^tc. The ftmaUnefts of the unny renders the 
aaturai strength of the communiiy an overmatch for it; 
and the citizens, not habitnated to took up to the oiililary 
power for protection, or to submit to its opprosKions, 
neither love nor fear the soldiery; they view them with 
• ipirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and 
stand ready to resist a power which they suppose m»y he 
exerted to the prejudice of their rights. The army 
nndcr such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate 
10 suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or 
insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce cncroaeh- 
vents against the united efforts of the grejtt body of the 
people. 

In a country in the predicament last described, the 
contrary of all this happens. The perpetual mcnac- 
ints uf danger oblige the government to he always pre- 
pared to repel tt; its armies must be numerous enough 
tor mstant defense, The continual necessity for their 
Rfirices enhiinccK the importance of the soldier, and 
propunionably degrades the condition of the citiwn.' 
The military state becomes elevated above the civil. 
Thr inliabit^rils of territories often the theater of war 
Jie nnavotdalily subjected to frequent infringements on 
Iheir rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those 
ti^ts; and by degrees the people are brought to con- 
siikr the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as 
Iheir superiors. The transition from this disposition to 
ttii of considering them masters is neither remote nor 
4iftc«ll; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people 
onder such impressions to make a bold or effectual 
tnutance to usurpations, supported by the military 

P«Cf. 



'Thf leLitbia of ikc (o)<l>rr t« lh« cillto In Getmtny M praeni ii > 
■**» poof of thb theory — Eoitob. 



45 IXSVLATED SITUATIOff AN ADVAffTACE, 



The kiMcdoin o( Great Bril.tin l.*1t<i u-itlitn the fh^l ilc»L-n|)tini 
An insubr nitiialtoTi. anil a putvctful mnriiie. gu.Kdinc H in a f,^v^.\ 
mr.tsiire against t(ic (louibtlitir u( foreign iiivxviun. superscile ll: 
neceuity of a numcroiu atmy within ilic kingdom. A luffii 
(orct to make head against a &u<)ilen deSccDl, nil the mlliiia oou 
have lime to tally aix! emboily, b all that hiu l>ccn dceni 
reipiiiite. No motive ol national policy ha^ tlciiiandcd. nof won 
public o|>iiiion have loleialed. a larger number of iioojn upon i: 
domestic csial>ti'ihii)cnis. 'Diete has been fof a long tunc pa: 
lilile luom for (henpetnlion o( tlie oIIkf cause^i which have bceii 
rnuineraied as Ihc convtxiuenccs of intcriMl war. This p«cuHm 
felicity of siiuiilion has, in a greui de^rre. contributed lo presci 
Ihc liberty which thai counir>- lo Ihrs day eiijoyt, in spile of th 
ptevaleni voialily aitd cotruplion. tf.vn the cuntr^iry, Ilritain hai 
been situa led on ibc continent, and Iiad been compelled, as il: 
vtnuhl Imvc been, by thai silualtoit. lo make l»er militar}' e»iabliUh 
roenlsat borne cocilcnsivc wiih iltoscof (he olhcr great powers i 
Europe, abe, like ihcm. would in all ptul>:ibitily tK. at this day, 
victim lo ihe absolute power of a Siingle man. Tis pos&ilfli 
though not eaiy. thai ihe |>e»ple of that islaiMl may Ifc cnxlavet 
from other caii<«s ; but it cannot be by iIk prowess of an army 
inconsideiablc at Ihal which has been usually kept up wrilhin llw 
kingdom. 

Itwcare wise enough to pr<:scrve tl>e Union wc may 
for ages enjoy an advantage Minilar to that of an tiisulated 
•uttutioiL Europe is at a great distance from us. H 
colonics in our vicinity will Ik likely to continue toi 
mtirh ili«pru|>urtioned in strcntcti to be able to gire D 
any daiiKcroiis annoyance. Exten&ivc military cstaliltah 
menis cannot, in this position, be necessiiry tu oa 
iterurity. Bui tf wc should be (Iii.untted, and the integra 
parts should either remain separated, or, Hhitb is mos 
probable, should be thrown together into two ur ihi 
confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, i 
Ihe predicament of the continental powers of tvurope— 
our liberties would be u prey to the means of defendin 
ourselves against the ambition and jcalonsy of 
other. 

This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid an 
weighty. It deserves Ihc must seriotis and mature coo 
sidcraUuD of ever^ prudent and lioockt man u( whatev< 



il A BAKktEk AGAINST FACTtOtf. 47 

party. If such men will make a firm and solemn pause, 
and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this 
interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its 
attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will 
not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Constitu- 
tion the rejection of which would in all probability put a 
fioal period to the Union. The airy phantoms that flit 
before the distempered imaginations of some of its ad- 
versaries would quickly give place to the more substan- 
tial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable. 

FUBLIUS. 



No. 9. ItmdiftiUnI Jtnml. NomnlKrii, i;!?.) Hamilton. 

THE UNION A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMES- 
TIC DISTURBANCES. 

Examfif ef Gritk and Italian refuilirt — Arguattnts against rtpubli- 
m gntrHmtHi and civil libiTly — Improvtments in the art ef govern- 
mim—Adoantagei ef txtendfd Urritory — Opinion ef Montesquieu — 
Neattitj fer lubJivisien implied in MenUsquieu't view — Fedtralixatien 
ttitpeibtnt fsr the extension ef govern men I — Quotation from Mon- 
tefuien — Inatcurate distinetien ieltaeea confidfration and consolidalien 
—Defatilien tfa eenfedtratt republic — Federal character of proposed con • 
iiiiidiem — Ljeiam confederacy. 

Te Ike People of the State of Neiv York: 

A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the 
peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against 
domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to 
read the history of the petty republics of Greece and 
lUIj without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at 
thedistractions with which they were continually agitated, 
and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they 
*ere kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the 
eitremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occa- 
sional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrasts to 
the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then 




48 



SCIENCE OF POUTICS PROGKtSSfVE. 



[iro.1 



inl«rvah of fdidtjr open tu \\t.vi, we behold tbem with a 
mixture of tc^rci arising from the reSection ihat tbe, 
pleasing scenes before as are soon to be overwhelmed hj I 
(he teinpeiituduit waves of sedition nnd {mny rage. IfJ 
momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, 
while they dazzle us with a transient and ficeting bril-J 
liancy, they at the same time admonish us to lament th;tt| 
ihc vices of government should pervert the direction and] 
larnish the luster of those bright talents and exalted' 
endowments for which the favored soils that produced] 
them have been so justly celebrated. 

From I he (lisuTilen that disfigure ilie annals of ihose trpublie 
the advocatrt of drpalivn have drawn atgumenIK, nol only ag^iiiutl I 
ihe (oims of republicjin g0VFrninci>t. bul agairiM the very |inrict-| 
pies ol civil litiedy. Tlicy hare lierricd all free governn>cnl a»] 
uiconsisieni with thcofdcr of Mcicty.and have imlulged ibcni^vtil 
in maliciuiu nultaiioii ovirr in (ricndi un<l |urtiuft>. Ila|>ptly tori 
inankitid. uu[)«i<louk f;ibric« rrai^ on the tuitis of 'Cihniy, whicliJ 
have flourished for ages. Iiave. in a few glorious iiiMances, (ciutedj 
their i;k>oiTiy fophism^ Aii«l, I trust. America wilt be the braa 
anil sittid founiUiInn of otiicr ediftces, not leu roagniliceiit, which^ 
Will be equally peinuineiii inonurneiils of their errors. 

But it is not to be denied that the portraits ihcy hdvcl 
sketched i»f republican government were U>" just copies] 
of the originals from which they were taken, If It 
been found impracticable to have devised models of al 
ronre perfect structure, the enlightened fnemis tu libertyl 
would have been obliged to abandon the cauw of ihacj 
6t>eeies of government as indefensible. The sricnce of 
political, however, like most other sciences, has receire4j 
great improvement. The efficacy of various principles ia 
now well understood, which were either not known at all.] 
or imperfectly kimwo to the ancients. The regular dl«- 
tM tribiition of power into distinct departments; 

>«. 4T. tite introduction of legislative balances at»i 
checks: the institution of courts composcil of )udf 
holding their "Hires during good behavior; the rcpre- 
1^ sentatidii nf the people in the legi:datitre by 

Hoi. ftS n. depDties of their own cicctiiio: these are whtfDj 
new discoveries, or have made Ihtir principal pntjj 



AfOATTESqUIEU OX SMALL REPUBLICS. 49 



tuwnrilfi perfection in modern times. They :ire oie.nn*, 
A(ul|>owerfiil mcan^tiy which thcL-sccllcncesof republican 
sorernment nutyberciitinetland iis iraperfcctit>ntilcssi-nc<I 
or avoided. To this catalo);uc of circtiiiiNtniices tbat 
tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil 
fovernment, I .thnll venture, however novel it may appear 
to some, to add one more, on a prim-iplc^ whirh has been 
made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitu- 
tion; I mean the khlakgkmknt of ttie okbit within 
which such systems are to reroh-e, either in respect to 
the dimensions ofasinttte State, or to the consolidation 
tel«^ of several timallcr States into one great Oon- 
Uta<14. federacy. Th« latter \% tliai which imme* 
dntcly concerns the object under consideration. It will, 
however, be of use to examine the principle in its appli- 
cation to a single State, which shall be attended to in 
mother place. 

The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress 
fxtion am! to f^uard the internal tranfinillity of States, as 
M inrrcasc ihcir cxiernal force and security, is in reality 
noiancwidcu. It has been practiced upon in different 
mvntriea and ajjes, and has received the sanction of the 
■unapproved writers on the subjects of politics. The 
opponents of the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, 
dud and circulated the observ^ilions of Moiilesquieu on 
(he Qecesstty of a contracted territory for a republican 
gonnment.' But they seem not to hare been apprised 

'Thit iin'l<'>il>lr<lly km itnij^ril at ■ xjJy lu nn ('tm{;i fi»iii Uoiiim- 

fiio la Ihf ihinl l«lt«r of Cnlo (Gtot"? CUntonl |iul>luhr<l hi tlit Ntut 
"A /wuriM/, Ociobw i;. 1787 (FonTi "* Etuiyt on tli« Conttitulion,** 
p. ii6| where M<iaicw|iiiFu it qootoj M uyine. " I< >* iMiinil U> • rt> 
pl>lc In lime oaK a tmiil temuity, ■'■IhrrnKc ll cinnot long nib>l>I; 
ni kirec •rrio. Ilicrc am ninn ol lir^r fnrtunr*. ini( L-isittcxiuenlly uF Icui 
^liMlion; thcTT If* loo greal <[«i>oi\i(» lo irnx in Ihp ti«ii't» ol ■ linulc 
■a ■mbitiout p«non soon brooiDB i«i>ti>>l< ihat h« nny he 
, ,-:'ul. iiiii clurtout by oppreHlng hii (ellow-ciiiicnii. and IhM I* 
' 10 i;niiilRit', "ll (he tniiti of lilt cmintry. In tii^ 
I. cijoJ II t>rii&ce>t in * ih'iiiunil rltun; in • \m.M 
I '>! ibn piiKliT U emily jMneii-td. tfller unilcrelood. »i<l 
'le mach oil wvrf diiicn: alxttei Iiiit« ■ If» eMent. ■nrl 0/ 

iu> i.^ Ileal ecUd— lie alw tbawi you. iIirI ibe duniton of (h« 

'^>Mv oi ;t|ia(ta irn cmlng iii >|h bavin]; raiiilnued irlili Ihe UMe «■- 




50 SUALLKBSS OF TERltlTOHY UNDEStRASLE. Oh,! 

of the scnliments of that great man expressed in unulhci 
part of his work, nor to have adverted to the coose 
quencGS of the principle to which they subscribe with 
such rcadjf acquiescence. 

When MuntcK()Uteu reconimendii a snuUI extent (or 
republics, the standards he had in view were of dimen* 
sioas far short of the limits of almost every one of these 
States. Ndtlier Virginia, Massaehusettii, Pennsjrlvaniar 
New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any 
means be compared with the models from which he 
re^isoned and to which the terms of his description apply. 
If we therefore lake his ideas on this point as the crite 
rion of truth, we shall be driven to the allcrnalivc cither 
of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, ur of 
3pliltin|{ ourselves into an infinity of little jealous, clash 
ing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries 
of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects uf uni- 
versal pity or contempt. Some o( the writers who have 
come forward on the other side of the question M-era to 
have been aware of the dilemma; and have even been 
bold enongh to hint at the division of the larger State 
as a desirable thini;. Such an infatuated policy, sucti 
a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication ot 
pcity offices, answer the views of men who pf»sscss not 
qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow 
circles of personal intrigue, but it could never promote 
the grir;ilneiLs or hapi<ineK*i of (he people uf America. 

Referring the examination of the principle itself tu 



Icnl o\ tetiilory alln ill \%\ wsn: «iul thai Ihe amliMMin of Albeoi xaX 
\»nAxniim In cHanuiiil nsil ilii«cl ihe union, Imi lh«fn tbclt lil>«rtic* 
■nilcarif ilieia « iBuiuichy." Thou)^ tlie lut hunilfiJ ircan hai nuile 
AtiT iliKUtuon of the Uiew)' uniicccauj. yet il tt ialrroiliiig in ot« %n 
nptnkm >it Jdlsnon't. wriUcn \atmtAiMt\f alKr Itw Inniajik of ilcnuc- 
n<7 In iHoi, when hr wtu4c. " It (umnlm a new proof o( Ihe (•l>ehooil 
uf Montm(ui«ii't ilixtiine. Ih>l > republic »n be |ireutt<-<l ..^iv in • 
■mall i«niiory. TIm reTcne ii the Initli. Hail nui ini •vcn 

a ihinl onlf iA whu h i>. ve wei« cone. Duiwhilr (rrn:'> ,i » 

llkeui e|iKli.-niic. ipuned ccrutii tmilt. l)ic khi'Iiip nmnii.uJ *auiij aa4 
niilovctml , ■ii'l belli un till ibeir lnriliTm toalil rctoret fioin the ten- 
piirirT delaiioii; and thai dicuiaitance haa gi^m me Qica) uoailan.'' 
— EmiOK. 



■MlItMl 



A COSPEDERATB REPUBLIC. 



5» 



anoilicr [ilacc, as has been already mentioned, it will be 
sulncicnt to remark here that, in the sense of the author 
who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occasion, 
it would only dictate a reduction of the size of the more 
coosiderablc ueubers of the Union, but would not mili- 
tate against their being all comprehended in one con- 
federate gorerninGot. And this is the true (]ue$tion, in 
the discussion of which we are at present interested. 

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from stand- 
ing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that 
he explicitly treats of a Confederate Repl'blic as the 
npedient for extending the sphere of popular govern- 
incot, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with 
those of republicanism. 

" ll IS very jKobaUe " (says he"), " that mankind would have 
been obliged al Icnxlh lo hi*e coDXtanlly umk-r tlK gDVcrnmcnl of 
a nnglc person, had ihry nol contrivecl a kiii<l of consiilulwii ihat 
bu all ihe inienul ailvaiiiages uf a [cpiihlJcan, tagctli«T with the 
cuetiul fofce of a monarchical goveinmeitt. I mean a CON- 

nSKJtATC RKfUBLrC. 

"Thkt form of govcmnveni Is a convention by which several 
uiull«T UaUt ut-'Tce (o become meinbetx nf a larger ant, which 
they tntcnd to form. It is a kiml of assemblage of sucicika ihat 
cooslilule a new one. capable of mcreuiing, try means of new 
UMcutioas, till lltcy arrive lo sucti a degree of power as to be 
able 10 provide (or i)ic siccurity of llw uniletl body. 

"A republic of iKiK kind. al>lc lo withstand an cxtenial force, 
my soppon itself wvtituui any intemul corrupiions. Tbc form 
•I tliH society prevents al) inanitcr of tnconvciiirnces, 

* If D singk member should atieiiipi to usurp the supreme 
authority, he could nm be supposeil lo hnvc an equal authority 
Mil credit in all the confcderale stxtc^ Were Ik to have loo 
gmi inlluence over une. this would alarm the res). Were he to 
nbdue a p^iit, thai which would still remain free iniglit oppoie 
bim with lurccs indejiendenl of thiue which Ive bad usurped, and 
wtrpowcr hini before Ike could t>c settled in his usuipatiun. 

" StumUl a |>i>pulsr insurrection happen in one of the confr<l«r- 
«e stales, the oihcnt are able lo i)ucll il. Should abuses creep 
into one pirt, ibey arr reformed by those that remain sound. The 
uaie nuy be destroyed on one ude, and not on the other ; the con- 



' " Spirit of Law*," vol. t. book \x. clMp. i.— I'ijbuvs, 




s» 



A CO/fFBDEKACV DBFINBD. 



tv*.* 



federacy may be <linio1vetl. and l1i« confcderites {xesen'e (hrit 
sovereignty. 

*■ A* ihij govetnmenl \i compoted of small rcpublbct, it enjo)-* 
the iniernal happiness of each ; and with respect la its eilemal 
Btuaiion, tl is posscued. by means of the Msocialion, of lUI the 
ulrantaget of ixttgt monaichies." 

I hiive thought i( propec to quote at length ihcK intemiine 
pnMaget. becauM ihey contain a luminous abridgment of the prin 
cipal arguments in forof of the Unioo. and must effectually n- 
roove the false impressions which a mis.ippticaiiun of other pans 
tA the work was calculated to make. They hare, at the saiiM! 
time, an intiinate connection with the more immeili.ite dMt|;n >>l 
this paper; which te. lo illDtiraie the teniJency of ilie Union to 
repress domestic faction and insurrection. 

A distmction, more subtle than accurate, haft been 
raised between a Conftderaty and a tonsoHdaiion of the 
States. The essential characteristic of the first i > said to 
be the restriction of its authority to the tnembers in 
their collective capacities, without reaching to the indi- 
Tidiiats of whom they are composed. It is contended 
that the national council oagbi to have no concern with 
any object of internal administration. An exact equalitjr 
of siiffnge between the members has also been insisted 
npon as a leading feature of s confederate government 
These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they an 
8upportc<l neither by principle nor precedent It has in. 
deed happened that governments of this kind have gen- 
erally operated in the manner which the distinction, 
taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; 
but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions 
to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as cxampl 
will go, that there is no ativilute rule on the subject. 
And it will be clearly shown, in the course of this inves- 
tigation, that, as far as the principle contended for ba: 
prevailed, it has been the cause of Incurable disorder am 
imbccilily in the government. 

The definition of a CanftJtratt Rtfuhiii seems simply li 
b« " an assemblage of societies," or an association of twD 
or more sUles into one state. The extetit, modifies' 
tiotis, and objects of the federal authority are mei 



lutltMl LYCIAN CONFEDERACY. S3 

matters of discretion. So long as the separate organiza- 
tioa of the members be not abolished; so lung as it exists, 
bf a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though 
it should be in perfect subordination to the general 
authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in 
theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The 
proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition 
of the State governments, makes them constituent parts 
of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct 
representation in the Senate, and leaves in their posses- 
sion certain exclusive and very important portions of 
sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every 
rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal 
governmenL 

lo the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three 
OTiEs or republics, the largest were entitled to three votes in the 
COUMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to fvio, and the 
, unallesi to one. The Co.itMON COUNCIL had the appointment of 
all the judges and magistrates of the respective CITIES. Tliis 
was certainly the most delicate species of interference in their 
iniemal administration ; for if there be anything that seems ex- 
cluiiret)' appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it Is the appoint- 
mnt of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of tliis 
uuciation says : " Were I to give a model of an excellent Con- 
federate Republic, it would be that ol Lycia." Thus wc perceive 
that the distinctions insisted upon were not within Ilie coniempla- 
■ioQ of this enlightened civilian ; and we shall be lead lo conclude, 
that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory. 

PUBLIUS. 



54 



POPULAK GOV&KNMENTS FACTIOUS. fBo. ID 




No. 10- (A'^KMt/lai^jlAirrfAM-.Hot.H, DtT.) MadiSOa 

THE UNION A CHECK ON FACTION. 

Tmdmiy *f f9ftUar gavirmiHiHli If /iiitira — Crmflaiali t/ im/uifitt 
hkJ iailaiililx i- Staff trtvrHmfnli — lir^nitiaa t/ /illijH—llfmtJjr aj 
/tutian—Ciirtaitrntat •>/ liirr/) — Cauttii'J f^HtH inuaU in mam^O/- 
ffiiitg iHl/rti/i—f,ffiilaliiiit fy mf/fritjr airn U mttriiU'i jidgmtmh 
— Chii tt^ilatisit'^CaHlTei !•/ /oilifti—MaJfrily (unfiMM ef rigkb — 
A fart Awnraty mmahU bt ifntrtl fatO^it — A rtmrJy in rtprtttnlutivr 
toPtrHmtHi — Difrrmrf itttarfn a drtoirary dm/ a rrfitilii — A»t*»m, 
lagft g/ a Jilfg<Ut^ tkfitn Mfy — &Hptti»rily g/lat[t evrr imtUrtfuHiu 
—Greatrr frtftrtifin «/ /il tkarailirs^AJviiiiUgt a/ greater HHmttr tf 
tittles — Utititity ff Mi/maiuiiiHft wilk tftnl iirtHmilancti — Hnffj 
(vmhimatUii ■>/" ualifiai and lt<a{ f;rx*Tnmfmi in tki UnilrJ S*atr> — 
GrralfT Wrriltry amj ftfiiUlimt frrmilltJ ty rtpnibian iham itfmacralic 
gvtKrmuunt — Faiti^n tiimliaJfy t»tal — Advanlagi 0/ t/Hifn mrr SiaUi 
»t t» l»t«t frrjudieti atbi uhtmii »f injaitiifi — Tht t'mam* rtmt^ ftr 
diu»sn Hunt iHtiMnl U rtftMitt. 

To tht Ptople *»/ Ihe Sl^U of NeVf York: 

Among the numcruus udvunUges promised by a wcll- 
construcied Uniou, none deserves to be more accurately 
dcvdupcii th3n_its tendency to break and cootrot tite 
violence oC^uciion) The friend of popniar goverutnenis 
TiffVerTindsnTniscIf so mucli aUrmcd for ihdr character 
and fate as when he coniempUlc'i their pnipenxity (o 
this dangerous ticc. He will not fail, therefore, to set 
a diic value on any plan which, without violating the 
principles to which he is nttaclied, provides a proper 
cure for it. The instatHlity, injustice, and confusion 
introduced into the public councils, have, in Inilh, heca 
the mortal diseases under which popular icoremments 
hare everywhere perished; as they continue to be the 
favorite and fruitful topics (rum which the adversaries to 
liberty derive their most specious declumatiuns. The 
valuable improvements mndc by Ihe American coosUto- 
tlomon the popular models, both ancient and modem, 
cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be 
an unwarrantable partiality lo cuittend Uial they have 
as effectually ubvialetl the danger on this tide as wu 



1 OVERBBARIXG RVLB OF MAJORITIES. 



55 



wished and expected. Complaints arc ererywhcre 
licattl [rumour most <:onsUterute AnA virtuous citizens, 
equally the rtitnils of public and private faith, and of 
pablic and personal liberty, that uur {{overDincnts are 
too unfttubic, that the public good ts disregarded in the 
conflicts of ri val p arties, and that measures are too often^ 
decided, not according to the rules of justice and the 
rights of the minor party, but by the sugieriiir force of 
an interested and ovcrlicaring majority.!; However 
anxioasly wc may wish that these complaints had no 
(oondatiim, the evidence of known facts will not permit 
OS to deny tliat they are in some degree true. It will be 
found, indeed, on a candid review of our Riluation, that 
tome of the diMtrcuieit under which we lal>ur have been 
erroneoDsly charged on the operation of our goTem- 
ownts; but it wdl be found, at the same time, lliat other 
causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest 
tmsfortunes; and, pjirticularly, for that prcvaitins and 



' Tbii «M the •bnoM unii-oul defect of the State covemiDcntt prlo* to 
M> aiojHliNi of the Federal CoiiMiiution, knil led iLUilttnii to Kuert Uiat 
"i« m» 0>«aninw>il ihc r«iil |-i«Tr Im in itie nujariijr u! ibv torn- 
■uiMy awl like iniawon ol , . . t>H)ili it ■.hirfly to ■>« n(>|irtht^iiled, 
K( itom ihe uls of Govenimenl conltity lu ihe unie of ilt cimitiliwfits, 
feu (rhd Ihe uu ID which Ibc CwrerriMitni b the meie initnimeot of 
ikt 9»\fa ouiulier ol tbc conMilDcnu." 'I'lie fntt ))■ ihe inaic ciIniot< 
tMti\ a wvotal of the Skatn IkKl ailo|)leii hilii iil li^jhlo nrhlch UnwM 
tc•■■■^<lJ pralecli^cl lli« tife and prDjierljr of the mhiorrly. Nulatile ii 
iW npctleaoe ot ViiEinia, which embodied in iii conuiiution the e)«bi>. 
Ob Kill .J ....1.1. tf)a,ol l^titoi^e Maiou, jfel in abwiute canttnvcntlon 
<• i-t the lci;nlaluic at iii»n>ei>lk |>(MlUally <eiiterei] all 

I' ■ liiodv Thry Mi-prmUtl Ihe iiiilnt;H 'i tbc i-mirts. de- 

■*!»■) Ikmi omii ■inotuni u> at lu place llie ttgiklalWo pomr in the hand* 
■tf a miiuinly «1 ■ niBJonir ; twice altcmpled to nniiul all conitltulionnl 
Wknrilr by appoiniiiisfl JiciAioi; liniicd the InnchUc ; enacted tender 
wl Qihet tx fait /ittr.t Ltut ; and aitainlcd > inan ol hl)£h inawit 
*mI itnlsieij hH life ((wlnltd without nmccu n\ law. Such comlucl 
fotaced ■ dinciaK vtoteil fiom Jeaefson (tcr quotalion in TAf 
f'Jmlhl. No. 4»). No* till the adoplion o( the Fedetal CanMitnliDO 
*ilh lt« mtntinti on -Stile |towcn and < SaiKemc Court to cnlorce thean, 
v« Ihere an* irue check (inn to the Slate le)c''lal>ite> <» irae Jitolectloii 
(mm li ■■-■■ tl it In be nutcil llval acvcril ol the South American 

i^htio .111 it rifliU and iiipnoie cvuiti to enfurca ihcm, 

**knil Die ir»; .iiliitiing the same rruilti. while, to lh« conlfmtf. in 
Oical Bnuin. "here ihc leniijtlivc aulhorllv ii pratlirallr omnipolerl, 
tta Bito'iritT. •• a •> h<.-le, bat been lairif dealt iiith ia ibe latl hundred 
jwia.— torroB, 



56 



LIBERTY AND FACT/OS'. 



Dl». 






increasing distrust of public engjigemcnts, and alafm for 
private eights, which arc echoed from one end of th 
continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if notJ 
wholly, effects of the unste;i(1tnefi9 and injuslicf with 
— - which a factious spirit has tainted our public adnirnis- 
_^ Irattons. 

By a faction . I understand a number of citizens, 
whether amounting to a m^ijority or minority of the 

whole, arh n :irf ^ ) nilfi1 :it)<1 :ii;tH;it<?d *'Y f"1|ir ■'"■"""■'' 

j of Other c itiiii ns. or to t he permap^"* ""■' aprpfra' e 
(interests of the community. 

Thprn^re twn mfthndit ijt eiiri og the mischiefs of 
faclEnT^c one, by removing its c»u w«; the othec>J) y 
I controlling its.e^:ts. 







I h ere arc again two methods q f fcmnving "■" '■i— iffi 
offarrln n; the one, by dcstr g .yJn g the l iliert j f which is 
essential to its existctKc; the other, b y ^Jvint' to eT^fi fV 
citizen the same opinions, the same pas&ions, and the 
same interests. 

It could never be more truly said than of the first 
remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is 
to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it 
instantly expires. But it conld not be lefts folly ta 
abolish liberty, which is essential (o political life because 
it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihi- 
lation of air, which ts essential to animal life, became >t 
imparts to fire its destructive agency. 

The •iff'^ i-tpj-dii-nt U as imjir ii -li <-a l iU .1* JJie, first 
woul d be ^nwLs c. As long as the reason of m.in con- 
tinues fallibtr^ anil he is at liberty to cicrcise it. dJITercnl 
opinions will be formed. As l<>ng as Lbe cunnertion 
subsists between his reason and his self-love, his upinions- 
and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on cacli 
other; and tlic former will be olijecis \« •;«■ 

will attach themselves. The diversity in s of 

men, from which the rights of property onginalc, is not 
less an insuperable obstacle tit a unirnrrally "f inieresta. 
Tbc protection of these faruUies is the first object ul 



1 PJtOFe.KTr A CAUSE OF FARTIES. 



57 



cnvernment. From the protection of diUcrent and iin>A\ 
equal (acuities of acquiring property, the possession of ] \ 
different degrees and kinds of property immediately/ I 
resalts; and from the influence of these on the senti- f' 
acQts and views of the respective proprietors, cdsucs\ / 
a dirision of the society into different interests antly 
pinies. I 

Ttlc menrcailSW M faCTton a rc thus s own in the . 
nature of tnanT and we sc'c-tticm everywhere broucht int<i 
different degrees of activity, according to the different cir- _ 
cnmstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions 
concerning religion, concerning government, and many 
other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an 
attachment to different leaders ambitiously contc^oding — 
tor pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other 
ilescriptions whose fortunes hare been intereslins to the - 
tinman passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into 
parlies, intlamed tliem with mutual animosity, and ren- 
dered them much more disp>^>scd to vex and oppress each 
I Other than to co-opcrpte for their common good. So > 
strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual 
■Biiao«ities tlvat, where no substantial occasion presents/ 
itwlf,~lhc mr>st frivolous and fanciful distinctions Iiavc| 
been suOi^:icnt to kindle their unfrieniily passions and 
eulfe their moat violent conflicts. But the must com 



% 



r- urce of fac tlops-has l)ceinBrff5rious T ~"^ 

lit ^ l pn tlf prflpr rty. Those who liold 



anil ihusc who arc without property have ever formed 
lUstinct interests in society. Those who are cre^litors, 
and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimina- 
tion. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a 
mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with m.iny 
lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, 
anil divide them into different classes actuated by dif- 
ferent sentiments and views. T he r e gulation _of_Jheje^- 
-- and interfering JT^t ^ri-o^ fnr>"'i the principall 
t" modern legijilaiionj , ami involves the spirit of \ 
pirty and (artion in the necessary and ordinary opera-/^ 
♦tons of the government. 



S8 



LEGtSLATOXS AS PARTISANS. 



Ute.lO 



/ 



Mo nun is allovred to be a judse in Ms own cauM, be- 

^^ cause his interest would certainly bia& his iudgmcnt and, 
not improbably, coirupt lits integrity. With v<iiial. nay 
with greater reason, a body of men are unlit to be iM>tli 

,1-, judges and parties at the same time; yet what arc many 
of the most important acts of legislation but so many 

-—judicial deterniiiiatioii.4, nut indeed concerning the righlik 
of single persons, but concerning the rights of large 
bodies of citizens? And what arc the dillercnt classe s 
o f Icgtaljitor* hut ii ilvi»'?it»w und p.iriipt iJi ihi> f:*)m^a 
wKich they de termine? Is a law proposed concerning 
pnvate debts? It is a question tn which the creditors 
are partieit <in one side and the debtors on the other. 
Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet 
the parties arc, and must be, themselves the Juilgcs; and 
the most numerous piirty, or, in other words, Jhe m ost 
iiQWcrful factiop. nyist t»c rxoertcd to arcvanT knal I 
uome<lic manufactures be encouraged, and in what 
degree, by rc^irictions on foreign manufactures? are 
questions which would be differently decided by the 
landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by 
neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. 
The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions 
of property is an act which seems to require the most 
exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legitilative 
act in which greater opportunity and temptation are 
given lo a predominant parly to trample on the rules of 
justice. Every slulling with which they overburden the 
inferi or numb er is a shilling saved to their own pockets. 
/ It is in vain to say thiit enlightened staie^nKn will be 
fable to adjust these clashing interests, and render them 
lall sutKcrvicnt to the public good. Enlightened states- 

-| men will not always be at the helm. Nor in many cases 
can such an adjustment be made at all without taking 
into view indirect and remote considerations, which will 
rarely prevail over tlie immediate iiiureitt which «qe 
party may find in disregarding the rights ai another or 
the good of the whole. 
/ The inference to wbicb wc are brought i» Utat the 



i] ffOCU/tErOFACr/OfflA'FVKBD/iMOCRACy. 59 



)n i.oiisistS ol Ic^s tliiiii ;i nt.ijurity, nrlicf is/ 
the repiilrfican principle, which enables the/ 
iefcjit its sinister views by rccular vote. Itl 



>t be removed, and that rclicl 
the means of i ciitrolling \\s fffedt. 



1( a faciiu 
pplinl by the 
najarity to defcjit its sinister views by rcgiil 
may clog the administration, it m*y uonvulsc the 
society: but it will be unable to execute and mask its — 
Tiolence under the forms of the Constitution. When a 
tujority is ■n<:ludcd in a faction, the form of popular 

irernmcnt, un the other hand, enables it to sacrifice ~ 
lo its ruliiif; passion or interest both the public good and 
the rights of other citixens. Tt> s;:r»r ^ Hiy piiMi<-. ptntl-V 

tliiri l"-"'^"'' ^igh^^ ^giM"-" llu-.^Lmfprj- i\i gnfh Ji fartinnjy 
lIlP tarn.- time tn prrsffyf t\\^ npirit and thft fnrirl 

' "■ CV^T'"!'"'''-! '3i ll"'" 'I"' W^"' "bj'*! t t't vrhii"!] 

1' i.i riea ar c__dir'"'""' Let mc add that it is the 

great desideratum by which this form of government can 
he rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so 
long labored, and be recomnieudcd to the esteem and 
adoption o( mankind. 

B y what means ifi \\}]^ object attainable ? Kvidcntly by 
one of ^wo onl y: Eitli rr the e» isteni;;f »l" tV- aj""* 
sio n or interest in n r'^i"'-i'y ■' ■'>■' ■■■■■"« t;n.> -mLitr 
nreventfl d. or the muii jrily. -lu vij n; ;;iii It <i»rxi stcnt 



tpportitnity be suffered to coincide, wc well know that 
Pseither moral nor religious nxnives can be relied on as 
u) aile()uate control. They are not found to be such »n 
the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their 
efiicacy in proportion to the number combined together, 
Uui ta, if) proportion as their efficacy becomes needful. 

From this view of the subject it may be concluded 
llui t a pure dem oCT yv . by which I mean a society con- 
s iviing nf a small numltfr OT J?HizJ;fta, wlio aait ^pgaiig 
afflWtsTPr tflf gfU'i'FiiSicftl In pcrMH; 



V 



isioD or interes t, must be rendered, by their nu mber 
[)<) local situation, iinablc lo concert and car^v into 
jfect schemot oi oppry siim. v\ the im[>ulse and the 






admit id-jut 



HlffBff the LuisLtTtrfyoOa cBon- A common passion or 
btrrcst Will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority 



6o 



DEMOCSACV AKD KtPUBUC. 



fira.lO 



of the whole; a communication and concert result from 
the form of government ilscK; and there \% nothing to 
check the inducements to sacrilice the weaker party or an 
ohnoxtouft individual Hence it is that such democracies 
have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; 
have ever been found incompatible with personal security 
jjr the ri^hlsofproperty; and have in general been as 
short in 'their lives as they have been violent in their 
deaths. Thuorclic pojiiiciajis, who have patronized this 
' species of government, have erroneously supposed that 
I by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their politi- 
I cal rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly 
\ equalized and assimilated tn their possessions, their 
|. opinions, and their passions. 

l/i A republic , by which I mean j gff'-'^'''"r"'m if ■'''''•** 

jlih r "''hrni'^ of representation takes pl ace , opens a dilTcre n t 

I pr^apccU and promises^ the cure for wh i cHwc are -se*k i n g. 

I Let us examine the points In wliich It varies from pure 

democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of 

the cure and the efhcacy which it must derive from the 

. . Union. 

The two great pointsof difference between a demQcra<;v 



anil w ~|iLiMii: arc: Jirst i the d clyyjf^i on of the govern- 
ment, in the latter, to a small number of citizens etectrd 
by the rest; ScC onilt^, the g rcMt rr nnif^ h tf "f ^i tij^na^ 
and greater sphere ol country, over which the latter may 
be oxtcnded. 

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, 
to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them 
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose 
wisdom may best discern the true interest of tbcircountry, 
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least 
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considera- 
tions. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that 
the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of 
the people, will be more consonant to the public good 
than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened 
for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be 
inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, 




ADVANTAGE OF MANY ELECTORS. 



6i 



odintMer deM];ns, may, by intH);ue, by corruptiun, 
turbjr otbcr means, first obtain the AufTfai{e», and then 
'bttriylhc interest, of the people. Th e giicsiioq ^ rciu lt- 
wheUier small o r entcnsive rcpiihhs:<, ;irr ia»rf 
I'llf Ki rh^ rlrLtion n\ prnppr f;iiarilianit lA y^\r 
«al; aiwl it is clc;irly <leciilc<l in favor of the luttcr 
trim obvious coniideratluns: 

la itit fi rst place , it is to be remarked that, however i 
uuU the rcpiiulic may be, the representatives must be 
rued to a certain number, in order to guard ugainNt the/ 
few; and thai, however large it mjy be, llicyl 

imited to a geriaTtTn umber, in order to guard) 

ipiniEHie confusion of a multitude. Hence, the num-j 
*ci ol representatives in the two cases not beinj; in 
frtfortion to thjt of the two constituents, and being 
profQrtiunally greater in the smalt rt-puhlir, it lullows 
llui,if the proportion of &1-iJi»«jjj < r^ |>r nut-JyM-Ju the 
hf|tj|ittn in thf 1Tint*'-'-p"''''J'| '^■'' f» r|npr~w iTrprpxrnt a 
T-, aad cooseqaeBil y a g reate r prulmlMhty of 







!n \\\K iK'st place, as each representative will be chosen 
^racruter number of cititens in the hirge tluin in the 
null republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy 
andidiies to practice with success the vicious arts by 
■hicbelectionVare too often carried; and the suffrages 
■^ ihe jieoi>lc, being more free, will be more likely to 
ttnier in men whO^KTSseS^the most attractive merit and 
lilt most diffusive and entablislied chiiracicH,' 

Ufflusi be confessed tliat in this, as in most other cases, 
*«« is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences 
■iilbc found to lie. By enbirging Ion mu4:h the number 
of dteiors. you render the representative too little 
■Vquigied with -all their local circumstances and lesser 
'ntowtt; as by r«lacing il too mui:h, you render him 
<">toly attached to these, and too liiUe fit to comprehend 
udponne great and national objects. The federal Con- 

'1*iUi(nnc)iiu« Mailhon nct-kcloil to eonxliIcT (he caiiTenc of Ki» 
Pt w ia ii . ih4t III* enviR ibe numbtT n( clcnon. the (ewet tlien 
**iHbi aho covlil pcnonaTly know the cniiditlale. — totrofc —^ 



k 



DEMOC/lACr AKD RtPVBUC. 



[Rs.19 



of the whole; a communication and concert result from 
the form of government itself: and there i« nothing to 
check the inducements tciacrtfice the weaVer party or an 
obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies 
have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; 
have ever been found incompatible with pcr&onal security 
or the ri ghts of pr operty; and have in general been as 
short in tlitir lives as they have been violent in their 
deaths. Theoretic politicLuis, who have patronined this 
' species of government, have erroneously sup^scd thai 
I by reducing mankind to a |>crfcct^c5}ualily in their politi- 
I cal rights, they would, at the game lime, be [>crfeetly 
I equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their 
1 iOpinion5, and their pasiti'ms. 

A republic , by which I mean .i [f^r^rnm^ni in wlii.-h 
of representation takes pla ce, op ens j differe nt 
projfpect, and proniiist^ the cure rorwhicirKcarc.sc»J(ing. 
I<et us examine the points in which it varii:» from pure 
democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of 
the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the 
Union. 

Th e two great p « i n ta^of difference between a democrac y 
ano a republic arc: hrsu ihc dclc y ^ ^ti on of the govern- 
menij in the latter, to a sm.-ill numt>er of cittiens elecled 
by the rest; Mc onHf^, the greater numbly nf y itigens^ 
and greater sphere ol connlry, over which the latter may 
be fvxii'nded. 

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, 
to rdtne and enlarge the public views, by passing them 
ihronjch the medium of a chosen hwly of ciiiMns, whoM 
wisdom may best discern the true interest of theirconnlry, 
and whu»« patriotism and love of justice will be lca»t 
likely to sacrifice it lo temporary or |>artiat considera- 
tions. Under sacb a regulation, it may well happen that 
the public voice, pnmounced by the rrji- '.vcs of 

the people, will be more consonant In i < < good 

than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened 
for the purjinse. On the other hand, the effect may be 
inverted. Men of factious (emiwrs, of lucal prejudices, 





ADVANTAGE OF MANY ELECrORS. 6i 

o( sinister designs, may, by intrigue, liy corruption, 

by other means, Trrst obiain the sulTrai^o, and then 
ciray the intcrc&t, of the pfoplc. Tli c qUL-sitoii resu lt- 
ing ip. yht^ther Knmll or oxttrnsivi: rtfjuihlir^ .in; liiiirr 
**^ffil''*'' '" '^ *^ flpftion of pr niirr g"^""-""" "' }}■•' 
j>ublig , gcal; aitd it is clearly decided in favor of the latter - 
by two (ibviotiK considerations: 

In the fi rst p lace, it is to be remarked that, however 
small the re pn line may be, the representatives muiit l)C 
raised to a certain number, in order to guard against tlie, 
cabals of a few; and thai, however large it may be, they 
must Tic Timt led to a ccrtaTn number, in order to guard 
a^iniit the confuition of a multitude. IIcn<:e, the num-j 
ber of representatives in the two cases not bein^ i 
proportion to lliat of the two constituents, and being 
pniporlioiially j;roaler in the ^malt repiiblir, it fulluws 
that, if the proportion o f ■JU-i^lMra^JxrsJtcJat- l«fc*- J u the 
Uixc_lliaa-iJUiie.«»wilhrep«bUc^c.torou:c"wiir present a 
gTMt-r '■'••i'.n, and <;<>H)Kxt*w«UliL a greater u tababiliiv of 
afii 

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen 
by a greater number of eili/cns in the large than in the 
small republic, it will be more diflicult for unworthy 
candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by 
which clection^T? too often carried; and the Kutftages 
of t&e. iiEi>ple, being more free, will be more likely to 
center in men wlib pfVBseHsthc most attractive merit and 
the mo«l diffusive and establitthed chiiractew.' 

It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, 
there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences 
will be found to lie. By enlarging too niU4:h the number 
ot electors, you render the representative too little 
icquainlcd with nil their local circumstances and lesser 
inlercstit; as by reducing it too much, you render him 
unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend 
and ptirsuc great and national objects. The federal Con. 



' In ihW coocIiMJO!! MadiKRi ikqIccihI to conniler the conncne of liii 
(irr^nsiijun, Unl llie Kicaler lli« number at electors, lli« fewer there 
■Mid be wIk) (irald f>nvon»llr Icnuo iIk c*iMtiiUlc.'~^UiT«K^ 



6a 



LOCAL NATURE OF FACTION. 



mo. 10 



stitti^iyji foriTiB a hamir comhiiwtinn in this rgspcct: Iti^ 
itiKfots \\vinv r.-rcrn:<l ti> the 



■■"iiiiiilil-'K^ 



j; rtM I : uul 

I JJtIOIialj the h> fTl ^"'1 pjriii iif^ir rii 1 

r 'I'lic Other point uf difference !s, tfit grc5lCr number" o( 
citizens iimj ext<!iit of territory which may tw tirousfit 
Vm1Ih>V within the cotnpa&s of republican than of 
Hi 14- democratic government; and it is t h i s cir - 

V "irr It'"" 'i[|'''v whicli n-'tulfr-i [-nrlnn^ r'liiiiHy- 



Tis k-^s lo I'l: ili'-. j ilril ill ihr furnifr than iii ihftj a tier. 
The sm.Tllcr the society, the fewer probal^ly will be tlic 
distinct parties and interests composing it; tlie fewer the 
distinct parties and intcrAK^ the tnoULjccqucntly will 
a niiijority be found of the same p^irty; and the smaller 
the number of individuals compoMnf; a majority, and 
the smaller tlie compass within which they arc placed, the 
more easily will they concert and exectilc their plans of 
oppression, ^xtcn d the sphere. and_you tajte -n a ytt'T 
^jaricty of parties and^intc rests; you make it less probable 
thai a majority of the whole will have a commoD motive 
to invade the rights of other ciliiensi or, if such a com- 
mon motive exists, it will be more difficnlt for all who 
feel it to discover their own strength and to act in uniso 
with each other. Besides other impedimenls, it may 
remarked that where there is a consciousness of unjHt 
or dishonorable purposes, communication is always 
checked by dixtrust in proportion to the number whose' 
concurrence is necessary. 

Hi-im^^^ ilrariy .ini inrii ''■" ''■■* ■^- — " "-*VtinliU;T 
Willi li J republic has ovi-r-i di-m n frilt y i n i'\fiHf'^liTiir H tf 
el l^tts y ] f^rrl'""i is enjoyed Jty. a large over a smal l 
republic, is crij oy cd hv th i ^ Unimi fiy^r ■!■» 'Jt .t— .i..n- 
p AilBg ft. Does the advantaee txinsist in the substitu- 
"iion of representatives whose enlightened views and 
virtuous sentiments render them superior to local proj- 
udiccs and to schemes of injustice.* It will not be 
denied that the representation ol the Union will be most 
likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it 
consist in the greater security atTnrded by a greater 
variety of parties againtt the event ol any "tme part)' 



/ 




VNWN cures POUTlCAt DISEASED 



H 



I 



H^iUe to outnumlicr awX njiprcss the rcstf In an 
cquil degree (Iocs the increased variety of parties com* 
pratd within the (Jnioo increase this security. Does it, 
in 6iit, consist in the greater obsi^iclcs opposed to fKF 
oracm and accomphnlimcnt of the secret wishes of an 
■ NDJnMaml interested mnjority? Here, again, the Client 
[olthe Union gives it the most palpable advuntnge. 

Tbe influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame 
vilhin their particuUr States, but will be unable to 
>pnad a general conlLigration through ttic other States. 
.A iiiigious sect may degenerate into a pcilitical faction in 
i|»itof the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dis- 
persed over the entire face of it must secure the national 
noscils atjaiiist any danger from that source. A rage 

tfAt[upcr money, for an abolition of debts, for an cqua 
ffmiion of property, or for any other improper or wicked 
prft)«l.vill be less apt to pervade the whole body of the 
I'niuii than a particular member of it; in the same pro- 
innion as such a malady is more likely to taint a |i«ir- 
bcobr county or district than an entire State. 
In tfae extent and proper structttre of the Union, 
thntfore; we behold a republican remedy for the dis- 
«!<» most i ncident to r eimhiican government. And 
*«onliog to the decree of pleasure and pride we feel in 
tnit republicans ought to be our zeal in cherishing the 
|s?<ntaiKl supporting the character of Federalists.^-^ 

PtJULIUS. 



\ 





6< A.VEK!CA COMMBMCIALLY ADVBXrVRt)i!&. I>«.11 



No. IZ- jtadi^itAml/tMrma/. Ita n m^ H tt, tt^>. Hamilton. 

UTILITY OF UNION AS REGARDS COMMERCE 
AND A NAVY. 

A-ttvH/iMnni ^mmmiaf tiaratltr ef Amerira — Ctrnmertial ftalnay 
ef /iHnift — A tmtiiMUil ctmaifrtial fality ntctitary ta t^uHttraH Ettr^ 
^fu» rtttritlt**il^DuirimiHatia n^iitll O^^^f BrttdlH — Kilittliihmml 
0/ a l-'fJirat mty — /'A/ l/nirtJ Milts liMt />■ tttgmt Ikt ar^iltr »f 
RHifft in Amt'ira — DiiuuitH itrMtH Iv wd^ mr inHmrrit a frfj — 
Stfaralwn tfilt faaUe mariliitt nafUai la frticnlv fht ifmfilinn af »ur 
falilital iiiilnuf — fifaHntal (nammial rijfhtt ■aikiik tailt tt tail ty a 
JiiitluHatt af tlu Can/rJ/raty — 7'Ar fiiktrtit — A lavy a grtal maltaaaX 
aifttt — Sk-ireaf llu Saul*. MiJJlt.aaJ /tWivEiielamJ SlaUiiii a mn-jr~ 
UarttlraiaeJ iHUriimrtt ^tlivtrH tif Slalei — UntHrlH^ af frtr i»ltr, 
itaU €aanii/Ti/ avftiiiil utiify-~AiitnJf>»y m Amfriean affairt — Eun- 
ffaitilamiaaliim 0/ Ihf vftU — Bifftn'i anj Haptal't tktarj a/Jtgtntraej 
in Aaurita. 

To the Pea^e */ Ike Stalt 0/ Nnv York; 

The iraportanoe of tbe Uoioa, in a commercial lixhl. is 
one uf those points about which there is least room to 
entertain a ditferL-ncc uf opinion, iind which hat, in fact, 
commanded the most general assent of men who have 
any actjiiaintance with the subject. This a[>plics as well 
to our intercourse with foreign countries as wiUi eadi 
other. 

TiMtre ine appearances to auihorite a su|>posiiim that the 
advenliiruui i|hrii which diuingiiisltcs the iToinn>cici.il e\\a,tM.wt 
of Ammt.t has AittAf excticil uneuy senxiiltniis in wvct^t ul llie 
liiarititnr puM'^rt o( Kuropc. Tbcy scrm to Iw apprehensive tA our 
too %rcM interference In llut cairyinn \\xiAf wliich t& the 5U^ 
piMi (A ilxrir iMirt|;:iltun and tlie fnund.ilion tA their lural tlienglh. 
Tlvoic of thrm which have coVoni« in America look Iniwatil li> 
what 0>i« coiintty i« cap.ible a% liecarning. with piiinfut solicitude. 
Tlicy (uiFsee the dangrn ihjt may thrcaicn their American 
domintons front (tie iiciKhboiltooil of Stiiic!> u'hicli have all lite 
disposilions, and U'milil jioi^scu all ihc nirjins, retjunile to the 
ctealion of a poweiful nijirmc. Imptc^sium ul litis kind will 
naturally intlicaie the policy <A foslning dii-ivionfi aninitt; iw, anil 
of depriving us, u \at a\ pouiililc. of an AO'lvtt COMMKXCK in our 
own bottoms. This would answer llie threefold purpow of pfv- 



luailtMl 



PROHIBITORY SEGVLATIONS. 



TcntJoK Mir intcrfcTcnce in ihdr navigation, o( monopoliting the 
profit! vi (itir irndr, anil i>l c1i]>|nng the ninj;^ by aKicIi we might 
Mur to a dnngcrous gieaiiica^. Uiit not |KU(ience lotbid the 
dcUiL h would ivM be iliRiciiU to trace, by (ucls. the workings o( 
iIm policy to the cflbtii«i» o( mintsicr*. 

If we coniinuc united, we may coutilcraci a policy v> undiciicDy 
to (Hir prcnpcfity in a variety of ways. Uy prohibilory Tcgiilaiions 
txEcniling ^1 the same time throughout the Stales, we inny Dbll^e 
lureigit countries to bid ajjainsi each other for the privileges of our 
maikcl*. This assertion will nol appear chimeriCiil to those who 
are Able to appreciaie the iinporuncc of the marlcelK of three mil- 
beat of people— increasing in rapid progresiion. (or the iuo»l part 
euluwvcty addiciei) to Agriculture, and likely from local circuni- 
nmces to remain so—to iiny mnnudcinring nuiion ; and the 
Knincnse difference there would be to the trade and navigation of 
Mich a nation. beiAeen a direct coiniiiunication in ii& own ships, 
mil an indirect ci>iivcy;>i)Cc of its products and returns, to and 
iiDoi Arnehcii, in the ships of another country. Suppose, (or 
auaiicc, we hod a government in America cap.-ible of excluding 
Great Britain (with whom ure have at pretieiii no treaty of cnin- 
nerce) (lom all otir ports: what would be the proh.ilile operation 
(fihitstep upon her |>olitic*? Would li not enable us to negoii- 
Im ate. wiih the fairest prospect of success, (or coinnicr- 

I».a. cial privileges of the most valuable anri eitcnsive kind 

n the dominions of that kingdom ? When these questions have 
been asked upon culler occasions, they have tcceivc<l a plausible. 
bal aol a solid or sali!i(.-iclO(y answer, ll has tieeti said ihm 
poliibiitont on our pan would produce no clunge in the s)-slem 
>( Britain, because she could prosecute her ir^dc with us ihiough 
t)ie n>rdiiim of the Dutch, who would be her immedi.ile cunluiners 
4nd payrnasicrs (or those articles whicli were w.intcd for the 
lapply of our markets. But would nol her n;ivigaIion be niateri- 
illy injumi by the lossof the Important advantage of being her 
son carrier in that tra<le ? Would nol the principal part o( M« 
profits be hiierceplexl by the Dutch. M Ji contpenution for iheir 
tgency and risk ? Would not the mere circumstance ol (rciglil 
KUsiDn a considerable deduction ? Would not xo circuitous an 
■niercourte (acUiiaic ihc compeliiions o( other nations, by enluncing 
■he ptice of B(il>sh caniino(]iite« in our markets, and by transfer- 
rini; [o uihci hands Uie managefneni o( t)iis Iniettsting branch of 
ibe Iltiiish commerce ? 

A mature consideraiuon of ihe objects suggested by thew que*- 
Ituns will iustify a belief that the real disadvantages lo Britain 



FEDERAL KaVY. 



iir«.n 



from such a slate of ihingt. conspiring with th« (KcposscMloas of 
a great piu-t of ilie iiaiioa in fararot (he Ameiican trailc. and with 
tti« iinpunuciiiiM of the WcM IndiA IslaiKk. wouM produce « 
relaxation in her pre&ent system. ui>d would tel us into the enioy- 
ment of privileges in ilic niarkcts of ihotc Ulantls and eltewticrc. 
from which our irAtle would derive ttie most sul»untUl bensfiis. 
.Sucfi a point gaitml from the Briiish government, and which cmitd 
nol be cxpeclcil without .tn equivalent in exemptions aiid tmmuni- 
lies in our tn.irkcli. would be likely to have a eorrctponijcnt effect 
on (he conduct of other nations, who would nM be inclined to sec 
(liemsclvcs aitogelliec supplanted in our trade. 

A further resource for influencing the conduct of Euro- 
pean nations toward us, in this respect, would arise from 
the cstahlishment of a federal navy. There can be no 
doubt thai the continuance of the Union under an eRi- 
cicnt government would put it in our power, at a period 
not rery distant, to create a nary which, if it could not 
vie with ll»o«e of the great maritime powers, would at 
least be of respectable wci(;ht if thrown into the scale of 
cither of two contending parties. This would be more 
peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the We»t 
Indies. A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the 
reinforcement of cither side, would often be sufficient to 
decide lh<^ fate of a campaign on the event of which 
interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. 
Our position is, in thi» re«p«ct, a most commanding one. 
And if to this consideration we add that of the usefulness 
of supplies fr»m this country in the prosecution of mili- 
tary opcraliwi* in the West Indies, it will readily be per- 
ceived that a situation so favorable would enable us to 
bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. 
smRo. ^ price would be set not only upon our 

ll.pMt. friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a 
steady adherence to the Union, we may hope, ere long, to 
become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able 
to incline (he tMilance of European competitions in tltis 
part of the world as our interest may dictjite. 

But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall 
discover that tlie rivatships of the parts would make 
them checks up<Hi each oUier, and would frustrate all the 



■wuum] liisufitotiRKTAii.s Passive commescb. 67 

tempting advantages wlitch nature bas kindly placed 
within our reach. Id a state so insigniScant our com- 
nerce would be a prcf to the wanton internieddlinKs 
o( all nations at war with each other; who, having noth- 
ing to (ear from us, would with tittle scruple or remorse 
supply their wants by depredations on our property as 
often as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality 
will only be respected when they are defended by an 
adequate power. A nation despicable by its weakness 
forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.* 

Under a vigorous national govcrnmenl. ibe nalurnl titcngih 
•lid renourcen of (lie couiili)-. dirccu-d lo a common iiiien:si. 
WOaU baffle all the combine I ioni; of European jcalouty lo 
rairain our growih. Tliit siiuHtiuii would even take away the 
motive to mcIi combin-itiunt. by inducing An impraclicabilily ol 
viffrtti An active ornmercc, an eitun^ivc iiavigalion. and a 
nourishing miiine wouUI Ihen be tlic ofliipriiii; ol moral and 
physical necr&siiy. We might defy Ihc lilllc arts of ihe little 
po^iicjans lo control or vary (he irresistible and unchangeable 
warse of nalarc. 

But in a Male of disunion llvese combinallonx might exist and 
nUKhi operate with succms. It would be in the power of the 
nuntime nations, availing ihenuclrcs uf our uniremal impotence, 
lo piesciibc the conditions ol out poiiiicnl existence ; and as they 
luve a common inlercM in beiiit; our cairii;n. ami stilt inaie in 
(■tci'rnliii); our becoming ihcirs. thny would in all probability com- 
bine to cmbatrnM our navigation in such a iiMiincr as would in 
tffeict destroy It, and conlioe us to a rASSIVK couuEftCB. We 
dioutd Iheii be compelled 10 content ourselves with the flrsi price 
tA our commodiltes, and la see (he profit* of our trade snatched 
tram ui to enrich our enemies ai>d persecutors. 1'hat unequaled 
(pint of cnlrrpTLte which nignaliics the gcniu.i of the American 
iiictiilunts and navlj^aturs, and winch Is in Itself an inexhaustible 
mine (if national neatth, would t>e MiHcd aii4l lost, and poverty 
■oil disgrace would oveispread a country which, with wisdom, 
mi^t inahe herself the admiration and envy of the world. 

There are rights of great moment to the trade of 
America which arc rights of the Union — I allude to the 
ftsberics. to the navigation of the Western lakes, and 

'Tlib tnitti «M ijuickly provnl by the conne o4 EijElsad bdiI Fntnce 
tmn 17^ nnii) ilie Wu tA iSta, (or duilac that period ow commerce 
«M a ptey whenever clilwr cIiom. — Cniron. 



\ 



6S 



NAVV A NATIONAL OBJECT. 



Uto-U 



to that of the Kli&sissippi. The dissolution of the Con 
fc<lcracy would give room for dclicute questions con 
cerning the futuft! existence nf ihe&c rights; whitb tlie 
interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to 
solve to our diftadv»ntage. The disposition of Spain 
§a, with regard to the MiMissippi needs no com- 

!••■*- mcnL France and Britain arc concerned with 

us in the fisheries, and view them as of the utmost 
moment to their navigation. They of course would 
hardly remain long indifferent to th^t decided mastery 
of which experience lias xhown us to he possessed in this 
valuable branch of traffic, and by which we are able to 
undersell those nations in their own markets. What 
more natural than that they should he disposed to ei 
elude from the lists such dangerous competitors? 

This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a 
l>artial benefit. All the navigating States may, in dif 
ferent degrees, advantageously participate in it, and 
under circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile 
capital would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of 
seamen it now is, or, when time shall have more nearly 
assimilated the principles of navigation in the scrersl 
States, will become, a univers.il resource. To the estab- 
lishment of a navy it must be indispensable. 

To this great national object, a navv, union wilt con- 
tribute in various ways. Every institution will grow and 
flourish in proportion to the <)uaQlity and extent of tin 
means concentered toward its formation and support. ^ 
navy of the United States, as it would embrace tin 
resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy 
of any single Stale or [lartial confederacy, which would! 
only embrace the resources of a single parL It happens, 
indeed, that different portions of confederated ,\merica 
possess each some peculiar advantaj^c for this csseottal 
establishment. The more southern States furnisli in 
greater abundance certain kinds of naval stores — lar, 
pitch, and turpentine. Thdr wo<»d for the construction 
of ships is also of a more solid and lasting texture. The 
dltference in the duration of the ships of wbltdi the navy 



BMUual 



COMMBKCE BRTWEEA' STATES. 



«9 



might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern 
vofid, would I>c of signal imporuincc, either in the view 
of naval strength or of national economy. Some of the 
Soaihcrn and of the Middle States yield it greater plenty 
of iron, and of belter tiu.ility. Seamen must chiefly be 
drawn from the Northern hire. The necessity of navai 
prutection to external or mnrttime commerce does not 
require a particular elucidation, no more than the coD- 
tlDcivencss of that species of commerce to the prosperity 
of a nary. 

An unrestrained intercourse between the States them* 
wires will advance the trade of each by an inlcrchanjce 
<rf their respective productions, not only for the •cupi>ly 
of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to 
foreign markets. ' The reins of commerce in every part 
■ill be replenished, and will acijutre additional motion 
»nd Tigor from a free circulation of the commotlilies of 
every parL Commercial enterprise will have much 
crater scope, from the diversity in the productions of 
different States. When the staple of one fails from a bad 
turvest nr unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the 
suple id another. The variety, not less than the value, 
«f pntducts for exportattim contribute* to the aeltvity of 
foreijin commerce. It can be conducted upon much 
belter terms with a large number of maleriab of a xiven 
•alup than with a smaller numlier of materials of the 
UniF value, atising from Ihe competitions uf trade and 
from the lluctaations of markets. Particular articles may 
be in great demand at certain periods, and unsalable at 
others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can 
itarcely happen that (hey should all be at one time in the 
btier predicnmeni, aitd on this account the operations of 
the tBcrchant would be less liable to any considerable 
obstruction or stagnation. The speculative trader will 
U once perceive the force of these observations, and will 
icknowlcdgc that the ag^cgatc balance of the commerce 

i.ilily no (inck rlciuent hu ta much caiilribulr^ In Hir pro*- 

'I 111* Ualleil hliict n llic l*ct llmi il ii pruiically llie hri;nl 

^tajiaj ia the woild la sfaicb luimliktrJ inilc b pcimlitcd.— EniTOL 



76 



COMMERCIAL UNITY. 



m«.ii 



of llie UniU<] Sutes would iMtl fair to be much more 
favorable than that of the thirteen States without anion 
or with partial unions. 

It mil)' ]>crhaps be replied to this that, whether the 
States are united or disunited, there would still be an 
intimate intercourse between them which would answer 
the siime ends; but this intercourse would he fettered, 
interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, 
which in the course of these papers have been amply 
detailed. A unity of commercial, as well as political, 
interests, can only result from a unity of Koverument. 

There arc other points of view in which this subject 
might l>e placed, of a striking and animating kind. But 
they would lead us too far into the regions of futurity, 
and would involve topics not proper for a newspaper dis- 
cussion. I shall briefly observe that our situation 
smHo. 11, invites and our interests prompt us to aim at 
**••■ an ascendant in the system of , American 

affairs. ' The world may politically, as well as geographic- 



' In thti idea U lo be (ouml an ci[lvci|muio« of vhtl hu lincr cone 
lA tie lixHcly lenncil Ihe Mnciioe IhxiiTiie. Kut anipmllonalil/ thu 
vrnr «l«iltG principlr, whicli U> Ifait Avf has n«Tor liocn pMdMljr 
■lemieil. U in linili mcrrty nne eiiimuon of • &ieil con*Klioa is 
ihr lai][<' p*n of (he peo|>]e of the lJnile<l Suici (hat Europenii powcn 
thall eveiii<i*Ur lie whoJIj' exclnclol fioni ihe i«a coaiiiicnii of AnterUa. 
Ill 1733 Fmikltn «i|:e<l uixm the llitinh iwai^-enniyt ilie ceilisg of 
C-uitiila inil No** Scntu In the Unili-tl Slain, rni Ibc gmiindt Ihm «ll 
lni« ni)ipn>chenMtil between (he iwo caunlrin iroutd be iBipotiilile to 
lunR ai tboie tcrtiioctn were Tclaiucd bf EnglaiKl, and time nai pimcd 
■ill view, fat llioa|;K himlrtJ in bli>xl uitK ui, awl with iuteiettt alnuNl 
iilenileal. Cjieat Itiiiaia it to^ay in |>ii|<iiUr eMiiiiali^iii iwr graatni 
oneinjp. Scanolf tns ulions b the feHioe aipiimt !>|>aiD, «hkh Iron Ika 
linl hai b««n of all Earopean pmren the one (i> nhicli we owe (be moit 
(avDn, ycl (onanl which wc have >cle(l in a nunnei tni)ilrinc pcipeliMl 
oUtonat eanuiy. Watm u llie luttonat (crlini; lia% lieeit toitard FnUKe. 
we aiitnl Si. Ilomingo |u obtain iti fcteituna by «ttty )kmuI>1(, II Mr- 
itplilioui deoke ; ibe moment newi iru r«c«iT«<l ol Napohym't 
acquiiition of LnuiiJana. Jeilerson announced thai " i( ii impotulile thai 
Fraace anil the Unlleit S(am can couliniae lone friemU.' and Ihe Ul- 
feelin)' b«T oecupuluu of Meiii:ii (VirJm'cil it tlill iarnioi:i' I 'rtii. 

IleRnnnA ptcilwbly viiinil, anil cnntHiun lo viiue Ihe isttir . uf 

lit couBl rynen when h*il«<l»tr'i '' ■■' " ■"" r .."(,. i-r»fy am ^ , . ,, ,. ^I » 
Ihe nmltam which all Atbtii lobepaofikd." anJ 

■hat " Iheobjcci of bodi ninti ' (cas ikflBcni-e f(om 

lilt* hnmlti'liaiK." lie iiarrlcil bu umi-yl w lu, Indccii, a* vim la 




HuUlMl 



EUROPEAX SUPREMACY. 



»• 



>Uy, be divided into four parts, each tUTing a distiDct set 
of interests. Unhiippily for the other three, Europe, by 
her arms and by her negotiations, by fvrce and by frutid, 
bas, in diRerent dej(rce!(, extended her dominion over 
tbcni alL Africa, Asia, and America have successively 
felt her domination. The superiority she has long main- 
utned has templed her tu plume herself as the Mistress 
of the World, and to consider the rest ot mankind a& 
created (or her bcnclit. Men admired as profound 
philosophers l»ave in direct terms attributed to her 
inhabitants a physical superiority, and have tiravcly 
usertcd that all animals, and with them the human 
ipecie*, degenerate in Americii— that even don;* cease to 
bark after having breathed a vfhilc in our atmosphere.* 
Facts have loo long supported these arrogant pretensions 
of the European;, [l belongs to us to vindicate the 
hiaor of the human race, and to teach tliat assuming 

" btfwch the \Ar* ibai w« consid«T the whole Giilf Siicain m of our iraterx, 
ia alikfa hokiitiim anil ctulkiiii; at in lie (iduiikI upon." 

How far (bt« |KiliL-]r n fdivmsblc ii not t-jtily dccideil. On III* One 
krad, U is ubvioBi that the Amotion (ctnlnikt ttill lirlil Xiy Euroiwaii 
Maen uv fa> belter and mure prj(«(ully guvcrnnl l)iiiii llimc whjcli 
•tw «dl■cv^d ind«pcn<iencf. To ihe (orl'miy, it ii ccilain that Futopc 
klai nusm liable lu wan of matcnnl imi>oiUncc ; lliat tlic cit«n>ioii of 
Iboic Ban lo llic wnlnii hxli ai llie wiiilit l« altnoM inevilalik tn Ion); 
« thaflialcl tctiilorit? tbctrin ; aiici lli.nl. iiii'ieui-ci. thrirtolanictare ihe 
neat potCBI CBiHcol f rid ion liclwcen llir C'lU'iIrir-i liclOiiig I hem and ibe 
UnlMd Sutct (initaii<,cil in llic Fitherict oioA ilrhtint; S«a ditiiulei, ivllli 
Cnil fkiuls, and lhrC«l>auillllitiiUict with Squill)- [> iioliviuuhihal. in 
More Uioa tin* view, Kwnifx'Kii ffouicitkiifu of Anicrican tcrttlory cutiAli* 
Mo a neBicr lo Ihr pCMClul pclity t,\ ilii; tlmicil S4Htn. 

Il la to be reEiHIcI, in view of lliii policy, lliiil Krt-iidciil Cleveland 
boad lin liilcffciciiec in tl« Venejiielaii contpm-ny oti Ihe clound of 
dwfn to iciiiil'lii.'an imlttiiltiiiii>. lor tlic aunmption nppealeil iicillicr In 
nor lo huinaaily. Had )ic. iii (iluc of Ihik {nclol. laktrn the 



pOBIMn that lh« United Stalei wnnld tiercnftni iiihiil lliat all diiputu 
nawcrti Europe and America muit be arlrilnlnt, and llial in no tn-e 
■nsLl Ibe United Suicollaw Ruropcan maifnte l» rilmd lo thi> liall iit 
IW wnfld. lie wKiikl han lakea a far moie tenable (khiikxi, hat* 
Blnnceil Ihe inletr*!-! of llie I'oilf'l Slatr.. and have done • ijreat >tr*ke 
to bunauilj. That ihii potilioii » ineiiublr. ami it in (act to. much to 
the iiKeroi ot Europe ai America, Kemi a1rca<ly Mllln) in thcoiy, mu) 
iW PiciliJcni who fciiallj ciiablhhei it u a piaclice will laiili hit name 
ki{h In AmerViaii hitiory. — Knnoa. 

* [Oe I'aua'i) " K«t>ri<1ici )>hjIOKiphi<|uea uir In AntmcaiHa."— • 
PliaLit't. Fur a reply Iiy JtSciKrii, lee " Nolci on VirQinia "(Brookljiv 
'»MJ Y- «.— Eonoa. 



COMMERCE AND REVENUE. 



[iro.u 



brother moderation. Union will enable tis to do it 
Disuniun will niltt another victim to his triumphs. Let 
AmGricanti ditidain to iie the instruments of European 
greatness! Let ihc thirteen States, bound together in a 
strict and indissoluble Union, concur in creeling one 
great American system, superior to the control n\ all 
transatlantic force or inHuence, and able to dictate the 
terms of the connection between the old and the new 
world! PuBLiua. 



No. 12. (.v/v Yttk Piktt, S wmUt (T. iftr.) Hamilton. 

UTILITY OF UNIONS AS REGARDS REVENUE. 

Cimmfnt Iht grfnt ttmrtt »f uativmil VMllk—Cnimn'a nitnlM If 
agrifm/tuTf — T-tifi miut tf affsirli,-afj If tkt ^laittily 9/ misfijt — SttMt 
Ttvrimtt »/ Gtrman Emfirt— Prtvrly a/ ilatt Imiuriti — TiU-tHfit im 
Grtat BritmH — DhIUi lir main Jffwi/tiK* in Am*nta—Umf^mUri$f 
tf txdu tttd Jirtil laxii — Hutitt frit UtiitJ ty gemtrtt ffvemmtf^— 
Sf-tU in/fiO VvH niutl in imttaiHnf — Rrvtntv ftlreU af framtr — 
UHtiiiUkofit a/ $mi4ggliKg timJer rtaliiivtt gwtmmtMl — OiuiJotHfafr 0/ 
Brihtin <■> rtgttrdi tmHtgiiiif—Stil/r imf<ub — Frrntk and /ingiitA 
itulifi — Rnvnue /rtm anient ifiriti—'Nalinnttriiitimtimp&iiiNe uiilh- 
tut n-EvMH/ — Nitiiiilr frr imffiti — t/if/ifH/arily rf fxiitt* aitd Mrttl 
UxafifM — IVilAtitl .»H imffit, taxft will (klrfiy /aU mt Umt. 



Tt> the Peopie of thf Sl-ile of Nen; York: 

The effects of Union Upon the commercial prosperity 
of tlie States have been scifficiently delineated. Its ten- 
dency to promote the interests of revenue wilt be the 
subject of onr present inquiry. 

The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and 
acknowledged by idl enlightened statesmen to be the 
most useful as well as the most productive source of 
national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary 
object of their political cares. Dy muliiplyinK tlic means 
of gntiiication, hy promoting Ihc introduLtinn and cirtni- 
lation of Uic prerions metals,— I lurte darlinfr objects of 
human avarice and enterprise,— it serves to vivify and 



iBdtlOB) 



COMMERCE AND AGRICULTURE, 



73 



invigorate the channels of industry, and to make them 
Ruw with greater activity anil copiousness. The assid- 
uous merchant, the laborious husbandman, the active 
RKchanic, am) the industrious maoufacturcr— al! orders 
of (KO— look forward with eager expectation and growing 
abcrity to this pleasing reward of their toils. The often- 
i^aied question between agriculture and commerce has, 
from indubiubie experience, received a decision which 
\m silenced the rivalship that once subsiiitcd between 
ibnn, and has proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, 
(hit their interests are intimately blended and inter- 
vixen. It has been found in various countries tltat, in 
proportion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in 
nlue. And how could it have happened otherwise? 
Cuold that which procures a freer vent for the products 
<f the earth, which furnishes new incitements to the ciil- 
ihaiionof land, which is the most powerful instrument in 
iocreasing the (|uantity of money in a state — could that in 
fine, vhich is the faithful handmaid of labor and industry, 
ia erery shape, fail to augment that article, which is the 
frotilic parent of far the greatest part of the objectti upon 
Vliitti they arc exerted? It is astonishing that su simple 
atmih should ever have had an adversary ; and it is on«, 
UBOng a multitude of proofs, how apt a spirit of ill- 
Uonncd jealousy, or of too great abstraction and relinc- 
■mt, is to lead men astray from the plainest truths of 
Kuon and conviction. 

The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be 
proportioned, in a great degree, to the rjuantity uf money 
■nIml ><i circulation, and to the celerity with which 
*"* it circulates. Commerce, contributing to 

Mh these objects, must nf necessity render the payment 
■'taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite supplies to the 
•fciMry. The hereditary dominions of the Kmperor of 
Geraany contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated, and 
lopohtus territory, a large proportion of which is situated 
in mild and luxuriant climates. In some parts of this 
territory are to be found the best gold and silver miocs 
ia Kurope. And yet, from the want of the fostering 



u 



DIJtaCT TAXSS UNPOFULAR. 



tlb,lt 



influenceofcummerce, that monarch canboastbut slcuder 
revenues. He haa several times bren <:umi>cllcd to owe 
obligations to the {xicuniury succors of other nations for 
the preservation of his essential interests, and is unable, 
upon the strength of bis own resources, to sustain a long 
or continued war. 

Uvit il is not in (his nspcct of the subject alone thai Union will 
be »cen (o cooduce to the |>urj>cisc o( teveiiue. There arc oilier 
points ol view, in which its influence will Appear m«rc immediate 
and deci»ire. It is evidenl from tlie state u( ihe couiilry, (loni the 
habits of llie people. \\ott\ the expetience we Itare ha«l on the 
point itKcir, that it b impracticable to raise any very considerable 
sums by direct taxation. Tax law* have in rain been niuliiplkil : 
new melliods tci enforce the coltcclion have in vain been tried ; 
the public expectation lus been unilormly <lisappuinlc<l. and (he 
treasuiie»of the States h.ive rcntaine<l empty. The popular sys- 
tem ol admiiiixiralion inherent in (lie nature ul po|Milar govern* 
mem. coinciding with the real scarcity of money Incident to a 
Ungiiiil and mulilaicil slate of trade, has hitherto defeated every 
Gxpeiiuient for cxiensire collections, and ha:> at length taught the 
different tegi-'datuTcs the (otly of attempting them. 

No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will 
be suTpriscd at ihrt circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that 
of Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much 
more loicrahlc. and from Ihe vigor of ilie Kovcniincnt much more 
practicable, than in America, far the greatest pjn of lite nattoiial 
revenue is derived from (axcn of the iiidiiect kind, from imposts, 
and from excises. Dutks on imported artklcs form a Urge branch 
of tliiK Utter desciipliun. 

In America it is evident thai we mu«t a loitg linu; depend for 
Ihe means of revenue chiclly oii such duties. In most pans of tl, 
excises must be confined within a narrow compau- The genius 
of the people will ill brook the inquisitive and peiemptoiy spirit of 
excise Uws.' The pockets of ilic farmerv. on the otiter hand, will 

' So DOpopnlo' >» ■> nciHi tax in Ibe lul nntury that onlv tbrae of 
Ihe cotoniei hud levkd il in ealonia) ii«iet, and not omb diie nad dated 
lo lueim a tovtceoJ rcvcMue tn Ihe period Iroin 1774 lo 1787. In (he 
New Vork conmbMi whkti n\\iitA ihcixniuiiaiiiin il wa*lvti« aiinrvdlo 
iCTlnin wlivlly ihiE national ^nrrn'Dxix from (hit torn of lautioa. awl 
iKo oJ the italca, in tbeir tuegnltd •nieiulnieiiu. wiiked all excises ta 
be appovtiooed on tbe uata. tcBving to etich ifce qimtHiD bow lo raite 
its pTopoRioD. The reasan nJ this unpoiwlarily vu dm lo the circuBi- 
Uanca of (he tax bdnf pncll^Ilv the im\f one wMcli IdI) on (be prod- 
net ol ifcc wnall fatmcr, lo abinn issJ; manej wu al«ap a ran 




bBtltoBl STATE IMPOSTS IMPRACTICABLE. 



rrluctanlty )-ield but scanty supplies, m tlie unwelcome shape o( 
inptMliiaiis on lltcii Iiouscsand Unils;and peiMinal property m 
100 precarious anil lnvisit>1c a fund to be Uid hold of in any otbcr 
■Af (ban by the tmperceptibte af^eiicy of taxe« on cuiiiurnpiion. 

U iheK remarks have any foundation, ihat state of things which 
win best enable xa to iinprore and extend so valuable a resource 
mini be l>csi Mlapteil to our political welfare. And it cannot 
admit of a serious doubt that this suic of tliiiij{S muil rest on the 
bttis of a gciKral Union. As f.ir as this would lie conducive to 
the mtercsis of cocnuierce, so (nr it must tend tu the cutcniiion ul 
the revenue to be ■Ir.tiATi fiom that source. As far at it would 
contiibule to rendering rctjuUtions fur the collection of the duties 
marc simple and efTicacimi^ so f.ir it mutt *erve to answer the pur- 
poses of milking the same rate of diitie<> more productive, and of 
pinii^it into the pourer of the goveriinicnt to increase the rale 
mImuI prejudice to ttadc. 

The relative situation of these States; the number of 
nrcis iritfi which tlicy arc inlerscctctl, nnd of bays that 
■s-th their sfaurev; the facility uf communication in 
every direction; the affinity of language and manner*: 
the familiar habits of intcixroursc; — all these are cir- 
Cttmstanccs that would conspire tu render an illicit 
trade between Ihcin a matter of little difficulty, and 
voold insure frequent evasions of the commercial retcula- 
lions uf each other. The separate States or confedera- 
cies would be neceuiiated by mutual jealousy tu avoid 



pWiMJon. kll Dilict laxev on contumpliofi being levied on the mciMnlile 
duMs, who cuily oontniiinc!«il ihe euh advance whicJi (he («■ cniaileil. 
AlnuM with (lie iawoAtWtm tA tlic tuliiiiiKl );<)vciunienl, lliiiiillon id- 
rscated attil ntitiinrd ■■< civi>ir ii>, wliiiti i'l turn priHliiiti) Ihe Whinky 
Ktbttlinn. An excite vai inililutrd in the War of i£ia uid alKi in the 
Civil War; the tatter hecame ^rnimcnl. und now prodncn alniMt 
half the goieniiBem revenues. IhiLl it ii no iDHQcr an uii|i<i|iiii*r (ax ik 
dot to tlir (act thai Ihe |i>iiiluclkin a\ tfiiTilt. t>ecr, anil ti>)iiv>.'u ■» noiv 
coolrailcd by crrat maciulaclurinR enr^ioratixns, wiiivli hate no dlSitully 
in coaiaasDding ind}' money. Wheie the ume conditiom ilill cxiil 
whidi (onnerly made ihe tax unpopular (the nioomhine dttiillcriet of (he 
SoMbem mouKUlas), it it at much haled m crti. Sec atliclct o( K. C. 
JamM on Kxcltea. and W. C. Koid un Inlenul Kcvmue. in Lalor'a 
" CrclopK'lia uf Politkal Siirnce." The laine change in public oinnion 
kuoccum^ in Cleat Biilain. Johnaon, in hiiOieilonarv, denned Eiciw 
■•"■balelul lax levied upon conmoitillci. and Bdiuiicod not by ihe 
nMmaa J>d|^ o( properly, but wreiche* tiircil liy lho»c \o whiim 
ewba i* paid, «UIe oow tlie hcer lax ii the one iuvanaUy uud to 
tMnd 001 the yearly bod^oL— EnrrOR. 



7* SMUGGLlXa CONTROLLABLE BY VKlOff. tBffclJ 

the temptations to tliat kind of trade by the lowncss of 
iheir duties. The tcmjtcr of our governments, for a 
long lime to come, would not permit those rigorous pre* 
cautions by which the European nations guard the ave* 
nues into their respective countries, as well by land as 
by water; and which, even there, are found insufficient 
obstacles to the adventurous straugems of avarice. 

In France, tlietc U an anny of jntroli (aji they are called) con- 
sianttf emplov'd to secure their fiwal rcKuUlions agsinn Ibe 
iiinxKli of the ilealerx in conEinlKinil Iraite. Mr. Neckar computes 
the nunihcr of these patroK at iipw.trds of iweiiiy ih4xi!tnn<). This 
should the immense ilifficully in preveniing tlut species o( IrafKc, 
where there is an inbnil communic.tiion. and places in a strong 
hgh( the dn.iil vantages with which the collection of duties m this 
country would lie encuniltered. K by disunion the Slates should be 
place<l in a siiuaiion, with rcsjiect to each other, rcscntbling ihai 
of Fr^ince with respect to lier neighbors. The arbilraiy and vexa- 
tious powers with which the patrols are necessarily arm«] would 
be intoIrr^tMc In i free counliy. 

If, on the contrary, there be but one government per- 
vading all the States, there will be, as to the principal 
part of our commerce, but okk bide to guard— the 
Atlantic coast. Vessels arriving directly from foreign 
countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely 
choose to hazard themselves to the complicated and criti- 
cal perils which would attend attempts to unlade prior to 
their coming into port. Tbcy would hare to dread both 
the dangers of Ihe coast, and of detection, as well after 
as before their arrival at (he places of their Tinal destina- 
tion. An ordinary degree of vigilance would be com|>e< 
tent to the prevention of any material infractioits upon 
the rights of the revenue. A few armed vessels, judi- 
ciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at a 
small expense be made u.scfiil sentinels of the laws. And 
the government having the same inicresl to pi:ovlde 
against violations everywhere, the co-operation of its 
measures in each State would have a powerful tendency 
to render them cffccltial. Here also we should preserve, 
by Union, an advantage which nature hulds out to 09, 
and wbicb vuuld be rcliitqutsbed by sejiaratton. The 



SiaUun] 



REVBNVE FROM SPIRITS. 



77 



t'uitcd States lie at a great distiince from Europe, and 
it a considerable distance Iroin all other places with 
which they would have extensive connections of foreign 
trade. The passage from them lt> us, in a few hours, or 
in a single night, as between the coasts of France and 
Britain, and of other neighboring nations, would be 
impracticable. This is a prinligious security against a 
diKct contraband with foreign countries; but a circui- 
lODs contraband to one State, through the medium of 
lOiKlier, would be both easy ami safe. The ditference 
between a direct tmiiortation from abroad, and .in indirect 
iapurUlion through the channel of a neighboring State, 
in small parcels, acconling to time an<l «pportunity> with 
the additional facilities of inland communication, must 
be palpable to every roan of discernment. 

It is therefore evident that one national gorcrnmcnt 
wnid be able, at much less expen.te, to extend the duties 
01 imports, beyond comparison, further than would be 
pnaicable to the States separately, or to any partial 
toofederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be 
iMcned that these duties have not upon an average 
MKoied in any State three per cent. In France they 
>fc tstimaie^ to be about Rfteen [>cr cent., and in Britain 
Ihey excee«1 this proportion." There xcems to be 
noihinj!; to hinder their being increased in this country 
to at least treble their present amount. The single 
vticle i)( anient spirits, under federal regulation, might 
If made to furnish a considerable revenue. Upon a 

'i' '" the impi»rtatton into this State, the whole qnan- 
,i(i'iried into the United States may be estimateil at 
lillions of g.-)llons: which, at a shilling per gallon, 
-lint produce two hundred thousand pounds. That 
irticle would well t>ear this rate of duty; and if it should 
■end to diminish the consumption of it, such an effect 
»nuld be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the 
KOBooiy. to the morals, and to (lie health of the societjr. 
Thu'e i«, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of national 
etiraraifance as ihi-so spirits. 

* U my Mcnwy b« richl Ihcy aoMnini la twenty p«r cent.^Puujm. 



78 



BXCtSSS UNPOPULAK. 



i]r».u 



Whitt will be the con sequence, if we xcc not able to 
avail (>iirNelvc» iif ilie resource in question in its full 
extent? A nation cannot long exist without revenues. 
Destitute of this essential support, it must rcsiKO it» 
inilcpeiidcncc anU tink into the degraded condition uf a 
province. This is an extremity to which no sovernmeni 
will of choke accede. Revenue, therefore, must be had 
at all events. In this country, if the principal part be 
not drawn from commerce, it mui^t fait with oppressive 
weight upon land. It has been already intimated that 
excises, in their true signiTication, arc too little in unison 
with the feetinj;!t of the people to admit of great use 
bcitiK made of that mode of taxation; nor, indeed, in 
the States where almost the sole employment is agri- 
culture, are the objects proper for excise suffiuieutly 
Dutocrous to permit very ample collections in that way. 
Personal estate (as has been before remarked), from the 
difficulty in tracing ii, cannot be subjected to large con- 
tributions by any other means than by taxes on con 
sumption. In populous cities, it may be enough the 
subject of conjecture to occasion the oppression of indi- 
viduats without much agt{rcp:ate benefit to the State; but 
beyond these circles it must, in a great measure, escape 
the eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As the neces- 
sities of the State, nevertheless, must be satisfied in 
some mode or other, the defect of other resources must 
throw the princifKil wetKhl of public burdens on the p»s- 
scssors of land. And as, on the other hand, the wauls 
of the government can never obtain an nde<iuate supply, 
unless all the sources of revenue are open to its demands, 
the finances of the community, under such embarrass- 
meniK, cannot he put into a situation can<iistcnt with its 
respectability or its security. Thus we shall not even have 
the consolations of a full treasury to atone for the oppres- 
sion of that valuablcclassof the citizens who are emphiyed 
in the cultivation of the soil. But public and private 
distress will keep pace with each other in gt"itmy concert: 
and unite in dcploriD]{ the infatualiuu of those counsels 
whicb led to disunion. Pusuva. 



NATIONAL CIVIL LIST. 



79 



No. 13. U*^f*dlmlJ*»r»^.'Soi*mhttti.tlfil,) 



Hamilton. 



ADVANTAGKS OF UNION FROM THE STAND- 
POINT OF ECONOMY. 

Smtllrr txpratt ff tit-U list — CimI tiilt ej ttfaratt t^nfttUrafin — 
tamf^ r/ li'f^l Britain — PniaUt tintl tf JiniioH e/ frififitJ ttn- 
ffirinn — A NirrtlurH anJ d S^utiem Jnlg«e—Pfiiti,Ht »f Peam/t- 
tui* Grtaltr aea^my d/Mtr itaft-itraif. 

71 tht People of tht SiaU ff A'lW Y^rk: 

Ai cannectcil wiihtlie suhjeclof icvcnuc.we nwy willi propriety 
coMtdcr iImi o( ecunoitiy. Tlie money saved frnni one nbjrct 
nuy be uwally applied lo anoihcr. antt iherc will be sa much tlie 
leu 10 be drawn (ruin Ihc puckets of ihe pcujite, tf ihc Sinics are 
•Med under one govenimenl. ihcrc will be but one national civil 
bit 10 support -, if llicy are divided inlu several confedetacicK. then: 
«ill be as many different n.iiioiial civil lists to be provided for — 
iml eodi o( (tiera, us (u the principal deparlinents, coexicii:iive 
■itb Hat whtcli would be necessary Tor a f.'overnmerit of llie whole. 
IH The entire sc|»ration of ihc States into ihittceii 

1*-H. uitconnecled sovetcigmicsis a. pio)cct too exliava^-Aiit 

Hid too replete with dantrcr lu have nuny advocaict. The idea* 
d men who specuUie upon (he dismember m cut o( the empire ^ccin 
tncndly turned taw.irdi three cimfi'dcracicn — one coniixiing of (he 
(Our Narlhern. another «l the (our Miilille. and .1 third ol ihe Rve 
SoAhem States. There is little piobiibiliiy thai there would be a 
prner number. According to this disliihiition, each confederacy 
VmiliJ comprtv an extent of territory larger than thai of llic king' 
tiA« <rf Great ttriisin. No well-informed man will suppose thai 
(he ailaira o( wch a confedetiicy can be properly regulated by a 
govemmeDt l«s comprehensive in itsorg.msor inMilutions than 
ihst which has been proposed by the Coiivenlion, When lite 
duMiwiuns of a .Stale uliain lu a certain inaKiiilude. it requires llie 
umc energy of ([UTCinincnl and the tkime forms of adniiiiiMration 
frhich arc reiguiiilc in one n( much Kieater extent. This idea 
kclmiis not of precise demons! rAl ion. because there Is no rule by 
V'bicK ore can roea»urc the momentum ul civil power tieccuary 
lo llir govrrnmeni of any given number of indivitluals : but when 
IK consider llial lite island of Britain, nearly comincDsuraie with 
och ti (he suppov^ confeilcracie:!. contains about eight millions 
(< pcuple. and wlicn we reflect upon llic degree of nuilHifiiy 
rtqufacd to direct the piissioas of so lar^c a society lu ilie public 



So 



PROBABLE LEAGUE DlVtSWNS. 



([ooil, we iihall tw no rrafton to <loubl ihal the like porli» 
piiwcT would he sufFiririii to jietfornt ihc Mm« (.i»k in « mm 
far more numernui. Civil pow«r, piaperly orgniiiici} and exci 
is cjipitlile ol ihfTti«iiig its force loa very gicui cxiem: and cai 
a m.inncr. reproduce iUelf in evciy part of a great em jiire 
judicious arrangemenl of sulwi'dinale instiiuiioas. 

Tlie suppiMtliuii iliai tnch confciteracy into which the Si 
would l>e likely to be divided would require a govcmment not 
comprehcuHivir llian the uiic prupriMi). »il1 b« &lmif-lhcncil 
nnorhrr siippo%iiion. more prob.ihle than that which prrvetils 
Willi liirec tociftclcr.icics as the -iltcrrialivr lo a grneral Uniiin, 
S«iIIot. wc attend carefully lo geoj-raphical and commcr 

lands. consiilerallnn!>, in conjiinction niih the h;il>ilt i 

prejudices of the iliflei^nt -Sralcs, we tlinll ht led to conclude I 
in c^kfw ol disunion ihcy vvill innst naturally league iheniwl 
under two {[ovi-tnnients. The (uur E^Mern Stales, ttoni all 
causes i><al form the link* of national sympathy and cuiiiiecti 
may with ccriainiy be cxpccied tu unite. New York, sit ualetl 
sJic i«, would nevet lie unwise enoujjh to oppnse a feeble i 
unaupporied Rank to the weight of Tliat confeiJerncy. There 
olher obvious reasons lliat would (ncililale her accession la 
New Jersey is too small a Siaie to think nf being a frantier 
opposition tolhissiill more {>owerfu1 combination; nor do ih 
appear lu be any ohsiaclrs lo her a<linission into it. E 
Pennsylvania would have strong inducements lo join the Notth 
lcA)jue. All active foreign commerce, on the basis o( her C 
iiaviKation, is her true policy, and coincides wiih the opinions % 
dispositions of her ciiiieii«. The more Southern States, (i 
various circuinxlaiices. may not itiink themselves much inteie4 
in Ihe encouragemeni of naviKaiion. They may prefer a sysi 
which would jfive unlimited scope tu all nations to be the carr 
as W4-II as llic purchasers of ibrir commadiries. Pennsylvs 
may nut choose to confound her interests in a connection 
adverse lo her policy. As she must at all events be a tioni 
she may dccni It most consistent with Iier safety to have 
exposed side turned towards the weaker power of ihc Soutti 
rnlhcr than towards the stronger power of the Noiihern ConI 
eracy. This would give her the f.iirest chance to avoid lieinj; 
Flanders of America. Whatever may be the detennlnation 
Pennsylvania, if ilie Northern Confederacy includes New Jeri 
there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy lo the south 
that Si-iie. 
Nothing can be more evident than that the ihittcea StatMW 



J 




EXTEf/T OF TBUmrOftV. 



8i 



beal>1e lo siippoil » national govcmnieiil bcittr (linn nnr-h.ilf, or 
■-ihircl, or any nimitict lew Ihnn ihe whole. This reflection 
have great weight in ohviating tlint objection to the prtinoted 
, which is [otindnl on the principle of expense : un objec'iion, 
r, which when we come to iflke a nearer view of U. wiil 
Appear in ever^r lis'il to stand on mistaken ground. 

[ in addition lo the con v deration of n pliiniliiy of ciril lists, we 
into view llie nuinl)er o( persons wJio must iieccuanly be 
I 10 guard the inUnd com municji linn hclnccn thediHeient 
cies aipiinst illicit irulc. ;ind uho in lime will infalliMy 
Iftinf; up nut of ihe nrcc^sitics i>f revenue : and if we aUo take into 
(irw the niilii.'try c«iab]i»hment» which ii has been shown would 
■lavnidatily result from the jtMlmi*ici and conflicts of llie sei'enl 
utinitt Intii whkh Ihe Stales would be diviiled. we «hall clearly 
dacuTcT llial a se|Mratton would be not less injurious to the 
tcDnomy. ilton to the tranquillity, commcTce, revenue, and liberty 
rf ewiy part. Puui-lUS. 



No. 14. 



(A-m Vfi PtiM. KovtmlKi yt. i;lT.) 



Madison. 



OBJECTIONS TO THK EXTENT OF 
TERRITORY. 

Ah tvd/iiuO' di^iitttf—Cntfti^gH ej < r/fiuhlit nili a itmstr^y-^ 
f.mr a/ifMr\UfJ d/mxratiti — MfektlKUai f»n>rr !•/ rtprtifiiUtieti — 
_Ktim'al iimit ef d JimMroty — HxptriaMt in nfrtifulalicm inJtr Ikr 
mftJfi-aiy — Di'^iiirai af ikt Unttttl Sluttt — A'a */ Etirfftam cevn- 
iii—tiaiiliJjMriiJitlii>« af gtntra! f-roiTHiamt — Volm t/ lut^rJi- 
■ ptitmmrHli in riialifn A» liu sf Itriiltry—EvtulMl gttvth e/ 
Vtifn^-lnlttHal tMf-ifVfmtith faiililalfJ—Tif marr iHitaat Ikt Slnff 
'tr ^'ruUr Ikt nfeJ tj natitaal gtiftrnmtnl — Warning againti Ikttf 
^Xrfavr Jiinnifn. 

n tht People 0/ tJu Slate of Nao Y^rk: 

Wc hare seen the necessity of the Union, as our bul- 
wark U]!3insl foreign danger, as the conservator of peace 
iiDring oiirselvCK, its the guar<lian uf our commerce and 
other rummon iniercsts, as the only substitute for those 
military establishments which have subverted the liber- 
i of the Old World, and as the proper antidnie for the 
lex of faction, which hare proved (uiul to other 



Sa 




SEPUBUC AND DEMOCRACY DEFINED. 



popular governments, and of which alnrming symptoms 
have been betrayed l>y our own. All tlut remains 
within this branch of our inquiries is to take notice of 
ftn objection that may be drawn from the great extent 
of country which the Union embraces. A few obser- 
vations on this subject will be the more proper, as it is 
perceived that the adversaries o( the new Constitution 
are availing themselves of the prevailing prejudice with 
regard to the practicable sphere of republican admiais- 
tration, in order to supply by imaginary difficulties the 
want of those solid objections which they endeavor in 
vain to find. 

The error which limits repiiUican government to a 
narrow district has been unfolded and refuted in preced- 
SmITm. >»S papers. I remark here only that it sccma 
BkDdiO. to owe its rise and prevalence chicDy to the 
confounding of a republic with a democracy, applying to 
the former reasonings drawn from the nature of ihe 
latter. The true distinction between these forms was 
also adverted to on a former ucc^sion. It is that, in a 
democracy, the people meet and exercise the government 
in person: in a republic, they assemble and administer it 
by iheir representative!! and agents. A democracy, con* 
s«quently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic 
may be extended over a large region. 

To this accidental source of the error may be added 

the anificc of some celebrated authors, whose writings 

have h,^d a great share in forming the moilern standard 

of political opinions. Being subjects either of an ah- 

solote or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to 

heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils of thost 

tforms, by placing in comparison the vices and defects of 

Ithc rcpnbtican. and by citing as specimens of the latter 

Itlve turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern 

I Italy. Under the confusion of names, it has been an 

'easy laM: to transfer tu a republic observations applicable 

to a democracy only; and among <ilher«, the observation 

that it can never be established but among a small numtKr 

ot Ifec^ile, living within a small compass of territory. 



fOlMDl 



.VATV/lAl. UAf/r OF REPVBUC. 



«3 



Such a fallacy may have been tlie less perceived, as 
most of the popular governments of antiquity were of 
Im llie democratic species; and even in modern 

■fcH Europe, to which we owe the great principle 

of representation, no example is seen of a government 
•bolly popular, and founded, at the same lime, wholly on 
ihai principle.* If Europe has the merit of discovering 
iha great mechanical power in jtovcrnmcnt, by the 
vmple agency o( which the will of the largest political 
budy may be concentered, and its force directed to any 
object which the public good requires, America can claim 
tl\f merit of making the discovery the basis of unmixed 
uul cxlcnsive republics. It is only to be lamented that 
uy of her citizens should wish to deprive her of the 
additional merit of displaying its full efficacy in (he 
tstablisbmcDt of the comprehensive system now under 
her consideration. 

As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance 
(roQ the Central point which will just i>ermit the most 
Knote citizens to assemble as often as their public func- 
tioDs demand, and will include no greater number than 
tan join in those functions; so the natural limit of a^ 
rcpuhlic is that distance from the cenier which will] 
lardy allow the representatives to meet as often as may 
be necessary {or ilic .idministration of public affairs. 
C» It be said that the limits of the United States exceed 
ihii distance? It will not be said by those who recollect 
tW the Atlantic coast is the longc&t side of the Union, 
that iJuring the term of thirteen years the representatives 
b1 the States have been almost continually assembled, 
i«I that the memhers from the most distant States are 
not chargeable with greater intermissions of attendance 



"uU tx! illSicull la (Ulr ninrr HriHr tlutn Km b«en done bv 

kK. (n •!■« fint vhipltr ol hii " Uc^inaiitgi of New EnijUnd, 

■»■ i.ni, .-, , .'j«ai«iivF (■oreTHiBpnt. ttrkfljr, he onllina wh>i he 

'"» I I'Eiul idei. ot "caiw]itc«i vlihoui Incnfpotaliun " ; 

^JL At a-..,.,., . ird, or " ixiiujuett milti incuninnlion. Iiul vilhoul 

^^^^HwBUbun " : 'Bit )iL ilie 'IViitanic or Engliih hlei, in which repre- 

^^Vuh« *u su ackDoiiV^i-ol righi. — Eoiros. 



«4 



t)lM£.VSTONS OF UNITED STATES. 



i1h.U 



T 



than those frooi the States in the neighborhood of Con- 
gress. 

Tim we nutyform a Juster eslimate urilh regard lo this interest 
ing subjecl, lee ui man lo (he actual dimension* of (lie Union. 
The limii* as fiied by the treniy of peace, are : on the <att the 
AiUniic. on (he sou(h Die hlitnde of ]l desren. on the wett Ih 
Mississippi, ami on the north an irregular line, running in some 
instances bcyonil the 4;tli ilqiree. in others falling as tuw as th« 
421I. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies bctow thai latitude. 
ComputioK the distance between lite jist and 4S(h degrees, 
amount!! to 973 common ntilet; computing it from 31 lo 41 
degrees to 764^ miles. Tiiking the mean for the distance, thi 
amount will be 868V miles. Tlie mean distance from the Attanlic 
10 the Mississippi does not probably exceed 7^ miles. On a com- 
pnrison of (hi* extent with (hat of several counlr>es in Euro|)e. the 
piaciic.tbilitjr of rendering our sysieni commensurate to ii appears 
to be deinoiiMrabte. It is aol a great deal liirxer than Cernuiny,' 
where a diet representing ibc whole empire is continually assen)' 
Med ; or than I'olani) before llie late disn.ieml>ertnent. where ana(hei 
national diet was the depository of ilie supreme juMver. Pai&ing 
by CraiKe and Sjiain, we find tlul in Great Britain, interior as it 
nuy be in siie, the representatives of the nonhern extremity of the 
island have as lar (o travel lo tlie national council as will be 
requireil of thoie of the most remote parts nf the Union. 

Favorable as this view of the sulijcct inny be, some 
observations remain which will place it in A light ftill 
more satisfactory. 

L i\k the first place it ie to be remeinbercd that the gen- 
cfal government is not to be charged with the whole 
power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdic- 
tion is limited to certain enumerated objects, which con- 
cern all the members of the republic, but which are not 
to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The 
subordinate governments, which can extend ihclr care to 
all those other objects which can be separately provided 
for, will retain their due aotbority and activity. Were it 
proposed by the plan of the Convention to abolish the 
governments of (be particular States, its adversaries 
would have norac ground for their objection; though it 
would not be difBcult In show thai if they were abolithed 
the general government would be compelled, by the 



EVENTUAL GROWTH OF USIOM. 



H 



principle of self. preservation, to reinstate them la their 
proper jurisdiction. 

A second observation to be made U that the itomcdi-^ - 
ate object of the federal Constitution is co secure tl»e 
anion uf the thirteen priinttire Suites, which we know to 
be practicable; and to add to them such other States asi 
may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighbor-i 
hoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. 
The arrangements that may be necessary for those 
angles and fractions of our territory which lie on our 
north western frontier muitt be left to those whom 
further discoveries and experience will render more 
equal to the task. 

Let it be rematked, in the third phicc, that the inter^|^ 
cuurse throughout the Union will be facilitated by new] 
improve me Dts. Roads will everywhere be shortened,' 
aad kept in better order; accommodations for travelers 
will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation 
oo our eastern side will be opened throughout, or nearly 
throughout, the whole extent of (he thirteen States. 
The communication between the Western and Atlantic 
districts, and between different parts of each, will be 
rendered more and more eiisy by those numerous canals 
with which the tKneficence of nature has intersected our 
country, and which art finds it so little diflicult to connect 
and complete. 

A fourth and still more important consideration is 
that, as almost every State will, on one side or other, be y 
a frontier, and will thus Hnd, in a regard to its sifely, an 
mduccment to make «nmc sacrifices for the sake of the 
{cncral protection; so thcStatcs which lie at the greatest 
distance from the heart of the Union, and which, of 
coarse, may partake least of the ordinary circulation of 
its benefits, will be at the same time immediately conttg- 
Bous to foreign nations, and will consequently stand, on 
[Kirticuhir occasions, in greatest need of its strength ind 
resources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the 
States forming our western or northeastern borders, to 
send their representatives to the seat of jovernmenti 




86 




DISUNION SEP ROB A TED. 



nt^r 



but tliey wnuld Tinti it mnrc %a to straKgle alone again&C 
an invading cDcm}\ or even to sup(mrt ;ilon« the whole 
- expense »( those precautions which may be dictated bjr 
the neighborhood of continual danger. If Ibcy should 
derive less benefit, therefore, from the Union in some 
respects than the less distant States, they will derive 
greater benefit from it tn other respects, and thus the 
proper equilibrium will be maintained throughout. 

I sulniiit to you. tny fellow-citizm^. ihrse consiil«raiioiis, in (nil 
conlt<Ici>cc liut ihc gitnil «.-n»c which h^x »u olieii marked your 
decoiont will jIIow ihcni their <luc woglx .mil cHrci : i^ind ilut j-ou 
will never xuRcr (iiSiciillJcK, hawcvcr [ciTiniiUblc in ap|>car;iiic4r. or 
hnw<-vcr r^iihion.iblc the error on which ihcy may be luunOctl, to 
drive yiiu into (he gloomy and periloui icenc iolo whkh the advo- 

Icntcs (or diMnion would conduct )xiu. Huirhen nol lo the 
unnaluml voice which tells you ih.it the people a( America, knit 
logedicr at (hey arc by so niany cords of affection, can no longvf 
live losclhcr a« nirmhrrs ol Ihe same family : can no longer cnn^ 
tinue die mutual K^srdUni o( their tiiuiual happiness; can no 
longer lie fcllovr-eitiiens of one );rrai, respectable and RourUtiing 
eniprre. Hearken not to ihc vincc whKh pi;(uUndy tells you thai 
ihc (orm of govrmment recommcti<l«l (or your adoption is x 
novelty in Ihe poKtical world : that it lias itevrr yet Ivad a place In 
the ilieuries ol (lie wililot projector* ; thai it rashly aliempt* 
what it is impossible lo accomplish. No, my CMinlrymen. shut 
yoar ears against this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts 
against the poison which It conveys ; the kindred blooil which Aowi 
in the veins ol American ciiiieni, llie mingled blood which (hey 
have sbcil in iic(cnse o( their sacred rights, consecrate their 
Union, and excite horror at the idea of their becomiiis aliens 
rivnis. enemies. And if novelties arc to be shunned, Ixlirve ran 
be nmsi alarming ol all novdiies, the moat wild o( all projects, ilM 
St rash of all aiierapts, is that of tending us in pieces, in oidei 
I preserve our libeilies and promote our happiness. But why ii 
ibe experiment oi an extended republic to be rejecled. merely 
because it may comprise what is new ? Is it not the glory of the 
pcO|>le of America, that, whilst they have paii) a decent regard to 
the opinions of former times and nihcr nitions. they have no! 
suffered a bhnd venenlion for antiquity, (or cntiom. or (or names, 
to nvemitc Ihe siijjgestinns of thru oivn goixl snise. the knosvlrilgl 
tA ihcir own situation, and die lessons ol their own ciprricnce \ 
To this iBBtdy spirit, posterity wilt be indd>tcd lor the pouenion 



KESUtr OF THE RayQLVTlQU. 



«7 



will iSc wurlU (or ilti- example, of ihc numerous innovations dli- 
plijtd on ihc Ainericaii Uitattr, in fav-oi of |>iivaic righis and 
fuhlic lu{>(Hnni. Had no iiiipDi'inni >icp l>ci:n ukcn by ilie 
kiiUra o( ilic RevoluiKin fur Mtitcli a |)ii:c«lcn( couM not be dis- 
cormd. no guvcmincnt dtablislietl o[ vrliich un ciiicl model did 
DM ptoeni Kielf. Ilie pcupk- of the United Slam might, at llils 
moment, have been nuniliercd amoriK llie niclatichuty rictiias 
«( Briiguiittd counciU, niu^i Jt bcM Itai'c been laboring under tlie 
■ciKlit of some of thotc lonn* which tuve cru!ilic<l ilic Ubalica of 
ihc lot of mankind, litppity for America, tiappily, we Inisl, (or 
Hw whole huin.tn race, ihcy pursued a ii«w and ntore noble course. 
Thty jocoaijiiiiihcd a revolution whicli Ims no parallel in the annals 
•I Iniinaa locicly. They tcarcil the {^brlci of KovcniincniN wliieh 
hm no nxntel on ilte f^cc of (he globe. Ttiey formed the design • 
id ■ |[iat Confcdom<:y. which it ii incuniticiit on ilicir succeuors 
•B mi|irovv aitd iicrpeiuiUc. U their works bciray int perfect ion », 
>t Hundcr at ihc (cwnesH of llieni. \{ they erred nimt in the 
'ruciure of ilie Union, this was the work most difficult lo be 
occiucd : this is (he work which hat been new niuilelcd hy the act 
ttl four Convention, mid it b tlut iict on winch you nre now to 
■kibcnilc and to decide. 1>U&I.IUS. 



No, IS. 



itmdtftmfm Jf9HMl, DKcnUr 1. 1]47.> 



Hamilton. 



UKFECTS OF THE PRKSKNT CONFF-DKRA- 
TION IN ITS DEPENDENCE ON THE STATE 
GOVERNMENTS, 

TW inmjitituer «•/ '*f ifm/fdirali&it a utf-n-iJtut truti—XitUJk »J 
iBili»x nttii-nal hamilintifH — CmlmJitlriy tonJml «f tf-f.-utt <>/ Ike 
•^ttitmHtit — Xtttuily t/a gvirrnoitHl that ittiUtUI en iuMvidn-tU^A 
fr/THwifttt tilling iu> /V italf gvt^mintnfi iwf^nr/- *«/ an aUitiHtt — 
F.fHtm*t ragt In Earaft frr Itagnri — A liai:ut wriut n teaftJ/ralt 
fisrmmiitl ia Amfriia — Dilltiittiaii ititma a pntmrntal acting tn a 
l>Ut and a»t ^tHitg it iii£tiiltiali—'Cami*f» ittnrit imtffr<liial /■> 
(#Mn ektiintn fa tit Utien — Ori^a af g^itnminl—C*»tri/utiil Im- 
iiiu]/ rf all tfn/i4tTit(Up^Niili«tia( ittpi mil nti tf m/tre/i/ fy ilafi 
tntfWHfini — J*j>i-ii>(u attira ef ikt ikirttta italti — Imf*teme «•/ llu 
Cat^nit— KxamfU ff tki vnriatu iMti. 

T.1 tAe J'eapie of Ihe State </ New York: 

In tlie ciiurse of the preceding papei^ I have enilraTored. my 
hUuw-ciliscn*. to pl,tM Itefwre you in a clear and convincing liglii. 




88 



CONFEDERATION iNSUFFlCtENT. 



I]t«.Ift 



iIm importance of Union to your pi>liiic-il safety nnd happincM. 
have unfoUlcd to you a coniplicaiion ol (Uitgcfft to which you 
would be exposed. Hhoiild you jtetmil that ucted knot which binds 
Ihe people of America logrlh^r lo be sewrcit or diHOtved by 
ambttion or by ar.irice. by jentoiity or i>y minrepreKntaiian. In 
the scqitel o[ Ihe inquiry through which I proprw* lo nccom|Mny 
you. ihe ttTiths intFiide<l lo be inculcated will receive (nriher con- 
firntatioD from facts and Aiguincnts hitherto unn<>liccil. If thi 
lOitd over which you will »lili hate lo [ia»> sliould in some p(ace« 
appear lo you tedious or irkcome, you will recollect Ih^il you are iu 
quest o( iiilorinjiion on A subject ihc niosl.nMMitcntuus which can 
engage llie attention o( a free people, tlut Ihe field through which 
you have lo irarcl i» in ii»e(l spacious, and that the diSiculiies o( 
Ihe journey hare been iinnecessiiirily increased by Ihe maies with 
which soplii&ity has beset the way. It wdt b« my airn lo remove 
the obf tacle« from ymir proKrcti in as compendioa* a manner as Jt 
can be done, without soctificlng utility to dispatch. 

In pur&uaiKC uf the plan which 1 have laid down for 
the discussion of the subject, the point next in order to 
be examined is the "iiixulTiL-icncy of the present Con 
federation lo the preservation of the Union," It may 
perhaps be asked what need there tsof reasoning or proof 
to illustrate a position which is not either cunlroverted or 
doubted, to which the undcrsiandings and feelings of all 
classes of men assent, and which in substance is admitted 
by the opponents as well as by the friends of the new 
Constitution. It must in truth be acknowledged that, 
howcrer these may differ in other re^peicts, they in 
genera) appear to harmonixe in this sentiment, at least, 
that there are material imperfections in our national sys- 
tem, ami that something is iiet:essary lo be dune to 
rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that sup- 
port this opinion are no longer objects of speculation. 
They have forced themselves upon the sensibility of tbi 
people at large, and have at length extorted from thos< 
wliose mistaken policy has had the principal share in pre- 
ciptiating the extremity at which we are arrived, . 
reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in th 
scheme of our federal government, which have been Ion, 
pointed out and regretted by the intelligent friends of the 
Union. 



JfATlOffAL UUMtUATlON. 



«9 



Wc nuy tndeml with proprieiy be said lo have readied almost 
■he lui sta^e ol njilioiMl huniiliaiion. Thcic is scsrcety any- 
thing ihat can wouikI llie piidc oi degrade the character of 
an iiKtcpmikni nation which wc do not cupericncc. Are (here 
mgageinents to the peTforiniiiice of which we are held by cvccy lie 
rdpectaMc nmonK men ? ThcK are the lubjects of coniUnt and 
iiabhohlag vwlalMHi. Do we owe debts lo lorcigncra and to our 
ti<*n dbMni contracted in n limc of imminent petil (or Ihc procr- 
raiioa of uur pohilcal existence f ThcM rcitijiin w ithoul any 
proper or utufactory proviiioii for iheir ditch^irKe. Hare wc 
valuable Inriloria and inipotiant posts in the pokt<M^ion o( a 
(ofc^ power which, by express stipulations, ought long since lo 
have been Mitfendeied ? 'I'tieic are siitl retained, to (he prejudice 
of our inleresls. not teis Uun of our ii{;h(s. Arc we in a condition 
lo Trwni Of lo repel ihe aggression ? W'c have neither iioops, nor 
Irieasurj', nor gorcmnwnt.* Arc we even in a condition lo leiiiuii- 
Mraic with dignity? The fuM imputations on our own failh, in 
respect to the same (rejiiy, ought liist to be lemuvcd. Ate we 
entiltcd by nalutc and compact lo a free lunicipation in the navi> 
gation of (he Mississippi? Spain cxcluiies us from it. Is public 
credit an indispensable resource in time ot public danger t Wc 
seem to have abandoned its cause as de«pera(e aiitl irrclrievable. 
I» commerce of importance lo national wealth ? Ours is at ihe 
lowrst point of drclcnston. Is re*prctability in the eye* of foreign 
powers a safeguard aKaitiiU (orei]jn encroa<hnieiii» ? The 
imbccihly of our goremmeiK even forluds ihcm lo (real with us. 
Oar am1>assadon abnxad aic the mere p.igeants o( nitiiifc 
soTctrtgniy. Is a violent anil unnatural decrease in ihc value 
ul land a symptom of national <hvliete * 'I'lie price ol iiiipiufcij 
buHl in most pans of the country is much lower than can be 
accounted for by (he quantily ol w^stc land at maikel, and can 
only be fully explained faylh.K want of private and public confi- 
dence, which is so alarmingly prevalent antong all tanks, and 
which has a <lirecl (endency to itepteciaie properly of every kind. 
Is private crc<l<( the friend and patron of industry? Thni most 
mefol kind which retalcs (o bonnwing and lending is leduccd 
within the narrowest limits, and this still mote from an opinion of 
insecurity than from the scarcity of nrnney. To shorten an 
cnnnctalian of patliculais which can afford ndther pleasuic nor 
iwiracfion. it may in general be demanilcd. what indication is there 
•f nalional disortlrr, poverty, and insignificance that couUI Irefatl a 
coauaimity so pectiKarly Messed with naiut^d advantages as we 

* " I mean (m the Union."— PuBLI Vs. 



90 



IMPHRlUSi IN iUPBRlO, 



[ao.u 



are. which does mM lonn a part of the dark catalogue oJ our publk 
mis(otiuncs ? 

'ibis is the melancholx Mluution lo whkh w-c tiitvc been brought 
b]r those v-ery maxtins and council* which would now <klcr u» 
ftan> adopling the propojed Coiiviiiution : aoii nlncli, not content 
with having conduclrtl u» lo llic brink o(aprecipke, »ccin resolved 
to pluiige us into the abjru that aw^ita ui below. Here, nvf 
couniryiiien, impelled by every motive th;il ought to influeficc an 
enlightened people, let us make a fiiin stumi for oui safety, out 
iranquilliiy, our dignity, our reputation. I^t us at lasi bt«ak the 
Utui chaim which )i4S too long seduced u> fioai ttie paths ol 
felicity and pra»prriiy. 

It is true, us has been before observed, that facU, too 
KtubtMrn to be resisted, have produced a specie* of 
general assent to the abstract proposition that there 
exist materiiil (icfe<:ti> iit our national system: but the 
osefuliiess of the coiiccs»>inii, on the part of the old 
adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a stren- 
uous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles 
that am give it a chance of success. While they iidmit 
(hat the goveinment of the United States is destitute of 
energy, they contend against conferring upon it those 
powers which are requisite to supply that energy. 
Tbejr seem still to aim at thinjjs repugnant and 
irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority, 
without a diminution of St.ite authority; at sovereignty 
in (he Union, and complete independence in the mem- 
bers. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind 
devotion the political monster of an imprrium in imfitn^. 
This renders a full display of the principal defects of the 
Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils 
we experience do not proceed from minute or partial im- 
perfections, but from fundamental errors in tlic structure 
of the building, which cannot be amended otherwise than 
by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of 
the fabric. 

The great and radical vice in the construction of the 
existing Confederation is in the principle of I.F.GISLA- 
TION for STATES or GOVERN .MENTS, in their COR. 
PORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as 



MmUIob} 



AIUAAC£S Br TitEATV. 



9" 



contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whicli 
l/icy consist. Though this principle does not nm through 
aJI the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades 
and xoTcrns those on which the efficacy of the rest 
dcncoils. Except as to the rule of apportionment, the 
tJmtn) Siiites has an indcrinite discretion to make 
requisitions for men and money; but they have no 
authority to raise either by rcgulation-t rxteii<linj{ to the 
indtvidual citizens uf America. The consequence of this 
is that, tliotigh in theory their resolutions concerning 
itbose ubjccts are taws constitutionally binding on the 
tnemtiers of the Union, yet in practice they are mere 
rccommendatiuns which the States observe or disregard 
at their option. 

It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the 
homan mind that, after alt the admonitions we have had 
frum experience on this headi there shutiUI sttll lie found 
mea who object to the new Constitution for deviating 
tmm a principle which has been found the hanc of the 
old, and which is in itself evidently incompatible with 
the idea of uovr-KsuKNT; a princi[)le, in short, which, if 
it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent and 
sanguinary agency of the sword for the mild influence of 
tlm magistracy. 

There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of 
a league or alliance between independent nations for 
certain defined puq>oses precisely stated in a treaty 
regulating all the detaiU of time, place, circumstance, 
and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and 
depending for its execution on the good faith of the 
parties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civitizerl 
nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and 
war. of observance and non-observance, as the interests 
Of passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the 
early part of the present century Uicrc was an epidemical 
mgc in Europe for this species of compacts, from which 
the politicians of the iimc« fondly hoped for benefits 
which were never realized. With a view to establishing 
the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the 




9> NATlOlfAL AVTHORITY OVEtt C/TIZE.VS. IHo-K 



vrorld, all (he rexoufces of negotiation irere exhausted, 
aad triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they 
were scarcely formed before tlicjr were broken, giving an 
instructive but afHirting lesion to m.inkind, how little 
dependence is to be pbccd on treaties which ha»c no 
other sanction than the obligations of good f.iith, and 
which oppose general considerations of peace and justice 
to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion.' 

If the parliciilar States in this country are disposed to 
stand in a similar relation lo each other, and to drop Uie 
project of a general DiscReriONAitY svpekintendenck, 
the scheme wouhl indeed be pernicious, and would entail 
upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated 
under the first head ; but it would have the merit of being, 
at least, consistent and practicable. Abandoning all 
views towardsaconfederate government, this would bring 
us to a simple alliance offensive ami defensive; and would 
place us in a situation to be altL-rnutivc friends and 
enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rival- 
ships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, 
should prescribe to us. 

Uul if we arc unwilling to be placed in this perilous 
situaiitm; if we still will adhere to the design of a national 
government, or, which is the same thing, of a superin- 
tending power, under the direction of a common councd. 
we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those 
ingredients which may be considered as fonning the 
cliaractcrislii: difference between a league and a govern- 
ment; we must extend the authority of the Union lo the 
persons of the citixcns — the only proper nbjecu of 
government. 

Government implies the power of making laws. It is 
rssential to the idea of a law that it lir attended with a 
sanction; or, In other words, a penalty or punishment for 



' An Mlramc enrnfle of the Ml»eo( ttr«l>e« i» firniaheil In Xhr nc«nl 
Tcnlalioni n( Dikoiatch, \ty wlikLh li m%\ U-<'wa tkti ihc Oemiku Em|iiie, 
M-liHe \irmni liy th* Droil'iiiiil l<> Auuto *f>:I UtXy. \\»A m l!ie uiait lira* 
■ wcrri Itraiy u-ith Kxwa. vhich nnllUiwI itw (nu«l aucBliil prmitioni 
of llie compatrl. — Eihion. 



bafllM) 



BXFOKCEMEXT OA LAO'S. 



93 



ilisobeOtence. If there be no penalty annexnl to dis- 
obeditrnre, the reKulutiuns or coinniamls which [irctcnO 
to b« laws will, in (act, amount tu nuthing; more ttian 
advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it 
nujr be, can niily be inllicted in two ways: by the agency 
of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; 
by the cokkcion of the magistracy, or by the coercion' 
of armt. Tbe firitt kind can evidently apply only lu men; 
the last kind must, of necessity, be employed a([ainat 
bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is evident 
tliat tliere ix no process of a court by which the observ- 
ance of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. 
Sentences may be denounced against them for violations 
of their duty; but thc^e sentences can only be carried 
into execution by the sword. In an association where 
the general authority is confined to (he collective bodies 
nf tbe communities that compute it, every breach of the 
laws must involve a state of war; and military execution 
mu^t become the only instrument of civil obedience. 
Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name 
of government, nor would any prudent man choose to 
commit his happiness to it. 

There was a lime when we were told that breaches by 

the States of the regulations of the federal authority 

were not to be expected ; that a sense of common interest 

wtMikl preside over the conduct of the respective meiit- 

Lbcrs, and would bcftet a full compliance with all the con- 

fstitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at 

the present day, would appear as wild as a great part of 

what we now hear from the same quarter will be thought, 

when wc shall have received further lessons from that 

L best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times 

flMtraycd an ignorance of the true springs by which 

humao conduct is actuated, and belied the original in- 

ilucenients to the estahlt»hment of civil power. Why has 

government been instituted at all? Because the passions 

III mm will not conform to the dictates of reason and 

jasiice, without constraint. Has it been found that 

bodies of men act wKh more rectitude or greater disin- 



M 



CENTRIFUGAL TENDEXCIES. 



Wa.lS 



teresteilness than iiKlividual.'.? The contrary of Uiis li;ts 
bcea inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of 
nMnkitid; and the inference is founded upon obvious 
rvatuns. Kf;g;ird tu rc|>uiaiioti liiis a leis active inlluencc 
wlien the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a 
number, than when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit 
of faction, which is apt to mingle its poixon in the deliber- 
ations of all bodies o( men, wilt often hurry the persons 
of whom tlicy arc composed into improprieties and ci- 
cesKS for which they would btuAh in u private cajMcity. 

In addition to all this there is in the nature of suvercitin 
power an impatience of control, that disposes those who 
are inve«tetl with the exen:i«e of it to look wilh an evil 
eye upon all external attempts to restrain or direct its 
operations. From this ii|)irit it happens that, in every 
political a»»ociittion which is formed u[>»n the principle 
of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser 
sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric 
tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the 
operation of which there will be a p«r|MMual effort in each 
to lly off from the commua center. This tendency is not 
difficult to be accounted for. ft has its origin in the 
love of power. Power controlled or abridged' iit almost 
always (he rival and enemy of that power by which it is 
controlled or abridged. This simple proposition will 
teach us how liitle reason there is to expect that the 
persons intrusted with the administration of the afitairs 
of the particular members of a confederacy will at all 
times be ready, with perfect good-hunior and an unbiasetl 
regard to the public weal, to execute the resolutions or 
decrees of the general authority. The reverse uf this 
results from the constitution of human nature. 

If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot 
be executed without the intervention of the particular 
administrations, there will be little prospect uf their 
being executed at all. The rulers of the respective 
members, whether ilicy have a constilutiuual right lo do 
it or not, will undertake to judge of the propriety uf tlie 
measures themselves, 'i'hey will consider the cunforuiity 



BuBUloal 



SrA TES DELA V LEGISLA TWtf. 



95 



of the ihinK propoecd or required to their immediate 
interests or aims; the momentary conveniences or in- 
conveniences that woutd attend its adoption. All tliis 
will l>c done; and in a spirit of interested and suspicious 
scrutiny, without that knowledge of national circum- 
sunoes and reasons of slate which is essential to a right 
judgment, and with that strong predilection in favor of 

r local objet^ts which can hardly fail to mislead the de- 
cituon. The same process must be repeated in every 
member of which the body is constituted; and the execu- 
tion of the plans, framed by the councils of the whole, 
wilt always fluctuate on the discretion of the ill-informed 
aiul prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have 
been conversant in the proceedings of popular assem- 
blies; who have seen ho;w difficult it often is, where 
there is no exterior pressure of circumstances, to bring 
them to liarmonious resolutions on important points, will 
readily conceive how impossible it must be to induce a 
namber of such assemblies, deliberating at a distance 
from each other, at dilferent times, and under different 
impressions, long to co-operate in the same views and 
pursuits. 

In our case, the eoocurtcnce of ihiiteen distrnei sovereign wills 
is requiuie, under lire CinfRlftalion, to ihc comptcic exccuiiiin a( 
every important measure I h At proceeds from llic Union. It lias 
happmeil as was to have been fotescen. The measures of the 
Jiiion have not been executed ; the delinquencies of the St.ites 
have, sifp by step, malured themselves to an exireme, which has 
ii lenpb .iireiird \\\ the wheels o( the national goveramcnt and 
iiEht tlicm lo an awful stand. Congress at thi* lirne scarcely 
cs the means ol keeping up the forms of administration, till 
he Suies ean have lime to agree upon a tnoic substantial subsii- 
rtatc (or tiie present shadow of a federal govemmcni. Things di<l 
not come to this desperate extremily at once. Tlie causes which 
K»vc been ^)ecified produced al firsi only unequal atui dispropor- 
tinnaie drgrces of compliance will) the requisitions ol live Union. 
The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the ptciesl of 
wnmpl^ ami the teinpiaiion of intcresc to the complying or lo the 
1 iqucnl Slaie*. Why shouh) we ilo more in proportion 

I < r- who are embadccd with us in the same political voyage ? 

Wti| shook! we oonseni to bear hmmc than our proper share of the 




COffFEDERACIES OF ANTIQUITY. Wo. W 



common Inirilen ? T^vne were «i^»lionf whkli Iniinan tidflsh* 
ncss could not withstand, and wlikh even &p«cul4livc men. who 
looked forward To remote contequences, coaUl no:, wilhoul besila* 
lion, combat. Exch State, yielding to the persuasive roicc of 
immediate interest or convenience, h*% succcstiveljr wiltidiawn its 
siippon. till tlie (tail ami tottering edifice seems ready to (all ujmd 
out heads and to cnuh us beneath its ruins. 

PttBLfOS, 



No. l6. (JVfW IV4 /1i>-ivf, UMrnliir. «, ijlf.) Hamilloo. 

DEFECT OF THE CONFEDERATION IN ITS 
INABILITY TO COERCE. 

Tht fnly i^mililutiaital rrnidy agaiml dttiiifiUMi iMri ii forct — 
/mfiitiUlitjf »/ iMrciaH — SyiifalAy ttlaytn Ikt ttaitt — Pfttailt affrti 
ff lUM ta foreign nathm — A fritatU JiitttmH»n gf tkr Uuini — 
OnAlttiiiMJ ef itatii inffrrtiag a •Mii&nalgtvtrnirul—Cfriaiutxrf 
<i//;e/uratiffn inU a mmlary i//iftli$m — fmfviiiUltly efftfrrilg tie targtf 
ilaM — Military larrtiea a ngnal Jgr lin'l xui- — 7'ir Hfw gfitrtimttti 
mttit titmJ tit filttmi — Slair rfiditoiut r/ lutitiial latp — Tit Jistiiulirm 
tilavfti HV»-i^mf/iaaie itiiJ attiit riiiilatut— Tiki nitr tfnilitulttn fult 
ilaUmUumt in ill trtu lighl—Bm^yniHi of itate agrnfiii ty H*tinul 
gevtyiimrHl — Na frriH tf gtvttnmtnl la/t /rtta m^itliat. 

To tht Peopie of the Slate 0/ New Yark: 

The icndencjr of the principle ot legislation for States, 
nr roinmunilif X, in their political ('.uj>;icitie$, as tl has 
l)£cn exemplified by the expcrtiuent we have made of it, 
is equally attested by the events ivhich have bcfallcD all 
other governments of the eonfederate kind, uf which we 
have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence 
in those syMem«. The cnnfirmalions of Ihitt fact will b« 
worthy nf a distinct an<) p;irticular examination. I sliall 
ujntcnt myself with barely observios here that, uf all 
la, the confedprai-it-s of aniiqin'ly which history 

Rn.lt, has h;)ndcd down tou:^ llie l.ycian ;ind.\chKan 

leagues, as far .is there remain vestiges of ihcm, appcir 
to hai'e been most free from the fetters of that mistaken 
principle, and were accordingly iboM wluch have best 



i COK/tao.V OF STATES DIFFICULT, 



9T 



ddcnred, and have most liberally received, the applaud* 
ins uRrsgcs of political writers. 

Hit exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphat- 
iuiif, be styled the parent of anarchy: it hav been seen 
thitdeiiiiqueDcic& io the members of the Union are its 
lutuTjland nccc&sary offspring; and that, whcneTcrthey 
tupiicD, tile only conxtituiioiial remedy is force, and the 
lamMliate effect of the use of it, civil war. 

It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of 
Eovemment, in its application to us, would even be capa- 
We of answering its end. U there should not be a large 
ana)r constantly at the disposal of the national goTcrn- 
omt, it would cither not be able to employ force at all, 
0'. wlien this could be done, it would amount to a war 
'•«t*MH parts of the Confederacy concerning the infrac- 
tions of a league, in which the strongest combination 
"tialJ tic most likely to prevail, whether it consisted of 
ihotc who supported or of those who resisted the general 
SPtiiorily. ' It would rarely happen that the deli iK|ucm:y 
lobe redressed would be confined to a single member, 
■nJ if there were more tii.in one who had neglected their 
'lit]', similarity nf situation would induce tlieiu tu unile 
lOr common defense. Independent of this motive of 
TVjKilliy, if a large and inHuential Slate should happen 
Iv be the aggres:iing menit>er, it would cutninonly have 
'eight enough with its neighbors to win over some of 
Ibcm as associates to its cause. Specious arguments of 
ilaagcr tu the common liberty could easily be contrived; 
I>l'"'!>it>le excuses for the deficiencies of the party could, 
viiti'iul diHi :ulty, be invented to alarm the apprehensions, 
inSame the passions, and conciliate the good-will, even 
of those States which were not chargeable with any 
violation or omission of duty. This would he the more 
iikely tu take pUce as the delinquencies of the larger 
iBeiahers might be expected sometimes to proceed from 
an ambitious premeditation in their rulers, with a view 
t'> getting rid of all external control upon their designs 
i>l personal aggrandisement; the better to effect which 
it it presumable they would tamper beforehand with lead* 




UKlOft ffOT SVPPOKTED. 



m«ti« 



iiig tndividunis in Uie adjacent States. U associutcs 
could not be found at home, recourse would be had to 
the aid of foreign powers, who would seldom be disin- 
clined to encouraging the diftitenitionx of a Confederacy 
from tile firm union of which itiey had so much to fear. 
BMiiot*t« When the sword is once drawn, the passions 
■«■*• of men observe no iMundtt of moderation. 

The susgestions of wounded pride, the insiigalions of 
irritated resentment, would be apt to carry the Stales, 
af^ain.tt which the arms of the Union were exerted, 10 
any extremes necessary to avenge the affront or to 
avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this 
kind would probably terminate in a diiwolulion of the 
Union. 

This may be considered as the violent death of the 
Confederacy. Its more natural death U what we now 
seem to be on the point of expcriencinK, if the federal 
system be not speedily renovated in a more substantial 
form. It is not probable, CMinsidcnng the genius of this 
country, that the complying Slates would often be in- 
clined to support the authority of the Union by engaging 
in a war against the non-complying States. They would 
always be more ready to pursue the milder course of pul- 
ing themselves upon an equal footing with the delinquent 
members by an imitation of their example. And the 
guilt of all wijuhl thus become the security of all. Dor 
past experience has exhibited the operation of this spirit 
in its full light. There would, in fact, be an insuperable 
difilicully in ascertaining when force could with propriety 
be employed. In ihc article of pecuniary contribuUuo, 
which would be the most usual source of delinquency, it 
would often 1^ impoKKtble to decide whether It had prt^■ 
ceded from disinclination or inability. The pretense of 
the tatter would always beat hand. And the case must 
be very itagr^nt in which its fallacy could be delected 
with suRicicnt certainly to justify the harsh cxpcdienl of 
compulsion. It is eacy to see that this problem alone, 
as often as it should occur, would open u wide field for 
the exercise of factious riews, of partiality, attd of op- 



iUaillMl 



LARGER STATES. 



99 



DO, in the majority tliat Iiapiicned to prevail in the 
itional coanvil. 

Jt seems ta require no paint to prove that the States 
tht QOt to prefer a national Coii&titution which couM 
MJybe kept in motion by (he instrumentality of a large 
ttigy, continually on foot to execute the ordin^iry rec|ui&i- 
iwos or decrees of the government. And yet this is the 
H><o alternative involved by those who wish to deny it 
(he power of extendin); its oper:ition$ to individuals. 
Snch a scheme, if pf;icticablc at all, would instantly dc- 
perate into a military despotism; but it will be found 
every light impractieablc. The resources of the 
moo would not be equal to the maintenance of an 
'\f considerable enough to conhnc the larger States 
HthiQ the limits of their duty; nor would the means ever 
furnished of forming such an army in the first in- 
ftnce.' Whoever considers the populousncss and 
Urengtii of several of these States singly at the present 
juaetnre, and looks forward to what they will become, 
cTtn at the distance of half a century, will at once dis- 
■Bits an idle and visionary any scheme which aims at reg- 
■ibting their movements by laws to operate upon them 
in their collective capacities, and to be executed by a 
coercion applicable to them in the same capacities. A 
pni^a of (his kind is little less romantic than the mon- 
s<«r't)cniiig spirit which is attributed to the fabulous 
heroes and demi-gods of antiquity. 
Kren in those confederacies which have been com- 
of members smaller than many of our counties, 
principle of legislation for sovereign Stales, sup- 
by military coercion, has never been found ef- 
It has rarely been attempted to be employed 



t Suonf inil Bavirii «rcre Hriujilly furcpil to befome memben of 
(Unuoa EiDjiiie. knil lo tUt diy ii it que>tlanabl« wbttlicr, M die 
4iif tint Kiiigiite, PnHiii, were iiKccufnlly allacVcd by Riiuia or 
•ft, Havana wiiilil nut iHipt*(pia ■I'ilr ilwtf >rilli Aiiktiia. — Kmior, 
A <xtt not iltotttlber unlike tb» cooililion ii to be (cmiid lo trrland. 
■Wm tnwiia uid ■ lai^c i«>al conitabuUrT have viih diflicully bc«n 
•'■bhnuinaUy \o majiitain tlK lawt maile ioi it by ruliunsnt in Ui« 
'u Uiiec hunilniil ycart.— KoiIoR. 



tm 



NATIONAL ariZEffSHlP. 



tVo. IS 



but against the w«aVer in«mb«r!t; and in most instaines 
attempts to coerce the refractory arui disobedrcnt linve 
been the signals uf bloody wars, in which unc half o( the 
confederacy has displayed its banners against the other 
half. 

The result of these observations to an intelligent mind 
must be clearly this, that if it be possible at any rate to 
construct a federal government capable of rcgnlating the 
common concerns ami preserving the general tr.in<|uillity, 
it must be founded, as to the objects committed to its 
care, upon the reverse of the principle contended for by 
the opponents of the proposed Constitution. It must 
carry its agency to the persons uf the citizens. It must 
stand in need of no intermediate legislations; bat 
must ilMrlf lie emjwwcrcd to employ the arm of the ordi- 
nary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The maj- 
esty of the national authority must be tnanifestcd through 
the medium of the courts of justice. The government 
of the Union, like that of each St.ite, mnst br :ible to 
address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of in- 
dividuals; and to attract to its support those passions 
which have the strongest influence ti|>on the haman 
heart. It must, in short, possess all the means, and 
have a right to resort to all the methods, of executing 
the powers with which it is intrusted, that are poskesscd 
and exercised by the governments of the particular 
States. 

To this reasoning it may perltaps \x objected thai, i( 
any Sute should be disaffected to the authority of the 
Union, it could at any time obstruct the execution of its 
laws, and bring the matter to the same issue of force 
with the necessity of which the opposite scheme is re- 
proached. 

The plausibility of this ohjection will vanish the mo- 
ment we advert to the essential diflercncc between a 
mere NoK-coMpi.iANci:and a ihrect and altivr xesi»t- 
ANCK.' If the interposition of the. Suie I he 

• TW« •tinliiuriion hw lirpn jiiiliftnl lo « trniariMil'- '"■•':• ' '" ir«i-ity 
Ikfon lli> ailoplion of ibr (•iltral conitilalion lli« ttam by ourtljr pa*- 



BXECUTlOlf OF LAWS. 



lOI 



tiecesury to give effect to a measure of the Union, thejr 
kire oQljr NOT TO ACT or xa ACT KVASiVELY, aod the 
(nmute is dcfeatiKl. This neglect of duty may be dis- 
Euneil under alfccted bnt unsubslantidl provisions, so as 
nM to appear, and of course not to excite any alarm in 
the people for the safety of the Constitution. The State 
luilffs may even make a merit of their Kiirreptitiuux in- 
Tasioosgf it on the (troun<J of some temporary conveni- 
tiKf, exemption, or ^dv^intagc. 

But if the execution of the laws of (he national jjovern- 
"lent should not require (he intervention of the State 
'tfiildtures, if they were to pass into immediate opera- 



I^Wian nalliRnl tuch lulional lawt and crcn trcAtin. ■* itiry <)iiitit ; 

Jj*nlb ItM crcilian rA ■ govemnieni aclinc dir«llj' on ihc jie-iiilc. and 

''"tlMr rcqiiifiiig aaivc mikunce, the >itein|itt i<i ickiu ilie iiaiionil 

I* ^ put or llie Male |;uvr[nniciilt, liavc licvn frw tii<l luve Ml<ii>in 

■**• luihcil lu 0))vii iriiiunce. In th? Ulmiiii-ail ca» (iSoq) (In 

PWbh ol Pcniuylviiiiu onlticii ool ihc mililin, «nd succcafully rc' 

*>*eil a prooest of Ihc Supreme Couci, aiiil in ilic I'leek aiuI ('lierokec 

''*4lw(l83S-'^J'>). ''"■ ■'■■''« "f Gc<iij"iii wat ei|iia11jr Micicudil ill 0|J. 

pj»( by (nrCT- llio '.'"Wrt'i ilii-im. It ii to lit nolfil. Iiowcvict. lliat 

™k UMn niallil&calkiiis ncie directed ■gainil the juilicial deiwtliuciil, 

■Ud iKOMMriljp isbAiaiicrcd iii in |H>k(cn> hy it* bciiie compel J«>j lo 

(■If tpon ibe oAciil* ol aiiolhrc <lc|iuitiiiciil loi an aititiil cnforijc- 

Xiit No auam|)t rA % ilair i^vornni«n( or cwmontiiin !■> nollilTH 1»«. 

*Ueli wa* llw dotir ul the exei-iitii« ilr pan merit to fieciite. lint crer siil'- 

(•tW. |p 177?. IhoqgU VirijiiiiB Weill lo the leiijilh o( jiiiichaiiiia 

Mai. her reuiiancc u ■ poliiitnl lioily ta the Alien mid Seiiitioii lann 

*u kmiled to tbc patiine of Uuitliiivc icMiliiitunt : ai»l ihoiii^h in iHji 

bovlb Carolina acibuMy ciiiliixlicd l(L>i>pv. the vhiioKiuuft lariff Uwh itcre 

WTtr lor a iBiiRtrnl 'lU^(>elldc<l, iV thin) type of nullilicitiuo. — the re- 

■iiunr* to UniicI SiatFi lawi, not ilirough the interveniiun o£ the mte 

txvtamcntt. bal through popular tciitinwnl, — haa succccilol bcti. For 

■lu«e f«^i% the exciie Uw uf I7i>t wa« (uci-cvifiilly mltteil in Wrttdn 

Pmnylvaola- t!>*^ Haniilloii'i Wntki. lii. S7f-) Tlic enibarco lawt 

(rf 1808 wcrr vncanalally mittcl in New I^iii-lni«l, liecinie the local 

moll and Jariei woald nnl cvniiil llioie who broke the law. Tlic Fusi- 

U*p iflave law wat Uri«ly imltiAcd ia the Konhern itaict. and the at- 

■napled ciirorocmeni of it inuu cvciiliially lure ticeii abaniloneil, haij 

(bcCitU Wat not intetvcii^ii. The lainc ililhcully ctitd |c>-<l>y in the 

Jilll«" ii>hi>.ky tei'liuiM uf the Smith, u-hiro it is almoit impot- 

■c coavitliont under the naiioml levrnne lawi. from Jutim 

tliu. The most tenuikable incident, however, it (i)rnr>hcil by 

: ai (Jalifoinii. wh«rc ibc prcMutc of pubiii: opinioii duclni; th« 

ir W9^ --" ^FM.-i^ that the tiniled Staves ^^reenbackK vcTcnrvrral* 

•eJInnr' . ile Ibeir l<<inga toKnl te'i^ler, (hat Mate retnain- 

Ita aB<'^Li ' 'ghioui the war^ ■nd loihit day. though the paper 

'toouey uuouMien au rtsiuancc, ibe uM of H a very ancomnKiD. — EotTon, 



lO) 



CONTHOL OF SEDITION, 



Ota. 16 



lion upon the citiiins themselves, the lurlicalar govern- 
ments could not interrupt their projfrcss without an open 
and violcni exertion of an unconstitutional power. No 
omi&sions nor evasions would answer the end. Thejr 
would be obliged to act, and in such a manner as would 
leave no doubt that they had encroached on the national 
rights, An cxpcnment of ttii.t nature would always be 
liaiardous in the face of a constitution in any degree 
competent to its own defense, and of a people enlight- 
encd enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and 
an illegal u«urp;ttioit of authority. The success of it 
would require not merely a factious majority in the legis- 
lature, but the concurrence uf the courts of justice and 
of the body of the people. If the judges were not em- 
barked in a conspiracy with the legislature, ihcy would 
pronounce the resolutions of ttuch a majority tu be con- 
trary to the supreme law of the land, unconsiitational 
and void. If the people were not tainted with the spirit 
of their State representatives, they, .is the natural guard- 
ians of the Coustitutiiin, would throw their weight into 
the national scale and give it a decided prcpondcrancy in 
the contest. Attempts of this kind would not often be 
made with levity or rashness, because they could seldom 
be made without danger to the authors, unless in cases 
of a tyrannical exercise of the federal authoniiy, 

U opposition to the national government should arise 
from the disorderly conduct of refractory or seditious in- 
dividualK, it could he overcome by the same means which 
are daily employed ag.^inst the same evil under the Slate 
governments. The m.igistracy, being Cfjually the minis- 
ters of the law of the land, from whatever source It 
might emanate, wouhl doubtless be as ready to guard the 
national as the locvil regulaiionit from the innuds o( 
private licentiousness. As to those partial commotions 
and insurrections which sometimes disquiet society, 'rum 
the intrigues of an Inconsiderable faction, or from suiltlen 
or occasional ill-humors tliat do not infect the great bod^ 
of the communiiy, ihr general government could com- 
Riatid moru (intensive resources far Uie suppression o( 




''KantMl LEGISLATION FOR tSDI^IDIJALS. 



iti^tirba fierce of that kind titan would be in tbc power ot 
any single member. And us those mortal fends which, 
ii certain conjunctures, spread a confiagraliun tlirtjagh a 
wWlc nation, or through a very large proportion of it, 
proei'cdiiig either from weighty tauses of disconleiit given 
I7 tbe Kavcriimcnt or from the coiilagjon of some violent 
popular paroxysm, they do not full withid any ordinary 
nksof ealculutiitii. When they happen, they commonly 
lAouDt to revolutions and dtstnemberincnts of empire. 
Nu (wtm of government can always either avoid or con- 
trol lliem. It is in vain tu hope (u guard against events 
Joo miKhty for human foresight or precaution, and it 
voulil be idle to object to a govcrtimetit because it could 
tiotperrurm im]>ussibiH(icK. 

PUBLIUS. 



No. 17. 



Itmttf4»dni /mrmai, UeccmbeT «, rjtj.t 



HatniltoQ. 



XBFUTATIOM OF THE AROUMKNT THAT A 
GOVERNMENT BASED ON INDIVIDUALS WILL 
BE TOO POWERFUL. 



UmUttlilmJ littl Iht mtliatial gWfrnuirHl trili iiAwri lAr mii/uary 

tulttnly — iM/t<l4 if »i\U:mttl amUtttn—ljtAl ameintt not allwiaj^ 

^jitti tf griurmS Juriijutim — Eaiiir ftr Iht itatii U tHtroiKi m lie 

atitnal auti^rilia — GreaUr fofKljriiy tf ilau grhrritmeni— TfmJtnty 

( KantinJ t* HfigMtrifisI .tfUtAitfHi — Linal juiiitt Iht mrst altrattiw 

want aj ftfular tieJiemt unit iiIIm imril — 7'** Md/i^nu/ grrtrHmtnl 

I immJiaUly (tnitrtlrJ nu/4 lit fittfiti — Kinaif/t in fnulttl timtt — 

' 't^Hgt^t ifiun/u tin/! and txtrrn—Exampii *f tlamikip in StaHaiut 

igtMmmrHli itrnfaral nvM /tinUI iarvmtt—Lrtal gavtmntntt 

'imtaui t» f^tusi t>^ tttfidtntt ff Iht ftfflt. 

Ta the Pfff-le 0/ the Slate of New York: 

An objection of » nature dtllerent from tliat which has 

cen slated and answered in my last address, may pcr- 

ips he likewive urged ^igainst the principle of legislation 

the individual citizens of America. It may be said 

It it would tend to render the government of the Union 

too powerful and to enable it to absorb those residuary 




I04 



KO EyCJtOACHMF.Xr Oy STATES. 



a*. IT 



;iutliorilies which it might be judged .proper to leave with 
the Stales for local purposes. Allowing the utmost lati- 
tude to the love of power whiijh any reasonable man can 
require, I confer* I am m a loss to discover what tempta- 
tion the persons intrusted with the administration uf the 
general government could ever feel to divest the States 
of the authorities of that description. The regulation of 
the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold 
out filcmlt-r allurement to ambition. Commerce, Rnance. 
negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects 
which have charms for minds governed by that passioo; 
and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in 
the first instance, to be lodged in the national depository. 
The administration of private justice between the citi- 
zens of the same state, the sii[>ervision of agriculture' and 
of other concerns of a similar nature — all those things, in 
short, which are proper to be provided for by local lejji*- 
lation — can never be desir.-iblc cares of a general jiirisdio- 
tion. It is therefore improbable that there should exist 
a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers 
with which they are connected, because the attempt b> 
exercise those powers would be as trouhlc^oine us it would 
be nugatory; and the possession of them, for that reason, 
would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the impor- 
tanre, or to the splendor of the national government. 

But let it be admitted for argument's sake that mere 
wantonness and hist of dominattnn would he ^iiRicicnt to 
beget that (lisjMtsilion, still it may he safely affirmed that 
the sense of the constituent body of the lutional repre- 
sentatives, or, in other words, the people of the several 
States, would control the indulgenee of so extravagant an 
appetite. It will alirays be far more easy for the Slate 
aia goTcmmcnts to encroach upon the national 

l»4l. authorities, than for tlie national government 
to encroach upon the Slate authorities. The proof vt 
this proposition turns upon the greater degree of inHfl* 



'RmmHtoti •cancly (ortMW ihs crMtioa ol a DvporiBWiU of A|)t> 
cullui«.— EiNio*. 



LOCAL AJ'TAa/itENT. 



lOJ 



tm.t irhicli the State governments, if they adminUter 
ihcir affairs with upnglitnesg and prudence, will genen 
xllf possess over the people; a circumsunce which at the 
<UK time teaches iiii that there is an inherent and 
iolriasic weakness in alt federal constitutions, and that too 
moch pains cannot be taken in their organization to give 
thta all tiic force which is compatible with the principles 
of liberty. 

The superiority of influence in favor of the particular 
SDVcniments would result partly from the difluEivc eon- 
itniction of the nationiil goTernment, hut chiefly from 
llif nature of the objects to which the attention of the 
Stiie administrations would be directed. 

it is a known fact in human nature that its affections 
anciMDiDonly weak in proportion to the distance or dif- 
'miTeacss of the object. Upon the same principle that 
In a man is more ;itiached to his family ttian to 

B^tt. his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than 

lo the community at large, the people of each State would 
Ixapt to feel a stronger bias towards their locnl govcrn- 
•enu Uian towards tht; government of the Union, unless 
tht force of that principle should be destroyed by a much 
ter iulmimstraliun of the latter. 

This strong propensity of the human heart would find 
pntverfnl atuiliaries in th^ objects of State regulation. 

The variety of more minute interests, which will ncccs- 
unly fall under the superintendence of the local adminin- 
Ultons, and which will form so many rivulets of influence 
nnning tluough every (wrt of the suciety, cannot be 
particularized without involving a detail too tedious and 
anintercsting to compensate for the instruction it might 
■fford. 

There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the 
province of the State governments which alone suffices to 
place the matter in a clear and Siiiikfaclory light— 1 mum 
the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. 
This, of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, 
ind most attractive source of popular ul>edience and 
■Itaclimcnt. It is that which, being the immediate and 




SATIOSAL INTRK&STS CRKERAt.. Wtt" 



visible guardian of life and property, having its benefits 
and its terrors in constant activity before the public ejre, 
resulating all those personal interests and familiar ccm- 
cerns to wliicU the sensibility of individoals i» more 
immediately Awake, contributes more than any other cir- 
cumstance to impreiising upon the minds of ilic people 
affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government. 
This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself 
almost wholly throuffh the channels of the particular guv> 
cniments, independent of all other causes of influence, 
would insure them so decided an empire over their re- 
^ective citizens as to render tliemat all times a complete 
counterpoise, and, not unfrequcntly, dangerous hvuU to 
the power of the Union. 

The operations of the national government, on the other 
hand, falling less immediately under the observation of 
the mass of the citizens, the benefits derived from it will 
chieHy be perceived and attended to by specubiivc men. 
Relating to more general interests, they will be less apt 
to come home to the feelings of the people, and, in 
proportion, less likely to inspire an habitual sense of 
obligation and an active sentiment of atlacliment. 

The reasoning on this head lias been abundantly exem- 
plified by the experience of all federal constitutions with 
which we are acquainted, and of all others which hare 
borne the least analogy to them. 

Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly 
speaking, confederacies, yet they partook of the nature 
of that species of association. There was a commiwi 
head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose authority extended 
over the whole nation; and a number of subordinate 
vassals or feudatories, who h.-id large pontons of land 
allotted to them, and numerous trains of inferior vassals 
or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upan 
the tenure of fealty or obedience to the persons of whom 
[hey held iL Each principal vassal was a kind of sover- 
eign within his p.-iriicular demesnes. Tliecoiiseijuencesof 
this situation were a continual opposition to authority u( 
tlie sovereign, and frecjuent wars between the great baraiw 



I 



iMBMil 



FEUDAL BASOAWES. 



TOJ 



or chief (eudatoriGS thcm<ielvc3. The power of the head 
nf the nation was commonly too wc<ik, ciihrr to preserve 
the public pfuce or to |>rol«(-t the )>eo))le against the 
opprei.»ionfl of their immediate lords. This period of 
European affairs Is emphatically styled by historians the 
limes o( [eudal anarchy. 

Wlicn llie MucrtiK" lujipcneil to be amait of vigorous and war- 
like temper iinil (i( lujicnur abililiei. lie would acquln; n prnniuil 
•ciEhtJAil iiillucDCc winch ai)!>wctTd. (or llic time, ttic puifiosek 
"I a more rcKuUr nutlioriiy. Bui in gencru], the power of the 
turons iftuinphcd over thai o( the ptmcc: antl in iii.ioy instances 
lui tluminion was cniitely thrown <ifl, and the Kid fi^'* were 
nntn) inioindrp^mlrnipiincip-ililicsor sinics. lit those instances 
in Mhkh tlie monarch Iin:i1ly prevailed over hiii vasdalx. Iiii suc- 
(nstnu chiefly owing la the lyr;<niiy i>f lliovc vassaU ovri their 
■bptmlcnts. The lurons, or ii<ibk% equally the enemies of liie 
t<mrcit:n and the opprcsM)rs of (he common pcojilc. wrre 
ili«adcil aiMl dciCHted t>y boili; till mutual danger and mutual 
inkieil eSecled a union between ihem fatal to the power of tlie 
*rii«eiacy. Had the itobles, by a cunOuci of clemency and jus- 
tict. preserved the fidelity and devotion of their retainers anil fol- 
lowers, the contests between them and the prince tnusi almost 
atntfi have ended In tliclr favor, and in the abridgment or »ub- 
nniM of the royal autliorliy. 

Tins I* not an axscrlion founded merely in speculation or con- 
itiuie. Among ottier illusiralions of its truth which might be 
"ItiJ, Srnlland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit rA dan- 
l6ip nhich W3*. at an e.jrly d.«y, inlroilireed into that ItinKdoni, 
Ukiin); (he noblea and their d«penilenla tiy lies equi»*alfnl to those 
M 4>ndre<t, rendereiJ the arislociacy a constant ovcrmaicli for the 
power of the tnonaich. till the mcmporaiion with England sub- 
<Kd Its Rerce anil ungovemabtc spirit, and reduced it within those 
nilcs of ftuborilitialion which a ntore rational and more energetic 
w.>inn of ciril polity had previously established in the latter 
Lingdoiii. 

The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly 
becompariHl with the feudal baronies; with this advantage 
in iheir favor, that, from tlie reasons already explained, 
they will geacrally possess the confidence and good will 
the people, and with so important a support wilt be 
He cffecluaHy to oppose all encroachmcntii of the 
iiatiooal goTcrnmcnt. It will be well if they are not 



loS 




CR£EK CONPEDBRACIES. 



UTtt. It 



able 10 counteract its legitimate anil ncct-ssary authority. 
Ttic points of similitude consist in the rivaiship of 
power applicable to both, aod in the concentration of 
liirge poritnns of the strength of the community into 
particular dkposjts, in one c^se at the disiioK;il of indi- 
viduals, in the other case at the disposal of political 
bodies. 

A concise review of the events (hat have attended con- 
federate governments will further illustrate tht» impor- 
tant doctrine, an inattention to which has been the great 
source of our political mistakes, and has given our jeaU 
outty a direction to the wrong side. This review shall 
form the subject of some ensuing p;ipers. 

PtTRLItrS. 



No. 18.' (.Vn. Ytrk /wfar. !>«. j, ■}•}.) Hamilton and Madison. 

EXAMPLES OF GREEK CONFEDERACIES. 

A»^Metj9mit tammU, lit fttMri im kUttrf — Tkt AftUiAH Itogat^ 

To tht Ptople of Iht Stale a/ New Ytirk: 

Among (he confeileracicc of nniiquii)', the most considerable 
wattliat of thcOtrcun repuhhcs auociatcd umkr ihc Amphk- 
fl, tyoiiic council. Frwn the be«i account* Iransmiited 

iro. la. oj this celebrated Insiilulion, il bore a very iiiMiuc- 

''■ ■ The iubje>rt o( thi» ami (he l«™ roiltwini; nmolwi' • ' 10 

1w loicn up \ij tmth Mt. II. Knit M(. M. Wlut hal !.« . Lt 

Ml- H.. liao liX'l enlcrcd muic bFicD)' lulu tlic iiubjo;!, •>.'■. I'l; vUti 
Mr, hi. OH lu *{>|>Cii(ii>i; lll*l llic t.itti-'r ua> mj;*)^ In It. wllh lar^r 
miilFriil*. ■•(! with « vkv ti> ■ ■iioic |irr>*iw ilrliiimtiim ; siiJ Irom ui 
pen III the Ullet, (he xienl p>pen m-ni 10 the I*m«.' " 

" The at«ve note (inm the pen of Mr. MidiMMi w»» wrilten 00 ifce 
niir|>in n! the leaf, i-MnmMi<:ln{; niih Ihe pinent lutmliet. In (he tapij 
of the Foletaliii lnscicU \<y liiin tii (lie puUilthet."— A'«jy in lit n/i/im 
»ftSiS. 

" No. tS il ■Krilwile') to Mt. IHmilton wd Mr. Mo^iton juintlT' A. 
H. li»rt ilnini up loniethiBt on the nibjeiUioft'"- 1 v ■ <^-' -'-■' 'i'- -wo 
■tt( Not (19 and lay. On fiiuliiie thai ). M. ■< ih 

|ui;r> nislrilaH. aoil with a new ti a <iti>te jr. ud 

whil he tiail wri'i«n Int" tile lMni)t i-f J. M. li t-. (hi-mI- ">• 

re«oUeaed, that KWicthini- in Lha (ttaaQhi ma; hart beer, .lul 



H.UdX.1 



AMPHICTYOIVIC COUNCiL, 



109 



iifc juutogy lo the prcseni Confederaiion <A U»e American 
Suies.* 

The TncmbcM rctjiined the character t>\ independent And 

«ovcrci)^ Kiiitci. anil had cqu.it voteii in the fcdcriil council. Thb 

council lia<l a general ^uthor>t) to ptn[)osc and resolve whatever it 

iudj[ctl necessity lo< the coinmon wcllatc of Greece ; to declare 

and carry gn war; lo decide, in the laM retort, all controversies 

between Ihe members ; to line llic iimfreasing parly ; lo employ 

the whole force of the confederacy ngjiinst the ditobcdieni ; lo 

admit New tnembett. Tlie AmphicIyunN weie the guardians of 

rdigion aiKl of the inimeiise riches belonging to the tcniple <rf 

DdphiM. where they ha<l the right of jurisdiction in conirovei*ies 

between the iiihahitantf and those who cantc ta consult the oraclr. 

Adfurthet provision Jor the efficacy of the federal powers, they 

took an oath miiiually to defend and protect the united cities, to 

pDiiiih llie vioUlorv of thi« oath, jnd lo inflict vengeance on 

ucril^gioQs ilcspoilcfK of the tcniple. 

la theory and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems 
Mnplf luflicient for all geiieinl purposes In xcveial material 
inuancts they Mceed ihe powers enomeialed in ihe articles of 
MnfedentKXi. The Amphiciyon« had in their haitdt ihe Kupersii- 
l"»e* theiitne*. oneof the piincipal engines by which govern- 
BCMwu then maintained ; they had a decUred anlhority lo use 
McKioii against refractory cities and Here bound by oailt lo 
enri Ihit jtilltorily on the necessary occasions. 

Verf different. nevcrilielcM. wai the eiperinienl from lliciheory. 
"Hk powers, like iha)« ol the present Congress, were adminiitemt 

iM ihe Aumhers oi pdnied : bin it wu ecriaJnly not of ■ nature 01 
MotM lo slltitt ibc iiiiprcukiii left on lh« niliiil of I. M., from whotc 

Elbe jupcn "<iil ti> the ptrn, IliM tliey «ci« n\ th» cUkx "rillto by 
Ai the hi^Imic nuteriaiii of A. II.. u far ai llirv wrnt, were 
dnMos timiUr or the Mme with thme provided by J. (il.. nnd ni » 
ttt ipplioiioM of them piohably DCcnired lo both, >n impreiiiioa ini|;hl 
bkfl iHi llie ninil ul A, H. that the Nim. in ijuetlion wcte wnlleii 
i><llf, Th«^ icmaiks ire nude *<> veil lo octnunt fur ■ ililciornl In 
hi rSnt. it nuile by A. II.. aik in juslice lo J. M.. who. aloiyi rt|>»rtl- 
i>Cihen in > diScrenl light, h»d to slated Ihem lo ftn inquiring friniil. 
I«| befoie it wu known or (appotwd that a dilTcreoi imprcuion ciiiied 
■T^bei*." MailiuMi'i MalciDiml in paper entitled 'flu /•'t^rraiiii. — 

EltT(l», 

' la Ihe " Leilen and Other Writinn o( /amei Madison," i86{ fi. 393). 
<>pnnicd ■ |»pei eoiitlcd "Nofes of Ancient and Modem Confederm- 
on.'' umI from tlut p«f«r tlie folloirine accounts were drawn. Tile 
Udorr ol llm fiteeli conleiUraciCk it \rM at leii):ll> in R. A. Ficeman'i 
"Hiiloey M f«^l<r*t Gowmnmit (mm the Fnuml.iiion ijf (he Achalaii 
laague toihe Uitnption of the United States," a wurk which. lotobviont 
■oMot, mm never ooioplcied. — EDfroK. 



I lo JEALOUSIES OF CKF.RR STA TES, Of*. » 

by deputies a{ipoinie<l wholljr by ihc diics in tlicir |>o1ittcnl »paci-l 
tie». and cxK<:i»«<l over thvni in Uie SAine cajUL-iticti. Iletice the 
wcnkncu, the disordcrt, and 6nally ihe (Icsiniciion ol iIk con- 
(tderacy. Tlie more ]K>wct(ul meinben. innlKul ol brin^ kcpi inj 
awe and &uborilmation, i)ritiii)ited tucccSMVcty over all ilw i»L 
A(Ii«ni. as we Icim Irom Dciiiohlhenes. wiis tlie uiblltt of GtT«f«I 
scveniy-iliTcc yeais. Tl'c L-tcciljemonians ivc xl govrfiiiil it lwc«i)-J 
nine yenr^ ; ai 4 xubtcqiKiit pcnod, aftei the iMttlc of Leuclr; 
the Tbcbiins had their (urii of dninlnation. 

ll h.i|>i)eii«(l but Iiio often, ai'conlinK to llukireh, thai ihel 
deputies of (he &lroiige&i cities auvd and corrupicil itiose of (hcl 
weaker, and llul judsineni went rn favof u( llic niosi pownful^ 
pany. 

Even In itic inidnl of de{en»ir« aim) djuKerous wais with Penti 
and Macedon. the nictnbeis no-cr acted in conc«-n, and wetr^ 
nxwp or fen-er «( them, etemally ilic dupes or the hiielin>-<i of ihK| 
conimon ei>emy. The intervals o( fotcign war wctc filled up by 
doinutic vicisMiudev coiivulMons, and ciinsKe. 

Afier ihe conclusion of the war with Xerxes, il apport thai it>«| 
LacedxTOonians required tlut a nunil>er u( tlie cities kliould 
lumcd out of the confederacy for the iitif.nthfii) part ihcy lud 
acted. The Athenians. Gnding thai the LaeedatinonUns wouh 
lose (ewer panitHns by tiich a mcasiii^ than iltcinulws, «a<S\ 
would becvnte inosicra of il>c public del Iberat ions, visorouly 
opposed and <h-featrd the aitcmpi. Thti piece of hbiory pr 
At once the inelficiency of the union, tlie and>>IMin and Jealousy 
its movt powerful mcmbcni, And the dependent ami iteKracIird eon- 
dKion ol the test. The sni.iller nietnlicrs. tlvoiigli rniiilnl by ihe 
theory ol their sy:i(em to revolve in equal ptide and tnayeiiy aioundJ 
the eotniiion ceti'.cr, had become, in fact, satellites of the orbs 
primary magnliude. 

Had Ihe Greeks, says the AbM Miloi. been as wise as thcjr ' 
courageous. ll>ey would have 1>ecn admonished by ex|>cr>enoe 
Ihe necessity of a closer tiniori. and would have availed themselv 
of the pence svliich followed llitir succctti aKtiinsi the Persian arms 
to establish such a reforninllon. Instead of this obvious policjrJ 
Athens and Sparta, inftateit with the >'iciones and ihe glory ih 
had acquired, became lir;>( nvili and then enemies, and dill each 
other inlinitdy niorc mcKliiel ilwin ihey had suRrrril from Xenc 
Their mutual jcalouues. (ears, hatreds, and injuries ended in 
celefanite<l re}oponnesian war, whkh lt«etf ended ia the ruin 
slarery q( (he Alhcirians who lud begun ll. 

As a weak goTcmment. when not at war. <■ crcr a){italed 



K.uda.1 



ACfl.aAX LRACUB. 



Ill 



inwnu) lUtMnsiofit. so ihrte ncrcr fail to bring on (rnh calamitlca 

bum alnuud. The Pliocians having plowtril up nomc conse- 

CTalcd ground belAnging to thetem|ileo( Apollo, ihc Amphiciyonic 

councD, accotding lo ibc -lupeiMilioii of Hie uge. int posed a fiii« 

oM the ucnlegious oflcndcis. The Phocians, being Rt>«ted by 

Ailten3 and Sfiurta. reluicd to ubmil lo (he decree. Tlie Theban». 

with others of ibc citicx. undcitool: <a maintain the auihority ■>( 

ilic Amphictyoiu, and lo avenge the viuluicd god. Tlie latter. 

Iidag the weaker party, invited the aui«tancc of I'liilip of Mace- 

dod, whohad secretly fostered the content. Plidip gladly ieiinl 

til* opportunity oJ executing the tlcxii^n!! lie had long planned 

>KaiR»l lh« liberties o( Greece. By his intrigues and brSbei he 

won over 10 (lis interests the popular leaders of several cities; by 

ihdr inducnce and votes gainrd adniisMon Into the Amphictyotiic 

CDUBcil ; and by liis arts and his arms made liiiiiself master of the 

nmledenicy. 

Sucli were the coiuequcnccs of tlie fallacious principle on which 
ihis int cresting ctiabliihrncnt was fouiidcd. WnA Greece, s.iys a 
pdiciout ob&civei on her (ate, been united by a stricter confedera- 
tion, and pervei'crcd in her union, she would never have worn Ihc 
chaifuuf Macedofl, and might Itave proved u barrier to the vast 
prajecu nf Ramc. 

The Acha>an league, as it is called, was another society of 
Cnoui rcptildics which supplies us with vAluable inslriiciion. 

Tlie union here was far more iiititnale, and Its organisation 
Mch wiser than in ih« prcceiling instance. 1( will accordingly 
ippur that, though not exempt (ruin a similar catastrophe, il by no 
avan* equally deserved it. 

Tic ritiM mn<p04ing this IragiM retaine«l tlieir municipal juris- 
diction, ajipainied thdr own oRicers. and eiijoyr^l .1 perfect equality. 
TIk wnaie. in which they were represented. Iiad the sole and 
tuhiitre right of pcuce and war; of sending and receiving 
■aknuijors ; of enicririg into treaties and alliances : of appointing 
■ tliid magistrate or pnttor, as lie was called, who commanded 
iWir annie*, and who, wiih the advice and consent of ten of the 
■cwion. not only administered the government in the receM of 
At Kiialc, but had a great share in its deli betui ions, when 
■■nnbled. According lo the primitive constitution, there were 
liB|irairnni a^soci.tlcd in the administration : but on trial n single 
■ ■ ■ r-m-il. 

ih.tt the cities had all the sanve laws and etitioms.lhe 
**»« we^;Jit4 and mejismes, and the sante money. But how far 
<lui rflcci proceeded from the aulhorily of the federal council ia 



IIS 



D/SSOLVTIOff OP lEAGUE. 



rva-it 



left in uncrrlainly. Tl i« said Aniythat ihe ciliM were in a mannrr 
compclltd lo receive ihe siiinc Uws and usages. When UiccdvmDn 
wai brought into the league l>y Phili>paemen, it was aiicn<ln] with 
an sbolition of ilte Insiiiuiions and laws ol Lycurgus. and an u<toj>> 
lion of those o( the Achieans. The Ampliiclyonic ciinfedcracf, 
of which she had been a member. )e(( her w the full eterclM of 
htx ^veniiiient and her legislation. Thb ciicumslance alone 
provct a very nuietal <liffercnce in the genius <A the two systems. 

It is much to be ref^rettcd that such tmpeifect monuments 
rem.iin of lhi« curious political fabric. Could ils interior structurr 
and regular II per at ion be a«i:rcriain«l.it b probable that mure Itghl 
would he ihrnwn bf it on the Kcience of frdrr,)! govrnimrni tKan 
by any o( (he like ex|>erimeni« wtih which we ate .tciguainicd. 

One important fact trems to be wilnected by all the hixtoriann 
who lake notice o( Achaf-an afTdir«. Ii is llut, a« wdl after the 
renuiMiioti of lite Icsiuue by Aratus xa before its cliviolulion by the 
arts of Maccdnn. there was infinitely mofc of ntotkratiofi and 
justice in the ailni in isl ration of its ^vernmenl, and less uf viulntce 
and flcdition in the people, than were lo be fouiitl tn any of the 
ciliet exeicivng 'iigfy alt Ihe pienifplires of sorereignty. The 
AbW MaWy, in his ohscrratlons on Greece, wy^ thai ilw popular 
govcrtimenl, which W.is so (ernpcatuoiis elsewhere, raii!iF(l no 
d>sortI<-i9 In the nirnibers nf llic Achirjn republic, kffausf tl 
ttMi Ikeri lemptrtti by Iht gtntrat anlketily and la%'i of Ikf 
e&n/tdffaey. 

Wc are not to conclude too hastily, liuwcver. thai (action did not. 
ill a ceit.)in degree, agitate (he panicotar cities ; much les« that 
due subordination and harmony ret};i>ed in ilie general s)'steiD, 
Tlu; contrary is sufficiently displ.iycd in the vicisailudes and fate ul 
the republic. 

Whilst the Amphiclyonic confederacy renuitned, thai ol ihi 
Acbsans, which comprel>rn<le<l the less impon^nl citir* nnty. 
ma<le li((le figure on (he theater of (Ireecc. When the former 
l>ecame a viclim to Macedon. the Uliir was sparrrt hy llw (itilic 
ol Philip and Alexamler. Uiviler the Micceswui ol lliese prtnen, 
liowev«r. a difdrrcnt policy preiailcd. The ans of dirision wi 
praclicetl among the Achxans. Each ciiy w.is wluced into i 
•eparate intcreti ; rhe union was dissolrcd. Sotnc ol the chk' 
felt under (he tyranny o( M.icedonian garHsofis : others tintlrr III. 
ol usurpers tpringing 4Mt of their own confusions. Sharne ami 
oppress^n errlnng awakened Ihelr loi-e of lllwny, A few eiiii 
reunited. Their example wac followed by odicrs. aa opp»itunili< 
were found ol cutting of) their lyranU. The leagirrMiun cnibraixd 



SUBJUGA TIOX OF ACIIAIA. 



113 



ilnxnl the whole Pcloponnenui. Mncedon mw iti prosTCM, btit 

»ra» hiwkrcd by Inicnwl ilrtsensions (torn stopping ii. All Girec* 

caught the enlhutusm and seemed tcaily to tinile in one confeiler- 

acy. when Ittc )iMlausy and enry in Spnna nnd Aihens,o( ihc 

ruing {[loTy of the Achxmii. threw a fuinl ilnnip on llic enterprise. 

Tncdf«ul of I he MaceiJoni.in power indiiceii the k^iguc tocoun 

Ihe ilhnnce of Hie \iii\-£i ol Egypt and Syria, who. ui HUCCeMOiH of 

Aleuflder. were riv.ils of the king of Mnceilon. This policy w;is 

'kfci'rd by Cleoniencs. king <i[ Sjiaita, who was leU by hi* ainlii- 

iiun lo make nn iinprovokcil ;ilUi:kon his n'ighlinrs. the Ach.-raiiK. 

mil who. .u an enemy lo Maceilon. Ii.id inlernt enough wilh the 

£|[>p<an and Syrian p«ince« to effect a tncach of their engage- 

tnentt with the league- 'llic Aclixaiis weic now re<!uci-i1 tu the 

lUleiiiBHaf submitting lo CIcomcncs. or ut supplicating (lie aid of 

HactdMi, its fomter oppressor. The latter expcitieiit wjis adopted. 

Ttie contei'ts of the Creeks always jRoiilcil a pleiuing opportunity 

Ml llul powerful neighbor of iiiteiiiieiMlmg in their affjirs. A 

Miftdonian army (|u>ckly appearcit. Cleuiiicnei wax van<|ui»hcd. 

Tiie Aclioean^ noon experienced, as often hapjwns, that a riciorioos 

lul powerfnl ally ix but anothrr ii.itiie (or a master. All that their 

■ou ab^i compliances could oliiaiii from him was j tukratiun 

c4 iW exerciM ol thcirlawii. Philip, who was now on the throne 

(f Haccdon. soon provoked liy hi« tyrannies fresh combinattoiM 

unMg the Greeks. The Ach;trjnH. though weakened by tntemal 

^tMniuoos. antl by the revolt of Mi^Ksrne, onrof its nien>hcrs,hemg 

)Med by the ,^toliJin» and Alhenidna, erected tlie standard uf 

<fp(ttiIi(M. Frndintl thernM^li't-s. though tliu^ iiippnrtcd, unetjnal 

■•tile uadertaking. they once more had recour;ie tu the dangcious 

■'■:.i,-nt of intriKlucingthe succor of foreign artni. The Romans, 

■■ "iiMn the inviuiion was mjidc, e-4gerly embiaced it. Philip 

*u coiiquacd ; Macrdun subdued. A new crisis ensued lo the 

le^ue. L>issensM)ns broke out atnnng its members. These the 

Rwuas fostered. Callicrates and other popular leaders became 

mercenary bistramcnis for inreigling their countrymen. The more 

dtcauatiy to nourish disconl anil disorder the Kon>ans liad.to the 

aiumifhinent nf ihoxe who confided in their sinccrily. alica<ly pro- 

diiioed univemal liberty* througboul Greece. With the same 

iavdkiaB news, they now seduced the memtiCTS fmrn the league. 

by (epnswnltng to llicrr pride the vioNition il eominilted on their 

WTTTTignty. Dy these arts thii union, tlie laU hopi^ of Greece, the 

lul ho|« of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces, and &uch inibe- 

I but another name moic ipecioui for the independence of 
the«a>l>Rvon ibc federal bc»d.—Pi;BUUS. 




114 



CBRMANiC BODY. 



10.10 



cili(]r and dislraciion ImroJuccd. that tlie nrms af (tome (ound 
little (tifiicultf in comiilciin^ llie ruin wbicK their att» had com- 
menced. The Achxniia wctc cut (o pieces, and Acliaia hmdcd 
with chains, umlcr which ii in gr(i;iniiig al this hour. 

I bave thought it nut supcrHuous \o give tlw outltites of this 
important portion of hintoty ; both because it leaches more than 
one lesson, and bcrviuM'. as a supplcnicni in the tn;iiine« of the 
Achxan cunttiiutiun, it onpliulicalljr illuMraie% ll>e leiidcncy of 
letleia) bodies rather to anarchf among the members, than to 
tyranny in tlw head. FlJBUUih 



No. 19. Umj,ffnJntjt<i'mai,t>*e. I. >rir-t HamiUunand Mafli 



lison I 

i 



EXAMPLES OF MEDI-«VAL AND MODERN 

CONFEDERACIES. 

Tht Grman rmfirt—Eramfie efPtUmJ—Tkt Smii ttnfrJtr, 

Tfi the People *•/ the State e/ yV«w Yfirh: 

Tlie examples u( anctcni confedL-raciet. ciied in my laM paper, 
have not ethaiixtcd the source ol expciimcnlal inttiuclion on ibi* 
subject. Tltcrc are existing iniliiutions, founded on a similar 
[ttinciplc, which merit particular contiilenuioa. The 6rsi which 
j>n»enls ilicif Is the Germank body. 

Ill llic r.irly ngef, o( Chriitiaiiiiy, Germany wa* occupinl by 
seven diuinct iiation^. who had no common ditef. Tlie Pranks. 
one of the number. h.ivinK conquered the (iauls, esubhshed ihe 
kingdom which has i^tken its name front ihcm. In Ihe nuiih cen- 
tury, Chariema);tie, its warlike monaruh, cairied his vxriurious 
arms in every iliiection, and Germany became a pan of his Ta»l 
dominions. On ihe disincmbeTineni, which took place under his 
sons, (his pan vim erectc<l inio a separaic and independeiii empire. 
Chailnnnsne and his immediate ilriccnilanis pcnsessrd ihe rrtHlf , 
as well at the ensigns and rtigniiy o( imperial power. Rat Ihe 
principal vasvits, whose fiefs had become hriediiary, and who 
composeal the national die it which Charlemagne had nni 
abolished, t;(;iduiitl)- threw ofl (he yoke and advanced lo •o«er- 
eijjn juriHltcliun and independence The (oicc o\ imperial 
sovereignly was tniufliGieni lo rrstmin such powerful depriulmis. 
or to preserve the unity and tnuK|tultiiy of the empLte Tbe most 



l.uiM.1 



POWERS OF THE DIET. 



"S 



(utioM prirBte win, accnmpantrd with n-cry species o\ calamity. 
*fte rarriwl on bclwcpn llie difltrrciil priiKCS and stales. The 
irapeiial aulhorily, unaUtc to mniiiLiin tiic public nrdci. decline*) 
b)r degrees till U wns ulmust ntinci in ilie anarchy which agiiaicd 
like knj! Interval between the dcith iif tiic last cmpcior of the 
Swbmi,an<l (he accession ol tlic first cmpeior o[ the Austrian 
Ihms. In the dcrcnih century the einpcrots cnjin-cd full sover- 
apirf; in the liliccmh ihcy had liiilc more than the symbols 
u4 tleeonllon!! o( power. 

Oulol this feudal syslein. which has itself many (A the Important 
Icxuitt of a cunfedctucy. hax grown t)ie federal lyileni wliich 
niuliliiic» the r.rrnianic empire. Its powers arc vcsicd in a diet 
nftoenting (he component mernbers of the confc<l(^nicy : in the 
cDipctOT, vbo is the oiecniiifc magistrate, with a iicKstive on the 
•traces of the diet ; m\A in the imperial chamber, and (he aulic 
ocuncil, two jiHJIciaiy tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in 
0Miiv\«nic9 wliicti concern ihe empire, or which happen among 
itsniciiibcrv 

The diet posseuei til e general power of leei!>Iaiiiig foi the cm- 
pte; of nuLinc war and peace; coiiiraciing a!!iartce«: assessing 
qwias of iriKips and money: conMruciing furlresacs: regulating 
<*n; admithng new memberiii ; and subjecting ditobe<licrit mem- 
i«n tu the ban ol (he empire, by which the patty i* degraded 
UDm hift lovereign rights anil his possessions forfeited. The 
14 ol Ihe coriledeiacy arc expreasly restricted fiom enlering 
lalo compacts prejudicial to the empire; from impa.iing toIU and 
4aUe« Ud their mutual iniercourse, without the consent of the 
eaperor ottd ilicl; from altering the value of money ; Irum doing 
iejuslice to one another : or from affording assistarxe or teircni 
to ilisturbers of the public peace. And the ban it denounced 
«|akist MKh as shall violate any of ()ies< reitriclions. The mem- 
bers of the diet. a» such, ate subject in all cases to be judged by 
ihermjtcror and diet, and in their private capicrties by Ihe aullc 
Gouacil and imperuil chamber. 

The prciogaiivet o( Ihe emperor are numerous. The tnost \vn- 
pottant of ibem are : his exclusive right to make propositions to 
ibe dirt : lo negative its resolutions ; to name ambassadors ; lo 
canfer dignities and titles; to I'tll vacant electorates; to found 
unlTri^ities ; to grant privileges nol injurious to the stales of the 
empire: to receive and apply the public revenues; and generaity 
to walcb over the public s.-ifety. In certain cases, the electors 
(am) a council to him. In quality ol emperor, he posse^tr^ no 
tnrirfury within ilie empire, nor receives any (evcnue for his ftupporU 




Ii6 FEUDS OF GEKMANY. »». IB 

Bui Ills revenae and itominionc. in olhi^r qualities, conitllliitc hi'm 
one ot the moil powerful piinccs »ii Europe. 

FTUrn such a pantile of cunvliiutionat powers, in IIk repn^tcnta- 
lives nnd head of this confrderiicy. ihe niilural suppositiim would 
be that ii must form an excepiion 10 the |[ci>«Tal cKxrncicr which 
belont!s to its kindred sy^icniv Nothing would be (urihcr Irom 
(he reality. The fundamental principle on whK-h il tests. \\\»X the 
cmpiR! is a community of sovere^s. tliai the diet is a rcprcMnta- 
tlon of sovCTelgns. and that the laws aie addrcsaed lo soveragns. 
rcndcra the empire a nerveless hod)-. incapaMe ol reguLiilng Its 
own niemhen. insecure ag.ilnst external dangers, and ai^tated 
ivitli urici-iuiiiK feniiemaiioiis in its own bowels. 

The history of Germany is a hi«ory of war* hetwcert the emperor 
and the piinces and stales ; ol wan amonx the jirincei and stales 
tltenuclvc:( : of the liccntiotisness of the strong, and Ihc oppm- 
siofi of the w«aV : of (oicit;n inlru&iont. and fomjin intriKties ; ul 
rcquisilioni of men and money dtsrci^rdcd, or partially com* 
plied with ; of aticinpts to enforce thcin, aitogcihcr abonire, or 
atteiuled with sliiughlcr and desolation, involving the innoccnl 
with the guilty : of sencrai imbecility, confuuon. and miier}-. 

In the sistcenth reniury. ihe emperor, with one part of the rrn- 
pire on his side. wa& wen en^aj;''' ag->i"si ■'>« other princes and 
stales. In one of the coniticis. the emperor himself was put to 
fJTglii and very near being made prisoner by the elector ol Saxony. 
Tlic Inle kinK <>f Cruuia was more than otice pilled against liis 
imperial sovereign : aitd commonly proveil an nvcrmalcb for tiim. 
Conirmersiesand wars among the mcmliers ihenuelrcs have been 
so common thai the Cerman annak are crowded with ibe bloody 
pages which deKribc diem. Previous lo the peace of Wesiptialia. 
Ciermany w.-u dcsnlnie'l by a war of thirty years, in which Ihe 
rmptror. with one hall of (he empire, was on one sjite. and Sweden, 
with ihe oihrr half, on Ihe oppoMte side. Peace was at tengtb 
ncgoiiairit. and dictated by foreign powers ; and the ariiclcs of il. 
In which foreign po»-crt arc parties, made a fandamenlal pan of 
ihn Germanic consiiiuiion. 

If lite nation happens, on any emergency, to be more nniied by 
the nccei^iiiy of self-ileleiise. ill situation is still deplorable 
Military preparations must be preceded by SO many tedious d»> 
citsnoni. arising from the jealousie*. pride, separate views. aiMl 
clashing prrlenuona of M>vcreign bodiev. tlist hrforc llie dirt can 
settle the arrangements, the enemy are In the fiekl ; and bffnre 
llvD federal troops ant ready to lake \\. are rctiriag into winter 
quarters. 



t.udii.1 



MtUTARV CQBltaON. 



»«7 




Tlie unall hml)' of niiional troops, which has been judged 
iimSKUy in lime of pcice. is defeclively kepi up. Indly piiid. 
inlrtted wilh locjil prrjuOices, and gupponed by irrcguUr and 
■iBpoporliunale cwitributiuni Iv (lie Iceaiury. 
Pie impDuibtlily of niiiinuming order and dupenting jii&iice 
iiMot; iheM Mveiei^n aubji-cU produced ihe cipeniiii'nt o{ 
ing ihc etnpirc iiiio nine or len circles or dbiiicit; of giving 
interior ot^nniiaiiuii, .iiiil o[ charging Ihem wilii itie 
ndiiMy execuiMm of the Uwt againM dclinqiiem ami coniumacioux 
■ncfitets. This experiment lias only lervcil lu deinonMraic more 
f«Uf Ike radical vice ol the consiiluiion, Each circle Is the minia- 
tvtpklure o( the deformities of ihn pulnical nioiiairr. Thej' 
Bifkt (ail to exccuie Itielr conimissions. or Ihcy do it uilh ull the 
ilniMaliuii mill carnage of ciril Wiir. Somen iiie^ whole circles 
an ddauliers; and then ihey incicate ihc miKtiicf which iliey 
»trt iruiiiuicd to remedy. 

We niayforin M>me juitgrncnl of this ichcnic of military coercion 
fntn a umplc given by Thiunus. In Donawenh. a free and im- 
pcritldiy of the circle of Suabia. the Abb^ de St. Croix enjoyed 
lin unmuiiitics which had been rr»erved to him. In the cxet' 
of these, on some public occ.i^ions, outrages were committed 
hl«i by iltc people of the city. The consequence was tliat the 
ijr was put uivder the ban of ihc empire, anil the Duke vt 
fiivatia, thuugh director of ;tnoihcr circle, obtained an appoinl- 
IKnl to enforce it. Ite*oon ai)|>c.-ur<l before ihc cily with a corps 
alien ihou«^nd iroopv. and liniling ■' ^ 1^' occasion, as he had 
tardly inieiuled from ihe beginning, lo rm'ive an antiquated 
(laim, on the pretext that his ancestors h.id suffered the place to 
le ilismenilietetl from hia territory.* he look pusMssion of it in hit 
own name, disarmed and punished the inliabiiaois, and reanncxed 
<^ city to his domaiivs. 

U may be askefl. pei h.ips. wlut has so long kept (his dls^intetl 
niacbine from falling entirely lo pieces } The answ-er is obvious. 
The weakncM o( most of the mcmlicr?. who arc unwilling 10 
tipuse themsdvea to Ihc mercy of (otcian powers; I he weakness 
of nmtl of the principal members, compared wilh lh« (ormliUhlc 
(Kiwcis all aiound the:m ; the vast weight and inlliience which ihe 
empcrar derives from his sep.-irate and hereditary dominions ; and 
inirrcst he feels in prcscniug a sysieni with wlitch his family 
is connected, ami which constitutes him the 6rsl prince in 



^■ahli 




'nedd, "Voind Abr^. Chronol. de I'llUl., elc. d'AUenugne," 
1 the ptKleit ■m In LniktaaKy biraicU fur Ihc cipcnw uf tli« exptdt 
Am.— POMJU*. 



ii8 




Sff/SS CA.VTOXS. 



iha. i« 



Kuro|H-;— lltn^ c.iii^K «iipporl a IccNc nnd prvcariouK Union; 
whilsl l\\c rcj)Flknt <ju:ility inciitirTtt It> tli<- luiturc of sotrreij^iny. 
.iiul which time con I i 1111.-111)' ittrenijihcnt, ]»cvenlt any rcrotm 
wliiitevcT, fouiideil on a proper GonM>lict3iion. Nor U H 10 be 
im^ncd, if tlii« olMtaclc could be »urminintcti. that the netKhbor* 
iitg powers would suffer « revotoiion lo i^ihc pl«cc. which woutd 
f;ivc (o the cinpiie the fotce and pre-eininence 10 whkh ll b entiileil. 
Foreign luiions have long considered llwmsetvcs ns inierested in 
(lie clianKcs nude hy events in lliii conslilution ; and have, on 
v-irious occusions, betrayed Iheir policy of |>crpeiualing il& anarchy 
and weakncu. 

If ntoie direct examples were wjnijng. Poland, as a gOTrnitneni 
over local sovereign!!, migtit not iniptupcily be taken notice of. 
Nor coutd any prool more striking be given of ihc cal.imitK-s How- 
ins from sucii tiiUtlutiuns. Equally until tor setf-governnient and 
self-defense, il has long been at itic nirrcy of ii« jmwriful neigh- 
bun ; who have bicly ha<t the mercy lo diiiburdcit tl of one-thiid 
of its people and tcnilorirj. 

The connerlion among llie Skim canloni iicarcely amount! toa 
conteder.icy : though il is »omctim<-t ciicd as nn in-Umce of the 
stability of Mich invlituliunv 

They have no common itciwiry ; ivo common iroopi cvcfi in 
war : no continon coin ; no common judicaiory, nor any Mhcr 
common mark of Koverdgniy. 

Tlvey are kepi tOKelhei by the pwuliarliy «f ihrir lopogTaphiCal 
position ; by Iheir i(i<livi4lual w«akncM ami insigrilAcancy ; \yy llie 
(ear of poweiful neighbors, to one of which ihcy weie lotnterly 
subfccl ; hy ihc few sources of conienliun among a peoplr of xuch 
simple and iMinogcneous m.inners : by ihrir joini ininrM in ilxir 
dcpcndciil pov^eisiuns : hy the mutual 3i<l llivy stand in nerd of. 
(or suppressing iniUftcclioos -ind rrbHli«n«. an aid e^pmsly Ml]ni- 
lated. and often required and afforded : and by itie neceuliy of 
some reg<i1ar .ind permanent proviswm for accoinmrMlatlng de- 
putes among lite cantons. TIte provition is, that ilie parltes at 
variance xhall each choose four juilges out of (Itc neutral onnionK. 
who. til case of ilisagreemeni, chouse an umpire. This triltutMl. 
uiulcran oath of impartiality, pronounce* cteTuiiiive seniencc which 
all llic c.inioiis arc bound lo enforce. The comprtency ol ihi<i 
rvjulatiun m;iy he eilimated by a clause in tlwir Ireaiy of 1683, 
wlih Victor Amaili^iis of Siivoy, in which he obliges hiinsetf ii> 
interpose as medialor in iliiputes )>eiwcen the caoloiu, and M 
employ force, il nccmary. ng;iintt tlx coniumacious {wny. 

So far as ihe peculiarily of Ihdr case will adniii of comjuuixm 



"""'^ 



KniU UNITED NETHERLANDS. "9 

itith that of the United Slates, it serves to confinn the principle 
intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may 
tuTe had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a cause o[ 
diBereace sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it [ailed. The 
controversies on the subject of religion, which in three instances 
have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said, in fact, to 
have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic cantons 
hate since had their separate diets, where all the most important 
concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general diet little 
other business than to take care of the common bailages. 

That separation had another consequence which merits atlen- 
lion. It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of 
Beme, at the head of the Protestant association, with the United 
f^vlnces : and of Luzerne, at the head of the Catholic association, 
Willi France. Pt/BLius. 



No, 20. iNtw YsrkPaektt, Dec >i, i;!;.) Hamilton and Madison. 
EXAMPLE OF THE UNITED NETHERLANDS. 
Ntlure Bf govtrnmiHt — Hisleriial illuilralieut — The priunt con- 

Td Ike people of the State of New York- 

The United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or 
raiher of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirm- 
mg all the lessons derived from those which we have already 
retlewed. 

The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign stales, 
and each state or province Is a composition of equal and inde- 
pendent cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces but 
the cities must be unanimous. 

The sovereignty of (he union Is represented by the Slales-Gen- 
fial, consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the 
provinces. They bold their seats, some for life, some for six, 
three, and one years; from two provinceslhey continue in appoint- 
ment during pleasure. 

The States-General have authority to enter Into treaties and 
alliances; to make war and peace: to raise armies and equip 
fleets; lo ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In all 
these cases, however, unanimity and the sanction of their con- 



POIVESS OF THE STADTHOLDER. 



no. M 



stiluenls are reqiibite. They have auiliuriiy to appoiitl and 
recclvR amhDi«M(tors ; to execiiic lmtic« arxj alluncn alreaily 
lorrneil; W ptovide (or ihe colleclion o( tlulies oii impurls and 
ripons; to rcguUlc the mlnr, with a saving to the |>iovinc»l 
righlJi ; lu gcnfirn as wvcicigiis the dcpcnilmt tciHtones. The 
provinces arc mir»i»cil, unlns with ilic geimal coritcni. from 
entering into (orriKn ircaticK ; from eKi.iUlUhtiiic impost* injutioux 
10 others, or charging ihrir neighbors with higher dtii>c» l)uit 
their own (ubjectn. A council of >tale, a chamber of accounts, 
with five colleges of admiralty, aid aiul fontfy (h« fcdcnl ulitiini>- 
Imfion. 

The executive magistrate of (he tinion i« the SladltioWer. wlio I* 
now an hercdiut}- prince. Hi» princi|Kil wi-ii;lit and intiueiite (fl 
the republic arc derived from thi% indr|>cnitent title; Itom lilt 
great patrimonial estates: (roin hii litiiiily conitccttons wiih sonic 
«( the chief potrnUies of Ivurope : and, more than ii\, perhain, from 
his being siadlhuldei iit the so-eral pfovineca. as wHl as for the 
union ; in which provincial (|iulity he has the appntnlmciil uf town 
magislniies umtcr certain legulaiions, c»ecuie5 provinctal ileciees. 
presides— when heplcaM^— in the piovinci.il iribunab, and hat 
(hroiighoui the puwci of panton. 

As St.idlliuider ci( the union, he has, howevef, considerable pte> 
roga lives. 

In his political capacity be h,Tt authority to settle disputes 
liettvcen tlie provinces, when other nvcihods fail : to assist at ll»e 
deliberations of IIm: Stales-General, and at their particular cunler- 
ences; to give audiences to foreign ambassadoTs, and to kcr|i 
:^[enl* lor his particular alTaits at (oreign courts. 

In his military capicity he cnmmands the federal troops, pio- 
rides for garriKins, and in gencr;il regulates inililary affairs ; div 
poscii of all appoinlmcnis. from colonels to ensigns, and of ibe 
guveinnientt and posts of forlilicd towns. 

In his marine capacilv he is Admiral General, and superintends 
and (Urects eveiythtng relative to nat-al foices and oilier natal 
affairs: presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy : appoints 
lietitenani admirals and other olTiceta : and establishes cotincils ol 
war. whose sentences are no) executed till he approves them. 

Hb revenue, exclusive of his ininte Income, amounts lo ibm 
hundred thou.-iiinil florins. The st.inding array which lie com- 
maniU consists of about foity thouMnd men. 

Such is the nature oI the ccleliraleil Belt^tc confederacy, as 
iWlineated am pnrchmeni. What are il>c duracten which pirao 
ikc lias stamped upon it t Imbedliiy iit the govern mail ; dbcwil 



■.MtlU 



TUE STATES^GENERAL. 



191 



anmg (he |tcovince* : foreign inRucnce and Jndignitia ; a prccarl- 
onaiKcnce b) peace, and peculiur caUmilieit from wnr. 

It vu hmg ago frmarketl by Croliux thai nothing but the 
haind o( hn countrymen to the Houvr ol Austria kcpi ihem from 
kciif rtiiMd hf ibe vices of theii constitution. 

The iraion of Utrecht, sajs another r«pecta)>te writer, reposes 
•njuUioritf in the Staicx'(rt:nctal. seemingly suiriciciii to secure 
lunnony. but ilie jc;iluuiy in each province i'eii(IciD ilie piaciice 
*t)7 iliftcreni from the theory. 

TVe Kune instrutncnt, s^ys another, obliges cncli province to 
Injrccrtain conltibulionit ; but Iliit article never coulil, aii<l profa* 
aMf Km wilt be executed, bcc.iuv; the knland provinces, wlw 
h»c Utile comineice. cannot pay an equal quota. 

In mallets of contribution, it is llic practice lo waive the anklM 
ofthecon.ititulion. The danger ol delay obliges the conncnting 
|*niKts to furnish their quotas without waiting (or the others, 
aid iben to obtain rcirnbunteinenl from the oiheis by depulatjuiu 
*li>cli arc (rc(|ueni, or otherwise, as Ihry can. The great wealth 
■•>' Influentx of the ptovinvc ol llullaiid enable her to eflecl both 
Ihae iiuipmei. 

tl ka« more than once happened that the ilcficicncirs had to be 
k'lan.Kely collected al the point of the bayonet ; a thing pracllca- 
Uc lliiM|{h dreadful, in a confederacy where one of the mcmbeni 
tmedf in force at) ihc rest, am) where several of them arc too 
mall to meditate resistance : but utterly impracticable in one 
conposed of ineinben xevcral of which arc wiiial lo each olher 
n itten(;ih and rctiources, and equal singly to a vigorous and 
ptrievtring ^Icfcnic. 

Kofeign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who w:is himself 
a foreign niiiiiiiter, elude tnattm taken ad reftreHdnm, by tam- 
(Kring with the pTovinees and cities. In 1736 tlie treaty of I^an- 
«*cr was delayed by these means a whtde ycir. Inst.inccs of a 
ilce nature arc rtumermis and notorious. 

In critical eirtetjjcocies the States-General are often compelled 10 
merlcjp their const it uiioiuil bounils. In ■'■SS they concluded a 
Irealy of iheniieJves at tl>c risk of iliirir heads. T)ie treaty of 
Wvslphalia. in 1&4S. by which their independence was formally 
and fvnally recogi>iie<t. waa coitclmled w*itliout the consent of Zea> 
bnd. Even ax recently as the Ian treaty irf peace with Great 
Uritab), the constitutional principle of unanimity was departeil 
liotn. A weakconMitution titunt neccsMrily terminate in dissolii- 
lion, for want of proper powers, or tlie usurpation of powers 
m|iihite toe llie public safety. Whether the iiturpalion. when 



■ 33 



DtSSBKSlOKS IK THE NETHERLANDS. IIMO 



oiicc begun, will stop ni llie Kilutary fioint. or %a forward lo itie 
■langnuus cilreine, iiitist (lc|itii<l mi tlir coiiirnj-ciicm o( ibe 
momcitl. Tyrannjf hnn pcrlinpt oflcnct grown nut of ihe *iSMm^ 
lions o( power, called fur, on pre&ung exigencies, by a tkleclive 
consiiluiion, than oui tA the full exercise of tlie Urgest coristitu- 
tlonal autharliie». 

NoiwithKniiKlin); the calnmilies produced by iKc StadthoUer- 
dilp. 11 liiu been Huppu&cd that urilhuul hi» influence in lite indt- 
vidual piovihccs, the cauKs i>l anarchy inanileit in ihe ciHiIcdcncy 
would lonj; a^u have dl^i9l<'Cll it. " Under such a Kovemtncnl." 
lays liic Abbi Mably. "ilie union could ncvet hnvc subniitcd, if 
the pruT>ncc4 hail not a ^pniig within thf-nisdveTt. capable of 
quickeniiii; ilicir lardinevt, and compelliiiK ibcm to ihe aanir way 
of ihinking. This spring i^ ll)c Suiilholdcr." It is rrmatkcd by 
Sir William Tcinpte. " that in the iiilenniurann ol the Siaillhoklet- 
ship. Holland, by her riches and her auihoniy. which drew the 
others jiiio n son of dependence, supplied the ptice." 

These are not the only ci renin Glances whicli liave controlled the 
tendency to anarchy and dbsoliitjoii. The surrounding powers 
impoM ail alisiiliile nneftsity o4 union lo a certain dcKiec, at the 
same time that th«y nouri.ih by their intrigues iJic consiitmiotiil 
t'icei which keep the republic in some degree alwajrs at (lieir 
mercy. 

The true patrioi& have long Iwwailcd the fatal tendency of these 
vices, and hare made iio less than four regular expcitments hy 
tXiriMriit'Hiiry aswMifi. convened for llic sfecial purpose, to 
apply a remedy. As iiiaiiy limes lias iheif lauilable (eal luund 
it iinlMMsiblc lo uiHt ikt fiuMt tuinncils in rcfiKining (he knoikti. 
ilic acknowledged, the f jtal evils of ihc exiling conMiiniion. Let 
us pause, my fdlaw-ciliieni. Un one inoinriil. over this iiteUn- 
choly and mofiiioty Ictisuii uf hinioiy ; and, with live tear that drops 
for the calnmilics braught on mankind by their ndrcrsc opinions 
and sclftvh pauMXis. lei our graiiiude iningte ah ejaculation to 
Heaven tor the proiiitious concord which lus dislingablied the 
consultations for our political happiness. 

A dnagn was also conceived ol establishing a general tax to be 
MlmEnistcfed by Ihe fcdctnl authority. This also liad its julvu- 
sarin and (aileit 

This unhappy prople srem 10 be now suflrting frmn popvUr 
OMTTiUions. (loni dissensions among iIk- Suies. and (mra Ihe 
actUitl invasion nf fuieixii ,\nns. ll»c cnsin u( thrlr ilrxliny. All 
nations havi- their eyes hicil on iliv nwfut spectacle. The first 
wish prompted by humanity ia that lliis severe trial may issue in 



MuMm] DerSCrS /.V CO^fFEDEttATIOS. i»i 

MKh A ttvolalion ol their gavemment as will eslablisJi ibcir union. 
ud ratdcT (I ihr pofcni ol irtnquiUilf, (rrcdom, and happincu; 
tht oeu, thai the asylum uodei wliici). we liust. the enjoynKnt 
at liicM blcsfings will «pmlily be Hccurrd in iliis ratinirjr. may 
Rtiiic anil conMt« llwni [oc ilie cai:i»tn>j>he <A their onn. 

I mike no apaloin' lor having dwelt »o long on the conlempla- 
lioti ol thwe (cdeial preceJtnu. Ex))«ieiicc is the oracle of 
Imlb; ami whcrr Iti rmiMintrt srr ui>ci)ui vocal, ihry ought to be 
cwkIumkc and sacml. The imporlani truth, which it iinccnii»i>« 
eaHy proaounces in Ibc present eate, i* that n sovereignty over 
tocenigns. ^i govcmmeni orer Koteniineiits, » legutaiioii I<w com- 
nunilia as contra<li«iingui<hc«l from individuals, as it U a solw- 
nw in theory, so in practice it ii sutitTntive o( the order aiw! ends 
*iijn\ polity, by subitituiing vMetut in place of law, or the 
ttntntniie (wrctoit ol the svMrti in place of the mild and s:itutaty 
tHrtitaot the mugistrticy. Publics. 



Na 21. OmJt^m^mlJnra^. OM««b*t •>, lAO HailliltOn. 

SPECIFIC DEFECTS IN THE CONFEDERATION. 

A'luatli^H tf lavti — tfo mttlital gvoranty tf itaU gntrmiunit — Daa- 
fffai fiUiMUly 9f Jrifrliim — Ai/t'Onljj;/! ef a Halintal gtaianly — 
Syikm «/ fiMfffai and ill tmf<ii'Hiii — lyiJSiutlr in finJiiif; a itfiii a/ 
J I tw Cww- Companion teltnttn lk< ilatei iw rts/inl U xva/li — Csntfttx 
tnriri rf wtaitk ami M-taHi ttilily — latfitalily t/ lajanim tun lo 
iativy Unimt— Tk4 nalisna! gitfrumeiil mail raiit ill SMm TtvritMi 
— Ttmjnuy t/ Ittitilifn h i/ulriiult ilirl/ — Tatti tn nrliilii tf ii^- 
tmt»flif» frtKritt tiiir fton limit — I>iiliiulign Mteffit iinlirttt aitJ 
Urtcl lasts— iHfiitittin iHKehttd mlk Jiml Itxet. 

n tkf Pe^fit 0/ tht Stale ef New York: 

Having in the three last numbers taken a summary 
re»icw ti( itie principal circumslancvs and events which 
have depicted the Rcnlus and fate of oihor confederate 
IDvcrnmcntti. I shall now proceed in the cnumera- 
tjoo of the oiosl important of those defects which have 
hitherto disappuinted our hopes from the syftletn estab- 
tiaheil amonj; ourselves. To form a safe and satisfac- 
torjr jtKlgmeni of the proper remedy, it is absolutely 



134 



wjyr OP SAtfcrioN to laws. 



!«•.« 



necessary tlint we sliottiti be well acquaiotcd with tbe 
extent and malignity of the disease. 

The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Con- 
federation is the total want of a sanction to its laws. 
The United States, as now composed, have no powers to 
exact ul>e<li«ncc, or punish disobedience to their re»o1a> 
tions, either by pecuniary mulcts, \>j a suspension or 
divestiture of priTilcscs, or by any other constitutional 
mode. There is no ex|}re$N delegntinn of jtulhurtty to 
them to use force against delinquent members; and if 
Ach a right should be ascribed to the federal head, as 
resulting from the nature of the social compact between 
the States, it must be by inference and construction, 
in the face of that part of the second article, by which 
it is decbred, " that each State shall retain every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, not txpretsly delegated to the 
United Slates In Congress assembled." There is, 
doubtless, a striking alraiirdily in snpposing that a 
right of this kind does not exist, but we are reduced 
to the dilemma cither of embracing that supposition, 
preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening nr 
explaining away a provision which has been of bte a 
repeated theme of the eulogies of those who oppose 
the new Constitution; and the want of which in that 
plan, has been the subject of much plausible animadver- 
sion and severe criticism. If we are uitwilling to 
impair the force of this <i|ip)aiided provision, we shall t>e 
obliged to conclude that the United States afford the 
extraordinary spectacle of a government destitute even 
of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the 
execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the 
specimens which have been cited, that the American 
Confederacy, in this particular, stands discriminated 
from every other institution of a similar bind, and ex- 
hibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political 
world. 

The want of a mutual guaranty bf the State govern- 
ments is annlhcr capital iniperfcction in the federal plan. 
There is nnthing of this kind declared in the articles lltat 



BisillM] 



CASS or tfASSACffUSETTS. 



"5 



cnniposc it: and to imply a tacit guaranty from coiisi<l> 
cniivns of utility would be a still aiore flagrant (lefKtrturc 
Iroiii the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply 
a tacit power uf cocrciun from the like cuniiideratiunti. 
The want of a giiarunty, tliough it might in its cons«> 
4l«enc« endanger the Union, docs not so immediately 
atbck its existence as the want of a cuiitrtiluttonal 
unction to its lawx, ' 

Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from 
the Union in repelling those domestic dangers which 
OUT MimetimeK threattn the existence of the St:ttc con* 
ttitations, musi be renounced. Usurpation may rear its 
crat in each State, and trample upon the liberties 
>)( the people, while the national tC'vernmetit could 
leplly do nothing more than behold its encroach- 
nunts with indignation and regret. A successful faction 
ny erect a tyranny on the ruina of order and law, while 
nn nccor could consiitultonalty be afforded by the 
UiMBto the friends and supporters of the government. 
Tkc tempestuous situjition from which .Miiss.~i(*hvi»etts 
lus scarcely emerged evinces that dangers of this kind 
tm arc not merely speculative. Who can deter- 

*•• mine what might have been the issue of her 

Utt convulsions, i( the malcontents had been headed by 
* Ocur or by a Cromwell ? Who can predict what effect 
a despotism, establiithed in Massachusetts, u<iuld have 
■pon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island, of 
Oiaaecticut or New Vork? 

The inordinate pride of State importance has sng- 
i£oted to some minds an objection to the principle of a 
faranty in the federal government, as involving an 
■Scions interference in the domestic concerns of tlie 
oeabcrs. A scrnpic of this kind would deprive us of 
"le of the principal advantages to be expected from 
'inion, and can only flow from a misapprehensiun of the 



TtwConpewof lb« Coa federal ion 1ia4 taken oiw iteptovud tudi % 
p>nnl« by inwnins iii the Oiiliiuince for llie (inTcriiineiil ot the 
^nA.We4 IVctttnrjr, > <)iiiim i^nHninlociai; ■ (V^iiitilinii govcmmoDl 



136 



IKADEQUACy OF QUOTAS. 



ai«.ii 



nature of the provision itself. It could be no impeili- 
mcnt to reforms of the Sutc constituiioits by a nujurit/ 
of the peojile in a legal iind peaceable mode. This right 
would remain undiminished. The j>uarunty could only 
operate against changes to be effected by violence 
Toward the prevention of cidamtlics of this kind, too 
many cliecks cannot be provided. The peace of society 
and the stability of tjovcrnnicnt depend absolutely on 
the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this head. 
Where the whole power of the government is in Die 
hands of tfic people, there is the less pretense fur tlie um: 
of violent remedies m partial or occasional distempers of 
the State. The itaiural curt! for an ill-ailmtnistralion, 
in a popular or representative consiiiuiion, is a change 
of men. A guaranty by the national authority would be 
as much leveled against the usurpations of rulers as 
against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition 
in the community. 

The principle of regulating the contributions of the 
Stales to the common treiisury by qvoia^ is another 
fundamental error in the Confederation. Its repug- 
nancy to an adequate supply of the national exigencies 
ha» been alrcikdy j)ointed out, and has sufficiently 
appeared from the trial wb'ch has been made of it.' 1 
speak of it now solely with a view to equality among ibe 

* Th« hiuory of ihe t«uil(t of the (|iKila tyitem wak il«Ictied by 
llaicillan. in hu tpntb on Uw K«N>rl, u foUowi : 

" I'be uBiicTUl ilc1m<|eency oi (h« Stitct iliiiiiiti: ihe <**i >k>l) be 
paaed om u-lth the ImR mciitiun u( It. 'I'lie imiIiIk cm<>uiaXBiral> 
wtr« ■ ptMuUc aiHil^T (or iliil drli mi •«■<■} ; ani it na* hajml the pcK* 
wDvId nar« priKluted gieaicr fiunilnaliif. Tht ctptrionil bu ilitajt. 
pointed lhil1iop« lo a dctiec which cohIoumU the koal ta^pilne. A 
coraparaltie ficw of the umipliuMa oi llic icversi Suua for ih* hw 
Uxi rtan will liimUli a tiiihinf; teuitl. 

" t>iiring thai iwtHxI. m\ nfy^titt h; a nuicment on oiii fit«. New 
Hampihiie. Nofin Carolina. S'nilk Camliiia. and Ccoi];ia ha*e p*aJ 
MMhiliS. I Hy DdChinf. heuUK. Ihc only OLtnial )ia]riDciii b ihc litlltli( 
uam 111 about ttven ihouunil .(..llnii liy Ntu lliiiu|n.liice. Siiiilli Cam- 
tllu Imlecd liah ctnliU, lial tlicke aic innr > •<• ..■-••■ • .liMi-nul on (ba 
MPfiBo* lumnlml li^hm iluTiDK >W nu, ' I hrl |i«cullu 

nulciiap and «mli«ii whiW (he iaiiwUi.i ' 

" Contmticul and DehiraTc hare |iai<l atnj.ii <.i>E-il>ii>i '. i iit 

tioM; Hauadiiuctu, RbuUa laUiid, aiul Miiylaul. a) .U, 



'BMDlMt 



lAMDS A.VD FOPULATIO.V. 



"J 



lales. Those who have been accustomed lo contem- 
iaxe the circumttanircs which produce niid constitute 
lutional wealth, must be satialicd thai there is no com- 
utoQ !(tandar<l or barometer by which the degrees of it can 
be awertained. Neither the value of Inndc nor the 
numbers of the people, which have been successively 
firopoied as the rule of State contributions, has any pre- 
(enaon to being a just representative. If we compare 

I the vealth of the United NelhcHaods with that of Russia 
•r Germany, or even of Krance, and if we at the s:ime 
line compare the total value of the lands and the a(i:t{re- 
{ite population of that contracted district with the 
lAial value of the lands and the aggregate popniation of 
ttw immense rei;ion<i of either of ths three la^t-men- 
ticacd cnuiitrics, we shall at once discover that there is 
no comparison between the proportion of either of these 
t>i> objects and that of the relative wealth of Uiose 

'■'");■■><■ >bout ihrec-liftliv : [^nntylviiila nearly Ihe whole ; Rnd Ncir 
Wk motv iluii Iwi <|iiata, 

"'tlieaB |>ri'i><itti<in« uc ukra on ihe iprcir requisrlioni : ih* indent* 
bra Inm *ety paitially ptiil, and in llicii iiFcttnt ttalc ue o( little 
WEuaM. 

" The (inymcnlt (nia the Pcdent Ireuury have ilectined rapidly cKh 

yttt. The wbiile iBioiint fiv llicrc vnn Msl. in ^|";l;ie, lii» nol tifcedeil 

ll.4aD.0uj. 14 wlikh Nfw Vmk lim r-iid one liuiiilied )>rt ttnt. mure 

pfo[>f<rlion. Thi» inm, lilllc more lh«n $400,000 a vear. it 

be cun(eiT«il. hat been eihauilcii in Ihe luppoil oi ihe civil 

■It ui ihe lliiuiii iiid Ihe nei-eVNliy |;ii.-inli atid |>«ri«tii( 

mciulk. and on IliP (mnlieti ; trilhonl ni>y iiirplii* lot |>a]r< 

|ian •>( III* iletil. foreign ot domtMk. principal or iniereM. 

Ii^i ar« tDniiniiflllgr growine vorte : the UtI year in pariicular 

pnhced leu lliui floo.ooo, and thai from only lua ur three .Sut«. 

Sneial M (be States kivc been vi I'int; unacrnMomrd lii |>«y. ll'al lliey 

«™ iin tuii|;ci tiniiTiiicI (Ten alioul ihp ap^virancn "f <yini|>lian'.'e, 

"< iiTTr-rrlkul anil N'ew Jency have nlnioil (ormally declined I'^ying 

Tli« iBtcn^iblc niAiive ii. the non-conciitfcncc of ihii Slaie 

t lyiicni. Ike re-jl nne niual lie conjectured from Ihe fwt. 

i.jt'.iLL, il I uiiiii-r^fjiit^l th« HEV|>r u\ tuunic late reAolaliona. 

111! lUr inieirit ihi? pap apon her annmptiiiii III her own 

I. 1^1 !i cnt« iherc wilJ li« little coining from het to the tJfiitcil 

rti-. uitu% lo be biiiiging mitlers lu a criMk 

P' I iijiiji)' kuppoat of the ftiteii] ijoi'eriiRienI hai of lale de- 

] eallrety uiani I'ciiniylvaKia and New Viitk. If fcnniyU 

. lo cimliona li«( air), shat will be Ibe lilualiun of New 

An- we willinc lo be ifae Atlu of the Unton ? m ue wo willing 




L-- .1 - 



\"<%. I 



to tm a {wiUb ? ■'— Bwroit. 




I3S 



CAUSES OF XATIOA'Al WEALTH. 



rva.« 



nations. ]f the like parallel were to be nia between 
several of the American States, it would (arnisfa a like 
result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina, 
Pennsylvani.i willi Connecticut, or Maryland with New 
Jersey, and wc shall be convinced that the respective 
abilities of those States, in relation to revenue, bear 
little or no analogy to their comparative stock in Inndt 
or to their comparative population. The position may 
be equally illustrated by a similar process between 
ttie cijtintiex of the sume State. No man who is 
acquainted with the State of New York will doubt 
that the active wealth of Kings County bears a much 
greater proportion to that of Montgomery, than it 
would appear to be if we should take cither the total 
value of the lands or the total number of the people as 
a criterion! 

The wealth nf nations depends upon an inRnitc variety 
of causes. Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the 
productions, the nature of the government, the genius 
of the citixens, the degree of information they possess, 
the state of commerce, of arts, of industry — these cir- 
cumstances and many more, too complex, minute, or 
adventitious to admit of a particular specification, occa* 
sion differences hardly conceivable In the relative 
opulence and riches of different countries. The conse- 
quence clearly 'm ()>at there can be no common measure 
of national wealth, and, of course, no general or station- 
ary rule by which the abitity of a Slate tu pay uxes 
can be determined. The attetnpt, therefore, tci rc£ulate 
the contributions of the members of a confederacy by 
any such rulr c:mnot fail to be productive of glaring 
inequality and extreme oppression. 

This inequality would of itself be stiGlicient in America 
to work the eventual destruction of the Union, if an; 
mode of enforcing a compliance with its requisitions 
could be devised.' The suffering States would not long 

I An •mn|ila nl Ikl* Inrlh vn lliv altcoiitml nalljficaliua \rf KoBtti 
Caiolina III llif i>roltrtire Uriffl "I iS.iJ. which (rom Iwn [point ol Weir 
pl(Md uiJali bunWni «■> Ike Sonili fot (lie bcDB&l ol Ihe North. Mon 




^pUtMl ADJUSTMENT OF mBQUAUTIBS. "9 

^Busctit to remain sssociatcd upon » principle which dis- 

^Rbutes the public burdens with so unequal a hand, and 

^which was calculated lo impoverish and oppress the 

citizens of some States, white those of others would 

Karccty be conscious of the small proportion of the 

■right Uiey were required to sustain. This, however, is 

M eril inseparable from the principle of quotas and 

raiuisitions. 

There is no method of steering clear of this inconven- 

but by authorizing the national government to 

Q revenues in its own way. Imposts, excises, 

leral, all duties upon articles of consumption, 

nuy be compared to a fluid which will, in time, find its 

rcl with the means of paying them. The amount to 

contributed by each citiicn will in a degree be at his 

m option, and can be regulated hy an attention to his 

lunrces. The rich may be extravagant, the poor can 

Ik frugal; and private oppression may always he avoided 

a judicious selection of objects proper for such impo- 

ioia. If inequalities should arise in some States from 

[nttcson particular objects, these will, in all pmbability, 

coonterbalanccd by proportional inequalities in other 

tet from the duties on other objects. In the course 

lime and things, an equilibrium, as far as it is attain- 

^le in so complicated a subject, will be established 

cvtrywhere. Of if inequalities should still exist, they 

^^cvld neither be so great in their degree, so uniform in 

^^beir operation, nor so odious in their appearance, as 

^BUk which would necessarily spring from quotas, upon 

^poy scale that can possibly be devised. 

"■■"iV- the EatI wit >liniM< n unaniRtoui; in opponn^ what tt deemeil 
■tBletwir uf the Wtvl anil Souih lo shill an undue ihme of Una- 
*>M apon Uw fonaer Mclio*. in the intomc tai. and though rctUiancc 
'■fctto wa* only iwcnly tlmwii in the cuuili, (hire can lin iiu iloiil>l 
1^ a lapft porttoii of ihuie h h<> wctr 1 ialil* lo pay ihflm were (jiiil* ■» 
■'I'imIiibI ii> nnllKf l)i< law by evaiiuni ea aclunl fnliilicallon, as (be 
^^■kCaniliniini wrtc in \iyi. Ihe Hile iiifl«crite beina in lUe <hanite 
"Mlhodi BUlde nemuiy by tlie inieneninj; ycaii. Both tnclilenU go 
Uiknvbdlwabtolultty fulllc il i> <ui iinr kvik.ii l>> icck ti> i<ii|>cHciliiF 
^^gMiMtinc '"■"lo* '>■> anoihvT. (ur it diihI riiU nilxt in rnniun of tii* 



I JO 



TAXES Off COXSUAtPnOff. 



!»•. 



It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles uf eon- 
sumption that ihcy conuin in their own nature a sccurity 
agaiost excess. They prescribe their own limit, vliich 
cannot be exceeded without deTeating the end proposed, 
that ia, an cxtcn&ion of the revenue. When applied to 
this object, the saying is as just as it is wilty, that "in 
political nrithnietic, two and two do not always make 
bm four." If duties arc too high, they lessen the 

iro. 3ft. consumption; the collection is eluded; and 

the product to the treasury is not so great as wlicn they 
arc cualined within proper and moderate bounds. This 
forms a complete barrier against any material oppression 
of the citizens by taxes of this class, iind is itself a 
natural limitation of the power of impo.sing them.' 

Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomi- 
nation of indirect taxes, and must for a long time con- 
stitute the chief part of the revenue raised in this 
country. Those of the direct kind, which principally 
relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of 
apportionment. Either the value of land or the number 
of the people may serve as a standan). The state of 
agriculture and the populuusness of a country have been 
considered as nearly connected with each other. And, 
as a rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in the view 
of simplicity and certainly, are entitles) to a preference. 
In every country it i< a herculean task to obtain a valua- 
tion of the land; In a country imperfectly settled and 
progressive in improvement, the difficulties are increased 
almost to impracticability. The expense uf an accurate 
valuation is, in alt situations, a formidable objection. In 
a branch of taxation where no limits to the discretion 
of the government are to be found in the nature of things, 
the establishment of a lixcd rule, not incompatible with 
the end. may be attended with fewer inconveniences than 
to leave that discretion altogether at large. 

PtlBLIIJS. 



' Itanriltain Ktitelj cosccivctl lhi> IXMai;* fA h uriR MU tnniait pur. 
poscty "(iB ittt trdnClliHi ol irvmur liy nun^ of lurfl cieaAi** ram 
nf dulvM B> III rnliKV llir itn^wnaliiHti la a Biinimuia, — CurrtML. 



KKCVLATIOfl OF CO.VAl£flC£. 



IJl 



No. 22. 



(JKr* r*n Paiktt, DfetBOrtt M. ti»ti 



Uamiltoa 



DEFECT OF THE ARTiri.ES OF CONFEDERA- 
TION AS TO COMMKRCE, ARMY, STATE 
RQUAI.ITY, JUDICIARY, AND CONGRESS. 

VJH/ •//esurr O rtfMhlt nmmiTtt—Cfmmtrtial trttliti imfniiHt — 
Stftttti frekiUH^ai o/ttrtatH tiatff — Irrilaliim itlmrn Iki Haiti af Iht 
Uiiii Statn — C'Btmettt tf Gtrmauy — (Jnf^Mi b/ laiJitrs — Citmftlitifn 
W Tiimiti in ttftmt anJ imntifi — t-fiial luffwaic of tkl itjUi a grial 
mi~And ffHtradiilf a /uHJummlnI ma-cin tf TifHbtiien gn^tummt 
—MiKfiity g^vtrn'ttM — SimttiMg trili fit Cmgrtii — A eiftt em gfpJ 
liguttiSm «i wf/l at «• kiJ^RtitiU at la /e'tign Halitit—KffiMiti 
latfia li ftrttin ttfrmflitn — Oai Jidvamtafr */ mtnariky — Bxamfb 
ff Omt<4 Prifttniti — Crgxenini' itftti »/ lit t»H/rtttTiiti»i» a tMMl 
•/ jmdiiiary fts^r-^Xftfiiily fer a iitfrnnf IrttHHt — Thirlm uf^~ 
™<r tttirli an t-iftiiifilHy — Still af a litlglt atunHy er cftigrttt — 
Tit mfiitratian ralifitJ hy iht ilatet, ittt ty ike ftafit. 

n thf Peofle cj the State of New York: 

In addition to the defects already eaumerated in the 
uiiting federal sjrsteiii, there arc others of not less 
importance, which concur in rcndcrring It ;iltogettier 
anfit for the adminiKtrution of the alfairs of the Union. 

The want of a power to rej[ubte commerce Ik bf all 
(urties allowed to be of the number. The utility of such 
a |»wer has been anticipated under the first head of our 
■m(tiirics; and for this reason, as well ta from the uni- 
Tfrsiil conviction entertained upon Ihc subject, little 
Bt^ be added In this jtlacc. It is indeed evident on the 
ouiit superficial view (hat there is no object, either as it 
rcs{ii-ctK the interests of trade or finance, that more 
uronjcly tiemands a federal superintendence. The want 
•A It has already operated aw a bar to the formation of 
beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given 
"ccasionib of dissaiisf^tction between the Stat<-B. No 
Biitton acquainted with the nature of our political asso- 
LUti'm would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations 
•itbibe United States, by which they conceded privileges 



I3» 



CONS/STEf/CV NEEDBD. 



(I«.«l 



of any importance to them, while they were apprised that 
ihe eng^agements on the part of tlie Union might at any 
moment be violated by its members, and white they 
found from cxpcriciw^c that they might cnjuy cverj- 
advant:tge they desired in our markets, without erantinj; 
us any return but such as their momentary convenience 
might suggest.' It is not, therefore, to be wondered 
at that Mr. Jcnkinson, in uHhcrinK into the House of 
Commons a bill for regulating the temporary intercourse 
between the two countries, should preface its inlrnduc* 
tion by a declaration that similar provisions in former 
bills had been found to answer every purpose lu the 
commerce of (ire;it [Iritain, and that it would he prudent 
to persist in the plan until it should appear whether the 
American government was likely or not to acquire 
greater consistency." 



'Thn*. H newly m I out recoOect. wm tlie miuc tA hi* *p«cch on 
lotradaunc ilie lui liill. — I't:*i.ti:t, 

■ la 177$ htrliaiiieiii loicil in tniirc cetulion o( irsde u-ith lb« n- 
ToUvd colonin, biiiI ihmc laws irera ia (om when the Inst; ol ptwe 
WH lijpied ID 1783. In thM TMr Pill inlroilaced ■ bill to " adiMit ifae 
Amencftni into the beneibol EaclitK <««iMcn« on UmH «( eqwilit; 
with tlM EngNah lulijett." A* llie iiiilul tle|i«rti>re (rniii the " bimcui- 
lil« ti]r»t(in " of Gnal Britain, it tncniiHitmJ lite ino%i olniiBUr t*m»- 
•nce, and prodeced (ram Lonl Sli«fii«l<l hit abl* " OI-OTiratHim on iW 
Connmcrce tl ih« American St>le»," Thi«. (0|2«(h«> willi th« <l{iiinit«d 
iclion o( the vaiion* mtci, pnvred in the Itciliili |;cneriiinent that thef 
could CAJoy ihg <oin<ncrt;c of III* Uaiicd M;tir> witltnoi niikini: n\j cob- 
ceniani wtntwrer. vnA (ur mire than Incite yean llie trial* aat 
" proviiicinallT ** r«t^1at«l by nrdrrs in coiiacil. In a report iit a Com- 
mlilee of Ike l-ordi n( the I'riv^ Council on (he Trwlc ut Gmi Britain 
wfth ihc United Stalei, tTi)l < Wubin);i>iB. iSSS). thn rcry iiuBliou o[ 
the prMlkalily o( pjoltil'ili'int ami mtraJnta from ibe lliinih i>Uai)- 
point vtrn ttAnit^rrl. aii<t decitV^vl al;a■l^^t, n trrtaiii to ic^tilt Iti a loat <A 
trade t» Ihe mliicliii^ tyinnlTy e<|Bal it> ihc injury ilonr l<i the muBliT 
diicriminiUe-l acnimt. In Amerin alter the otj^nniialin*! ol the natkuu) 
wivemnieoi. lUmilton wi|>p(Mieil an efjnally cnltchiened policy, hut \ti- 
lenon, la hii report no I'LinitncrcE (I?-))), ndioealed a conlrkty itHem. 
whiclj MailivM alteni|ile>l tti oirry out in (Cnn^rr^n hj hii rv«»litl»oaa 
kA Janiuiy ■>.. ITq^. Fmni that day ihrie lia> (reipentfy niWeil ■ 
ttrongly iiiii-Biitiili party in Cantjien wliiih hai lou^ht to fon-e ip«<al 
prliilegei from our grcaleu mttnim-) by lecblaiion unlrietidly lu her 

Cflinmetce antt .l.ij--- • Mir rniivl rrxnl iL>nr — ' c- I'l- ■•■— .imn 

hare lieen lo liij. : .nn] ij.i« on 1: trtx 

Britain ipl'ipti at" Koney, ami jd. i, < 1 - . n. i^.hhU 

iMt bapotlcd in Aaiencan tklp<.'-Ei>mit. 



BunUlM) CONFLICT OF STATE REGULATIONS. 



IM 



m^ 



III I 

i 



Several States have endeavored, by separate protiibu 
tions, restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the con- 
■h iJuct of that kingdom in tltis particular, but 

■fcU. the want o( concert, arising from the want of 

a general authority anO from clashing and dissimilar 
lixm in tlic State, has hitherto frustrated every cxperi- 
acot of the kind, and nill continue to do so as long as 
same obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue 
etist. 

The inlcrfcrinK and unncighborly regulations of some 
Stitcs, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, Iiave. in 
In ilillcrcnt instances, given just cause of uni* 

■»'l- brage and complaint to others, and it is to be 

frared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by 
i ratiotial control, would be multiplied and extended till 
ll«y became not less serious sources of animosity and 
•Ittcord than injurious impedimrnts to the intercourse 
betireen the different parts of the Confederacy. "The 
commerce of the (icfnian empire* is in continual tram- 
nds from the multiplicity of the duties which the several 
prinrcK and states exact upon the mercliandises passing 
Ihroasb their territories, by means of which the fine 
Dreams and navigable rivers with which licrmanyissu 
happily watered arc rendered almost useless." Though 
the genius of the people of this country might never per- 
mit this description to be strictly applicable to us, yet 
we may reasonably etpcct, from the gradual conllicis of 
State regulations, that the citizens of each would at 
length come to be considered and treated by the others 
in no better light than that of foreigners and aliens. 
The power of raising armies, by the m"st obvious con- 
uctinn of the articles of the Confederation, is merely 
luwer of making requisitions upon the States for quotas 
men. This practice, in the course of the late war, wns 
found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an 
economical system of defense. It gave birth* to 3 com- 
petition between the States which created a kind of 



* Eacydo^U, anldo " Eininic'—PuBUVt. 



134 



STATE LEVIES OF TROOPS. 



Ula.n 



auction for men. In order to furni&h the quuia» re<|iiirciJ 
of them, they outbid cacit other till bounties srow lo an 
enormous and insui>i>ortable sine.' The hope of a still 
ftirther increase alfunl«:d an inducement to those who 
were disposed to serve to procrastinate their enlistment, 
and disinclined them from engaging for any considerable 
periods. Hence slow and scanty levies of men in the 
mostcriticid emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments 
at an unparalleled expense; continual Ructuaiions in the 
troops, riiinuuK to their discipline »nd fnbjceting the 
public safety frequently to the perilous crisis of .1 dis- 
banded army. Hence, also, those oppressive expedients 
for niistng men which were upon several occasions prac- 
ticed, and which nolhing but the enthusiasm of liberty 
would have induced the people to endure. 

This method uf raising troops is not more unfriendly 
to economy and rigor than it is to an e(|ual distribution 
of the burden. The States near the seat of war, inHucnced 
by motives of self-preservation, made efforts lo furnish 
their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities; while 
those at a distance from danger were, fur the most pan, 
as remiss as the others were diligent in their exertions. 
The immediate pressure uf this inequality was nut in thin 
case, as in that of the contributions of money, alleviated 
by the hope of a final liquidation. The States which did 
not pay their proportions of money might at least be 
charged with their deficiencies; but no account could be 
formed uf the deficiencies in the supplies of men. We 
shall not, however, see much reason to regret the want 
of this hope, when we consider how little prospect liiere 
is that the most delinquent States will ever be able to 
make eompenK;it!on for their pecuniary failures. The 
system of quotas and requisitions, whether it be applied 
to men or money, is, in every view, a system of imtKcility 
In the Union, and of incqoaUty and injustice among the 
members. 

The right of equal suffrage among the Stales Is annther 



>Tbe wnc nnl *w miiKeUod In Uw Cliil War— Eomw. 



■i^lUri 



MAJORITY OF STATES. 



»3S 



Hoc 

i 



ciccptionable part of the Confederation. Every i^Iea of 
pro|x»niua and every rule uf fair representation con- 
In spire to condemn a principle which gives to 
■••'*■ Khodc Istiind 4n cquiil weight in the scale of 
po»cr with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; 
oKltu Uclairarc an equal voice in the national delibcra- 
tioesvilh Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Camlifla. 
is operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of 
pnklican jcovernmeuc, which requires that the sense of 
majority should prevail. Sophistry may reply that 
KiTcrei];Ms arc equal, and that a majority of the votes of 
die States will be a majority of confederated America. 
Hut this kind of logical legerdemain wilt never counter- 
KX the plain »U[rs;e^tioiis itf justice and common-gense. 
Ii may happen that this majority of Slates is a small 
waority of the people of America;* and two-thirds of 
die people of America could not long be persuaded, upon 
tbe credit of artilicial distinctions and syllogistic subtle* 
tics, to submit their interests to the m.inagemcnt and 
disposal of one-third. The larger .Slates would after a 
while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the 
Mnaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due 
uaportance in the political scale would he not merely to 
be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice 
the desire of equality. It is neither rational to expect 
tile first, oor just to require the last. The smaller 
States, considering how peculiarly their safety and wel- 
fare depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pre- 
tension which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to 
its duration. 

It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine 
States, or two-thirds of the whole number, must consent 
to the most important resolutions; and it may be thence 
inferred tiiat nine States would always comprehend a 
majority of the Union, liut this does not obviate the 
impropriety of an equal rote between States of the most 



'N«« llunfnblie, Rhode l*laad, N«w Jcncj, Delaware, Gtori^, 
ulh CtrallM, anil Uirylanil ur ■ niajivily n( ihr irli-Jc nnniber tA 
tin MUn, but llirj ilu not contiio onc-lUinl ot the peo|>lc, — PitnLitis. 




'i6 



JfECATtV£ OF MINORITY. 



nrp. Bi 






unequal dimcnitions and populousness; nor is the Infer- 
ence accurate in point of fact; fur we can enumerate 
nine States which conuin less than a majorily of the 
people;* and il is constitutionally possible that lliese 
oinc may give the vote. Ucsides, there ,-irc matters of 
considerable moment determinable by a lure majnrity; 
and there arc others, concerning which doubts have 
been entertained, which, if interpreted in favor of the 
saHieiency of a vote of seven States, would extend its 
operation to interests of the first magnitude. In addi- 
tion to this, it is to t>c observed that there is a proba- 
bility of an increase in the nun)t)cr of Stales, and no 
provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio 
votes. 

But this is not all: what at first sight may seem' 
remedy is, in reality, a poison. To give a minority a 
negative upon the majority (which is always the ease 
where more than a majority im retjuisite to ■* decision) is, 
in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater num- 
ber to that of the lesser. Congress, from the non-at- 
tcmlance of a few States have been frerjuently in the 
situation of a Polish diet, where a single vote lias been 
suiiicient to put a stop to ail their morcmenls. A sixtieth 
]>art of the Union, which is about the proportion nf 
Delaware and Rhode Island, has several times been able 
to oppose an entire bar to its operations, 'i'liis is one of 
those relinements which, in practice, has an effect the 
reverse of what is expected from it in theory. The 
necessity of unanimity in public bodies, err t'f some* 
thing approaching toward it, has been founded upon a 
supposition that it would contribute to security. But its 
real operation is to embarrass the administration, tu- 
destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute 
the pleasure, caprice, or arlilices of an insignifiranl, tur- 
bulent, or corrupt junto, to the regular d el ilicra lions and 
decisions of a respecuble majority. In those ementeo- 



" A'M New \faV ami Countciicni hi iW (««p>it>i; Mrm, MiJ ihqr 
will be IfB than > m%fit\%f. — FDHJUS. 



OBSTRUCTiVE LEGISLA TJO.V. 



137 



duora nation, in which the goodness or badness, the 
vnkne&s or strenf^th of its government, is of ilie greatest 
iaiponancc, there is commonly a necessity for action. 
Tike public business must, in some way or other, go for- 
*ud. If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion 
Ola majority, respecting ihc best mode of conducting it, 
tbe majority, in order (hnt somclhing may be dune, most 
coDform to the views of the minority; and thus the 
KoM of the smaller number will overrule that of the 
tmicr, and give a tone to the national proceedings. 
HtKe tedious delays; continual negotiation and 
ioiriguc; contemptible compromises of the public good. 
Aad yet, in such a xyMeni, tt is even happy when such 
Aimpromiftes can take place; for upon some acf4MonN 
things will not admit of accommodation; and then the 
■easures nf government nuist be injuriotixly sus]>ende<l, 
or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability 
of (^Haining the concurrence of the necessary number of 
*otes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must 
always savor of weakness, sometimes border uixni 
anarchy. 

It is not difficult to discover that a principle of this 
kind gives greater sco]>e to foreign corruption, a.% vrclt 
as to domestic faction, than that which permits the 
sense of the majority to decide; though the contrary of 
this has been presumed. The mistake has proceeded 
from not attending with due care to the mischiefs th<it 
may be occasioned by obstructing the progress of govern- 
ment at certain critical seasons. When the concurrence 
ni a large number is required by the Constitution to the 
ilutng of any national act. we are apt to rest satisfied 
that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely 
l^ttJane: but we forget how much good may be pre- 
vented, and how much ill may Iw produced, liy the power 
of hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of 
keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which 
thejr may happen tn stand at |>:iriteutar periods. 

Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in con- 
junctiun with one foreign nation, against another. Sup 



"3« 



FOK£lG.V COR&UPTiOlt. 



»«.! 



posv the neceKsity of our situation dcmanclcd pcacc,an<J tbc 
interest or aiubitiun of our ally tcO him to »cck tfic prwiccu- 
tiOD of t)ie war, with views that might justify us in nulc* 
ing separate terms. In such a state of things, this ally 
of ours would evidentty find it mucli easier, by his brilics 
■wKo. Bi^ intrigues, to tie up the hands of govera- 

Bfc mcnt from makingi; peace, where two-thirds of 

all the votes were requisite to that object, than where a 
simple majurity would suRice. In the fir^t case, he 
would have to corrupt a smaller number; in the last, a 
greater number.' Upon the s^mc principle, it wonid be 
much easier for a foreign power with which we were at 
war to perplex our councils and embarrass our exertions. 
And, in a commercial view, we may be subjected to 
similar inconveniences. A nation with which we might 
have a treaty of commerce could with mucb greater 
facility prevent our forming a connection with her com- 
{Kiiior in trade, ihougii such a connection should be ever 
so beneficial lo ourselves. 

Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as 
imaginary. One of the weak sides of republics, among 
their numerous advuntuKcs, !& thai they afford too eaity 
an inlet to foreign corruption. An hereditary monarch, 
though often disposed to sacrilicc his subjects to bis 

' 'I'hii tttrad of ihe inllnoim n( fiircign ):(>i>nn<nfih(> w*t \iy an meant 
■ntrasonable, nunng ihc Kerolulkmaiy Wat tl>« Ktpnrh miiintn (le- 
queotly intctfcrnl 1» ioHnciK-E l^ng'ciaioiiiil utioa. ind nicd ictm utrv- 
iut IbiiiIi la c<:>ciu|il tMilh ciHictciAmea auil ll»c prcu. tccuiini; fit faM 
OtHMiliy. anioni; irflm riiipodaql Ailtnul^^^rt, uti iiblriii^tt»fl Xt\ vm y^K^ 
envoyt wA !■> ■gm !■> a Irmly with firval ibilitn u-likh <tIJ nol satui* 
t''ratK», Ml in^iULitDii aliich foftunatrl^ uni ditrt-^anlvJ. In 1793. if 
ih« ptitdic (IU|Kiii:h« c4 (*cn^ arr to be bcUt^vr-^ Jrflcrwiii, i<i Iti^ 
rnlhiKium fnc Ktam.*. wai M>p|>)yiii); liim wilh lh« nnu cimlideiiltal 
wi'rcu fA ihc nl'inri. anil, a y«t laict, ih* t'icnch nuiiMier wrote hK 
plvv>iiiii«al llial l<aM'V>l[<li. Ihv S«-'rFTaiy of SUlc. Inraitbdl him with 
" prcdom " informalton awl riitmllr oiknl ("( nio>n«y. Daring ihii 
fierioi) Cnai Britain, Franc«, and Sfwin eaik had tti pirtkwlu wrttcn 
and {uamali in ibli cauntry, in ' ' ' ' ' ii;xi in ihc Wm, thr 

Fc*ur:h niinittci'k threat \a ai . 1 in ilii |mii|>fs. inJ 

tiis inlnlfcieiKC in lliv Ptril'li . , ;T, ■'■■' .:."^i--)iai 

lalM, th« Brilith tntitKiMo in Sfw -.)! tmi " iinr 

ll|[IUt]r nalioaal KBliurnl wai lirlii ' 1 mltal part ' -yW. 

A loielgn tiarrlei of thai time nMn iii liiu vojntij llial " llri'i* wcncJ 
10 1m nnauf l^i;luli, iiuuy FiEmii, hut lew Ainciicuii.'' Aflcr tin anil 




SBTSAYAL OF TKUSr, 



'39 



afflbition, has so ^enl a |>crftonaI interest in tlie govern- 
amtand in the external glory of the aacton, that U is not 
tatf (or a foreign power to give him an equivalent for 
whit he would sacrifice by treachery to the i.tate. The 
»<nM has accordingly been witness to few examples of 
tlai ipcctes of rnyal prostitution, though there have b«cn 
aboAdant specimens of every other kind. 

In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the 
coBmunity by the suffrages of their fclluw-cittiens, to 
Uatkias of great pre-eminence and power, may find com- 
poaations for betraying their trust, which, to any btit 
miadt animated and gnided by superior %'irtue. may 
ip^r to exceed the proportion of interest they have In 
the common stock, and to overbalance the obligations of 
doty. Hence it itt that history furnishes tis with so many 
•ortifying examples of the prcvalency of foreign corrup- 
lK>n in republican governments. How much this contrib- 
nteil to the ruin of the ancient commonwealths has been 
ilrtady delineated, (t is well known that the deputies of 
Ihe United Provinces have, in various instances, been 
|>ircliascd by the emissaries of the neighboring kingdoms. 
Th( Earl of Chesterfield (if my memory serves me right), 
ma letter to his court, intimates that his success in an 
important negotiation must depend on his o]>laining a 



« <be Wir of iBit, which nurkcil Ihc tcrniiiiiilinn of mir vital inlrmi 
*Ewititin po)i(in. Ihe pditital ()U«klioni bcciniF chieHy inlcrniil. Uid 
■lib ibtin tm* introdiKiion oJ (ord^^n influence diu[j|'eaKJ. vf ly ohkIiIj' 
)*jh «ri b]P • rcMtion to Ihe other eilreinc ol inleiikc ittiA iil lottig^n 
■MWb Tntetiir ilii*, ainud onlir >l jwrlicular Daliuiii. mil <lu« lo 
'^^tuj inciilvnis, bad alrevlj hrvn shown b^ Ihc vintrlmenl of ib« 
Alinltv ol I7<lS, ind by an anli-ilicn clautc ol the imenilmFiiU !□ th* 
^ANituioa pro|K»«] bj the 1 IuiIofiI conwiiion. Bm ike Eie.il ciprct- 
''M d 11 (ound veil! in the " Ainoricsii " i>r, muic cmiiiiunlj tpMk!ii|;, 
*'"Kbow NolMiiig" |arly. wliiih htgan almul iSjs. ami with varyit>i; 
•'■w nanifcileiJ ittinf ■mil th« outbrrak of the Civit Wir. A tecumnoB 
"Jlfc (wling «ipr«Me> tlielf lo-ilaj in ihe A. P. A. It n to b« noted, 
oWtm. that theie Uter mflvcnienu ^ive<l mote or leu ni cloalu to the 
'AuHiMtmpoulbleKlientfluintnHluCf rr1ii;>oii> inlnleniiice into Ameri- 
^PQUc*. The OMitl recent ialrwIiKtion ol Ihc qut^li'iii <ii luvrien in- 
'mm ma due to m <ery hirmlcu p4i>ate letter, «riilen by Ihe iFrititli 
"WtferjBtbe cainpal|[no(i$SH. whidi pitxlaccd an ouiburil of indiij. 
■■■■M nftcienl to induce l^ Prr>i<l«iit. (or nartibtn lather ihui 
dlpleinuic f«aMn*. to rc^ufM Hw ici^l (rf Il»l iniaittct.— EnrroK. 





140 



O.VE S(;P/tEME TRIBUNAL. 



\%^tk 



majar'i coniini»jiion for one of those deputies. And In 
Sweden the parties were alternately bought by France 
and England in so biircfacixl and notorious a manner that 
it excited univer&at disijust in the nation, and wni a 
principal cause that the most limited monarch in Europe, 
in a single day. without tumult, Tiolencc, or opposition, 
became one of the mo<ii ab-intute and uncontrolled. 

A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Con- 
federation remains yet to be mentioned — the want of 9 
(4,110, judiciary power. Law.t are a dead letter with- 
■"■ out courts to expound and define their true 

meaning and operation. The treaties of the United 
States, to have any force at all, must be considered as 
part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as 
respects indt\'iduals, must, like all other lavs, be ascer- 
tained by judicial determioationft. To produce uniform- 
ity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, 
in the last resort, to one supreme tribitnau. And this 
tribunal ought to be instituted umlcr the same authority 
which forms the treaties themselves. These ingredients 
arc both indispensable. If there rs In each State a court 
of final jurisdiction, there may be as many different final 
determinations on the same point as there are courts. 
There arc endless diversities in the npintuns of men. 
We often see not nnly different courts, but the judges of 
the same court differing from each other. Tu avoid the 
oonfusion which would unavoidably result from the con- 
tradictory decisions of a number of independent judi- 
catories, all nations have found it necessary to establish 
one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general 
stipcrintendence, and authorized to settle and declare in 
the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice. 

This is the more necessary where the frame of tlie 
government is so compoumlrd thnt the laws of the whole 
are in danger ot being contravened by the laws of the 
parts. In this case, if the panicular tribunals are 
invested with a richt af ultimate jurisdJctioR, besides the 
contradictions to be expected from difference of opininn, 
fftrrc will be miti;h tu [far from (hr liia« of local views 




VA/t/ABLE LECrSlATlO.V. 



»4< 




»nd prejudices, and from the interference of local rcgola- 

tioos. As often as xuch un interference was to hut>pcn, 

tb«e vonld be reason to apprehend that the provisions 

oj the particular laws might be preferred to those of the 

Kcoeral laws; for nothing i^ more natural to men in 

office than to look with peculiar deference toward thai 

nihority to which they owe their official existence. 

The treaties of the United Slates, under the present 

Cautituiion, are liable to the infractions of thirteen dif- 

hreoi legislatures, and as many different courts of final 

ftnidtcttun. acting under the authority of those legisla- 

The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole 

'dion, arc thus continually at the mercy of the preju- 

thc passions, and the interests of every member of 

it is composed. Is it possible that foreign nations 

either respect or confide in such a government? Is 

potsible that the people of America will longer consent 

trunt their honor, tlitur liappincss, their safety, on so 

precarious a foundation? 

In this review of the Confederation, 1 have confined 
■yself to the exhibition of its most material defects; 
^^■ssing over those imperfections in its details by which 
^^Ben a great part of the power intended to be conferred 
^^voQ it has been in a great measure rendered abortive. 
^Hmiist be by this time evident to all men of reflection 
^frho can divest iliemselves of the prepoMes^Jons of pre- 
^Mwceived opinions, that it is a system so radically 
liciiKig and unsound as tu admit nut of amendment 
but by an entire change in its leading features and 
cbiraciers. 

The organixation of Congress is itself utterly improper 

for (he exercise of those powers which are necessary to 

deposited in the Union. A single assembly may be a 

r receptacle of those slender, or rather, fettered 

ics, which have been heretofore delegated to the 

'ederal head; but it would be inconsistent with all the 




' rts il,r intifoct ot infrKliont nt ibe British TntVj of i J$J bf At 
.. ktc llamoioMi'* aoid Jc([rnion*scii<T»poadciiee (*' Anicri- 
.•,tt», fuicifii Rd»tio«t," i. 193).— ICuiTOK. 



"4» UiilTATtONS OF CONGRESS. (■•. » 

principles of good govvrnmcnt to intrust it villi those 
»Oilition;il puwera which, even itic moderate and more 
ralional adversaries of the proposed Cun&tituliun admit, 
ought to reside in the United Slates.' If tlial plan 
sliould not be adopted, and if the necessity of the Union 
should be alile to withstand the ambitious aims of those 
men who may indulge magiiifnent schemes of personal 
aggrandisement from its dissolution, the probability 
would be that ire should run into the projctt of confer- 
ring supplementary powers upon Coni^ress, as they are 
now conittiluted; and either the machine, from the 
intrinsic feebleness of its structure, will miilder into 
pieces, in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop it; or, by 
succesMve augmentations of its force and energy, as 
necessity might prompt, wc shall finally accumulate, in a 

' The Conlliienitl Ca>i|;teM hiil iltuunicl the cviti ill • wiigk IcghU- 
ItTI bcxly. fniiiiEiitly it hid JilopldJ rrwlnlioni only lo rrpeal |I|«M 
the neii A*,i. and in Mt-ml i-i%n hsd rriccinl, KcnAtidcted. anil 
•dopltd. anil asaiii i«ject«(l in tbe couitc ul • nccli. ilw <din« niolloa ; 
the ckin)^ being iue to the anival iw 'kguilnic nl nicmlian, nwl li> (be 
lack of any <lt«i;k. A wuel o' tlnliitily htiil liki'witr tirrii ^ll•l>■n ia 
Ibe sinel* aneinlily liody of I'trniiyhinU. ihe hiuoty of which liwl l>««> 
marked by «iireni«lv iapuUire and v«tiiitil« IcfiUalian. 1 be tkIik ol 
■ diial-bmlicd IcBitlalivc power tccniK nol nwtcly to conuil in ihc 
ulililioiiil ch«k iM hatly IcuUlution •'tik'h tlic iMay rX M{>*m« co«- 
aiiUntion nvcruanly invulm, liul in a ilili ^rcalrr iltjgfM', ia tbe 
tiicnuble (omptliliDD in which Ihey hecoiiM invnli-rd. Boih tcrk 
public fsTor. ooil ifiry (tierefiArc IhecniBe riTnlt. Nccemrlly a nwtuuic 
url|['n4teil lij one encounlen in (lie other • ilcrn vriltctini. aixl ilm It tn 
keen llial Ii»|ueally cull h'lme ^rc|Hiiei it» ■><'n hill, ami toiiag done 
w>, aillieiet t" tl wtlh a tHniili-en»a tlial hat omii-rlUil \\tr tnlrodsclkHi 
ol ■ •ew legnlntitr ctrni«ni in Ibi* «lia|<f «f > third or union diaaibtr. 
iivnll)' l<tmed > C€iafa*«M commiiieo, wade u)i al ui njual nunba- of 
memlieni Irum llie luii UMlri. wbiiw joint atllna in |>ia<.ti(« hn |p«xna>r 
&lnMMI illvUlorial. Thr leiKteni.-r the wntlil ntct fin ik):ilr ol Conf-rtv 
■ional ado)<lion u( llir " innvjuiik i)nmiiin" and Ihv laili.itncaliur inirn- 
diKtion ol '* cknurt," lo t-tir ttulhin* •)[ s Mtadily iucirauii); povei ovct 
kgiiUlira aclioa mnied to |>rtsi>liBe oAMnl ii to make le|;iiiUilou 
ilovct and Mhrrwiie ninr« dlllinli. While ihii may haTc in a{i|aiE»l 
■htftdvaMaf^ it U iwolxible thai llic jmblK i^aln (ii niiire itun t!«-y |iwi, 
Tor It ih L-cila(n tlul. lo ibaq'ly ciitK-al m<>niml<>, (.'i n itill ad 

with thv Krcatrtl iTlrritv (notably <n tlitft *ota of ih lallvd by 

the Vtiieiaelao mctuj^), anil the otdiiury dclar ■>» i . > li.icv mun 
ti«e for coeuKletalion. b«l even prerenU muvh li.x"''>tt<'n. 1'be itit- 
uhilion of each Concreat b a i:T*t« lo iuu>y tlioiihand lilllt, wliith wmilil 
ha*« hcen pute<l liul ibry bttt l>ecn leaihcl bi Ilia inAioa ; Ibiti um- 
knuata it well jiiuim by MbxigiMnl cienls.— Ciiicon. 



HMdlMal POPULAR COXSEXT A TRVE BASIS. 



'45 



single body, all the most important preroEntives of 
sovereignty, and thus cnl^il ti[)on oiir posterity one of 
the tnoftt execratilc Torms of government thnt human 
infatuation ever contrived. Thus we should create in 
reality that Tcry tyranny which the adversaries of the 
nev Conititulton either are, or afTect to be, solicitous to 
avcrL 

It has not a tittle contributed to the infirmities of the 
existing feileral system thnt it never had a r,iliAc»linn by 
the peopte. Resting on no better foundation ihnn the 
consent of the st-vcral lri;is!»tures, it has been csposed lo 
fre(|uent and intrirjite questions concerning the validity 
of its powers, and has, in some instances, i;iven birth to 
the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeat. 
Owing iu ratificatiori to the law of a State, it has been 
contended that the same authority nii)|;ht repeal the law 
by which it was ratified. However gross a heresy it may 
tie to maintain that afarty lo a (empaft has a right to 
revoke that tempaet, the doctrine itseUha* had respectable 
advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature 
proves the ncc^-ssily of laying the foundations of our 
national Kovcriiment deeper th.-in in the mere sanction 
of delegated authority. The fabric of .American empire 
oufht to rest on the sohd basis of dir conskkt or thk 
PKOPLR. The streams of national power ought to flow 
iflsmediatcly from that pure, orij^nal fountain of all 
tegiljoiate authority. Puulius. 



144 



IfEED OF A CO/fSriTUriOff. 



No. 23. (-Vw Vtri /«nia/, Doccnba it. tjh^ 



[10.21 



Hamilton. 



NECESSITV OF A GOVKRNMENT AT LEAST 
EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PRO- 
POSED. 

Oiitttt it tif fravUtJ far Sfmatijwalgavermmttil—Armw omJJIetli^' 
CuhOtim fitd/r freunt fpn/rJtrati^n — I'-/ih frejttt »f Ugiilatimx 
ufvn Ikt St-itfi — Lam mttil it ixlrmdni « iaJiviJujl ciiiwui — 7'** 
minlial fmHl in a itrnpcmttJ f'fvtrunrnt a diitrimiu-itira a/fvntr-— 
Fhtit and armiti /rem fAii feiM »/ m<ik. 

r* (he Pffff/e of the Stale 0/ New YorJt: 

TIic necessity of a Constitution, at least etjiially ener- 
getic with the one proposed to the prettervatiun of the 
Union, is the point at the examination of which we are 
now arrived. 

This inciuiry will naturally divide itself into three 
branches: the objeciti to be provided fur by the federal 
government, the quantity of power necessary to the ac- 
complishment of those objects, the persons upon whom 
that power onght to operate. Its distribution and organ- 
ization will more properly claim our attention under the 
succeeding head. 

The principal purposes to be answered by union are 
these: (he cuminuii defense of ilie roemlwrs; the preser- 
vation of the public peace, as well against internal con- 
vulsions as esf^rnal atLtcbs; the regulation of commerce 
with otiier nations and between the States; the superin- 
tendence of our intercourse, political and comracrcial, 
with foreigfn countries. 

"" V'<M«riI»y Ihc iiianuKti|M ciypy of ibc nibsequcal w» tomiintBicat*>l 
to tItB cititiH'. with (n 4aurancc ihat hit pmi k1losl4 In pmferra). in 
future, tot llie linl oihnini; Into pnlilic (iew the ui-cecilliii; numlwre. 
I( the jiulitic are |>leakcil to «ll|^MUe ilie cdtlor M a parllat printer. Ill 
IIm fu«of liii leiicnilol nuenion) of 'bdnf inlteeiKcd by nune.' whal 
iBore Clin l>« uid '. Tbii itJi^nu he prcrcn to tint ol • alaviili eopjiit ; 
ooii*«i|Binlly, unl<*i niBiiii>i,-ti|.|i ni* conrnunlmtnl, ho o-ill {« cun- 
(tialMd (lnmeTcr ieiailicinuii) <>lill lii eruach nixter iW ixiicliiv rhir^D ol 

pankUty."— .Vfwi Yetk^JnuHtt, tfnemttr iS, 1787. 



auKihnl 



NATIONAL AVTHORITV, 



US 



Tlw autboritlca essential lo tlie common defense are 
Uwse: 10 raise armies; to build and equip ficcts; to pre- 
scribe rules for the government of both; to direct their 
npemions; to provide for their support. Theite powers 
oagbt ttt exist without limitation, hetaute it it imp^stible lo 
fntu* or litfint tht txUni and tiftitly oj mUioHoJ fxigearia, 
«' iMe terrespQndtnt txlent and variety of Ikt means «'>iuh 
majit Hf^ettary tn tatitfy thtm. The circumstances that 
cadanger the safety of nations are infinite, ;ind for this 
reuon no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed 
00 the power to which the care of it is committed. This 
power ought to be coextensive with alt the possible 
oambinatioas of Aucb circumstances; and ought to be 
<nder the direction of the same councils which are 
splinted lu preside over the common defense. 

Tliis is one of those truths which, lo a correct and 
Dnprejadiccit mind, carries its own evidence along with 
■i; lad may be obscured but cannot be made plainer by 
ucumcnt or reasoning. !t rests upon axioms as simple 
Mthcyarc universal; the mtans ought to be proportioned 
to the M^,' the persons from whose agency the attainment 
uf sny end is expected ought to pn^Kess the mtam by 
■hich it is to be attained, 
^(lielher there ought to be a federal government in- 
sted witli the care of the common defense is a ques* 
D'"!, In the first instance, open for discussioti; but the 
nomcnl it i* decided in the aHirmutivc, it will fulluw that 
It government ought to be clothed with all the powers 
fD()uisite lo complete execution of its trust. And unless 
Icia be shown that the circumstances which miiy affect 
w poblii: safciyarc rctlucihle withincertain determinate 
'"OjIs; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly 
I rationally disputes), it must be admitted, as a ncces- 
ry Dunscrjucncc. that there can be no limitation of tbal 
sihntity which is to provide for the defense and pro- 
*<Clii>n of the community, in any matter essential to its 
**acy — tliat is, in any matter es&ential lo the forma- 
*••. Jirtditm, or wpport of the national fokces. 

DCtivcas the present Confederation has been proved 




146 



COAfMOa DEFE/fSE AND WELFARE. Wfc M 



to be, this principle appears to have been fiilly rrcognizcd 
by the framcrs of it; though tlicy have not miiile proper 
or adequate provision for its exerciHe. Congress have 
an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and 
money: t<i govern the anny and navy; to direct their 
operations. As llicir requisitions are made constitu- 
tionally binding upon the States, who arc in fact under 
the most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies 
required of them, the intention evidently was that the 
United St.itcs should command whatever resources were 
by them judged requisite to the "common defense and 
general welfare." It was presumed that a sense of their 
tnie interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith, 
would be found sutHcietit pledges for the punctual per* 
formance of the duty of the nicmbcrs to the federal head. 

The experiment has, however, demonstrated that this 
expectation was ill-founded and illusory; .tnd the obser- 
vations made under the last head will, 1 imagine. Iiave 
sufficed to convince the impartial and discerning that 
there is an absolute necessity for an entire change in the 
first principles of the system; tital if we are in earnest 
about giving the Union energy and duration, we must 
abandon the vain project of legislating upon the States 
in their colle4:iive capacities; ne must extend the laws 
of the federal government to the individual cilizens of 
America; we must discard the fallacious scheme uf quotas 
and requisitions, as equally impracticable and unjust. 
The result from all this is that the Union ought to be 
invested with full power to levy rroops; to build and 
equip fleets; and to raise the revenues which will be 
required for the formation and support uf an army and 
navy, in the customary and ordinary modes practiced io 
other governments. 

If the circumstances of o»r country are such as to 
demand a compound instead of a simple, a confederate 
instead of a sole, government, the essential point which 
will remain tu be adjusted will be to dis<:riminaic the 
OBJECTS, as far as it can be done, which shall appertain 
to the different provinces or departments of po««rj 



&irfH«l EFFECTIVE POlfE/fS. I47 

illowing to each the most ample authority fur fulfilling 
the objects commiite*) tu its charge. Shall the Union be 
constituted the guardian of the common safety? Are 
leeu and armies and revenues necessary to this pur[)osc? 
The government of the L'nion must he empowered to 
pass all laws and to make all regulations which have 
relation to them. The same must be the case in respect 
to commerce and to every other matter to which its 
jurisdiction is permitted to extend. Is the ad mi 11 iM ra- 
tion of justice between the citizens of the same State the 
proper department of the local governments? These 
must possess alt the autliorilies which arc connected with 
this object and with every other that may be allotted to 
their particular cognixance and direction. Not to confer 
in each case a degree of power commensurate to the end 
would be to violate tlir most obvious rules of prudence 
and propriety, and improvidcntly to trust the great 
interests \>i the nation to hands which are disabled from 
managing them with vigor and success. 

Whoso likely to make suitable provisions for the public 
defense as that biMly to which the guardianship of the 
public safety is confided; which, as the center of infor- 
mation, will best understand the extent and urgency of 
the dangers that threaten; as the representative of the 
WKOLC, will feet itself most deeply interetited in the 
preservation of every pari ; which, from the responsibility 
implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly 
impressed with the necessity of proper exertions; and 
which, by the extension of its authority throughout the 
Stales, cjin alone estatilish uniformity and concert in the 
plans and measures by which the common safety is to be 
Mcure<l? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolv- 
ing upon the federal government the care of the general 
defense, and leaving in the State governments the tfft<tive 
powers by which it is to be provided for? Is not a want 
of co-operation the infallible consequence of such a 
^stem? And will not weakness, disorder, an undue 
distribution of the burdens and calamities of war. an 
unnecessary and intolerable increase of expense, be its 



itfL 



146 



COUMO.V DEFEf/SE 



'STS. 



(Bo. U 



i 



I 



to be, this principle appears! 
by the framcr* of it ; though 
or adequate provi-itoii for 
an unlimited discretion to 
money; to govern the a' 
operations. As their r 
tionally binding upon t' 
the most solemn obti 
required of them, thr 
United States should 
by them judged reo 
general welfare." 
true interests, and 
would be found * 
formance of ihe i 
The eiperime 
expectation wa- 
vations made 



HaT« we nut li-id 
' i-ourse uf the 



t 



-< ^;tndid io- 

is that it is 

■ ::ra\ govern- 

I tlioGc objects 

It will indeed 

.ittcntion of the 

< Mich a manner as 

j with the requisite 

.\ been or may be 

I'M not, upon a di!t|>av 

I Mirer this description. 

.■.riimcnl, the constito- 

.lit to be trusted with all the 

"(M t0 ilflegiite /<» iiaygtverH- 

.il improper depositary of the 

Utu-rcvcr thk^f. can with pro* 

>r cuinciOent powers may safrljrj 

•■■:■> is the true result of all jus 

liijecU AtKl the adrcrurics of th( 

. ihe convention ought to have corKj 

I sliowing that the internal structui 

>;uvernmcnt was such as lo render it 

.c confidence of the people. They ought 

A iii'lcrcd into inflammatory dcclaroationtl 

',: (avils about the cxlt-nt of the powers. { 

.ire not too extensive for tltc objects oI 

riittration, or, in other words, fur the man-' 

Mt KATioNAi. iN'TKRXSTS; nor Can any sAtis- 

mcnt be framed to show tliat they are 

with such an excess. If it be true, as has 

noated by some of the writers on the other side, 

difficulty arises from the nature of the thing, , 

t the extent of the country wdl not permit us w 

■i government in which such ample powers can 

be reposed, it would prove that we ought to con- 

OQr views and resort to the esprdient of separate 



sufRccd to c 


there is an a 


first princip 


about givi 


abandon t 


in their 


of the ' 


Amerii 


and r 


TIh: 


inve 


equ 


re* 


n.' 




11 



SFFECTIVE POU'BXS. 



147 



■Homing to each the most ample authority for fulfilling 
ihe objects committnl to ils chiirgc. Shall the Union be 
coBttituted the guardian of the common safetjr? Are 
Ints and armies and revenues necessary to tins purpose? 
The government of the Union must be empowered to 
put all laws and to make all regulations which have 
relation to them. The same must be the case in respect 
10 commerce and to every other matter to which Us 
jmisdictiun is permitted to extend. Is the administra- 
Imo of justice between the ciliKcns of ihc same State the 
proper department of the local governments? These 
Muat possess all the authorities which arc connected with 
ttis object and with every other that may be allotted to 
ilieir particubr cognizance and direction. Not to confer 
iacach case a degree of jwwer commensurate to the end 
VQuld be to violate the most obvious rules of prudence 
lod propriety, and improvidcntly to trust the great 
interests of the nation to hands which are disabled from 
■tanaging them with rigor and success. 

Who so likely to make suitable provisions for the public 
itefense as that body to which the guardianship of the 
public safety is confided; which, as the center of infor- 
mation, wilt best understand the extent and urgency of 
(He dangers that threaten; as the representative of the 
WHOLK, will feel it»clf roost deeply interested in the 
preservation of every part; which, from the responsibility 
implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly 
impressed with the necessity of proper exertions; and 
■hicli, by the extension of its authority throughout the 
States, can alone establish uniformity and concert in the 
plans and measures by which the common safety ix to be 
secured? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in dcvolv. 
:upon the federal government the care of the general 

tfeiise, and leaving in the State governments the effedive 

lowers by which it is to be provided for? Is not a want 
^t co-operation the infallible consequence uf such a 
em? And will not weakness, disorder, an undue 

Buribution of the burdens and calamities of war, an 
HOnecessary and intolerable increase of expense, be its 



U8 



SATiONAL ttCTERESTS. 



[1F«.U 



nalural and inevitable cuncoiniLiiitx? Have tvc nul liad 
uocquivocal cxiicficncc of its effects in the course of t)ie 
revolution which we have just accomplished? 

Ever/ view we may take of the subject, as candid in- 
quirers after truth, will serve to conrincc us that it is 
both unwise and dangerous to deny the federal govern 
ment an unconlincd authority, as to all those objects 
which arc intrusted to its management. It will indeed 
deserve the most vigilant and rareful alt<r»tion of the 
people, to sec that it be modeled in sucli a manner as 
to admit of its being safety vested with the requisite 
powers. If any plan which has been or may be 
offered to our consideration, should not, upon a dispas- 
sionate inspection, be found to answer this description, 
it ought to be rejected. A government, the consliiu- 
tion of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the 
powers which a free people ou^hl to deltgaU to attygmtra- 
ment, would he an unsafe and improper depositary of the 
NATIONAL (NTr-Rf-sia. Wherever these can with pro- 
priety be confided, the coincident powers may safely 
accompany thein. This is the true result of all jnxt 
reasoning upon the subject. .■Vnd the adversaries of the 
plan promulgated by the convention ought to li.ive con- 
lined themselves to showing that the interna) structure 
of the proposed government was such as to render it 
unworthy of the confidence of the people. Tlicy ought 
not to have wandered into inflammatory declamations 
and unmeaning cavils about the extent of the powers. 
The MWK«s are not too exlcnsire for the oejRcw of 
federal administration, or, in other words, for the man- 
agement of our NATIONAL iKTF.KESTs; nor ciin any satis- 
factory argument be framed to slmw that they are 
chargeable with such an exceu. If it be true, as has 
been insinuated by some of the writers on the other side. 
t]iat the difficulty arises from the nature of the thing, 
and that the extent of the country will not permit us to 
form a government in which such ample powers Can 
safely be reposed, it would prove that we ought to con- 
tract our views and resort to the expedient of separate 



HtallUal SIZE AN AKGVMENT FOR US'lOff. 



M9 



coiifeilenicics, which will move within more practicable 
^ihcrcs. For the absurdity must ctintinually stJire us in 
the face of confiding to a govcrnnieni the direction of 
the most csftential national interests, without daring to 
trust it to the authorities which arc indispensable to 
their proper and efficient managctneni. Let us not 
attempt to reconcile cuntradictioos, but firmly embrace 
a rational alternative. 

I trust, however, that the impracticability of one 
(reueral system cannot be shown. I am greatljr mistaken 
if anything of weight has yet been advanced of this tend- 
ency; and 1 flatter myself that the observations which 
have been made in the course of these papers have 
served to place the reverse of that position in as clear a 
tight as any matter still in the womb of time and experi- 
ence can be susceptible of. This, at all events, must be 
erideni, that the very difHcnlty itself, drawn from the 
txtcnt of the country, is the strongest argument in favor 
of an energetic government: for any other can certainly 
never preserve the union of so large an empire. 11 we 
enbrace the tenets of those who oppose the adoption of 
the proposed Constitution, as the standard of our politic 
cal creed, we cannot fail to verify the gliximy doctrines 
*)iich predict the imprjclicability of a national system 
pervading entire limits of the present Confederacy. 

PuDUua;. 



•50 



STA/i'Dt.VC A/IVIES I.V PSACE. 



No. 24. C//<w ytriJtKr-ti, UwtnWi 14. •]•}.) 



IK«.ff 



Hamtltun, 



POWERS CONE-ERRRD BY NEW CONSTITUTION 
IN RECAKO TO NATIONAL lORCES. 

AIUg{.i xani 9f fteftr fnrviiinii agatmt lAt tsitlmtt tf ilimjimg 
iirmiii in limf */ ptmr — Riilriilitn of tkj ItgtiUlivt Autk-trily at 
rtfarJt miHlATy ritaktitkmtnU am unintrJ-v/ friiinftr — Wirrr lit 
tamiilutiea tttit tatilrvJ — t'lauits in Ikt ilaU lonililHlitrii in rrgarJ 
la thutdittg armf—The i^m* (iaust im Ikt artulri »/ <aHjtJfrali»H-^ 
Oamgfri tkrtauniaf Amfrktt — Nfftiiity /«• miltrn gurrinmt— 
Briliih atiJ Spamih tohniti — frvietlifm f/ tavjt yarJi luni •trumalt. 

T» tkr J'tfffle e/ the State tf A'rw Yari: 

To tlie powirrs proposed lu be conferred upon the 
Tederal government, in respect to ilie crwiiiim ami direc- 
tion uf the nalionul forces, I have met willi hut one 
speciRc objection, which, if I understand il right, is ttiii 
l„ — that proper provision has not been made 

Vn. ■• ag^iiiiKt the exisleiice of staiuliii^ ^irmics in 

time of peace; an objection which I shall iiuvr emieax'or 
to show rests on weak and unsubstantial fuundjtioos. 

It has indeed been brouRhl forward in the mtwt ngne 
and f!cncr;il form, supported only by bold assertionx, 
without the appearance of argument; without even ihc 
ttanotioi) of theoretical opinions; in contra di<:tton to the 
practice of other free nations and to the general geuic 
of Amerira aK expressed in most uf the existing con- 
stitutions. The propriety of this remark will appear 
the moment it is recolleclcd that the objection under 
consideration turns upon a sitppused necessity of restrain- 
ing the LRaiSLATive authority of the nation, in the 
article of military establishments; a principle unheard 
of, except in one or two of our State constitutions, and 
rejected in all the rest. 

A stranger to our politics who was to read our nevft- 
papers at the present juncture, without having pre- 
viously inupcctcd the plan ri-poned by thi- conveniiim. 
WDUld be naturally led to unc of two runclusiuns: either 



LEGISLATIVE AVTHOKITY. 



iSi 



I: 



it contained a positive injunction that sliiitding 

■Dies fbould be kept up in time of peace; or th^t it 

Wed ia the EXBCUTivK the whole power of levying 

UDops without Bubjccting liis di&cretion, in any shape, 

to the control of the legislature. 

if be came afterward to peruse the plan itself, he 
nulil be surpri&cd to discover that neither the onv nor 
Ikoiberwas the case; that tlic whole power of raising 
iratieswas lodged in the Lef^isiature, not in the Extta- 
Or; tliat this legislature wd« to he a popular body, con- 
tiuingiuf tlic representatives of tht: people, periodiciilly 
dectcil; and that instead of the provision he had sup- 
po«d in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, 
in respect to tlii.i object, un important (lu^liricutiun even 
of Uie legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids 
■lie appropriation of money for the support of an army 
for any longer period thiin two years — a precaution 
■tich, upon a nearer view of it, wilt appear to he a great 
and real security against the keeping up of troops with- 
itil evident nc<.'cssity. 
Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have 
ijiposcd would he apt to pursue his conjtcturcs a little 
•tinhcr. Mc would miturally Kay to himself, it is impos- 
sible that all this vehement utid puttietii; dcclamutiim can 
Ek without some colorable prctcxL It must needs be 
t^ ihis people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in all 
"<< precetling modeiN of the constitutions whirh they 
have established, inserted the most precise and rigid 
aiions on this point, the omission of which, in the 
w plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and 

lor. 

Ifi under this impression, he proceeded to pass in 
'eview the several Suie constittitiuns. how great 
*^Dld be his disappointment to find that tmo only of 
Ihta* contained an interdiction of standing armies in 



^1*111(1 



, 1^ iliilancnl at Hie nuKet ii taken from th) |iriiiled cDlkclion of 
Tilkins. rcniiijrWania anj Ninth Cumllna nre ihe two 
III llie InlelJitTliiiii ii) Ibne wonh: " Ak MafHltii]* kmiic* lii 

liae »i jKue ut ibiiiccnMi* l« llbcily, THRV OUCIir x^>t lo Ire kql 



<s» 



MIUTARY ESrABUSHMEXrS. 



nr«.M 



time of peape; t!iat the other eleven had cither observed 
a profound silence on the ^uhje^^'t, or had in express 
terms admitted the right uf Ihc Legislature to authorize 
their existence. 

Still, however, he would be persuaded that there must 
t>G some plausible foundation for the cry raised on this 
head. He would never be able to imagine, while any 
toarct of information remained unexplored, that it was 
nothing more than an experiment upon the public cre- 
dulity, dictated either by a detiberate intention to 
deceive or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate 
to be ingenuous It would probably occur to him that 
he would be likely to find the precautions he was in 
search of in the primitive compact hetwe<rn the Slates. 
Here at length he would expect to meet with a solution 
of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, 
the existing Confederation mmx contain the nicest explicit 
provisions aj;ainit military establishments in time of 
peace; and a departure from this model, in a favorite 
point, has occa^cioned the discontent which appears tu 
influence these political champions. 

If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical 
survey of the articles of (*onfederj1ion, his iisiontshment 
would not only be increased, but would arquirc a mixture 
of indignation at the unexpected discovery that these 
artictem instead of containing the prohilttlion he looted 
for, .ind though they had, with je.itous circnmspcction, 
restricted the authority of the State legislatures in this 
particular, had not imposed a single restraint on that of 



up." Thb U. in imh. ratkcr a cAOTKHt iluin a PROiiiniTiaM. New 
llimmlilic. MuMclintciri. [leliirtu, anrf MnirUiid hnvr. in »sch nt 
llirir mlU of K;);hls. a cliiiu in Ihii effect : " Sun'tin); armivt nn (lan> 
|[cioai to llWrlT. and nii(;lii not ro b« nuKtl or kept up witii-ilt the 
CUN^KS^ or the Lt^mu-HTUiiK " ; which U a lornul ■liniLviI.jn of llie 

sutlioritr of ibc T.f- -I '•■!•' ^^fw Voilf tiM nn bilk at r- ■'■ ■' her 

MMlitutlon My* r ■ alwil Ihr tiulttT, No i ^htj 

a|1)«>r anneiTO to ;■ ■ liiHii ol lt>e o:bci Slalci. ' ' ' '"tr- 

)n>lii|;, Rixl Ibtit twitiiliiiii'i* xtt rtpaWj v\mt. I >ni li>M. tiuwcTCr. 
iliBl iin« ot 1*0 SiAin hiire Mlh cS r^hu which du not injicar in Ihh 
culleciloli I Ifnt thai ihotc atu> r«a|[mu the right o( Ibc le][iUaIlv« 



tnmm 



EXCESS or COXF/DBXCE. 



>53 



the United Stat«s. If he tiappened to be a man of quick 
KDsiUlity or ardent temper, he could now no longer 
rtfraia from rcganling (hcsc clamors as the dishonest 
utillces of a sinister and u»priiii:i|iled opposition to 
aplu which ought at least to receive a fair and camlid 
examination from all sincere lovers of their country! 
Hod else, he would say, could the auttiors of them have 
been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, 
about a p4>int in which it seems to have conformed itself 
to the general sense of America as declared in its dif- 
ttmx forms of Kovcrnmcnt, and iu which it has even 
wpcradded a new and powerful guard unknown to any 
uf them? If, on the contrary, he happened to be a man 
of calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge 
a sigh for the frailty uf human nature, and would lament 
ihil, in a matter so inieresting to the happiness uf mil- 
lions, the true merits of the question should he perplexed 
irxl entangled t>y expedients so unfriendly to an impar- 
lul and right delermination. Even such a man could 
hardly fortwar remarking that a conduct of this kind 
has too much the appearance of an intention to mislead 
the people by alarming their passions, rather than 
to convince them by arguments addressed to their 
EDderstandioKS. 

But however little this objection may be countenanced, 
even by precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfac- 
tory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits, From 
a dose examination it will appear that restraints upon 
the discretion of the legislature in respect to military 
establishments in time of peace would be improper to 
be imposed, and if imposeil, from the necessities of 
society, would be unlikely to be observed. 

ThoDgii a wide ocean separaiM the Unitcl Stales from Europe, 
yM there Are rarioui consideratiou iliai warn lu against an 
ocess of confidence or security. On one side of us, anil stretch- 
tag lax Into our rear, are growing settlemcnrs subject to the 
domifuon of Britain. On the other side, and exlendinj; to meef 
(he Bniisb settlemenis, arc colonies »»<] csiahti^hmrni'i siil)i«-cl lo 
1^ itootlBion a( Spain. This situation antl (he vicinity o\ ilie 
Wesl ladia Islands, belonging to ihcse two powers, create between 



1S4 H'ESTER/f CAKSlSO/fS. !■•, SI 

Iheffl, tn icspcct (o their Amciic^n posscMiou and in nljilkm lo 
ti!i. u coninion interest, Tlic lavage tritie» <m our Western Ir«n- 
ticr ought lo be rrg.iiilcil a& niir natural enemies, their rulural 
allies, becauM; (hey have inust tu (ear frmn ws. anil tiioM to Im^ 
from them, The imprnvcmeiiis in the art of lutvigaiioii have, u 
to the facihiy of com n;ii nicotian, rendem] distant nations, in 
a grc-jt measxire, neiglitnrk Ilritaiii and S|)aiii are among the 
principal m.iniinie [lowrcrs o( Europe, A future cimccri of views 
l)cl\veen tliesc nations ought iicK to lie regiirikd a* iinpro)>ab!e, 
'I'hc increasing TcmoIencM of roii.%an);uinity is ever)' d^)' iliinintsh- 
ing the lotte of tlie faniily coni|uict between Fiance and Spain. 
And poliljcians have ever, with |{rcal reason, considered the tics of 
blood as feeble and piecartous links of i>ulitical connection. Tlwse 
circumstances, combined, ailinontsh lu not lt> be loo suinguine in 
considering ouncNe* 3& entirely out of iIk mch of danger. 

Previous to the Revolution, and ever since Ihc peace, 
there has been a constant necessity for keeping small 
E-irrit-ons on our Western frontier. No person can d(ii]t>t 
that these will continue to be indispensable, if it &hotild 
only be against the ravages and depredations of the 
Indians. These garrisons must cither be furnished by 
occasional detachments from the militia or by petnianent 
corps in the pay of the government. The first is imprac- 
ticable; and, if practicable, would be pernicious. The 
militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged 
from their occupations and families to perform that most 
disagreeable duty in limes of profound peace. Ai»d jf 
they could be prevailed npon or compelled to do it, the 
increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and 
the logs of labor and disconcertion of the industrious 
pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive obje<;ttons 
to the scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious 
to the public as ruinous to private ciltiens. The latter 
resource of permanent corps in the pay of the guvcm- 
ment amounts to a standing army in time of peace; 
a small one. Indeed, but not the less real for being snalL 
Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at 
once the impropriety of a constitutional interdii lion of 
such eslablishmeuts and the neceKxity of leaving the 
ntalter to the discretion and prmlcncc of the Icgislsture, 



Busllua) 



A'Arr A NECESSiTY. 



"55 



III proportion (o our increase fn slren|[th, t( is probable, nay, h 
in:i)r be said ccrljiii, (h.il Britiiin and Sp.iiii would Jiu^iiit.'iit Iheir 
miliiary csUblithmi^ts in our nei(;hl)orliooil. If we should not be 
williiijc to be expused. in a nitltrd and defenseless condition, lo 
llieif inKulls anil encroach men is, we sliotild find il expedient to 
increaLse our (roniicr gariisoiis In some ralio to ihe force by wliicli 
ouf Wettein scttlcnienis mij^i be annoyed. There are, and will 
be, pjiiicuW posi», ihc poMcssion of which will include the com- 
mand of Urge dislriclt of Icrritury, and facilitate future invasions 
of the tem.iinder. I( mny be added ih,it some of those pnstt will 
be keys lo the trade with the Indian nalionv Can any nun tliink 
•I MTOuld be wise lo Ic.ive ttich posls in a silunlion lo hr »l nny 
inilant sei/cd by one at the other of iwo nei);1i boring; and (orinida- 
ble powers? To aci (his pan would be (o desert all ihe utusl 
inaxinis of prudence and policy. 

If we mean lo be a commercial people, or even to be 
secure on our Atlantic side, wc must endeavor, as soon 
as possible, to have a navy. Tn this purpose there must 
bedockyards and arsenals; and for the defense of these, 
fortifications and probably garrisons. When a nation 
lias become so powerful by sea that it can protect its 
dockyards by its fleets, this supersedes the necessity of 
garrisons for that purpose; but where naval establish- 
ments arc in their infancy, moderate garrisons will, in 
all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against 
descents for ihc destruction of the arsenals and dock- 
yards, and sometimes of the licet itself. Puhlius. 



'56 



No. 25. 



fftOTECTJOy TO STATES. [Ho. M 



(Vn. Vtrt /rtintMi. P ™ tn »i. t|*T.) Hamilton. 



NATIONAL FORCFS COMPARED WITH STATE 
FORCES. 

Nuttiily tf nalienat Mtttrrt tf army mttd mtaf — Sillulien *f itattt at 
rtgardi fcriigtt tatftiti — Critiftil fnitirn r/ Xnp Ytrt — SMr grrrrn- 
rSfHti nalural rixuli tf tk* nalMHal — Ai'irA'ioW tkat Ikt fffii tttlt 
ttifftrl tkrir h{*t p>'etrnmtnt~Tkt iMri nstraiMeJ from ilmtJing 
frnti — fVanI */ drfirtilii/n im fnfvitd affntivf im ilanJiHg »rmifi— 
/mpfitiHaty ■>/ a ttntfiirtuy htttfttn tht tsttttlivt aid iht lfgiil»Hvt 
lUftTtrntHlt — AiltKtl tffttt tf a P'thitiltea »n ilamJutj; armirj — inailf- 
ftt^iy «/ flu mittlia — Ktttal tuftrimti e/ PfntUjr/naHta and Maua^ 
thntttti — Exftrinut t/ tht LiutJi*m9ui*iu. 

7> the P(^e of the Slate of New York: 

It may ptirhnps be urged that the objects enumerated 
in llie pretcdtng number ought to be proviilptl for by the 
State t;i>^ci''>">(^"ts, under the direction of the Union. 
But this would be in reality an inversion of the primnry 
principle uf our polilicat as-vKiation, as it would in prac- 
tice transfer the care of the common defcuse from the 
federal head to the individual members: a project op- 
pressive to some Slates, dangerous to all, and baneful 
to the Confederacy. 

The letritoricK of Briiain, Spnin. nn<l of the Indian n.itions In 
our ne>ghlH>rhoMl ilo rtoi border on p>xriictiUi Sialrs. hui encircle 
the Unnio Jrum M.iine (u (icurgj^i. TItc il.inKer, though in differ- 
ent degrees, is ihcrcfoie common, nnd llw nw-Jins o( giutdmg 
■{•.-linM it oughl.in like manner, 10 be (he obfccta of conunan 
counciU and of 4 common treasury. Il happens ihal come Stales, 
Ifom local siluaition, arc more dirMlly expascd. New Vurk is of 
tlib claiK. Upon ihe plan of srp.arntc provtoions. New York 
woul<l have to suuain ilie whole weij^ht of (be esiahli-ihrnrnU 
requUile to her imrnedi.tie kafrty. anil in the medUte or iiltmiaie 
proireiion of her neighbors. This would neither l>e rquiijibte as 
it mjjccleil New Yortt. nor »alc as it respected Ihe otiicr Slate*. 
Various iiicnnvcnienccs would attend such .« system. The Stales 
to whose lol it nii);ht f.itl to support the nccessar)' establish menu 
would he a* llllle able as wJlUng. Tor a considernble time lo come, 
to bear the burden of compeicnt prurisloiis. The sectirily of idl 



SAFETY IN NATIONAL FORCES. 



'57 



would thm be subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or iiu- 
Ulty, ol « part. If the resources of sucli pan becoming more 
^unilanl nnil extensive, ila proviMUtit sliuiilit be proportiin.ibly 
tn[>rgnl.lbi:a<herSlat« would quickly lake the alnim al seeing 
1 he « hole iniliiarjr foice d ilie Union in ilie lianils of two or 
IhcKof jti menibrni. and thone probably amnngst the mo»i pnwcr- 
iui. They would cacfa choose to have sume cuunteqioine, and 
fctlniKi could e.uily be contrived. In (hiK silti:iI>on. niililaty 
euliltihincnis. noun&lied by iiiuiiul jcduusy. wuulil be up) to 
iwcll beyond iheir natural or proper Nile ; .mil liring .ni the sepa- 
rate ifiipos.il of llw members, they woulil be tnjjine* (or ihe 
abndjnieni or deinoliiion of the naliun;d ;iuihc)rity. 

Rrugfis have been already jftveti to induce n stipjxjsi* 
lion that the State Rosernmcnts will too tiaturally be 
prone to a rivalsbip with t)i»t uf the Union, the fouiida- 
tioaof which will be the love of [xiwer; :ind that in any 
coMest bel'wcco ihc federal head and one of its members 
ibe people will be most apt to imite with their local 
EOTeranient.' If, in addition to tliisimmen<;e advantage, 
(^ ambition o( the members should be stimulated by the 
wpante and independent possession of military forces, 
Hvosld afford too strong a temptation and too great a 
fwilitjr to thera to make enterprises upon, and Anally to 
sulwert, the constitutional authority of the Union. On 
ike other hand, the liberty of the people vronld belesft safe 
oilhif state of things than in tliat which left (he national 
'orccG in the hands of the national government. As 
^** ai an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon 
*"f power, it had better be in those hands o( which the 
People arc most likely to be jealous than in those of which 
(hey arc Icjist likely to be jealous. For it is a truth 
■liich the experience of ages has attested, that the 
people are always most in danger when the means of 
injuring their rights are in the prissev.tion of those of 
»hom they cntcruin the least suspicion. 

_ 'Ttil* WR( prntol in iin cxtnonUnVT dosite at the outbrrak oF lh« 
L'iiil \Vm. UiiS irli»! vraa. prxtiou Miuty. Ihe people of roth Hale 
"Ihereil to iheir mtion. «in<I eien national oRice-holilcii *ni1 ihe army 
■nil iMTynAcvn of dir South mrdy \MtA, dtiMi|:)i lliry uimcliilKS heil- 
Citeil. lo violate ih«ir |«*Tiuasly lakm aa\\\\ \A nllrciaiice to lli« 
Iwwd Slotod.— Editos. 



■58 



UAlNTENANCB IN TIME OF PEACE, ««. » 



The franicrs of the existing Confcdcratioo, fully aware 
of the danger to the Union from the separate possession 
of military forces by the States, have, id express terms, 
prohibited them from having either ships or troops, 
unless with the consent of Congress.' The truth \% 
that the existence of a federal government and military 
eslahliiihmcntx under State authority arc not less at vari> 
ence with each other than a due supply of the federal 
treasury and the system of quotas and requisitions. 

There are other lights, besides those already taken 
notice of, in which the impropriety of restraints on Uie 
discretion of the national legislature will he equally 
manifest. The design of the objection which lias been 
mentioned is to preclude standing armies in time of 
peace, though we have never been informed how far it is 
designed the prohibition sliuuld extend: whelhcr tu rais- 
ing armies as well as to kefpiHg them up in a season of 
tranquillity or not If it be confined to the latter, it will 
have no precise signification and it will be inelTectual for 
the purpose intended. When arraii-s are once raised, 
what shall be denominated ** keeping them up," contrary 
to the sense of the Constitution? What time shall be 
requisite to ascertain the violation? Shall it be a week, 
a month, a year? Or shall we say they may be continued 
as long as the danger which ucuisioncd their being raised, 
continnes? This would be to admit that they might be 
kept up in lime vf petitf, against threatening or impending 
danger, which would Ih: at once to deviate from the literal 
meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce an exten- 
sive latitude of construction. Who shall judge of ilie 
continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly be 
submitted to t)ie national government, and tlie matter 
would then be brought to ihb issue, that the national 
government, to provide against apprehended danger, 
might in the first insunce raise trooju, and might after- 
ward keep them on foot as long as they supposed the 
peace or safety of the community was in any degree of 

■ None ihe ka. .Soutli C«inlina In iSm ralMxl tweltc ibauwnil " mlan* 
teen " in her ptc|itu-aiiaiu to tmlkt the jtcnci«l )[uTri»ni»iL — EimiMi 



MVrVAL DBFES'SELESSSESS. 



«5» 



iMpardy. It It easy to perceive that a discretion ho lati- 
ludin^ry as tliis would afford ;iinplc room for eluding the 
force of the provision. 

The «up[>oiied utility of a proviilon of this kind can 
uoly be fuuDdcd od the supposed probability, or at leaat 
puvsibilit)*, of a combination between the executive aiul 
the legislative, in »»mc Kohemc of uKitrpalion. Should 
this at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabri- 
cate pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities, 
instigated by Spain or Itritain, wnuUl always he at hand, 
IVuvocjlions to produce the desired appearances might 
evrn 1m; given to some foreign power, and appeased again 
by timely conccssiuns. If we can reaxon^ibly preniime 
soch a contbinaiion to have been formed, and that the 
enterprise is warranted by a sufficient prospect of suc- 
cess, the army, when once raised, from whatever cause, 
uron whatever pretext, may be applied to the execution 
*A the project. 

If, to obviate this consequence, it should be rcso'ved 
to extend the prohibition to Uie raiting of armies in lime 
of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most 
extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen — 
that of a nation inca|)acitated by it* Constitution to pre- 
pare for defense before it was actually invaded. As the 
lercmony of a formal denunciation of war has of late 
(alien into disuse, the presence of an enemy within our 
territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to the 
Eovernmrnt to begin its levies of men fur the protection 
of Uic State. We must receive the blow before we could 
even prepare to return it. All that kind of policy by 
which nations anticipate distant danger and meet the 
gathering storm must be abstained from as contrary to 
the genuine maxims of a free government. We must 
expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign 
invaders and invite them by our weakness to scixe the 
naked and defenseless prey, because wc arc afraid that 
rs, created by our choiirc. dependent on our will, might 
inger that liberty by an abuse of the means necessary 
s preservation. 



MIUTIA INADEQUATE. 



(■•.« 



Here I expect wc shall be told that the militia of the 
Gountrjr is its natural bulwark, utid would he at uU times 
equal to the national defense. This doctrine, in sub- 
stance, had like to have lost us our independence. It 
cost millions to the United Slates that might have been 
saved. The factK which, from our own experience, for- 
bid a reliance of this kind arc too recent to permit us to 
be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady opera- 
tions of war uj;ain»t a reitubr and disciplined army can 
only be successfully conducted by a force of the same 
kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of sta- 
bility and vigor, confirm this position. The American 
militia, in the course of the late war, have, by their valor 
on numerous occasions, crn^ted eternal mnnumcnls to 
their fame; but the braves.t of them feel and know tliat 
the liberty of their country could not have been estab- 
lished by their efforts alone, however great and valuable 
they were. War, like most other things, is a science to 
be acquifed and perfected by diligence, by perseverattce, 
by time, and by practice. 

All viuki;! jiolicy, as il Is conltary to the natural and eiperi- 
mccil cnuric oi human .-iR.-ufK, ilefcatt ilscU. Pmn!()'iranla, at this 
jnsiani, ufli>iils aii cxjinpk o( ihe ttuih of iliis reiiijirk. The Bill 
i>l Rigtits of ihni St^le decl.iret (liiit M.imlini; atmiK are (Uii|^- 
oiit to liberty and ouglii not lo he kept up in limr of peace, 
reiinvyl Villi i^i. ncvciilickss. in a lime of proftniTiil jicacc, from the 
cxiMcnce af pnriijl diMKkrs in one ni two of her couniirs, has 
resolved lo raise a bo>ly u( troops: and in all probulnlily will keep 
litem up at long ai there is any appenranec tA danger lo the public 
peace.' The conduct of MassacJiusclUi affords a Il-smm on ilic 
»ani« subject, (hough on different gromul. Thai State (wiihuul 
waiiint; for ilie Mnciion of Conijicss. as the ankksof ihe Con- 
leclcralion rc(|uiiir| w.is cornttclled lo rai«T lr(K>|« to ijuell a ilonies- 
Itc insuriectiuii. and xtili kn-ps ;i cotp« in p.'ky lo picvrnl a rcviial 
of the spirit ofrrvoll.* The t>uiticulat conslilulKifl of Ma>sacliU' 
seits opposed no obtlacle la ifie measure : but the instance 'v. «ill 
of lue lo inviruct \\\ ih.ii cases aie likely lo occur under our gov- 
crament, as well aa under llmie of oilier oaiions. which will some- 



' Tfce Wywmlne . 
* To lu|>|ireb bt 



■ — RotrnB. 
nm,— EoiroE. 



^&^ 



HtmaMo) 



SUBrEKFVGES. 



t6t 



limn rcnikr a milit.iry force in time of pc.ice eswnliiil lo the 
wcuriiy ol t))c VKwXy. and tlul it 1^ ihefefnrc iinprnprr in this 
■v>|>eci to control the legiiUiii-c di«cteiioii. 1( aliu tF.ichM us, iili 
Its applk.ilion to (he United Si.iirs. how little (he nuhls of a (ceblel 
{ovemntcnt arc likely to be raped cd. e>-en bj- its own consiltu-j 
enlf. And it teKhes us, in addiiion to the rest, how unequal 
parchment proviitiMis are lo a sttu^gte with pulilic iiec«»il)r. 

It vtxi a (uniUmcnial maxim of the l^ccdj-nionian common* 
wealth that the puit of admiral nhuutd nui be cuiifciicd twice on 
the same perwn. The Peloponnesi.in con(cdcral«. haring; *ii(. 
fercd A severe defeat .i( Ken froni the Aihctilans. denmnded 
Lysniidcr, who had before trrvrtt wiih siicccn in ihat capacity, lo 
c<Knmind the cmnbined fleeli. The Lacnla^iiionians. lo (jrallfy 
IlKir allies, and ycl preserve the scmblanee of an adherence 10 
ihcir ancient itiuiiuiions, had iecour»« to the Himsy sublerfiigc of 
Inrettiitg Lysamlcr with ihe real power of admiral, under (lie 
iKxninal liik of vice admiral. This instance is selected from 
iinon% a multitude Ihat roighl be cited ta conlinii llic tiulh 
alre.iily advanccil an<l dtusiiaieil by doftie«iic examples: wliich iS. 
ihal naliont pay little reganl lo rule* and maiim« tulcirUted in 
llirir ifety nalui'e to run conntcr to the i>eeessitie*of tocieiy. Wiw 
politicians will he cauliuui ^boul fclletiiig the t;<fvernment with 
lesliiclion* that cannot he obsei'ved, because they know thai every 
breach of the fundamental laws. thoiiKh tliclaled by necessity. 
Impairs (hat sncred reverence whi<rh ouKhi lo be maintained in Ihe 
brextt of rulers lowant the coiisiiiution of a country, and forms a 
precMlcni for ulher breaches where Ihe same plea of necessity 
■loes not exbl at all, or ialcst urgent and palpable. 



l6» POWER AND PRlViLBGS. »•■ •• 



No. 26. <.lm^ft-Jtmt /*i,rn»l, Dt<«nbMH, »«f.) HaiuiUoil. 

ABSURDITY OF RESTRAINING THE I.GUISLA- 
TIVK AUTHORITV AS TO NATIONAL DE- 

FKNSE. 

Pi^uiar mvtutimi Ktff aMf A> *fprtH»» f»ntr atd frivUegi — The 
Tttlftiil 0n UgitlMartt if 1 A> Jt/ttiM ia M' 'Ai" ifmfi/ulijHi — Ctnttal 
J/iiiitn t/ Amerim rffvifJ liitaA rttlraiM-~fiiil»ry 9/ lit rtttiitlutt 
w* itait-dni! armf I'a Uirjt B'tlaim — Prrutil ttaJiliim in thai <»»atry— 
Ah ktrejitary frijt,Ji<t tf ilaiiJi»i atmiri in Amerutt-^Tkt iiAttiamtilm- 
tiiini — ChKU 11 tsMifitHtifnM f/ Ptitftyhitiiii end Xtrlli C^tvUua — Bitn. 
mial affrrfriathnt tin4tr Ihi tttt* triililuti^a f»r army — AiimrJily */ 
ihf frrJUliont cf tki iicts</rnim n/ Amfruan liiiifly — /mfmiMl/y e/ 
gif4Hly HMgnrriliiig tkt army — Daugrr Jitm Ikt txrtaliit— Danger all 
tkt grtatir in » Jiiitnilni ilalt. 

Ta the Petfflt of the Slaft ef New York: 

II was a thing hardly to be cx|H?ticd that in a popular 
revolution tli« mitid^ uf men kIwiuUI Mop at thai h.ippy 
mean which marks the salutary boundary between rowKR 
ami PRivri-ROK, and coinhincs the energy of government 
with the security of private rights, A failure in this 
delicate and important point is the great source of the 
inconveniences we experience, and if we ure not cautions 
to avoid a repetition of the error in our future attempts 
to rectify and amcliuratc our system, we miiy travel from 
one <:liimerii:;il project to another; we may try change 
after change; but we shall never be likely to make any 
mnteriid change for the better. 

The idea of reslraininK (he leeistatire authority In the 
mean; of providing for the national defense is one of 
those refinements which owe their origin to a leiil for 
liberty more ardent than enlightened. We have seen, 
however, that it ha« not had thus far an extenNive prev- 
alency: that even in this country, where it made its 
first ap)>rur;ini:e, Pennsylvania and North Carolina are 
the only two States by which it has been in any degree 
patronized ; and tnat all the others have refused tu givi 



ItBiMm) 



DANGEROUS EXTREMES. 



i«3 



it the least countenance; wisely judging that confidence 
must be placed somewhere; that the necessity of doing 
it is implied in the very act of delegating power; and 
thai it is better to hazard the abuse of that confi'dcncc 
than to embiiiraiis the govcrniiient and endanger the 
public safety by Impolitic restriction x on the legislative 
authority. The opponents of the proposed Constitution 
comtKii, in this rrspcct, the general decision uf America; 
and, iuslead of beinj^ taught by e>:i)erience the propriety 
ofwrreclingany extremes into which vfc may have here- 
lotote run, they appear disposed to conduct us into 
others still more dangerous and more extravagant. As if 
the tone of ffovcrnmcnl had been found too high or too 
rigid, the doctnncs they ttach arc calculated to induce us 
to depress or to relax it, by expedients which, upon other 
uttaiiofts, have been condcmntd or forborne. It may be 
aftrmed, without the imputation of invectii'c, that if the 
pfvciples they inculcate on various points could so far' 
■^■D as to become the po|)ular creed, they would utterly 
uaii the people of this country for any species of govern- 
■Dent whatever. Uut a danger of this kind is not to be 
apprehended. The citiirns of .America have too much 
^■Kernmcnt to be argued into anarchy. And 1 am much 

Kilakcn, if experience has not wrought a deep and 
<Miui conviction in the public mind thai greater energy 
tecrnment is essential to the welfare and prosperity 
K community. 

It may not be umtss in this place concisely to remark 
('■e origin and progress of the idea which aims at the 
^Illusion of military establishments in time of peace, 
fhough in specnlativc minds it may arise from a con- 

Muplatiun of the nature and tendency of such instttu* 
m^ fortified by the events that have happened in other 
es and countries, yet as a national sentiment it must 
l>e traced to those habits of tliinktug which we derive 
'foin the nation from whom the inhabitants of these 
l*iUies have in general sprung. 

bi England, fnf a (nng lime ;ificf llie Norman Cnoquesi, lh« 
iriiy ol ibe monarch was almost uidiiniled. Inroad* were 



.64 



STANDING ARMIES IN ENGLAND 



no.M 



gradually m^Af upon Ibr p rcrog.it ive. in fnvor ol lil^rly. fir^i by 
Ihe iMroiis. nnil all e runt iK by the pcoplt, iill the Ki«,itr>i [Mfi of 
its mo<st fonniiUhle pr<rlcn«an« hccnmc extinct. But it was nol 
titl ihe rcvotuiinn in 168II. which ctevAtcd the Prince of Orange 10 
the throne ai C.xtxi Itriiain, that Enjjliih lil>eny was completely 
(riuitiph^nl. A« iiictilcnt to (he un<kf)nrd power of making war. 
an acicnowlcdKcd prcroKative of the crown. Chailes 11. hiul by bis 
own authority Itept on foot in ticne of peace * body of five llrau- 
aand rcguUr iroap«. And this number Jume* tl. iiicre^ued to 
ihiity tlvou3.>iid. wlio were paid out of his cti'il Msi. At the revo- 
lution, to abutixih Ilie uercine of so d-ingerout an nuihority. it 
became an Jiilicle of \\ie Rill o( Rights ihcii (ramed. that "the 
(aitin)! or keejiini; a tlandiii]; «iniy within the kiiif;iloni in time of 
)>eAce. Htlrtt tcilA Iht (OHtrnl 0/ l'.trtiitmtnl. w.i* .)g.iin«t hw." 

In that kin|{iIoni, when tlie pulse of liberty nas iil lt« highc&l 
|>ileh, no security ngainM ihr djni{c« of »lamlin|; armies wa» 
thought ret|uinite. bejoiid a prohibition of ilieir licins i^aised or 
kepi up by the men: authority of the executive m.igi*irate. The 
palrioiti who eflecled ihtit mcmonblc revolution were too Inn- 
|M:rjte, too well iiiformed. lo think of any icstrixiiil on the Icglslalirc 
iliscrclion. They were .iwarc th.it a ccrt.iia number ol troops for 
guaiiK and j[arTi.%ons were indispen«;d>le : that no prrcine buunda 
eould be lel 10 liie national exigencies : th.1l a power r<)ual 10 
erery possible contingency iituvt exist soinewlieie in the govero* 
mcni : and that when they referred the exercne ol that power 10 
llie liidgmeni of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate 
point of ixecaution which wax rccoiKilable with Ilie safety of (tie 
community. 

From (lie same source, the people of America majr be 
5.ii<l to have derived an hereditary imprcKsion of danger 
to liberty from slandius armies in time of peace. The 
ctrcumstani:cs of a revolution quickened the public 
sen>it>illty un every point connected wiiK the ftecuriif of 
popular rights and in some instances raised the warmth 
of nur Mai beyond the degree which conMsted with the 
due temperature of the body |>utitic. The attempts of 
two of the States to restrict the autlioritf of the legisla- 
ture, in the article of milit.^ry eitaliHshmenls, are of the 
number of these instances. The principles which bad 
uught us lo be jealous of the power of an hcretlitary 
monarch were, by an injudicious exi^eso, extended tu tlie 
representatives of the people in their popular assemblies 



I«»aM«l S/LEXCE OF STATE LEG I SLA TV It ES 



'6S 



Evtn in some of the Stales where this error was not 
tdopted we find uniiccesKary decUnitioiis tliat standing 
irmies ought not to be kept up in time of peace, with- 
out THK CONSENT Of tllK LEGISLATUKK. 1 Call them 

OD necessary, because ilie reason which had introduced a 
similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not 
applicable tn any of the State constitutions. The power 
of raising armies at all, under those constitutions, can by 
no construction be dccmeJ to reside anywhere else than 
in the legislatures themselves; and it wiis superfluous, if 
not absurd, to declare that a matter should not be done 
without the consent of a body which alone had the 
power of doing it. Accordingly, in some of those con^ 
stilutions,— and, among others, in thai of this State 
of New York, which has been justly celebrated both in 
Europe and America as one of the best of the forms 
of government established in this country,— there is a 
total silence upon the subject. 

It is remarkable that, even in the two States which 
seem to have meditated an interdiction of military eslab- 
lisfameots in time of peace, the mode of expression made 
use of is rnthcr caiitionjry than prohibitory. It is not 
takl thatstanding armies f^ii//'(cV^<r kept up, but that they 
wghtwt to be kept up, in time of peace. This ambiguity 
of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict be- 
tween jealousy and conviction; between the desire of 
excluding such establishments at all events, and the per- 
suasion that an absolute exclusion would be unwise and 
unsafe. 

Can it be doubted that such a provi»on, whenever the 
Utoation of public affairs watt understood to require a 
departure from it, would be interpreted by the legisla- 
tare into a mere admonition, and would be matte to 
jicid to the necessities or supposed necessities of the 
State? Let the fact already mentioned with respect to 
1^ Pennsylvania decide. What then (it may lie 

■••M. asked) is the use of such a provision, if it 

(ca»c to operate the moment there is an inclination to 
■Iisregard it? 



t66 pj/or/sroA's fok m/iitaxv forces. ili«.»» 

I-el us cicimine whether there be any comparison, in 
point of efficacy, between the provision alliulcd to and 
that which is contained in the new Constitution, for 
restraining the appropriations of money for military par- 
poses to the period of two yeant. The former, by aim- 
ing at too much, is calculated to effect nothing; the 
latter, by steering clear of an imprudent extreme and 
by beinjc perfectly compatible with a proper provision 
for the exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and 
powerful operation. 

The legislature of the United States wilt be oNigeJ, by 
this provision, once at least in every two years, to delib- 
«ratc upon the propriety of keeping a military force on 
foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to 
declare their sense of the matter by a formal vote in the 
face of their constituents. They are not at libtrty to 
vest in the executive department permanent funds for 
the support of an army, if they were even tucautiuus 
enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a con- 
fidence. As the spirit of i>arty in different degrees 
must be expected to infect all political bodies, there will 
be, no doubt, persons in the national legislature willing 
enough to arraign the measures and criminate the views 
of the majority. The provision for the support of a 
military force will always be a favorable topic for dccla- 
matiuR. As often as the question comes forward, the 
public attention will be roused and attracted to the sub- 
ject by the party in opposition; and if the majority 
should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, 
tlic community will be warned of the d.ingtr, and will 
have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against 
it. Indepciulcnt of parties in the national legislature 
itself, as often as the period nf discussion arrived, the 
State lc;!islatures, who will always be not only Ttgilant 
but suspicious and jcalom ;;uarilians of the rigtits o( the 
citizens agiiinst rncroaclinicnts friim the federal govern* 
ment, will constantly have their attention awake to ibe 
conduct of the national rukrs, and will be ready enough, 
if anything impniper appears, to sound the alarm to the 




CO.VSF/JtACy IMPROBABLE. 

people, and oot only to be the voiCK, but, if necessary, 
thcAKM uf discontent. 

Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community 
rtfairetifK lo mature them for execution. An army so 
Iju'ge as seriously to menace those liberties could only 
be formed by progressive augmentations; which would 
suppose, nut merely a tempurary combination between 
the legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy 
for a scries of time, Js it probable that such a corabina- 
iion would exist at all? Is it probiiblc that it would be 
[icrscvercd in, and transmitted alon^ through all the 
successive variations in a representative body, which 
biennial elections would n^iturally (iroduce in both 
houses? Is it presumable that every man, the instant 
he took his scat in the national !ien;tte or House of 
Re{)res«ntativi;K, would commence a traitor to his con- 
stituents and to his country? Can it be supposed that 
there would not be found one man discerning enoURh 
to delect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest 
enough to appiisc his constituents ol their danger? If 
such presumptions can fairly be made, there ought at once 
lu be an end of alt delegated authority. The people 
should resolve tn recall all tlie powerit they have here- 
tofore parted with out of their own hands, and to divide 
themselves into as many States as there are counties, in 
order that they may be able to manage their own con- 
cerns in person. 

If such suppositions Qould even be reasonably made, 
still the concealment of the design for any duration 
would be impracticable. It would be announced by the 
very circumstance of augmenting the army to so great 
40 extent in time of prwfuund peace. What colorable 
reason could be assigned in a country so situated, for 
tnch vast augmentations of the military force? It is 
inpostible that the people could be long deceived; and 
the destruction of the project, and of the projectors, 
would quickly follow the discovery. 

It has been said that the provision which limits the 
■ppropriation of money for the support of an army to 



|6S 



DANGSS GREATER IN DISUS'IOX. 



tB«.H 



the pericKj of two years would be unavailing, because the 
Executive, when once possessed o( a force large ctiouch 
to awe the people into submission, woultl lim] resources 
in that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense 
with supplies from the acts of the legislature. But the 
question aj^ain recurs, upon wliat pretense could be be 
put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time of 
peace? If we suppose it to have been created in conse- 
(]UGDCe of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, 
then it becomes a case not within the principles of the 
objection; for this is leveled against the power of keep- 
ing up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be sn 
visionary as seriously to contend that military forces 
ought not to he raiiied to quell a rebellion or resist an 
invasion; and if the defense of the community under 
such circumstances should make it necessary to have an 
army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of 
those calamities for which there is neither preventative 
nor cure, ft cinnot be provided against by any possible 
form of government; it might even result from a simple 
league offensive and defensive, if it should ever be neces- 
sary for the confederates or allies to form an army for 
common defense. 

But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a 
united than in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely 
asserted that it is an evil altogether unlikely to ntleml 
us in the latter situation, ft is not easy to conceive a 
possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the 
whole Union as to denuind a force cimsidrr.ible enough 
to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially 
If we take into our view the aid to be derived from the 
militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a 
valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of dis- 
union (as hiis been fully shown in another place), the 
contrary of this supp<^)sition would become not only 
probable, but almost unavoidable. 

rUBLtUK 



ALLEGED FOPVLAH DtSAFfUCTION. 169 

K0.27. (/f,~Kw»/!«i«,i>«B.b.r.(,ii*j.> Hamilton. 

IMPOSSIBILITY OF A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
WITHOUr A NATIONAL i-ORCE. 

AUigrd JiiiiKtiM4iMti af Ike pr^e t» frJerai «utA^ly — A pnftt'i 
»MitM€t It a fnttHmtitt fraforiiamJ t« ill gtmfntij sr tadntn—I.iMi- 
kmd 1^1 /*/ gtntral gavetttmtnl will tt itUir adminiiUnJ Ikin lit 
j^-^rnutnth 9/ Iht tt^lii—Eipteial i\ilHfo/ tkr n/tti^nal tfuatf '^Greater 
fnnr p/ Ikt x-iAVii in aalrelHii: itJilifn anil /atliut — C<rtrtriimml 
titmU it fill by iilii/iii~Crrliiiniy 't-tl 1 umea teill Hitd la iKiflt-f 
first leu »ften Ikan le/^ralt lottfttleTiiiiis — Tie genital ffvermmnl aiU 
It use 9t4inarji legal prteetut — Pitutiar ii,itnirilagt e»/>ytJ iy iiliomit 
Asm. 

TV the Peffle 0/ the Stale cf New York: 

It has been tirgcd. in ditTcrcnt shapes, that a Constilu- 
tiion of the kind proposed t)/ the convcntinn cannot 
operate without the aid of a military force to execute its 
laws. This, however, lilcc most other things that have 
Iwrn .illcgcd on that side, rests on mere general assertion 
nniuppurted by any preciite or intelligible designation of 
ihc reasons upon which it is founded. As far an I hare 
Iteen able to divine the latent mriinmg of the objectors, 
il seemit to originate in a pri^suppOKttiun that the people 
will be disinclined to the exercise of federal authority in 
any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any exception 
that might be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of 
the distinction between internal and external, let us 
in<|uire what ground there is to presuppose that disin- 
clination in Ihc people. Unless wc presume at the same 
lime that the powers of the general government will be 
worse administered than those of the State govfrnmcnt, 
there seems to he no room for the presumption of ill will, 
tlisaSection, or opposition in the people. 1 believe it 
nuy be laid down as a general rule that their confidence 
in and obedience in a government will commonly be 
proportioned to the goodness or badness of its adminis- 
tration. It must be admitted that there are exi:eptions 
to this rule; but these exceptions depend so entirety on 



i;o V.V/O.V TO BE %VELL ADMtSlSTBRHD. (■•. IT 

accidental causes that they cannot be considered as 
having any relation to tl)c intrinsic merits or demerits of 
a constitution. These c^in only be judged of by t-cneral 
principles and maxims. 

Various reasons have been suggested, in Ibc course of 
those p:ipers, to induce a probability that the general 
government will be better administered than the particular 
governments: the principal of which reasons arc Ihat the 
extension o( the spheres of election will present a greater 
option or latitude of choice to the people; that through 
the medium of the State legislatures — which are select 
bodies of men, and which arc to appoint the members of 
the national Senate— there is reason to ex|>ect Ihat this 
branch will generally be composed with peculiar care and 
judgment; that these circumKlunces promise greater 
knowledge and more extensive information in the national 
councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted 
by the spirit of faction^ and more out of the reach of 
those occasional ill humors, or temporary prejudices and 
propensities which, in smaller societies, frequently con- 
taminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppres- 
sion of a part of the community, and engender schemes 
which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or 
desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and 
disgust. Several additional reasons ufconsiilcrabic force 
to fortify that probability will occur when we come to 
survey with a more critical eye the interior structure of 
the ediltce which we are invited to erect. It will be 
sufficient here to remark that, until satisfactory reasons 
can be assigned to jostify an opinion that the federal 
government is likely to be administered in such a manner 
as to render it odious or contemptible to ilie people, 
there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposi- 
tion that tile laws of the Union will meet with any greater 
obstruction from them, or wdl stand in need of any other 
methods to enforce Utcir execution, than the laws of the 
particular members. 

The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; 
the dread o( punishment, a proportionably strong dis- 



R 



■•■Ul^l RESPECT FOR NATIONAL AUTHORITY. I?' 

conrascnicnt to it. Will not the goTcrnmcnt of the 
Union — wliicli, if )»o»scmu;<1 uf s\ due degree of power, can 
ult to lift aid the collective reftourues of the whole Con- 
federacy — be mort likely to repress Xhc farmer sentiment 
and to ins[>ire the latttr, than that of u single Sliitc, which 
can only command the resources within itself? A turbu- 
lent faction in a State may easily suppose itself ahle to 
contend with the friends to the government in that State; 
but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a 
■natch for the combined efforts of the Union. If this 
reDcction be jnst, there is less danger of resistance from 
irreifulur combinations of individuals to the authority of 
the Confederacy than to that of a single member.* 
1 will in this place luix^rd an observation which will 
Dt be the less just because to .some it may ai>pcar new: 
rbich is that the more the operations of the national 
authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of 
government, the more the citizens are accustomed to 
meet with it in the common occurrences of their political 
^fc; the more it is familiarized to their sight and to their 
Jeetingiv; the further it enters into those objects which 
'll{giieh the most sensible chords and put in motion the 
iiiost active springs of the human heart; the greater will 
be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and 
attachment of the community. Man is very much a 
creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses 
will generally have but little influence upon his mind. 
A government continually at a distance and out of sight 

' Ttiu hu hwn ntrioiiily ihovii by tlie 'lulinclion in llic puhlic mind 
between " RefuUn " «nd ■' Mililia." In l>oih the g'"' railtuid iiiiku 
of 1877 ami 1S94 llie noten rctiilnl billerly llie ImaI roililis. hut with 
lit* kMNainiuc ■)( Uniicil .Statci tnHiph, lbuiit>h ihcy iiunilieicil i>ii niEiie 
ikui tbc tnilii'i. aclii*] tc<»tiiiicr cvuceI. TIic urns citcuinttaiKit wu 
ihovn in the Lomlofi " un«mplo)-c<t-tioli " of 18SS, wh«n lli« fcelln)[ 
of lite inol> <o"ird the police vu cxcccdinsly billcT ; but the moincni 
Ik l<i' ' -teA. ihe ».Biff ilolcrt tieijio 10 joke uith them. The 

■fch-i iTcare Ix'lwcen mmllng loral uliuinitintlon and rMiit. 

U( the ri>ii{in » cnornaoiu, fur ihc Ifat « man knuwi, Iho more he ia 
govemed h]r bit imiginatjon. So long ai Mtcuion w«t under ditcuuion 
M ■ cniuliiuiMiul i|ne>tlon, the ina»» could lake no part, bnl when 
iht lUg vai nitnl ini, ilicy uJDiknUiod ihe i»ae men clearly than many 
•till* (Mdetv— £di roB. 



171 



/.ESS NEED OF FOKCS BY UfftOft. 



[■•. »T 



tan hardly be expected to interest the sensatioMof the 
people.' The inference il that tlie authority o( the 
Union, and the afTections of the citizens toward it, will 
be strengthened rather than weakened by its extension 
to what are called mutters of ititern.i1 concern; and will 
have less uccnsion to recur to force, in proportion to the 
familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The 
more it circulates through those chininek and currents in 
which the passions of mankind naturally l!ow, the less 
will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedi- 
ents of compulsion. 

One thing at all events must be evident, that a govern- 
ment like the one proposed wouid bid much fairer to 
avoid the necessity of nsing force than that species of 
league contended for hy most of its opponents, the 
authority of which should only operate upon the States 
in their political or collective cajMirities. It has been 
bm shown that in such a Confederacy there can 

Mo. IS. be no sanction for the laws but force; that 

frequent delinquencies in the members arc the natural 



' Thit menial >llTtni(« Tqinnhn the IpxI Io nnr of ih* nml bvfllianl 
wclioni of Itif^hni'i " Eii^IhK Contlitulion," in nhjcli he poi*t> oM 
llul ttM Kovcinmenl ol Eii]{Und tiiliial. pouaunga " iliiitiifiecl pavt" aail 
im '' cffi^iCMt |iaR ": the (iiriiier tvinu mjifilrrit liv ilic tuiernun. 4i>il llit 
tjtltvr l^y llic wnTltin;^ ^mtiiiktralKin. Tlir 'Ir^nifinl pvl. Yvr miiititaint. 
GomiMiiKb thai In^'lly ■o'l ravmncv hjr wliich alon« ilia In)^ part 
of Ibe people ii •.-unlrollcd ; ihe lack o( Ihis lie coiisidm ■ groU 
defccl l> Pictiilcnlial navetninviit. Vet the caainple of lic^il Uriuin 
lUtdf duriBi; Ihe Coinmnuiraillli. if nni n( Fruice and (lie Ciiiteil 
Stam, (iMnU tiare tliotm liiiu thai alial |r«ly cflonnimla tbc lojiliy aiHl 
rcrcTtnc* <A a peujfle n tlie i«al nalioiialily of irhttli. ia K'>cla<"l, IIib 
kDveiri)^ liippeni Io be ih« nnoM olinnui nrreiuon. ''^-'Ift iu hi* 
" Life of Sicin " iltitrt Ilic •liitincllon llial Nagvilcon n < i;*!!^)^ 

to mniucr luly. Getnunf. and Awdila bneauke there . c <oii»- 

tiioiU dial time, no ttuc WA** f>\ nalloaalltj ; Inil in ^1|»1r^ .imi Knula, 
where the contrary wn true, Nii)in)«on faittd iq^allr. Vet nil tliew 
coiiniriea wrnr ei^nally equipped with royally- Ho* the feiiK of loyally 
bai groirti in ihe Uniiccl Smicii. doi ihrD*|;)i Tcrenoce fur • AjmehMiI, 
but ihroQgfa ■ greatei an<f eieiter ronwIoqiacM of actual BMl(WtUly, b a 
BiOM ialemttne uu-ly \tm Hnlu nunwlii at Ihe oiitiinnl ril " •nnUp 
of tlic aintliliitioii " wlikh i)Frcto)>e(l almiHt with its aJii|-ti')n, anil noir* 
■ibyt Iherv i* nrach ntiikal initin)* about the Matitnenl tor " llir Hic". 
7*1 each form t^ loyally it \m\. a lurtacv eijweukiu of a far •leepcr lEclino. 
com^NioAini; eiactly to what Ba^cchoc luperiUlally betloed t'> !« metrly 
a leverciux lor i&c (Juecn.— EMioa. 



il 




olF&prin£ of the very frame of the government; and that 
as often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if 
at all, by war aiid violence. 

The plan reported by the convention, by extending the 
authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of 
the several Sutes, will enable the government to employ 
the ordinary magistracy of each in the execution of its 
laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, 
in the common apprehension, all distinction between the 
sources from which they might proceed; and will give 
the federal government the same advantage for securing 
a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed hy the 
guvernnient of each State, in addition to the influence on 
public opinion which will result from the important con- 
sideration of its having power to call to its assistance and 
support the resource* of the whole Union. It merits 
particular attention in this place, tliat the laws of the 
Confederacy, as to the tnumtraitii and ItgUimate objects 
of its jurisdiction, will become the sufKKMK law of the 
land, to the observance of which all officers — legislative, 
executive, and judicial, in each State— will be bound by 
the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, 
and miigistrate« of the respective members will be in- 
corporated into the operations of the national goveriimrnt 
at far as its just and {omtHuthna! authority extrmh, and 
will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.* 
Any man who wilt pursue by his own reflections the con- 
sequences of this situation will perceive that there is 
good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable 
execution of the laws of the Union, if its powers are 
administered with a common share of prudence. If we 
«tll arbitrarily .luppose the contrary, we may deduce any 
inferences we please from the supposition; for it is cer- 
Uinly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authori- 
ties of the best government tluit ever was, or ever can be 
instituted, to provoke and precipitate the people into 

* Ths MpAiIflry which hu bMit «nip1o):td, to Hh«w ikil thit wil! i«nd 
to lh» dntnini'm o( tho State ^venmievt*. will, in its jiropBr pUi*, be 
lally aeteeted.— PVKjua. 



'74 



MALADIES OF BODY POUTIC. 



f>«.M 



the wildest excesses. But tliough the acIvcrKirics of ihc 
proposed Constitution «liould presume that the nvtioiul 
rulers wuutd be inisensiblc to the motives u( public ^u-iA 
or to the obligattnns of duty, 1 would slill ask tlicm liuw 
the interests of ambition or the views of encroacbment 
can be promoted by sugh a conduct? 

TUBLIUS. 



No. 28. </BA/^W>a(/»anM/, Itecndbnit. tr«r,> 



HamiltotL 



CONDITIONS WHICH NECESSITATE A 
NATIONAL tOKCE. 

ttiurrtttitHi a miiaJy iiutfanMt frtm tkt k»iji ftlitU — An ititmr- 
Titian a d»ngtr I9 all ^Pitrn'n/ilt — Eiif<riiiKt 9/ Mjiiaikuitlli anj 
Peaiuj/iatiia — AVm York tmui I'rrmeHt — Sip^'aU ien/tJtra{»ti tntfetl 
U tAmt Hnjiliftii dJ tkt Uniitn—A /nil aHitatr If fkjitliaH ii that Ikt 
ffmer n in lit hunJi (■/ iIk rtfrtitalafivti o/ikefvofU — CrrUin intan 
'/ /v/k/i»- rtiutoHU ti nsitrf^alifti — A-tv^nl'gt «/ t-"gt ItrrU^ty vti 
*/ ttiiU grptrnrnfMl—imfr/iuitlilf t/ a taegr itaaJmg nrnty, 

J> tht Peo^t 0/ tke Slate 0/ New York: 

That there may happen cases in which the national 
government may be necessitated to resort to force, can- 
not be denied. Our own experience lias corrotMjrated 
the lessons taucht by the examples of other nations; 
that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise iu all 
societies, liuwever constituted; that ftcditions and insur- 
rections arc, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the 
iKKJy politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural 
body; that the idea of governing at all times by the sim- 
ple force of law (which we have been told is the only 
admissible principle of republican government) baa no 
place but in the reveries of tlii>se political doctors whose 
sagacity disdains the admunitinns »( experimental 
instruction. 

Should such emcrgrencies at any time hapjit-n under 
(he national government, there could be no remedy tiut 
force. The meaiu to be emplujrcd must be prupartioaed 



IhiIUm] 



locAt Msi/xfiEcnoy. 



'7S 



to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a slight 
comiDoiion in a small part of a State, the iiitUtia of the 
residue would be adequate to its suppression; and the 
■atural presumption is that they would be ready to do 
their duty. An iusurrei-tion, whatever may be its imme- 
diate cause, eventually endangers all government. Re- 
gard to the pubhc peace, if not to the rights of the Union, 
VMJd engage the citixens to whom the contagion 
had not communicated itself, to oppose the insurgents; 
mil if the general government should be found in prac- 
tice conducive to the prosperity and felicity of the 
people, it were Irrational to believe that they would be 
dUinclincd to its support. 

If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a 
whole State, or a principal part of it. the employment of 
adiScrcnt kind of force might become unavoidable. It 
appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to raise 
ttoops for repressing the disorders within that State; 
Ifcat Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of cora- 
■ottons among a part of her citizens, has thought proper 
to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose the 
Slate of New York had been inclined to re-eslabtish her 
'wt jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont, could 
sbc liavc hoped tor success in such an enterpnse from 
the efforts of the militia alone? Wuuld she not have 
ixea compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular 
force for the execution of her deitign? If it must then 
l>e admitted that the necessity of recurring to a force 
didcrcnt from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary 
Mlure. is applicable to the State governments them- 
«!«», why sliould the possibility that the national 
government might be under a like necessity, in similar 
otremitifs, be made an objection to its existence? Is it 
not surprising that men who declare an attachment to 
(he Union in the abstract should urge as an objection 
to the proposed Conslilutiim what applies with tenfold 
vcighl to the plan for which ihey contend; and what, as 
(kr as it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable con- 
sequence of eivil society upon an enlarged scale? Who 



174 MALADIES OF BODY FOUTIC. [»«. M 

tlie wildest excesses. But though tbe adversaries of the 
proposed Constitution sliuuld presume that the natioaal 
rulers would be inseniiible to tlie mutives uf public gu<Kl 
or to the obligations of duty, I would still ask thcin how 
the interests of ambition or the views of encroach meat 
can be promoted by such a conduct? 

PUBLIUS. 



No. 28. </«rf«ifiiA<ir/fBmi/. i>Mmb*rx,i|ff.) Hamilton. 

CONDITIONS WHICH NECESSITATE A 

NATIONAL t-OKCE. 

lni»rrtttie»i d mataiiy tmiefaraUi from lit tody ftlilU — An iMinr. 
rttlifH a Jatgi' la all gmtntmfHl — /CiftrHiut c/ J/JinuAuu/ti and 
J'tnntyii'am.i — AVic ytrt ffmufrrmeal — SffaraUimi/ti/ltradfiiiUjftI 
It lamr itnJili*m ai tkt l/ntft — A fitU aiuvitr In tijttluM it lisl fAr 
foc/tr U in lh< kartJt a/ Iki rtfristnlalivts »/ Iht ptafU — Ctrt^n nifittt 
e/ fefular riiuiiuuf is nmrfialUu — Aitivnlaj-r <■/ litfp Urril^rf ami 
e/ ilatt gavtrumtHl — /m/viiiMiIyi'/ » Urgt iliiHiiiu{ armj. 

To the PeopU 0/ the Slate oj New York: 

That there may happen cases in which the national 
([overnmcnt may be necessitated to resort to force, can- 
not be denied. Our own experience has corroborated 
the lessons tiiuglit by the examples of other nations; 
lliat emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all 
societies, however constituted; that seditions and insur- 
rections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the 
l>ody politic as tumors and eroptions from the naturni 
body; that the idea of governing at all times by the sim- 
ple force of law (which we have been told is the only 
admissible principle of republican government) has no 
place but in the reveries of those political doctors whose 
sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental 
iiisiniction. 

Should such emergencies at any time happen under 
the nation^tl government, there could be no remedy but 
force. Tbe meoas to be employed must be proportioned 



BunittoBi LOCAL /A'sa/ffiscrJOM, 17s 

to (he extent of the mischief, If it should be a slight 
commotion in a small part ol a ^t;itc, the militia of the 
miilue would be adequate to its suppression: ^nO the 
natural presumption is that thvy would be ready to do 
their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its imme- 
diate cause, eventually endanf[ers all govern nieiit. Re- 
gard to the public peace, if not to the rights of the Union, 
would engage the citizens to whom the contagion 
had not communicated itself, to oppose the insurgents; 
and if the general government should be found in prac- 
tice conducive to the prosperity and felicity of the 
people, it were irrational to believe that tliey would be 
disinclined to its support. 

If. on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a 
whole StJite, or a principal part of it, the employment of 
a different kind of force might become unavoidable. It 
appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to raise 
troops for repressing the disorders within that Stale; 
that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of com- 
motions among a part of lirr citizens, has thought proper 
to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose the 
State of New York had been inclined to re-establish her 
lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont, could 
she have hoped for succe** in such an enterprise from 
the efforts of the militia alone? Would she not have 
been compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular 
force for the execution of her design? If it must then 
be admitted that the necessity of recurring to a (urce 
different from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary 
nature, is applicable to the State governments them- 
selves, why should the possibility that the nuiiunal 
government might be under a like necessity, in similar 
extremities, Itc made an objection to its existence? Is it 
not surprising Itiat men who declare an attachment to 
the Union in the abstract should urge as an objection 
to the proposal Constitution what applies with (enfold 
weight to the plan for whiirh they contend; and w)ut, as 
far as it lias any foundation in truth, is an inevitable con- 
sequence of civil society upon an enlarged scale? Who 



176 



msuFFfCiet/CY of militia. 



tl«bM 



would not prefer that pouibtttty to the anceating .tgitit- 
lioDS and (requcnt rcvoluiiona which arc the cootinual 
scotirgcs of petty republics? 

I^t us pumue this examination in another IlghL Sup- 
pose, in Ilea of one general system, two, or three, or 
even four Confederacies were to be formed, would not 
the same difficulty oppose it&elf to the operations of 
either of these Confederacies? Would not each of them 
be exposed to the same casualties; and when these hap- 
pened, be obliged to hare recourxe to (he same expedi- 
ents (or upholding its authority which arc objected to in 
a government for all the States? Would the militia, in 
this suppuitition, be more ready or more able to support 
the federal authority than in the case of a general union? 
All candid and intelligent men must, upon due considera- 
tion, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is 
equally applicable to either of the two cases; and that, 
whether we have one government for all the States, or 
dilTercnt governments for different parcels of them, or 
even if there should be an entire separation of the Suites,' 
there might sometimes be a necessity lo make use of a 
force constituted differently from the miliits, to preserve 
the peace of the community and to maintain the just 
authority of the laws against those violent invasions of 
them which amount tu insurrections and rt^bellions. 

Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, 
it is a full answer to those who require a more peremp- 
tory provision against military estahlishmcnis in lime 
of peace, to say that the whole power of the proposed 
government is to be in the hands of the representatives 
uf the people. Tliis is the essential, and, after all, only 
efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the 
people which is altainaUc in civil society.* 

If the representatives of the people betray their con- 
stitoenti, there is then no resource left but in the 
exertion of that original right of sclf-<lefcnse which is 

* 111 loll cflicur "ill he eumiiwil liet«*rieT. — t'u«jt<». 
I In lh« leu n{ thi> nlltinn of l8oj. " ttt If Xhnt iht-nild bv n oUiiy 
nartRacctnl gmmunclil* u Uiere arc Statet."— £l>rTOK. 




OuBitWal 



VSUXPSJtS /y SMGLS STATE. 



•77 



paramount to all positive forms of government, and 
whicb ajjainst the usurpations of the national rulers may 
be cxcrtcO wiih inriniicly better prospect o( auccetis than 
ugainst those o( the rulers of an individual state. In a 
single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power 
become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or 
districts of which it consists, having no distinct govern- 
ment in each, can take nu regular meaxurex for defense. 
The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without con- 
cert, without system, without resource — except in their 
courage and despair, '['lie usurpers, clothed with the 
forms of Icjtal authority, can too often crush the opposi* 
tian in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, 
the inure difficult will it be for the [leople to fonn a regu- 
Urorsysiemaiic plan of opposition, and the more easy will 
it be to defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be 

^mo^e !i|>eedily obtained of their preparations and more. 
oKnts, and the military force in the possession of the 
wurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part 
■here the opposition has begun. In thiit situation there 
Biiu be a peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure 
"Kcess to the popular resistance. 
The obstacles to usurpation and th« facilities of resist* 
ttce increase with the increased extent of the slate, 
proriilcd the citizens understand their rights and arc 

Iifeposcd to defend tliem. The natural strength of the 
pMple in a large community, in proportion to the arti- 
kial strength of the government, is greater than in a 
mall, and of course more competent to a struggle with 
like attempts of the government to establish a tyranny. 
Bat in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, 
■nay be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. 
l*o*er being nlmost always tlir rival of power, the 
general government will at all times stand ready to 
check the usurpations of Ihc state governments, and 
these wit) have the same disposition towards the general 
tovcrnment. The people, by throwing themselves into 
either Kale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If 
their tights arc invaded by either, they can make use of 



178 



EXTENT OP NA TlO/f A SECUHITY. 



(»•. « 



the other as the instrument of redress. How wise will 
it be in them, by cherishing the union, to preserve to 
themselves an advantage which can never be too highly 
prized ! 

It may safely be received as an axiom in our political 
system that the State governments will, in alt possible 
contingencies, afford complete security against invasions 
of the public liberty by the national authority. Projects 
of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so 
likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men 
as of the people at large. The legislatures will have 
better means of information. They can discover the 
danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of 
civil power, and the confidence of the people, Ihcy can 
at once adopt a regular plan of op[>'>silion, in which they 
can combine all the resources of the community. They 
can readily communicate with each other in the different 
States, and unite their common forces for the protection 
of their common liberty.' 

The great extent of the country is a further security. 
We have already experienced its utility against the 
attacks of a foreign power .\nd it would have preci«ely 
the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious rulers 
in the national councils. If the federal army should be 
able to quell the resistance of one State, the distant 
Slates would have it in their power to make head with 
fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place 
must l>e abandoned to subdue the opposition in others; 
and the moment the part which had been reduced to sub- 
mission was left to itself, Its efforts wouM be renewed, 
aiw] its resistance revive. 

* TbU htt tMon diipnnvd hi hittofr. In ihc hif>h tM« of (r<lw«tiwi 
Stdjprkk noted ihu lh« il«aiocnt( were "gcllios ih« Siile Uorii 
lalo (Ivcir hindt lo play Ihcin like tiuicrio OB (ke U. S. ^0*1." 
bol no nntlc^ Mtioii u>uM be ucurcd. FrcqiMsl)> ' '.f Icfb- 

Uiont h*ve protntcJ >i;iiliitt (lie acilua u( Ui« lu : runenl, 

■R'l fc»vp (utthfitiiwr. wlKti tbi-ir o"n intrmh wftr 1; ,ji hi lliv 

Cnek tvit). not u:ru|itrd lo ofipciu* hy forcr the will ul Ihr natioiial 
[aTcriimeBt Bui nol oai« has • iiai« come lo (h« aiil of knolba 
oduallr ledilii^; ilie iiaiioiial avllioritjr while tlill hoMiag IImII m nem- 
Iwr of Ui« Unioii.—Etiti-olt. 



hiAi 



i^ai 



HtmilUal 



LAHGF. AKMY IMPOSSIBLE. 



«?9 



We should recollect tliat the eitent uf tlie military 
force mnil, at all events, be regulated by the resources 
of the country. l''or n long time to come it will not be 
possible to maintain a large army; and as the means of 
doing this increase, the population and natural strength 
of the community will proportiunably increase. When 
will Che time arrive that the federal ](<'vernment can rabe 
aiid maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism 
urer the great body of the people of an immcntic empire, 
who are in a situation, through the medium of their 
State governments, to take measures (or their own de- 
fense, with all the celerity, regnUriiy, and system of 
tndepemJent nations? The apprehension may be con- 
sidered as a disease, for which there can be found no 
care in the resources of argument and reasoning. 

PUBLItlS. 



No. 29t35l' (/-^•/^■A"'/'*'"-'^. J^u'Tt-tiwi Hamilton. 
THE POVVER OF REGULAIING THE MILITIA. 



A na/Mni/ imiJtni M ifmrnnt dtfmst — Uniformity in the milifia 
Imt/tml—IJiiiilfii pavtrt vf >uri<>iu/ gatrrrHmtiil tiHKfming il-ilr 
[trtei^CmUHlWn tominHiif faist tvaiiumi — AtsH'<lity tf tkt milili« 
framMg 1 Jan^tr if ttnlr-illfJ ty gt»tral gfivriimeHi — Cirlain gritvatut 
// ft/fH/nl mtUlary rxtrtiifi — AifcvHU(r ff utui tetfi—Tht ilatti 
lauin lo Adtv •> frtfjitdtraHt iafiatate 9r*r tht mitilia — Bxam^f 9f 
fttHMfitMi a£,iiaillifefiiitilufi''a—EiiaggeriilrJin^f$ti»niiomrrniiif 
mttiut ff •Hililia — Cru4tul tfmilitM in (att ef atltmftti Jtr^lim — Tht 
tiiHni gtmrraMfiU aiomf aUt Iff aie Hi miiitiit It prttal tit ttalti. 

Ta tht Piople of the SlaU ff New York: 

Tlic power of regul.iting the militia, and of command- 
ing its services in times of insurrection and invasion, arc 

'Thte CiMr *pf«*n:d M No. XXXV. Inlh« origiMi nubUniion In 
iW anr^WptlV ■<1<I >> ttifltct<it« Ixrr nin|]lM<d i,-liiaii<;Ji:u>tal]ir. la 
n.eollOFkBd cdilkin of 17^-*. ItoH'cvet. it it urinlcil a« N<i. XXtX.. 
^!.i. ..i_» jt it, |ito|>cr i>lnc« aiZLurling In nibjCki, ■■(! for tliii rcacon 
'' ' the liiM ciiiiiou liM l«cn (olIi>ired. Ilenccfottk ninilu 

<. . ill tic iioinl uatiurc. — Edituk. 



i8o 



VSlFOKMlty OF MILITIA. 



(SAttisn 



natural incidentit lo the duties of superintending llic 
common defense, and oE watching over the Jntcroal 
peace of the Confederacy. 

It requires no skill in the science of war to ditcem 
that uniformity in the organiiation and discipline o( the 
militi.-i would be attended with the most bcnclicial effects, 
whenever they vere called into Mrvice for the public 
defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties 
of the camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and 
conccrt^an adrantagc of peculiar moment in the opera- 
tions of an army: and it would (it them much sooner to 
acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions 
which would be essential to their usefulnei<t. This de- 
sirable uniformity can only be accomplished by conftding 
the regulation of the militia to the direction of the 
national authority. It is, therefore, with the most evi* 
dcot propriety that the plan of the convention proposes 
to empower the Union "to provide for organizing, arm- 
ing, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such 
part of them as may be employed in the service of the 
United States, rfstrving to thf Statrt rftpfdhfly Iht a/tpoinl- 
mfil o/ Iht o0ifrf, an J Ihf aulharily of trainini; Iht mi/ilia 
atiording to iHe disdpiiHt frturilnJ by Coi^rrtf." 

Of the different grounds which have l>een taken in op- 
position to tlie plan of the convention, there is none that 
was so little to have been expected, or is so untenable in 
itself, as the one from which this particular provision 
has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be the 
most natural defense of a free country, il ought certainly 
to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that 
body which is constituted the guardian of the national 
security. If standing armies arc dangerous to liberty, 
an efficacious powerover the militia, in the Iwdy to whose 
care the protection of the Slate is committed, ought as 
far as possible to take away the inducement and the pre- 
text to sucii unfriendly institutions. If the federal 
government can command the aid of the militia in those 
emergencies which call for the military arm in support 
of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with 



A 



HfemCuiil 



J>OSSE COUITATUS. 



i8i 



the employment of a dil7er«nt kind of force. If it cannot 
arait itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to 
the latter. To render .in army unnecessary wilt be a 
more certain method of preventing its existence than a 
thousand prohibitions upon paper. 

In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling 
forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, it has 
been remarked tli.it there is nowhere any provision in 
the proposed Constitution for calling out the ros^it comi- 
TATOS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his 
duty; whence it h.ix Iwen inferred that military force 
was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a strik- 
ing incoherence in the objections which have appeared, 
and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much 
calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the 5in- 
cerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same prrsons 
who tell UB,*in one breath, that the powers of the federal 
government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us, in 
the next, that it has not authority sufficient even to call 
out iJie posse coMtTAToa. The latter, fortunately, is as 
much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It 
would be as absurd to doubt that a right to pass all laws 
"w^KtffjurW/'-i'/Vr to execute its declared powers would 
include (hat of reciuiring the assistance of the citizens to 
the officers who may be intruKlcd with the execution of 
those laws, as it would be to lielieve that a right to enact 
laws necessary and proper for the imposition and collec* 
tinn of taxes would involve that of varying the rules of 
descent and of the alienation of landed property, or of 
abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It 
being therefore evident that the supposition of a want of 
power to require the aid of the rnssR courxATUs is 
entirely destitute of color, it will follow that the conclu- 
sion which h.is been drawn from it, in its application to 
ttie authority of the federal government over the militia. 
is as nncandid as it is illogical. What reason could 
there be to infer that force was intended to be the sole 
iiurniment of aulhorliy, merely because there is a (lower 
III make use of it when necessary* What shall we think 



t8> 



D/SCIPUXE OF JUIUTIA. 



(Ita. M cUi 



of the motives which could induce men of srnse to re^sun 
in thi« nunncr? How shall we prevent » conflict between 
charily and judicincnl? 

By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican 
je.ili)usy, we ;ire even taught to apprehend danger from 
tlic militia itticlf, in the hands of the federal government. 
It is observed that select corps may be formed, com- 
posed of the young and ardent, who may he rendered 
subsenrient to the views of arbitrary power.' What t>Un 
for the regulation of the militia may be pursued by the 
national government is impossible to be foreseen. But 
so far from viewing the matter in the same light with 
those who object to select corps as dangerous, were the 
Constitution ratified, an<l were 1 to deliver my sentiments 
to a member of the federal legislature from this State on 
the subject of a mihiia establishment. I shunid hold to 
him, in substance, the following discourse: 

"The proj«:tofdisiap]iningall the- militia of the United 
States is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capa* 
bic of being carried intu execution. A tolerable «Kperl> 
nexs in military movements is a business that rcqnirca 
time and practice. It is not a day, or even a week, that 
will suffice fur the attainment of it. To obli}>e the great 
body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the 
citizens, to be under arms for the purpose u( going 
through miliury exercises and evolutions, as often as 



' [n iSoj JclT<rwin pio|><>v:>l thin nty mIkiiic ot % danir>c'l inililU, 
■ihI wiaso ni;er tot it Ihnl hr draflcd ahill, anit ^nil^.irotnl lo fort* It 
(hruiIKh CoiKjrnt |k* '" Wrilinji of JelfFnoo," Fonl'i wlitiori, viii. WA, 
(luI II ITU itcfeuni by liii own paily. Ilituvi;!) (cU of I)if UkCh li> WBlck 
tbc " youni: :ii>J SKtriit " nii);hl Ire |<ul. Tlic ■iii|»>|>uliiity ot iha a-ar 
of t8i3 Hivnl liffjaly lo mak* tHlkuliim ai"l htr^k ilnn-n Ih* tilil 
mililB lim. nhicli cooipHlnl animnal drill outre <it lo-ior a ytu -, anil 
■hi* loiiling (lowly rilcndoJ tkracbnut ihc i.-auiilnr, unlit al the l>q;u>- 
nmtc o( the Ciail Wu linle wai left oJ tli« oU iilci of ■ iiunhouU ouUiis. 
Finally (lie olitn oiclhixl lin^ t«en enllTcly iu)>«tcilcil by • volitiitrat 
luililia nude up almml «huill)' ut iIm " yuuii); ami aidcnl.'' aiiJ with llli* 
ilevelopmenl hn tonic Ihc vriy impruvoiDriit horr Hicgclol. (or tbc new 
NaliOBil UiMnl, miliktr iht old nnnti}' militia, have lipcnme not ment* 

cipcl IrOOfM. Iral luic. I .u-.nii. ..> i.. ilinr iii..iiiivi'.l <'iu Lj.lii.r utiii 

thiii " local " ficwk ' ..)c 

the li«al d thon a.'. . .if 

llMU an Del^hbatluiwU.— LuttuJt. 



A 



pSutUtra] SUBSTITUTE FOR STANDING ARMY. i?3 

might be nccctisary to acquire the degree of perfection 
which would entitle them to ihcchanictcr of ii well-rejju- 
tatwl militia, wuuld be a real grievance to the people, 
aod a serious public inconvcoicncc and loss. It would 
form an annual deduction from the productive lahnr of 
the country, to an amount which, calculating upon the 
present numbers of the people, would not fall far short 
of the whole expense of the oivil estuhlishmtrnlft of all 
the Slates. To attempt a thing which would abridge thc 
mass of labor and industry to so considerable an extent 
would be unwise: and the experiment, il made, could not 
succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little 
m-jre c.in reas<»nably be aimed at. with respect to the 
[teople at large, th;in lo havi; them properly armed and 
equipped; and in order to sec ihat this be not neglected, 
it will be necessary to assemble them ome or twice in 
the Cour»e of a year. 

" But though the scheme of dii^iptiiiing the whole 
nation must be abandoned as mischievous or impractica> 
ble: yet it is a matter of the utmost imporutncc that a 
well-digested plan should, as soon as possible, be adopted 
for Itie proper estabhshmcnt of the militia. The atten- 
tion of the government ought particularly to be directed 
tu the formation ol a select corps of moderate extent, 
upon such princjples as will really lit them for service in 
case of need, liy thus circumst^ribint; tlic plan, it will be 
poHsiblc to have an excellent body of well-trained militia, 
ready to take the licld whenever the defense of the Stale 
shall reqnirc it. This will not only le*iscn the call for 
military establish mcnts, but if circumstances should at 
any time oblige the government to form an army of any 
m;ignitude, that army can never be formidable to the 
liberlies of the people while there is a large liody o( 
ritizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and 
the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own 
rights and those of their fellow- citizens. This appears 
to me the only substitute that can be devised for a stand- 
ing army, ami the best possible security against it, if it 
should exist." 



|84 



APFOINTMENT OF OFFtCEKS. Wo. » '«' 



Thus differently Trom the adversaries of ttic proposed 
Constitution shuuld 1 r<;a»on oii the »ame suhjoct, 
deducing arguments of safety from the very satirccs 
which Ihey represent as fraught with danger and perdi- 
tion. But how the national le)(i«l.-iiure may reason on the 
point, is a thing which neither they nor 1 can foresee. 

There is something so far fetched and so extravagant 
In the idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one 
is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with 
raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill, 
like the paradoxes of rtietofictaits; aft a disingenuouK 
artifice to instill prejudices at any price; or as the serious 
oOspring of political fanaticism. Where, iii (he name of 
common sense, arc our fears to end if we may not trust 
our SODS, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? 
What shadow of danger can there be from men who arc 
daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen, and 
who parttcipiite with them in the same feelings, senti- 
ments, habits, and interests? Wh:it reasonable cause of 
apprehension can be inferred from a power in the Union 
to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command 
its services when necessary, while the particular States 
are to have the j^e aitJ exdusipt app^iHtmetit fi/ Ihe offiterst 
If It were possible seriously to iiKlult;r a jealousy of the 
militia upon any conceivable establishment ut>dcf the 
federal government, the circumstance of the oficen 
being in the appointment of the States ought at once tu 
extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this cir- 
cumstance will always secure to them a preponderating 
influence over the militia. 

In reading many of the publications against the Con- 
stitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing 
some ill-written tale or romance, which, instead of 
natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nnth- 
ing but frightful and distorted shapes — 

" CotigiMt, lir<1fm>, amt chim*ns dire "; 

discoloring and disfigvring wtiatever it represents, and 
traniforming everything it touches into a monster. 



iAm^* 




MfSUSE OF MILITIA. 



A sample of this is to be observed in tlie ex.ig:geratcd 
and improbable suggestions which have taken place 
resticcting the power of calling fur the scrvicn of the 
siiliiisL That of New Hampshire is to be marched to 
Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to 
Kentucky, »nd uf Kentucky t<i l^ikc Champlain. Nay, 
the debts due to the Fret>ch and Dutch are to be paid in 
militiamen instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one 
moment there is to be a large army to Uy prostrate the 
lihiTiies of the people; at another moment the militia of 
Virginia arc to be dragged from their homes five or six 
hundred miles to tame the reptihitcitn contumacy of 
Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be trans- 
ported an equal distance to subdue the refractory 
haughtiness of the .iriittotratic Virginuins. Do the per- 
sons who TAWC at this rate imagine that thctr art or their 
eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities upon 
the people of Amerii-a fur infallible truths? ' 

If there should he an army to be made use of as the 
agiiic of despotism, what need of the miUtia? If there 
sboald be no army, whither would the militia, irritated 
liy being called u{>on to undertake a distant and lioi>eless 
expedition for the purpose of riveting the chains of 
ilavery upon a i>art of their countrymen, direct their 



' TXte hiilory oF our nililin hxi thown how ludpn i( it to employ ihrni 
t> liny obfect of wfaich (bey do not approve. In 17114 ihc Goicrnur of 
PfBatrl'aBi' Dolificil tlie rmiileni thtl it uxiiilil be impouiMc to criuJi 
the wliUky latiinccllan with the local milltii, (or they t-xt kirniii;ly 
ifBtpollillCil with Ihe RinTcmeiil t'> l>c Irntlecl to <)iicll JI. Tlir >afu««l 
«\ the mililia of Nrir York to invade CKnida in i3ia, snil (hr whole 
nnncoftheXrvEncUnd inTlitia<tnrineihc war of tSia. were siillmorc 
•trAlRC. In 1S61. while certain norlhciii itale* volu'itmilyoffcml their 
whule niitlllkt to tlie nalionil goveiiimeat, the I'letlilcnt't mil ujion Ihe 
MUnfor ieveiity-fne tlmiitai"! men drove cetlsiii >.lale» which had liiihrr- 
lii rttnaineil pattivg iiiln v^c«vIi»D. and thiuch cvtiaiii Iionlei ititti ifiil 
nt4 lake thi> eiiteoK action, they paid no heed to the oH. and it i> to be 
qtotiooni if ihii wn* any lau In ilie eliecnMf Mnncth. As alrecdy 
Ml«il. the new Natkina) Uiiaid \\ far ten Influenced by local tentlment ; 
tal thai Mmc of the oh) virtut xlill linuen in •.-ectiln wctlona wot thiiwn 
k Ihc great inilruoil strike ol 1S94, wlieo Ecrtnin Califutoia rei;iin«ul». 
ollcirt out lo protevt ili« eitrvmely unpouular Southern Pacific KaSruaH. 
■M inctcly nqfkcled to defend the toad. nui. it iru even alleged, acliially 
killed Iha auUen iu the detuuction «l jitoiieiiy. — Eoiioa. 



i8« 



MUTUAL SVCCOR TO STATES. llffcWfflS- 



COtirsc, hut to the scat nf the tyrant* who had mediuttil 
BO fooliiili as well as so wicked a project, to crush them 
in their imagined intretichmcnls of power, and to malte 
Ehem an example of the just vengeurKre of an abused and 
ioccnsnl people? Is this the way in irhich usurpers 
stride to dominion over a numerous and enlightened 
nation? Do they begin by exciting the detestation of 
the very instruments of [heir intended usurpations? Do 
they iisnally i^mmcnce their ciirecr by wanton and tlis- 
Kusiful acts of power, calculated to answer no end but 
to draw upon themselves universal hatred and execra- 
tion? Are sttppirsitionx of this sort the sober admont* 
tions of discerning patriots to a discerning people? Or 
are they the inHiimmatory ravings of incendi;ifies or 
distempered cn(hti«i:i«ts? If we were even to xuppoiie 
the national rulers actuated by the most ungovernable 
ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would 
employ such preposterous means to accomplish their 
designs. 

In times of insurrection or invasion, it would be 
natural and proper that the militia of a neighboring State 
should be marclietl into another, to reiiist a common 
enemy, or to guard the republic aj^atnst the violence of 
faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in 
r«spect to the Tirst object, m the course of the late war; 
and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal end of our 
political association. If the power of atTording it be 
phced under the direction of the Union, there will lie no 
danger of a supine and listless inattention to the dangers 
of a neighbor till its near approach had superadded the 
incitements of self-preservation to tlie too feeble im- 
paiMs of duty and sympathy, 

PDkUtJS. 



.SkSXItM) 



NAT/O.VAL KEVENVE KEEDED. 



187 



No. 30 [29!- i.v«»'w*/'«*tf.DnM.b»rje.ij87.> Hamilton. 
GENERAL POWER OF NATIONAL TAXATION. 

ffttifai uitA ftr revtiue — AfiHtt/ tie t-ifa/ refuiiitt in ^rttriimrtil 
— Stifi rftutfiif frtm itti 0/ rtefnttr — /ix-imflf of lit Turkiih 
mfirt — ExatfU in tntatJuspa if i^nfrJirMtfa — fitttaut unUmittJ 
mmitr arlUUi tf ttn/titration — Rrr^ntsiu frimifitt in Ikal tcmfail — 
CtmufitfHitj p/ lit tyif/m—A rimidy in a^ndfnmtai of fitetai and 
riftaiitteiii — 7'At >ritiiJ-/rr Jtiniuti^n itlnvtn inltTrml ami tsttmiit 
bMit-^ Thf fmtJaHuntai priiuifJe f/ iMtiniinJ j^ertern'fuvtl'^ l^hi rafiunit 
^ a mi/un ryiij/ la ill lUttiutUi — Prt^tilitti It ivffJ/ lit dtfiiiftuUi 
la aUrtlal lam by rfjuiulUit^Rnull »/ limiteil Immtim in timti ej 
mar'^Tht naliiitat gvttrnmtnl tkttild ftmst a» unrrilraintJ ftistr »/ 
luatini — Tie /awer «•/ bi.id/iiiii d ctrtain menni p/ i^rivannf. 

7> Ue Ptef>!e of <ht Slate of A'rtc York: 

It has been already ot>t>ervcil that the federal gox'crn- 
menl ought lo possess tlie pnwer of prwvuhnK for the 
support of the national forces; in which proposition vns 
intended to be ingludcd the expense of raising troops, of 
burlding and e<)uipping fleets, and all other expenses in 
any wise connected vrith tnilit.iry arrant^cments and 
operations. But these are not tho only objects to which 
the jtirisdictiuii of the Union, in respect to revenue, 
oust necessarily be empowered to extend. Il must 
enbrace a provision for the support of the national civil 
TiK; for the payment of the national debts contracted, 
or that may be contracted; and in general, for all those 
matters which will call for disbursements out of tliv 
aitional treasury. The cnncliision is that there must be 
tntcrwoTcn in the frame of the government a general 
power of taxation, in one shape or another. 

Money is with propriety considered as the vital prin> 
ctple of the body politic; as that which sustains its life 
and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential 
functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a 
regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources 
of the community will, permit, may be regarded as an 
iMlispemable ingredient in every constitution. From a 



■88 



COXFEDBRATION JifADBQUATE. Ul*. M iSBi 



deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must ensue: 
eitlier tlic p«»plc tnnst lie subjected to coiitiiiuul plunder 
»s a substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying; the 
public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal 
atrophy, and, in a short course of time. [>emh. 

In the Ollonian or Turkish empire, the sovereign, 
though in other respects absolute master of the lives and 
fortunes of his subjects, lias no ri;;ht to impose a new 
tax. The conseijucnce is that he permits the bashaws or 
governors of provinces to pillage the people witlioul 
mercy; and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of 
whtt:h he stands in need to satisfy his own exigencies and 
those of the slate. In America, from a like cause, the 
government of the Union has gradually dwindled into a 
state of decay approaching nearly to annihilation. Who 
can doubt that the happiness of the people in both coun- 
tries would be promoted by competent authorities in the 
proper hands, to provide the revenues which tbe neces- 
sities of the pnbtic might require? 

The present Confederation, feeble as it is, intended to 
repose in the United States an unlimited power of pro- 
viding for the pecuniary wants of the Union. But 
proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been done 
in such a manner as entirely to hare frustrated the 
intention. Congress, by the articles which compose that 
compact (as has already been stated), arc authorized tn 
ascertain and call for any sums of money necessary, in 
rhcir judgment, to the service of the United Sutcs; and 
their requisitions, if comformablc to the rule of apportion- 
ment, arc in every constitutional sense obligatory npon 
the Sutea. These have no right to question the propriety 
of Ihc demand; no discretion beyond that of devising the 
ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded. But 
tltough this be strictly and truly the case; though the 
assumption of such a right would be an infringement of 
the articles of Union; though il may seldom or never 
have been avowedly claimed, yel in practice it lias been 
constantly exercised, and would continue to be so, as 
long as the revenues of the Confederacy should reoiain 



SudlUsI 



THfORtl-.S OP TAXATION. 



189 



dependent on the intrrmcdintc agency of its members. 
Wlut Ihc conscqucnccK of tlii.t syNlem huvc been is 
within the knowledge of every man the least conversant 
in our |iublic uffairs, and has l»ecn amply unfolded in dif* 
ferent part^ of these inquirie*!. It is this which has 
chiefly contributed to reduce us to a situation which 
aflonis ample cunse bi>th of moi'tilication to Ourselves 
aid of triumph to our enemies. 

What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a 
chtnge of tlie system which has produced it— ina change 
o( (be fallacious and delusive system of quotas and 
nifnintions? What substitute can there be imagined for 
this^MK /atttut in rin-inec, but that of permitting the na- 
tional government to raise its own revenues by the ordi- 
nary methods of taxation authorixcd in every well-ordered 
cnnuituttati of civil government? Ingenious men RUiy 
<ittUim with plausibility on any subject; but no human 
ingenuity can point out any other expedient to rescue 
Ut from the inconveniences ami emt>;irrassments naturally 
rtiwlting from defective supplies of the pulilic treasury. 

The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitu- 
tion admit the force of this reasoning; but they qualify 
Ibtir admission by a distinction between what they call 
'(/»«/ and fxltiNot taxation. The former they would 
'tserve to the State governments; the latter, which ihey 
ttfiiin into commercial imposts, or rather duties on 
■mported articles, they declare themselves willing to con- 
™)e to the federal head. This distinction, however. 
«oulil violate the maxim of good sense and sound policy 
■Wch dictates that every powkr ought to be in propor- 
•ioa to iia object; and would still leave the general 
([■Xernment in a kind of tutelage to the Slate govern- 
"•wtB, inconsistent with every idea of vigor or efficiency, 
'"ho Can pretend that commercial imposts arc. or would 
^ aWnc cqoal to the present and future exigencies of 
'"< Cnion? Taking into the account the existing debt, 
'irciKn and domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment 
"liichaman moderately impressed with the importance 
^' public justice and public credit could approve, in 



igo KEQUisirroys upojv states, cm*, icaft 

addition to tlie esUblishments which all parties vill 
acknowledge to be necessary, wc cnuld not rcaeonably 
flatter otirselreft tliat tliia resource alone, upon (be most 
improved scale, would even suffice for iu pTc»«nl neces- 
sitietL Its future necessities admit not of calculation 
or limitation; and upon the principle, more than once 
adverted to, the power o( making provision dir them «« 
they ari&e ought to be equally unconfnied. T believe it 
maybe regarded as a position warranted by the history of 
mankind, that, ia the usual prcgrets a/ iJiingi, the ne<essilin 
of a nation, in eterj ifage e/ tti existenee, mill bt fvuiiJ ut 
least ffittil til its rtsour(ti. 

To say that dcfiriencies may he provided (or by recioisi- 
tions upon the States is on the one hand to acknowledge 
that this system cannot be depended upon, and on the 
other hand to depend upon it for everything beyond a 
certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its 
vices and deformities, as they have been exhibited by 
experience or delineated in the course of these papers, 
must feel invincible repugnancy to trusting the itatiunal 
interests in any degree to its operation. Its inevitable 
lenilency, whenever it is brought into activity, must be to 
enfeeble the Union and sow the seeds of discord and con- 
tention between the federal head and its memberx, and 
between the members themseivcs. Can it be eipected 
that the deAcicncies would be better su|ip1icd in tins 
mode than the total want« of the Union have heretofore 
been supplied in the same mode? It ought to be recol- 
lected that if less will be required from the States, they 
will have proporlionably less means to answer the 
demand. If the opinions of those who contend (or tlie 
distinction which lias been mentioned were to be 
received as evidence of truth, one would be led to 
conclude that there was some known point in the 
economy of national affairs at which it would be safe lo 
stop and to say: Thus far the ends o( public happiness 
will be promoted by supplying the wants of govrrntncnl, 
and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or ansicty. 
How ts it possible that a govcmmcnt half snpplied and 



BmIUmI 



HEVENUE tN CA<i£ OP tVAK. 



191 



alwap necessitous can fulfill the purposes of its instilu* 
tion, can provide for the security, advance the pros- 
perity, or support the rcputittiun uf the commonwealth? 
How can it ever possess cither enerf^y or stability, 
J'gnity or credit, confidence at home or respectability 
Abroad^ How can its administration be anything else 
tlun a succession of expedients lempori/ini;, impotent, 
ili^graccful? How will it be able to avoid 3 frequent 
saciiTicc of its engagements to immediate necessity? 
Hnw t:xn it undertalce or execute any l)t>eral or enlarged 
plana uf public good? 

Ut as attend to what would be the effects uf this 
situation in the very first wur in which we should liappen 
to be engaged. We will presume, for argument's sake, 
that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers 
'^poiposcH of u provision for the public debt and of a 
pc^e establishment forthe Union. Thus circumstanced, 
a var lircaks out.' What would be the probable conduct 
o' the tEi'Tcrnnient in such an emergency? Taught by 
"ipcficncc that proper dependence could not be placed 
•^n Ibc success of requisitions, unable by its own 
auihorily to lay hold of fresh rCKources, and urged by 
contidcrattuns of national danger, would it not be driven 
tu the expedient of diverting the funds already appro- 
P''iatt<] from their proper ulijci:!* to the defense of the 
^VxiKi It is not cjsy to see how a step of this kind could 
l*c avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident that 
Ll Ouuld prove the destruction of public credit at the 
'tfyraoraL-nt that it was l>ccomin£ essential to the public 
*^'eiy. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be 
■'itfctised with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In 
die modern system of war nations the most wealthy are 
utilised to have recourse to large loans. A country so 
lillle opulent as ours must (eel this necessity in a much 
tlninger degree. But who would lend to a government 

'Thit w» ultll |!Mvnl by ihr *M "I iSu, when, crmiag (u (lie lnt«. 
"fwq of coinniTKe. anil Fipn:ia11^ 10 ihv Mockailc. tli« imfHirli [cil alT 
^'Uci ui eiicnl u awlc Ihc dullct uliolly iiiaiii>t|iiite 10 ike ontinarr 
"Imna lA govcroncpt. Ut moie iiia(let|UJile to tlitac enutlcd b;r > lUle 



I») POWER TO TAX A MBAffS TO BOXROiV. Wa-SOiM) 

tlut prcf;ice<i its overtures for borrowing by an act which 
(Icmonst rated that no rclinnde could be placed on (he 
steadiness of its measures for paying? Tbc loans it 
might be able to procure would be as limited in their 
extent as htirdentome in their conditions. They would 
be made upon the same principles that usurers commonly 
leud to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors — with a sparing 
hand and at endrmoiiit premiums. 

It m.iy perhaps be imatiined that, from the scantiness 
of the resources of the country, the necessity of divert- 
ing the eKiahltHlicd funds, in (he case supposed, would 
«xist, though the national fcovernment should possess an 
unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations 
will serve to ({uiet all apprehension on this head: one is 
that WG are sure the re^iources of the community, in their 
full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of 
the Union; the other is that whatever deficiencies there 
may he can without difhciilty be supplied by loans. 

The power of creating new fun<ls upon new olijects of 
taxation, by its own authority, would enable the national 
government to borrow as far as its necessities might re- 
((uire. Foreigners, as welt as the ciiiiens of America, could 
then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; 
but to depend upon a guTcrnment that must itself depend 
upon thirteen other gofernmenis for the means of fulfilling 
its contracts, when once its situation is clearly understood, 
would rciiiiire a degree of credulity not often to be met 
with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and littl<! 
rcconciliibtc with the usual sharp-stghtedness of avarice. 

Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with 
men who hope to see realized in America the halcyon 
w:encs of the poetic or fabulous age; but to those who 
believe we are likely to experience a common portion of 
the vicissitudes and calamities which have (alien In the 
lot of other nations, they must appear entitled to serioos 
attention. Such men mii«t IicIkiM the ni ttial Mtuatiun of 
their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate the 
evils which ambition or revenge might, with ttw much 
facility, inflict upon it. t'uiiLiUB- 



■fc*^ 



POLITICAL Axioms. 



193 




No. 31 [30I. ifrm Vtwk P*rlm, Janiuty 1, itH.) HamillOa 

UNLIMITED NATIONAL TAXATION NOT A 
ROAD TO DESPOTISM. 



Primiftn •/ hgU tfflitd to Ik* nttttiity b/ gmrral prwtr »/ tax- 
fltcafilHhlitii tf tht nfiiiiity r/ tmlimiM italitnitt rttrtmiti—' 
»f tkt ff^'ntitti ef tkt (enititHtii»t — yttiiiily e/ rtvtnat f»r Uial 
timimilrutim-'P^tiaHe attarflmi a/ all laxafien ty nutifmal gevtrH- 
mas — IntfrttakiUtjofnsurpiilioiit by 1^ /tdrml gPtrfmrnrnt — H'ky nfl 

rthvt <■■ ilu Vnitn — Suit fjtvmuttnlt rriil ^rekiU/ faiitii ntfil injlu' 
nil ttvr fffft/^ Tin f*fflt akin tan frrurvr tkt rfia'titriii'it ittwriit 
lit £rtt/fj/ an J itatt got^mmrHt. 

Tf Ike Pe^f/f 0/ Ike Stale ef Nevi Vtiri .■ 

in (li&quisiiioiH o( every hind ihcrc are certain primary Inths 
« brtl (Krinciples. upon wliich all subsequent reuonin|p mutt 
drpend. These contain an inu-fnal evkkiicc which, anlrccilcnt 10 
allrclkciion or comtrinaiiOJi, <:oiiitnanil» the assent of ihu mind. 
Where il (itoiIikcs not this cffrct, tt rinisi proceed either finm some 
iltttcl or tti»OT(ler in ihe ori;ans of pciceptiun, ur fioin the influ* 
dice of soiive wrong inlercW.or passion, or prritMlicc. 0( this 
nuure are the inaxnnsin Hcometry, thai " ihe whole i& greater than 
nt pan : things nitial to the san>c arc cqiinl to one another ; two 
(ttii|[hl lines cannot inclose a s|Mce; and all tif;hi angles aie 
tqual to each olhpr." OF the lume n.iture ate tlic»c other nuiimt 
n elhiC9 and pulilict, that iherr ciinnot be an effect willtoul a 
cuoe ; th.1l the means ought to l>c proportioned to Ihe end ; lliat 
nny powcf ouf ht to be commensurate with iit object ; ilist ihcic 
miehi 10 l>e no limilaliun of a power destined to effect a purjiose 
wUcli is Itself incapable of Umiialion. An^l there are other truths 
lo ihe Iwo laller sciences which, it they cannot pretend to rank in 
(he class of aiioms. are yel such ilirect inferences from them, and 
10 obvious in iheniM^lvei. and so agreeable to the nntuiid and 
HMophistkated diclalps ai rornnion sen«e.that they challenge the 
aueni of a sound and unbiaml mind with a degree o( force and 
tnnTKtion almost equally irre«L«tible. 

The objects of geomeitical inquiry are so entirely abunicied 
from ihiMe pursuits ivhidi Mir up and put in motion the uniuly pas- 
>>ona of the huiiMii hean. that manLind. without difliculiy. adopt 
B*i only the more simple iheorems of Ihe science but eren those 
ikbiiniie paradoxes whicl). however they may appear suKeptible 



194 



C£A-£X.I/. POIfEX OP TAXATIOff. lll«.ll">0> 



of (kiDoiiii rill ion. arr ai vmiince with ikc natural concrpiions 
whicit the iniiiil. wiihoui the aid of pliiUnophy, would be ted to 
enicn^iii upon ilie !>iib)cci. The infikite divisihiliiv oI mai- 
ler, or. in other words, the inPINITk divixibillly o( a PIHtTS 
thing, extcndmg cv«ii to iIh minutest atom, Is a point aigrenl 
anivng ((eoiiielriciniis. Ihougjh not less tncomprcbensibk to coni- 
iiioii x«nM ihjiit any o( those niysterics in rehgion HgAinst wltich 
ili« b.iiierie» of idlidchly hive been to iiKliuirioualy leveled. 

Bui in the sciences of mncitls and politics men are found far less 
ln\ci»hlc. To a certain degree il ii right and useful that ihb 
should be the cue. Ouiicin and invcsligalion arc a Pcccssaiy 
»,imn% agxiiiit erroi and imposition. But this uoiraciablenchs may 
be carried too far. and may degeiterale into obiiinacy, pervenenes*. 
or disingciiuily. Though il caiinoi be pretended that the principles 
•A mural and political knowledge linrc. in general, lite tanie decree 
of crnainty with those of the ntatheiitnlics, yet ihey lure muirh 
better cUinu in this respect ihan, lo judge from llw conduct of 
men in pnnicular siiuaiioiu. wc should be disposed to allow ilvcm. 
Tiie ub»curiiy is much oftener in ihc paisioos and prejudiccii of 
ibe reasonrr than in ibc subject. Men. U|ion too many occasions, 
do nol give llieir own undeniandings fair play; I>ul, yiehling lo 
uimc untoward bias, they entangle Ihemselves in words and con- 
fuund ihernseire* in sublleliea. 

How else could it happen (if we admit the objectnn lo be tin- 
cere In ilicir opposition) that positioni so clear as tliose which 
in^mifest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the gov- 
ernment of the Union, should have to eitcouniet any adveruiics 
anumg nien ul diseernmcnl .' Tbuugh these posiliuns have been 
elsewhere fully slalctl, they will pcrlups not be impri>|>crly letapii- 
utaled in this place, as inlroduclory to an euininaliun of wlut 
may have been offered by way o( objection lo them. They are in 
^ubttaitcc as follows ; 

A government ought to contain in itself every power requliile 
to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to lis care, 
and to the complete execution of the tnuli for which it is resptm- 
tibte, free from every other coiiirol but a regard 10 the public good 
and lo the sense of tliv people. * 

As the duties of supcrimemling the national drfrnse aiMl of 
securing the publtc gieace ai,-jinsi foreign or domestic violence 
involve a provision lur casualties and dangers lo wliieh no passihte 
limits can be asugncd. the power of making that pruTtsion 
ought to know no uilici bounds than llie exigencies uf the nalinn 
uwl Uie resources ul the community. 



n 



il OPPOffE/^rS OP NATIQSAL rAXATIO.V. 195 

Airmnne !■ the MScniut engine by wliicli (he means oran- 
tnring the nntionni exlKcncks mml be procur«it, (he power ol 
procunng ihat aiiiclc in its full extent must itecessniily be 
cosfrehended in thai of providing fur ihuie ex^encies. 

At theory and practice conspire to prove iImi the power of 
IMOninng retreoue is unavailmx when eieiciwMi over tlie States In 
Udr collective upaciiie*. the fnlcinl government m\\%\ of necetsiiy 
U uivesicd with an unqualified power ol lauuioo In tlie unlinaty 
emla. 

Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be nattiral to 
caKltde Ihai the prD|>rieiy of a genctnl power of taxation in (he 
■ilioiMt govetntneiii im^lii talcly be permitted to rest on the eri- 
dnKC ol ihdc ptxipoutionn. unauit^tcil by ^ny addltjanal ar^- 
Miut or illustriattons. Btit we And. in f^ci. ilut ihe antagoni^is 
•I lie ptopoied ConMitution. >o far fron) ac<|iiicNCinK in tlieii 
jwtncu or iTuih. Kem to make iheir pnncipal and moKi tealoux 
<ft>n against (hit pan of t)ie plan, tl may therefore be saiisfac- 
■^toanalyie llie argumcnl« with which ihey comhnt II. 

tlutc of ihcin which have been most Ijboicd will) thai ricw. 
Wm n «ulMiance to amount lo this: " It i« not true, h^cniise tht^ 
nipBcies of (he Union may not be susccpiibli- of lrmit:itiott. that 
m pr)wa of laying taxes ought lo be mironfined. Revenue i» a» 
■vquitiie lo ific purposes of ihc tocat ailiiiinis(i;itions as those of 
Ihc Union : and ihe (onocr are at least of cqii.il impnriance willi 
Ihelwtn to the happiness of (he people. It is, therefore, as nec- 
tSMtj thai the Stale govetninents should be able to command the 
■**»« ol supplying their warns ns ihat ihc national government 
^'uy puuess (he like faculty in rctpecl to the wants of tlie 
UvoQ. But an imlehnite power of taxation in the lalter might 
tiid probably would, in dine, deprive the f^rmtr ol the means of 
Pending for their own necesiilicit ; and would suhjeel them 
'■■■■lely (o tlie mercy of the national legislature. A« the laws of 
Ifce Union ate lo l>ecoine the supfemc law of the land, as tt is to 
•twe power to p*ss all laws that may be ^EC^•-tSARV (or carrying 
i"ia eiecutton the aathoriljes with which il is proposed to vest it. 
1^ national gorcrnment might at any time abolish the (axes 
"tpMed for Slate ohyects upon the preiense of an interlereitce 
*«i lis own. It might allege a necewity o( doing this in order to 
("wtflieacy to the n^iiional revenues. And thus all the tesoutces 
*■ laution might l)y deerees l>ecome (he tuhjccli d( federal 
'*'*<>poly. lo the euiite exclusion and dtntiuctioii of the State gov- 
ts." 

Thia iBodi- of reasoning appears somdinics (o turn upon (he 



(96 



EyCHOACHMENTS OF STATES. [KfcJftttli 



suppoiilkm o( uvirpatiofi in (be nalional goveramenl ; at other 
times ll sccrnt (o be dntgitrrl only as » dcducdon front the contti- 
lutioiut oper.iiion ot ill Intcnikd powcnL it it only in the Inner 
light that it can hr iiJmiKcd to luvc any prelensions 10 faimeu. 
The moment we launch into conjectures about the usurpiiioDs ol 
■he icderal ^vetnment, we get into an unfiihotiiablc ab^-ss. «m1 
(sifly put ourselves out o( tlie leach ol all reaMKiing. Imagini^ 
lloii may langc n pleasure till it kcIs bewildered ainuUl Ihc labjF* 
rinlhs of an cnehaiiicil castle, and knon's not on which side to 
turn (o extricate iltcif from the pctplexiiic* into which il h»* so 
rashly Advent jTcd. Whatever m-ay be (he limiis 01 mmliiicjiions 
of tl»e powi^ni oE the Union, it is euy to Imagine an enilte» Irsin 
of pouibte dangers; and by indulging an excess ol fcsloiisy and 
limiility. we may bring ourselves to a itair nl abM>tule ilcepticiMn 
and irrcsoJudon. [ repeal here what 1 liave observed in f ubsiance 
m anoilter ptacc that all obnervationx foumled upon the ilanger of 
usurpation ought to be refetred to the compoaition and structure 
o( the guvernmeiil. not (o the nature or extent o( Its powers. The 
Stale govcTiimcni*. by their origiiiiil conftltuiion*. are imreKicd 
with complete wvereignty. In wh:>t does our sectiniy consist 
ogainti iiitir|uiion from thai quarter? Doubtless in the mannrt 
of their formation, anil In a due dependence of those who arv to 
admiuixier ihem upon ihe people. If the piYiposcd construaion 
ol lite fc«Ieral government be found, upon an tmpaitul cxjmina- 
liun of il. to be such as to afford to a proper extent the same spe* 
cics of Kecuriiy, all apprehensions oa the score of usiirpiaiion 
ought to be discarded. 

Il should not Ite forgolien that a disposition in tlir State govefiw 
menu lo encroach upon the rights oi the Union is quite as proln- 
Sm Me nt a disposilion in the Unkin lo rncnuch upon the 

Vd. 45. rights of the State governments. What shIc would he 
likely lo prevail in such a coollici. intltl drpend 00 ihe means 
which tlie contending parties could employ lourard secunivg 
wccesv A« in republics urcngth Is always on the siile 
o( the people, and as there arc weighty reasons to imluce 
a belief thai the State goremmenis will commonly poness 
mou iflddi^ce over ih«R), (lie natUTBl conclusMn is that «iich 
conlesta wilt be most apt to end to the iUKadranta|[e ol the 
UiiKMi: anil thai there is greater probahdlly of cncnuclf 
ments liy the members opmi Ihe federal brut than by the (edrral 
head upon the members. Bill ll ktrvid'ml that all cnnjccturesol 
this kind mint be exltemely vngite and Iallil4e r and thai il is by 
fat Ihc ufesi course to lay litem atlogeOicr aside, and to coniinc 



H»ailM«l JNDEPE.VDEXT STATE REFEXUES. 



I« 



our ailcnijon wholly to Ihr Ralnre and extmt lA iKe powera U 
ihcyaiv delinealed in ihe Congiiiuiion. Evcr^ihing beyond l!ii» 
miMt b« k(t 10 (hr prudence >nd 6rmii«si of Ihe people : who, a> 
thof will tioUl lli« scalM in thrir own hjnds. i1 is to be hoped, 
will alwajr* lake care to preMrve ihe coiiiiiiuiionut ciiuilibfium 
bawRi) the seiteral ami the Siaie Ko^'crnmcnis. Upon thi* 
((Donil, which 14 evidently iltc (nic one, ii will not be (lifficdtt to 
obraie ibe objection* which h.tve been nude to an indelintie 
power oi Uxaiiofi in the United States. PUfeLiUS. 



H.. 



32 \yX\, lfad,ffjU,*tJrurmal.Jtai'tTr: iftSJ HamUtOD. 



niFFERENTrATION OF POWF.RS BETWKF.N 
NATIONAL AND STATli OOVFKNMKNiS 
WITH ESPECIAL KKSCECT TO TAXATION. 



Ktlntilj ikal Ikt tl*ttt tkeutd foittit ittJtftaJtttl tt/tiU »f tr»tHtttt~- 
Tit fiJirai naililulwn »nfy a furital nrntn — 7'Artt taui a/ alitnatiiiH 
tf lUtr i»vtrfignU — Hxtlmivt It^iiljluvi tyitolinuil gtveTHmtnl^Tirtr 
tlUmn ff iM<k /#ii¥J — Pi'irtr r/ l.ixali>m J t^nftirriitl rigkl — A 
4mUi Kn a ftitilitn tf fxftdinuy mtj utt tf iHahlilj — CttNttrrtitl 
IntiJittUH rtitdtt frtm tlu Jitviitit a/ IMi lavtrrifn fviarr. 

Tj Ikr PenftU of tkf UlaU of New York ■ 

Alili'»i;jii I urn uf opinion thdl lliere would be no real tlanger of 
Ihe ci>n«c(|upnci!< >v)iieh seem to lie .ipprrhc-niled to the Slate %»■<' 
Trnmr'Hs from ji power in the Union to cuiiiiul ihein in the levies 
of money. liec.-iiiM I am prrtuadril lfi.i( the wm-c of the people, 
(he entremr h.iuni of piXivobitig t)ie reMnlincrits of the State gov- 
tminents, nml a conviction of the utility and neccufty ol tociil 
id<nmi«I rations for local pitq)oscs. would be a complete barrtrr 
ifaiiut the uppreinve ute of such a power ; yd I am willing here 
to allow, in ilt full extent, the juMness of the reasoning which 
ii^iiirr* tlut the imlivHlu.ll States ihoulii pos»t-*s an imlependtnt 
ir.il iiiicontioiUble .liilltoiily to rai^ tlirir own revenues for llie 
ii'liiily It! ilicir own wanii. And makin)[ thii concetiion. 1 aflitm 
tlial (With the vile exception of duties on imporli and export*) 
ihey would, under the plan of llie convention, retim (liat authority 
I* th« tnoii absolute and iinipialilted ien«e; .ind ih.it an allenipl 
<Mi ilie pan of the naiion.il goverinitcni to ahiidge then) la the 



198 MXCLVStVE DBLSGATlOfl. Wfc«««l» 

cxeiL'ise <A it would be a violeni aMumpiIon of power unwamnlcil 
by any ankle or clause o[ its Coiuiiiuiion, 

An eniirr con«>lid<iiion of the Sum inlo one complete national 
soveretgniy woulil imply an enllr; Mitiordinationof the pnrii; afxl 
wli "ever powci* might rcnuin 111 ihcm wouUI l>c altogether 
dependent on the general nill. But a» Ibe |iUn ol llie convention 
.iim» only at a panial union or con^iolidation, the Slate govern* 
ments would clearly retain all tlie iisUt> ol sovereignty which they 
before had. anil which were not. by that act. fxcluih-ffy delegaical 
to the United Stales. This exclusive <lclcj;aiion, or rather ilia 
alienation, of Slate "overcignij-. would only exist in ihrcc cases : 
■vherc the Coi»iituiioii in express terms granted »i\ exclusive 
aiitlioriiy to the Uniin ; where it };ranleil in one iiiMance an author- 
iiy to tlie Union, and in aiiotlier pruliihiled the Slates from exer- 
cising the like aulliorily: and wht-rc it granted an authority 10 (be 
Union, to which a siindar authority in [lie Si.ttcs would be abw- 
luiely and lot.ill/ conlradiclaiy and repn^Hiinr. I use these Icmik 
to distinguish this last c-usc from another which might appear 10 
resemble it. hut which would, in fact, be esscniially dilTerent : I 
mc.in where the exercise of a concurrent jiirisdiciion inighi be pr»- 
iluctive of occasional interferenees in the patky o( any branch of 
attminisiraiion. I>iii would nn| imply any iliieci contradiction or 
repugnancy in point of con'iiiiuiioiial authority. These three 
cases of exclusive jurisdiction in the [edcr.1l government may b« 
exeinphfied by the following insunces: The last clause but one 
in (he eighth section of the tirst article provides expressly that 
Congiess shall exercise " ^ri'/w^/w Ifghlatiitit" ota the dUtikl 
to be appropi'Uled as the seat of Koveminetil. This aiuwers to 
the lirst case. The first clause of the same section rmpower* 
Congress ■• la lay and colUcI laxet, dulits, impostt, and txtiut "-, 
nnd ilic second clause of (he Icmh section of (he tame aritcle 
decl.iret that '■ n^ Slate i4ii//, without the consent of Congress. 
Uy nHy I'llfiin/I vr dHliti an Imfiorls or fx/ntrit, except for (be 
purpose of executing its iiisppclion laws." Hence would result an 
exclusive power in (he Union to I.iy du(i«san imports and exports, 
with the particular exception meniioncd : but this power is abf idj^l 
by annihef clatue. which declares that no lax or duty shall be biiit 
on articles exported from any Slate ; in consequence of which 
qualilication. ii now only exiciuls to the ttuliet on imparls. This 
answers to ih« second case. The third will he found in thai 
clause which declares that Congress shall have power " to estab- 
lish an UNIFORM Ki;i.Eo( iMtura ligation ihrnu^huul the Unrieil 
Stales." This must ivecessartly be cxclusit-c. because, if each 



H«aUtn»1 A COXCl/XREXT POWF.Jt OF STATUS. 199 

Slate luid power lo prescribe a blSTlHCT KULK. lliore could \«H 
beaoNiroRU rule. 

A case which in.-iy |>crti;ipt l>e thought 10 rcsembk ihc \a\\tr, 
bal whkh b m (aci wtikly diflerenl. iiflccls ilic qu»(ion tmmedt- 
ately under cnniidcnition. I mean ihc power oi imposing taxes 
o%\ all arhclcft olhcr llian ci|]t>rls iiiiil im|iurl-i. This, I conlcmt. Is 
iR3i»Icslly a concurrent :ind coequal auihorily in the United Slates 
and In llic tntlindual Sutcs. There is plainly no ei|>Teiiuon in the 
Kranling clauM which makes that power tx^lMsiirt In the Union. 
There b no initepcndent clause or Mntmoe which prohibits (he 
Slntes (foin exeicisia]; it. So far it thix from tffing ihc caK that 
a plain and conclusive argument to the contrary i.i to 1>e deduced 
front titc nslmint laid upon the Stam in relation lo duties on 
tmporls and eiportii. Tlii» revtiiciiun imjilics an adinlHion iliai. 
il It were not ini'-'rted, ihe Stalci would |>«Me»* tlie power i1 
excludes ; anil il implies a further admiMion lliat. as to all other 
t.ilirs. iheaalhonly o( llw States rctnaiin undiniiniihed. In any 
□ihcr ricw it would l>c l>olh iinncccssary and dangerous; it would 
tie UBneceMdty. because if ihe ^rani (u ilie Union of Ihe ponder of 
laying xuch diitic» im|>]ied the exclusion of the Stales, or even 
tlieir subuntiiution in tliui particular, (here could he no need of 
Mich a rrtlriclion ; it wmiUl be d-mijcrons, because the introitucliOB 
al It Irads <Uivctly to Ihc coiiclusn^n which hai bt^t-n raenlioiied, 
and wfiich, il the reaiionin); of the objectors be jusi, couM not 
ha(-chc«n inlend«<l; I mean that ihc States, in all cases to winch 
Ihc Ttstncitwn did not apply, would have a cnncuirent power <i( 
lualion with ilie Union. The icsincttoii in question amounts to 
what lawyers call a NKOariVE phecnaNT— (hat is. a itfgaii«it of 
□ae thins, and an •i^w<i<>*'f of another 1 a negation of the buiImm- 
■ly of iIk Slates lo hnpoM taxes on imports and expoKs, and an 
affirmance of llteir aulhoiily to impo«c tfiem on nil other ariiclrs. 
I1 would tie mnc sophistry to aigue that it was meant to exclude 
lltetn aksoiulely trutn the imjiosilion of taxes of (he fonner kind. 
and to leave il>em at liheny lo lay oihcis iahjttl /■> tkr t^nlraf 'A 
the national legislature. The lestraining or prohibitory ct.iu.ie 
only Kxys thai ihcy shall not, vrilkout ikt (tmtfftl »/ Congrtti, lay 
such duties: and it we are to undeiitiand this in Ihe sense last 
meniiiMied, the Consiiiuiion would then be ma<l« 10 introduce a 
("iinil provision for the sake of a very alisurd cwiclusioni which is, 
lltal (be Slaiei. sc//4 tke tenstnt of Ihc national legislature, might 
tax tinporit and cx|>oiis ; and that they m>Kbt lax every other atii- 
a\t..anUtt •-aiilml/rJ \rf the t-ime body. If thb w.i.i the intention, 
wiiy nni leave ii in the tiist instance, to what is allcjjcd lo be llic 



lOO 



CONSTITUTIONAL SEPUGNANCY. lIi».M<»ll 



nalural operation of th« orif^iuil cUuse, canfening a general power 
of tnution upon the Union? It b ev»<I«nt thjit iltii could not 
have been (he intention, and that it vrill not l>ear a cotutnictkm of 
the kind. 

As lo a mtppoviiion <A tepui^ancy between the power of taxa> 
lion in the States anil in \\\r. Union, it cRnnot be supporieil in dial 
itenM; which would be requiMic to work an exclusion i>l tlra States. 
It o, indeed, possible that .1 t-ix might b« Uid on a purticukr 
ailicle by a Slate which might render it iHtxpeJienl (hjt ihut a 
further tnx should be bid on the Mine article by l\w- Union \ i>i]t it 
would not iin[>ly a cunitttutiiNial inability to inipoM a furihei tax. 
The qunniiiy of the impiMttian, the cupedicncy or itiMpedicncy of 
anincrenae on cither ude. would be muittally qvotloiis of pni* 
dence: but there would be invi>lved no direct can(r;idietifl(i of 
power. Ihc pxnicoUr policy of tli« luiiianal and of the Stale 
systems ol riiiancc yn\^\\ now and then nol eiictly coincide, and 
might lequire iccipiocal foittcjir>incev It i& not. Iwwei'Cr, a mere 
pouibiUly of iiiconvcnieiKC in the exetcisc of powers, but an 
inimedinie coiiuituiionHt rcpogn-tiivy ilut can by iniplrcition 
alienAle and rxlingiiish a pre-eiisting right of »(ivrre>gnly. 

The necessity of a concurrent furiulictian iu certain case« reMilu 
from (he division of the sovvretgn power ; and ibe rule that all 
■othoiitin of which the Si.ile>> are not explrcitly divested in (aror 
of the Union remain with them in full vigor, is not a theoreiical 
coiiM(|uence of iliJii ilivision. hut is clearly admilird by the whole 
tenor of the instrumi^nt which coni.iin.i the articles o( (he proposed 
Coristilulion. We there IiikI that, nntwillitlaiiding the -illirmntive 
grititi of general authorities, there h;i« been the most jKiiiilcd care 
in those cases where Jl was deemed improper thai the like 
authorities should mide in ilie States, to irucri negative clauses 
pcohibifing (hr exercise of them by the States. The tenth section 
of the first article coniisis altogeilter of such provisions. This 
dmimsianoo ii a clear indication of (he sense rA the cwiveniinn. 
and furnishes a rule of interpretation oui i>( the body i<l (he net 
whkh jtiuilies ihe position I have advanced, and refutes eveiy 
liypotbcib to Uk conuwr. Pu HU vs. 



niattlMl AI^RM OVER GENERAL CLAUSES, 



30I 



No. 33 l3»]. itmdttnUfmlJtmrmt. JM-Hiy ». t»«W HaOliltOa 

TAXATION CONSIDF.RED WITH RESPECI" TO . 
GENKKAl. I'OWIiKS. 

Tht grnrral ihtmi a imret af nmnetiitary alarm — ptfintlitH tf 
ftwtr^T%t itBfffing ihnus tharftitUt talM UMlalfgy, hut ftrftiltf 
l»rmllii-'Kiai«n far tkrir iHlr«dtuti0m~-T*f HatidKalgettrHmtal hk- 
t$iarify itt vtem jitdgt in latr-miiihng — Suffieird (aiti vf tHfiiian r/sMU 
mtrrijpil/ — Natnrr a/bmt imtidrrrd iti rrga'J l» tt^rtmt lovf — A "a- 
tMmalUmmtl lUprruu wktm a lll]ur/^ifUH — Tit fitutr r/ lit IfaUt ai 
Urtvttmt. 

To the P<0pU «/ the State ef New York: 

[The residue of the argument against the provisionsof 
IheConstituttun in respect tu taxation is ingrafted upon 
the following clause.] * The last clause of the eighth 
icction of the first article of the plan under consideration 
luthorizcs the national legislature "to make alt laws 
which shall he nettaary ixni prober fur carrying into exe- 
cution ihe fowen by that Constitution vested in the gor- 
tnimcnt of the United States, or in any department or 
olScer thereof "; and the second clause of the sixth arti- 
cle declares " that the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States made in punuana thtrtof, and the treaties 
made by their authority, xhall be \\\t^ supreme law ot tht 
laod, anything in the constitution or laws of any State 
to the contrary notwithstanding." 

These two clauses have been the source of much viru- 
lent invective and petulant declamation against the pro- 
posed Constitution, They have been held up to the 
people in all the exafft^rated colors of misrepresentatinn 
as the pernicious engines by which their local govern- 
ments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterini- 
luted; as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws 
would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor 

< In llie ori^Hil DFinptpet pobtjaitiaa this No. XXXIII. wat p«rt ol 
prvcnllnf number. l>iii In die collected «dliion ll wm dJviilH u 
e. anil ihc partloe of lbs Tint (Mtagnpfa In bnicliei« wat aildDd.— 

DiTOB. 



302 XECtSSAXY AiVD PKOPER LAtfS. OO.Mai) 

»ucred nor profane; and yet, strange as it nujr ap|>ear 
after all this clamor, to those who may not hare !»(>■ 
pencd to contemplate Ihcm in the same light, it may be 
affirmed with perrcct coiifidence that the const itutiuiial 
operation of the intended guvernmciit would be precisely 
the same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated, as if 
lliey were repeated in every article They are -only de- 
claratory of a truth wiiiuh n-ould have resulted by neces> 
sary and unavoidable implication from the very act of 
coHxtituting a federal government and vesting it with 
certain specified powers. This is so clear a proposition 
thai moilcration itscH can scarcely listen to the railings 
which have been s<> uopiously vente*! against this part of 
the plan, nitliout cinnttons that disturb its equanimity. 

What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a 
thing? What is lite ability to do a thing, but tlie power 
of employing tlic meant necessary to its execution? 
What is a legislative power, but a power of making 
LAWS? What are the mtans to execute a i.euislativk 
power, but LAWS? What is the power of laying and collect- 
ing taxes, but a lej^hlalii-t fvwer, or a power of mn/tiug 
laws, to lay and collect taxes? What are the proper means 
of executing such a power, but lutestarj and fm/nr laws? 

This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once wilb 
a test by which to judge of the true nature of the clause 
complained of. It conducts ux to \\n% palpable trallt, 
that a power to lay and collect taxes must be a power to 
pass all laws lueessary and fio^r for the execution of that 
power; and wtiat does the unfortunate and calumniated 
provision in question do more than declare the same 
truili, to wit, that the national legislature, to whom the 
power of laying and collecting taxes liad treen previously 
given, might in the execution of that power pass all laws 
meefttary ^nA proper to carry it into effect? I have ap- 
plied these observations thus particularly to tlic power of 
taxation, ber^iiise it is the immediate subject under con- 
sideration, and because it is tite most important of the 
authorities proposed to be conferred apon the Union. 
But the same process will lead to the same result in r» 



llUnl UNION JUDGE OF ITS OlfN POWEKS. to$ 






r 



lation to all other powers declared in the Constitution. 
And It is txprtitiy to execute these pt^wcrs that the sweep- 
ing tbuK, as it his been jtlfcctcdl)- c;(lled, authurir.es ihe 
national legislature to pass all neftsiary and proper laws. 
If there is anything exceptionable, it must be sought for 
ia the specific poweritupon which this general declaration 
is predicated. The declaration itself, though it may be 
chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least per- 
lectly harmlesR. 

But SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? 
The answer is that it could only have been done for 

eater caution, and to guard against all caviling rclinc- 
^euts in those who might hereafter feci a disposition to 
curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the Union. 
Tlie convention probably foresaw wliat it has been a prin- 
cipal aim of these paperx to inculcate, th;it the danjuier 
which most threatens our political welfare is that the 
Slate governments will finally sap the foundations of the 
Union; and might therefore think it necessary, in so 
cardinal a point, to leave nothing to construction. What- 
ever may have been the inducement to it, the wisdom of 
the precaution is evident from the cry which has been 

ised against it; as that very cry betrays a disposition 

question the great and essential truth which it is mani- 
festly the object of that provision to declare. 

But it may be again asked. Who is to judge of the 
luitstiiy Anti prefrifty of the laws to be passed for enecut- 
ing the powers o( the Union? I answer, first, that this 
luestion arises as well and as fully upon the simple grant 
q( those powers as upon the declaratory clause; and I 
answer, in the second place, that the national govern' 
mcnt, like every other, must judge, in the first Instance," 
of the proper exercise of its powers, and its constituents 
>D the last. If the federal government should overpass 
the just bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical 
;iB« of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, roust 
ippe^tl to the standariTthey' have formed, and take such 
measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution 
IS the exigency may suggest and prudence justify. The 



»<H A lAW J.VVOLVES SUPRE.VACY. [■•-MiJli 

propriety of a law, in a constitutional liglit, must always 
be dcterminciJ t>y the nature of the powers upon which it 
19 (oumled. Suppose, hy some forced constructions of 
its authority (which, indeed, cannot easily be imagined), 
the federal Icgfislature should attempt to rary the law of 
descent in any State, would it not he evident that, in mak- 
ing such an attempt, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and 
infringed upon that of the State? Suppose, again, that 
upon the pretense of an interference with its revenues, it 
should undertake to abrogate a land-tax imposed by the 
authority of a State; would it not be equally evident that 
ititswasan invasion of that concurrent jurisdiction in 
respect to this species of tax which its Constitution 
plainly supposes to exist in the State governments? If 
there ever should be a doubt on this head, the rrcdit of 
it will be entirely due to those reasoners who, in the im- 
prudent «al of their animosity to the plan of the cooven- 
tioD, fiavc labored to envelop it in a cloud calculated to 
obscure the plainest and simplest truths. 

But it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the 
supreme latt' of the land. But what inference can he drawn 
from this, or what would they amount to, if they were 
fM not to be supreme? It is evident they would 

■«.44. amount to nothing. A law, by the very 

meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule 
which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to ob- 
serve. This results from every political association. If 
individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that 
society must be the supreme regulator of thctr conduct 
Ua number of political societies enter into a larger politi. 
cal society, the laws which the lattermay enact, pursuant 
to the powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must 
necessarily t>e supreme over those societies and the in- 
dividuals of whom they are composed. It would other- 
wise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the 
parties, and not a government, which is only aaothrr 
word for political powf.b ash srvRKMACV. But it wifl 
not follow from this doctrine llwt acts of the larger *od- 
ety which are mal fvrnntft to its constitutional powers, 



tflAI 



■Udhttl L4 IV .VO r SOPKUME IF A USURP A TtON. lOJ 

but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of 
t!ic sfDxIler societiv*, will become tlie supreme law of the 
hnd. These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will 
deserve to be treated as such. Hence wc perceive that 
the claii&v which declares the sii|iretiiacy of the laws of 
the Union, like the one wc have just before considered, 
only declares a truth trhich flows immediately and nec- 
essarily from the institiitiuii of a federal govcrnmcnL It 
■ill not, 1 presume, have escaped observation that it 
txprtuly confines this supremacy to laws made punuant t» 
the Cotilitulhn ; which I menlion merely as an tn»iai)ce o( 
caution in the convention; since that limitation would, 
have been to be understood, though it had not been 
expressed.' 

Though a law, therefore, laying a tax (or the use of the 
United States would be supreme in its nature, and could 
not legally be opposed or contrtdlcd, yet a law for abro* 
sating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by the 
anthoriiy of the State (unless upon imports and ex- 
ports) would not be the supreme law of the land, but a 
Qturpation of power not granted by the Constitution. 
As far as an improper accumulation of taxes on the same 
object might tend to render the collection difHcult or 
prerarious, this would be a mutuiil inconvenience, not 
arising from a superiority or defect of power on cither 
side, but from an injudicious exercise of power by one or 
the other, in a manner equally disadvantage mis to both. 
It is to be hoped and presumed, however, that mutual 
intereKt wonid dictate a concert in this respect which 
irouid avoid any material inconvenience. The inference 
(rotn the whole is that the indiviilual States would, under 
tile proposed Constitution, retain an independent and 
uncontrollable authority to raise rcvenueto any extent of 
which they may stand in need, by every kind of taxation, 
except duties on imports and exports. It will be shown 
in the next paper that this concurkknt jurisdiction in 



'See die BbriHgmcnt a( Utxthall't ophiiaii In Mubuty vs. M»disoii, 
b Appeadix. — EurroR. 



ic6 SIATES iCBTArx AMPLE AUTHORITY. lir«.«'«l. 

the article of taxation wag the onlf admissible substitute 
fur an entire subordination, in respect to thi& br;inch of 
power, of the State authority to that vf the Union. 

PUBLIUS. 



No. 34 {32]. (Wnr Krr« Atdrf, JontuirT 4. iltt) Hamilton. 

THE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION IN TAXA- 
TIO.M OF THE STATES AND NATION. 

Tkt ilittit irtU tHaiit ittunttant laurtti 9/ nvtnue-'An tJKiatfit tf 
h-<tJiimU aulh^rtty frem RfviaH Aiit-vf — Tir uMBti rf lh< itatfi will 
rrJiKf ikrmitltvs fit vfj tiarrt'jf cm^iis—Niitnity fit frtvidt far mort 
than txiiliig BftliffHtit txigimciti ff rtvtnnt — Tlu mtifm mint l* im a 
feiili*n tt fifUtl itttif — Tkt fJUtisHi o/rnir rrign m tkr Auantiirtatt— 
War ix^nsti ef Eiitvpt (fiHftrtd vitk riftam a/ tnit liit — Etftn«i 
iiiuifrttliei in <7rt<U ffriMin — Hxamfili ff rrx-altUifnary Jt^ — Ammnt 
nirJtJ ftr ixfrnit tf iMfi-~-Poiiitlf furiitinH «/ ret^ai Mtoetn ttatn 
taiJ Halie»~EMlerital luiJ iHlfriral laJMlifn — CmtHrreml ttMoIitn iti 
tHty aJniiiitlf ijritrm. 

To the Peof^t ef tht State cj Ntw York: 

I flatter myturlf it has been clearly shown in my last 
number that the particular States, under the proposed 
Constitution, would have cokqual authority with the 
Union in the article of rercnuc, except as to duties on 
imports. As this leaves open to the States farthci[reat> 
est part of the resources of the communily, there can be 
no color fur the assertion that they would not possess 
means as abundant as could be desired for the supply of 
their own wants, independent of all external control. 
That the field is sufTicienily wide will more fully appear 
when we come to advert to the inconsiderable share of 
the public expenses for which it will fall to the tut of tlie 
State governments to provide. 

To argue upon abstract principles that this' " ite 

authority cannot exist is to set tip supposition . ry 

against fact aud reality. Uuwcver proper sacb rcaAuo- 



JtOMA.V CO-ORDINATE AUTMOKITV. 



J07 



ings ntight be to show that a thing i^u^'A/ no( Id exist, ihey 
^are wholly tr» be rejected when tlicy •ir«: made use of to 
prove tJiai it does not exist, contrary to the cvi^Icnce o( 
the fact itself. It is well known that in the Roman re- 
public the legislative authority, in the last resort, resided 
(or agc4 in two different political bodiex— not a^branchcK 
nf the same legislature, but as distinct and independent 
leijislatures, in each of which an opposite interest pre- 
Tdiled: in one, the patrician; in the other, the plebeian. 
Many arguments might have been adduced to prove (he 
unfitness of two such Bcemiiiglyroniradictory authorities, 
each having power laannutot rc/^ti/ the acts of the other. 
But a man would have been regarded as frantic who 
itiould have attempted at Rome to disprove their exist, 
eoce. It will be readily understood that I allude to the 
COMITIA CKNTURiATA and the coMrriA tributa. The 
former, in which the people voted by centnnes, was so 
arranged as to give a superiority to the patrician inter- 
est; in the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the ple- 
bc^ian interest had an entire predominancy. And yet 
Ihese two legislatures coexisted for ages, and tbe 
Koman republic attained to the utmost height of human 
treat n ess. 

In the case particularly under consideration there is no 
such contradiction as appears in the example cited ; there 
is no power on either side to annul the acts of the other. 
And in practice there is little reason to apprehend any 
inconvenience; twcaitse, in a short course of lime, the 
wants of the States will naturally reduce themselves 
wilhin a very narratv tompait; and in the interim the 
United States will, in all probability, (indit convenient to 
abstain wholly from those objects to which the particular 
Slates would be inclined to resort. 

To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of 
tliit iiuestion, it will be well to advert to the proportion 
t)elween the objects that will require a federal provision 
in respect to revenue, and tluMe which will require a State 
provision. We shall discover that the former are alto- 
gether unlimited, and that the latter are circumscribed 



30$ 



FVTUKR CONTINGENCIES. 



iv«.udai 



within very moderate bounds. In pursaing this inquiry, 
wc must bear in mind that wc arc not to confine our view 
to the present period, but to look forward to remote 
futurity. Constitutions of ciril government are not to 
be framed upon a calculation of exbtiogcxiscncies, but 
upon a combination of these with (he prob:iUte exigencies 
of ages, according to the natural and tried course of 
human affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be more falla. 
ctous than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be 
lodged in the national government, from an estimate of 
its immediate necessities. There ought to bea capacity 
to provide for future contingencies us ihcy may happen; 
and as these arc illimitable in their nature, it is impossi- 
ble safely to limit that capacity. It is true, perhaps, that 
a computiitiun might be made with sufficient acciinicy to 
answer the purpose of the quantity of revenue requisite 
to discharge the subsisting engagements nf the Union 
and to maintain those establishments which, for some 
time to come, would suffice in time of peace. But would 
it be wise, or would it not rather be the extreme of folly, 
to stop at this point, and to leave the government in> 
truKtetl with the care of the national defense in a state of 
absolute incapacity to provide for the protection of the 
community against future invasions of the publit' peace, 
by foreign war or dumcstic convulsions? If, on the con. 
trary, we ought to exceed (his point, where can we stop^ 
short of an indefinite power of providing fur emergencies 
ax they may arise? Though it is easy to assert. In gen* 
iTal terms, the possibility of forming a rational judgment 
of a due provision against probable dangers, yet we may 
safely challenge tliose who make the assertion to bring 
forward their data, and may affirm that they would bo 
found as vague and uncertain as any that could be pro 
duccd lo establish the probable duration of the world. 
Obscrvatiiins conliDcd to tJie mere prospects of internal 
attacks can deserve no weight, though even these will 
admit of no satisfactory calculation: but if wc mean lo 
be a commercial people, it must form a part of our policy 
to be able one day to defend that commerce. The sup- 



J 



^AalltM] tfAff ALWAYS A POSStB/UTY. '©9 

port of a navy and of naval wars would involve conlia- 
agencies ihat must baffle all the «lTorU of political 
arithmetic. 

Admitting that we ought to trjr the novel and absurd 
ciperinient in politics of tying up the handit of govern- 
ment from offensive war founded upon reasons of state, 
yet certainly we ought not to disable it from guarding 
the community against the ambition or enmity of other 
nations. A cloud has been for some time hanging over 
the I%uro|)ean world. If it should bretk forth into a 
storm, who can insure us that in its progress a part of its 
(iiry would not be Spent upon us> No reasonable man 
Would hastily pronounce that we are entirely out of its 
reach. Or if the combustible materials thai now seem to 
be rullecting should be dissipated without coming to 
maturity, or if a llainc »hiiulit l>e kindled without cxleiid- 
ing to us, what security can we have that our tranquillity 
will long remain undisturbed from some other cause or 
from »iime other (juarter? Let us recollect that peare 
or war will not always be left to our option; that, how- 
ever moderate or unambitious wc may be, we cannot 
count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the 
ambition, of others. Who could have imagined at the 
conclusion of the last war that France and Britain, 
wearied ami exh;iusted as they both were, would so soon 
have looked with so hostile an aspect upon each other? 
To judge from the history of mankind, ire shall be com- 
pelled to conclude that the fiery and destructive passions 
of war reign in the human breast with much more power- 
ful sway than the mild and bcncliccnt sentiments of 
peace; and that to model our political systems upon 
speculations of lasting tranquillity is to calculate on the 
weaker springs of the human character. 

What are the chief sources of expense In every govcrn- 
meot? What has occasioned that enormous aci'umula- 
tion of ilubts with which several of the European nations 
ore oppressed? The answer plainly is, wars and re- 
bellions; the support of those Institutions which are 
necessary to guard the body pohtic against these two 



3ie 



It^JJl DEBTS OF CJtEAT BittTAItf. IH«.M'M| 



most morul disuses of society. The expenses arisins 
from those institutions which arc relative to the mere 
domestic police of x state, to the supp4>rt of itn legisla- 
tive, executive, aod judicial departments, with their 
different appcndngcs, and to the encouragement of agri- 
culture and manufactures (which will comprehend almost 
all the objectft of state expenditure), are insignificant in 
comparison with those which relate to the national 
defense. * 

In ttie kingiiom of Great Britain, where all llic oslcniJlMHi* 
apparatus o( munntchy is to be proviileil (or, nor above a tldeenih 
|>arl of the annual Incaineof the nation Is appropiutcd to theclats 
ot expenses Um mentioned ; the other fourteen* fifteen I hs are 
4b3utbed in the paynieni of the intereU ol dcblK contr;icicd for 
carrying on ihc wAr> iii wtiich iliat country has been ciigjged. and 
in Ihe niaiiiicnance of fleets and armies. If, on lite otic hand, it 
should be observed ihai lite expenses incurred in the pro«ccuiion 
of Ihe ainbiliuus enter[ii'i»cs and rat ii glorious |iursiiils i>l a mon- 
archy are not a proper 8t;iiidjrd by which to judge of those wliich 
miglil l>e necev-uity in a rrpuhlic. ii uughi, on (he other hand, to 
be remaiked (hat there should be as great a ilitproponton between 
Ihe profusion and cx(rai'iiifaiice of a wealiliy kingdom m its domes- 
iic adminisiraiion, anil the fnigaliiy and economy ivhich in that 
parllcuiar becvine Ihe loixlesi siriiplicity of rei>ublican gorcra- 
meni. If wc ItaUncea proper deduction from one side agaiiut 
that wliici) it IS supposed ought to be made fioin the other, the 
praponioA may still be considered ai holding good. 

But let us advert to the targe debt which we have our- 
selves contracted in a single war, and let us only calcu- 
late on a common share of the events which disturb the 
peace of nations, and wc shall instantly perceive, without 
the aid of any clatMratc illustration, that there must 
always be an immense disproportion between the objects 
of federal and Slate expenditures. It is true that several 
of the States, separately, arc encumbered with coDsider- 



■*niis vas u> true in I7ft9. when tlut wu vritien. ittM TaAmm 
(" Wrilinn," V. ii j) Miknuly Brgnctl llial DMtnni liknulil (w aMulMlstf 
prijlil biltil (rum btxroiriiM nKincy. Thonyfa aiilitu^ xn<l natal exuentn 
■!« iilll \\w ^f^an cuue* of fiublic debt, ret m the denuKntimiion of mad 
cm nalions there is more and uwce teoileKT K> eaiploy the piihlle u«>lll 
(iw public wofhi aoJ impravement, anil ihia cluui|;e it B|iuUJly nuAtil 
ill AliKll'd, — Kliitiik. 




EunUtAnl 



EXPENSE OF STATES. 



ill 



ililc debts, which arc an excrescence of the late war. 
But this catinul happen a^ain, il the prupDScil system be 
adopted; ' and whrii these dcrbtx arc (lisctiarged, ilic only 
call for revenue of any consequence, which the State 
^vemments will continue to experience, will be for the 
mere support of their respective civil liatu; to which, if 
wc add all contingencies, the total amount in every State 
coght lo fall considerably short of two hundred thousand 
pounds. 

In framing a government for posterity as well as our> 
selves, wc ought, in those provisions which are designed 
to he permanent, to CiihniLite, not im tempumry, but on 
permanent causes of expense. If this principle be a just 
one, our attention woidd be directed to a provision in 
favoir of the State governmentft for an annu;d sum of 
about two hundred thousand pounds; while the exicen- 
cie» of the Union could be susceptible of no limits, even 
In Imagination. In thi« view nf the subject, by what 
logic can it l>e maintained that the local governments 
ou{;hi to command, in perpetuity, an Kxci.usive source of 
revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two hundred 
thousand pounds? To extend its power further, in 
txtluthn of the authority of the Union, would be to lake 
the resources of the community out of those hands which 
Stoo4l in need of (hem for the public welfare, in order to 
put them into other hands which could huve no just or 
proper occasion for them. 

Suppose, then, the convention had been inclined to 
proceed upon the principle of a repartition of the objects 
of revenue betwecu the Union and its members, in/''i» 
portion to ilieir com{wrative necessities; what particular 
fund could have been selected for the use of the States 
that would not cither have been too much or too little — 



' Nme the \t», tlie aillonki Mvcmment •«■ in «uh ilnUt ilttrjni; 
the irar tA «Si» itmi ib« ^iiIf< oTNrw V'irk and reniniflv«»iii a.lvmnf il 
•I MHUly ■ million and i halt <iullBn ; uid •lutin); Ihc Civil War niott 
at the Bonhmi ilitci incuntd "wot del'li." Ihnt of New Yotk alon« 
baine hi exMs of iwcnijr-ievcn million dollarv Rui iliii Ullcr wat to 
graau)' "Ut of propoTiuHi lu the ilcbit al ilx other ualc* Ihat rcually 
■lie Ut£ei pAit wat rrtandtd liy Iho naiioiiai guvetnmeDi. — Editok. 



%ti 



COffCUKSEifT TAXATIOy. 



We.Mctti 



too liillc for their present, too much for Iheir future 
wints? As to tbc line of separation between external 
and internal taxes, thin wonM leave lo the Stiites, at a 
rough coiu,)Utation, the command of two-thirds of the 
resources of the community to defray from a tenth to a 
twentieth part of its expenses; and to the Union one- 
third of the resources of the community to defray from 
nine-tenths to nincteen-twcntieths of its expenses. If 
we desert this boundary, and content ourselves with leav- 
ing to the States an exclusive power of taxing houses and 
lan<Is, there would still be a great disproportion bctwircn 
the mtans and the end; the possession of one-third of the 
resources of the community to supply, at most, one-tenth 
of its wants. If any fund could have been selected and 
appropriated, equal to and not greater than the obji-rt, 
it would have been inadequate to the discharge of the 
existing debts of the particular States, and would have 
left them dcperKlcnt on the Union for a provision for 
this purpose. 

The preceding train of observation will justify the 
position which has hcen elsewhere l.iid tlown, that " A 
coNcuRRFNT jUBisDicTiON in thc article of laxaiiun was 
the only admissible suhstitutc for an entire suhorili nation, 
in respect to this branch uf power, of Slate aulhunly to 
that of the Union." Any separation of the ohjccis of 
revenue, that could have been fallen upon, would have 
amounted to a sacrifice of the great intrhf^t^ of thc 
Union to the power of the individual States. The con- 
vention thought thc concurrent jiirisdiilion prpfrrable to 
tlut subordination; and it is evident that it has at least 
the merit of reconciling an indefinite constitutional 
|H)wer of taxation in the Federal gorcrnmcnt with an 
adequate and independent jKtwer in tbc States to provide 
for their own necessities. There remain a few other 
lights, in which this important subject of iaxat>t>n mil 
claim a further consideration. 

PUfiULS. 



maam 



1 




^f*' 35 [33I' ('-^/'•^•ryM'u/, Juiwy }, «]4s.) Hamilton. 



ANSWERS TO OUJECTIONS TO INDEFINITE 
POWERS OK TAXATION. 

A Smilalian tf laxatiea tall tnJ in ttndiu turJemi vh farlitular 

et/fili — 4 rrilrijlioti la JuHtt tvi/l riiiiU in Ihtir kting tarritJ A> an 

tHJitriMit ixitn — Htgk dtttitt prtJmt mugxliax. Hnjuf favtimg aj 

t^aiifailitrini itatfti, anJ epprittitn »f Ike miiietjnl — Pjijuhtki t/ 

JulifS faili mp*» Mk itllrr aiiJ tayer—CeaiiJtralifit ef ikt MdjVm lk4l 

lit fiTHiuntir f-ifs Ikt dalitt — High Julitt €rrltin Is ti allmdid walk 

iofiftuililt — An lyHjAM/ffu enly I9 if attainftl ty rxfiin — Sftcint inie>'- 

[*(/ af Srai Virk — Tht Jttire frr rrs-rnut Hktly 10 Umil rxcris ia dHtiri 

~~C»ntiJtralUH ef Ikt t^itelitn Ikal iht fft-'vu «/ SrfirruHUIifri ii lae 

imail^Ailit^t rifriitmlMian *f all elaiiti ftirtty viiianary— Inltrttli 

gf miiktmUi anj mamu/mliirin—O/ Ikt ItarntJ prafumm — Of Ikt 

tandtJ inttrttli — Taxalitn tf laiiJ — Tkt rrfreitnlalivt tidy viiU tt 

l-tkttjly ivnfrittti of LiaJifUfri — ifuluitl inlmil of all ituiri — /ftif,-n- 

I Httntu »/ rtfriunlalnti l-i fniiit tpinitn — Etitntivi informalitn 

\nttJrd in ikt taiineit of tataliMi—rke mtit prediulivl ijnttm »/ 

I Jlnamti ii lilt Itail iurJtnwmt. 

Ta Ike People o/ Ike State ef New York: 

Before wc proceed to examine any other objections to 
an inilcfinite power o( taxation in the Union, I sh;ill 
make one general remark; which iti that, if the jurisdic- 
tion of the luilional government, in the article of revenue, 
should be restricted to particuUr objects, it irniild 
naturally occasion an undue proportion of the public 
burdens to fall upon those objects. Two evils would 
spring from ihix source: the oppression of particular 
branches of industry; and an unequal distribution of the 
taxes, as well among the several States as among the 
citizens of the same Sute. 

Suppose, as has been contended for, the federal power 
of taxation were to be confined to duties on imports, il 
it evident that the government, for want of bein); able to 
command other resources, would frequently be tempted 
to extend these duties to an injurious excess. There are 
l.persons who imagine lh.n they can never be carried to 
IflW^reat a length; since, the higher they arc, the more 



114 HIGH DUTIES AND SMVGCUNC. iVa^UtWi 

it is allcf^cd they will tend to discour^ige an rxtravagant 
confitimiitiun, to jjroduce a lavornbl« Uibnte of trade, 
and to ()romote domestic manufactures. But all cstreincs 
ar« pernicious in various ways. Exorbitant dtittrs on 
imported articles would beget a general spirit of smug* 
gling, which is always prejudicial to the fair trader and 
eventually to the revenue itself; they tend to render 
other classes of llie community tributary, in an improper 
degree, to the manufacturing classes, to irhoro they give 
a premature monopoly of the markets; they sometimes 
force iniliutry out of its more natural channels into 
others in wliich tt ttovrs with less advantage; and, in 
the last place, they oppress the merchant, who is oftco 
obliged to pay them himself without any retritiution from 
the consumer. When the demand is equal to the quan- 
tity of goods at market, the consumer generally jwys the 
duty; but when the markets happen to be overstocked, 
a great proportion falls upon the merchant, and some- 
times not only exhausts his profits, but breaks in upon 
his'Capilal. 1 am apt to think that a divi^iun of the duty 
between the seller and the buyer more often happens 
than is commonly imagined. It is not always possible to 
raise tlie price of a commodity in exact proportion to 
every additional imposition laid upon it. The merchant, 
especially in a country of small commercial rapilal, is 
often under a necessity of keeping prices down in order 
to a more expeditious sale. 

The maxim that the consumer is the payer is so much 
oftcocr true than the reverse of the proposition that it 
is far more equitable that the duties oa imports should 
go into a common stock than that they should redound 
to the exclusive benefit of the importing States. But it 
is nut so generally true as to render it equitable that 
those duties should form the only national fund. When 
they are paid by the merchant ihcy operate as an addi* 
tional tax npon the importing State, whose citizens pay 
(heir proportion of them in the character of consumers. 
In this view they arc productive of inequality among the 
Stales; witich inequality would be increased with the 



idli 



LBkntOtral EQUAUZATIOX THROUGH EXCISES. JI5 

increased extent of the duties. The confinement of tlie 
Batiorul revenues to tliis species uf tmpuKts would be 
attended uiiti inequality, from a dilTerent cause, between 
■he manufacturing and the non-manufacturing States. 
The States wliich citn ^o furthest toward the supply ol 
their own wants by their own manufactures, will not, 
iiccording to their numbers or wealth, consume so greiit 
a proportion of imported articlcit as those States which 
arc not in the same farorahic situation. They would not, 
therefore, in this mode alone contribute to the public 
treasury in a ratio to tliuir abilities. To make them do 
this it is necessary that recourse be had to excises, the 
{iropcr objects of whii;h are parlicular kitiils of manu- 
factures. New Vork is more deeply interested in these 
rnosidcrations than such of her citizens as contend for 
liintting the power of the Union to c:ttcrnal taxation may 
lie aware of. New York is an inipurtinx Slate, and is tiot 
likely speedily to be to any Rrcat extent' a manufactur- 
ing Slate. She would, of course, suifcr in a double tight 
from restraininfC the jurisiliciion of the Union to com- 
mercial imfmsts. 

So far as these obscr^'ations tend to inculcate a dnngerof 
1I1C im)iort duties being extended toati injurious extreme, 
It may )>c observed, conformably to a remark made in 
jnolher |wrt of these )«pers, that ihe interest of the rev- 
1^ enue itself would be a sufficient guani against 

X0.BI. such an extreme. 1 readily admit that this 

would be the ease as long as oihcr revources were open; 
hui if the avenues to thcin were closed, hope, stimulated 
by necessity, would beget experiments, fortified by rigor> 
out precautions and additional penalties, which for a time 
would have the intended effect, till there had been leisure 
to contrive expedients to elude these new precautions. 
The first success would be apt to inspire false opinions, 
wUch it might require a long course of subsequent 
experience focorrecL Necessity, especially in politics 



'In the iciIofriiFcililiaaof iSwa. 
(ICM esl«»l. 



irti ui \nr ruiiauB uk iDVA. and Irvxn x j^tnlCT niifiropoilKHi 

l«i*mi \tet |>o|iuliiii<>ii and tcnilory ii uDtikclj' ipccdilv 10 be, to any 
i«. — Ki>n"«. 



»l6 WEAL REPKESF.NTATlOif VJSJOS'ARVM»-t»<W> 

oftco occastoiis fal&e hopes, fxl«c reusonjn^s, und a sys- 
tem or measures corrcspondifif;ly crruncous. But even 
if tliis supposed cxcesii should not be at consequence of 
the limitation of the federal povcr of taxation, the 
inequalities spoken of would still ensue, though not in the 
»ame degree, from the other causes that hare been 
noticed. Let us now return to the examiualion of 
objections. 

One which, (f we rnny fudge from the frequency of ila reperhion. 
seems niost to he relinl on. is (hat the Hotiic of R#pre«cntalive( 
Sh is not sufficiently numerous for the rvcrpiion of bII 

■». St. thi! <lilifeiFn< cla%tei of ciiitcni, in onlet to comtHiie 

live interests tuid feelings of cvefy paft of the ■.-ommui'iiy ii>d to 
produce a due syTnp.iihy between (he teprc»entuUvc body an<l it* 
constituents. This jvgument presents itself under a veiy ipeciriuf 
and leducinic furrn ; and is well calculated la lay hold of t)ie 
prejudices of iliose to Mhoin it is addressed. But when we come 
to dissect il with iitientioii. it wilt appc.ir li> be Tna<le up <>l nothing 
but fjiir-soiinding worxis. The object tl seems (o aim hi is. in the 
6r4t place, impraclieahle, and in the ien*e in which il is contended 
for is unn<^rtur)-. 1 reserve lot .-mother pUce the discufsiofi of 
the <|u«ili(>ii which frUtes to the sufficiency of the rrpresetilative 
body in lespcct to numliets. aitd sliall content mywif with cKam- 
inins hefc the panlciilai use winch )ws been nvade of a contrary 
su|»)iositiaii in reference to the immediate subject of out inquiries. 

The idea of an actual representation of nil classes of the people 
by persons of each class is nltofrether risionary. Unless it were 
eipressly proviiled in the Constiiution (hat each diftcirnl occupa- 
tion should send one or more membef^, the thinj; vrinild never 
take place in practice. Mccluinles aivd nuinu(acturrr« will always 
he Inclined, with few exccplion<i. tu ]^ve llieir votes to inerchanis 
in preference to persons of their own ptofrt^ni oi tcadrs. TboM 
discerning cilitensare well aware lliat (he ntechanic and manufac- 
luring arts lurnish (he materials of mercantile cnierprifie and 
in<lustry. Many of (hem. indeed, arc imtncdiately connccteil with 
the operations of commerce. They know Ifiat the merchant is their 
natural palron and friend ; and ihcy are aware iliat. howevcT greal 
the confidence they may justly feel in their own pood sense, their 
interests can he more eflcctualty pronKXetl by the mercbanl than 
by themselves. They are senslMe (h.it their liabiis in life have nM 
been such a* to give them those ac<{Uirr<l enilowinenis wlihoul 
which, in a deliberalive assembly, the [rreaiest natural abilities are 




StmUtonl 



TAXES Oit LAND. 



917 



(of the most patl uselm : aixt tliaC lltf influence and weiglit anil 
superior acqulicmrnts of llic mcrchanis rcndet lli«n more rqual 
lnacont«< with any spiril which might liapprn to infuxe ilielf into 
the puhtic couneiK unfricni)ly lolhe man u (a during and tradinn 
mirmift. These coovxIrraiionH. anil many othirs that might be 
mcniioneil. prove, and experience cnnfitms it. tlut attivtiis aitd 
manufActurcra ^wllt conimoni}' lie ilispuscd to bestow llieir ram 
npon merchants and ihuic wliam they rccommcnil. We miiM 
therefore ennt-ider ntcrchaiits as the natural representatives of all 
ibne clasMt of Die com in unity. 

With nrgaril to the trarned professions little need he observed ; 
they Irwiy (onn no divtnct interest in society, ami. accordii>f; lo their 
silualion and lalcnit. will be imiiscriminalely (he objecis of Ibc 
eonlidence ami chuice o( each other, and o( other [taris o( tlie conn- 
munily. 

Nothing remains but the laitdcd interest : and tl>is. in a political 
ew. and jMriicularty in relation to taxes. I take In be perfectly 
nii«l, from the wealthiest l.tmllord down to the poorest tenant. 

I tax can be laid on land whicli will not itfTecl tlie |mf|ftie1or of 
niOionx of acres a« well as the proprietor of a single acre. F.vrry 
bndhohter will iheTefore have a common inlereU to keep the taxes 
on land as hyw as possible: and common interest may always be 
reckoned upon as the surest bowl of sympathy. But if la-e even 
could suppose a distinciion o( inlemi between the o|mlem land- 
tinliler and the middling fanner, what reason is there lo conclude 
that the first msMild xl.md a l>eltcr chance of beint; deputed lo tlie 
national kgislalure than the last? If we take lact as our goidc, 
»nd took into our own Scnnle and Auemlily. we shall find thai 
nxidrrate pmprirtoni of land prevail in both ; nor is this less the 
cue in llir Senile, which consists of a sm:tlteT number, th^tn in 
(he AsfieniMy. which is composed of aKrcaIrr nondier. Where the 
quaBticallons of the electors are the SJinie. whether they have to 
diofiKe a vnall or a large number, their voles will fall u|>on those 
in whom Ihcy have most confMleiice. whether these happen to be 
men a( targe lortunes, or of moderate property, or of no pn>perty 
at all. 

It is said to be necessary (hat all clasu^ o( citiient stiould Itave 
_ pmc of their own number in (he representative body in order (hat 
Ihar feclini-s and inteiesls may t>e the better understood and a(- 
tended (o, itui we have seen that ihit will never happen under any 
atrangemenl that leaves the vole* of (he people free. Where this 
it the case, the representative body, with too few exceptions lo 
hate an)' inAwnKe on the spirit of the govemnMni. will be com- 



ai8 TAXATIOS RP.qUHtF.S KNOWLEDGE. IIh.»(M> 



poMil of landholdctf, merchaBts, aiu! men o( the leatncd piafc»- 
sions, Bm where is ilie tUngtr ilial ili« intFrcsts atiil (rcliiiK* of 
ihe ilitfcieiil rlastct^ of citticns will not l>c unclcmooif ot ntlcnilcd 
lo l>>- ihcsc lliicc ()cscrij>lion!> of men? Will not the Uiiilholder 
know »ii<l fcnl wlintrvct will promutc ot iiiiurc tlie iiilcrcsl of 
Undcd pro|>cr(]r f Anil will lie not. Iroin his own inicir&i in Uiai 
KpccicK of propetiy, be suflkienllj' ptonv lu texoA evety alicmpi to 
prejudice or eiicuniber ii? Will not the merchanl unilcretjnO and 
be dispoied lo cullivnte, a> far as may be ]MU|ier, the iiilcrcxlk of 
the mechiinic and minur^tciuriiig aita. lo whicli his cofiiinctcc 
i* so ncjitly allied? Will nol llie man of the teuined prufctxion, 
who will (eel a nctilrnliiy lo ihe liv^Uhips bctwcxn the difFcTcnt 
branclie* of induitiy. be tikcly to prove ait iiii|iartial arbiter 
between them ; ready to promote cither. «o far as it sh.ill appe^ir lo 
him conducive lo llie general ititeiesls of the UKicly ? 

If wc takcinio ibeaccauni the ninmcntnt]- humors or dt»pos>tioiii 
which nvty luppcn lo prevail in patticutar pant of the wciety, muI 
to which a wise ad iii in i^l ration will never l>e inalleotivc, it the man 
wlioiic Miuaiiun lead* to extcnsii-c inquiiy and inlorniaiiun teM 
likdy to be a compeieiil jodge of ilieit iiauiie, ettent. and (oiinda- 
liun lliaii one whose obH-iialion dot> not travel bej^nd lite circle 
of hi» neighbors and ac<|ii.iintancc« ? Is il not natural itiat a man 
wlio tka candidate for the favor ol <hr iieofili;. and wIm is depeiKl- 
ent on the stitfi.iKn »f hiit fellmv-ciliieiu (oi llic continuaocp ok 
Ilia public lioixxs, should lake caic to inform liimirll of iIkIi 
dispoiiiiont and inc)inalii>n*. ami sbuuUI Ik willing to allow iIkoi 
tlieir proper degree ol tiiDiicnce upon hi& cooditci i 'I'hK depend- 
ence, xnA Ihe necessity ol being bouiitl liiitinell. and liix pouierity, 
by Ihe lawK to which he gives his aucni, are the true and ilicy are 
ihe slronicdiords of sympathy between the rcptci^nUlivx and llie 
constituent. 

Tlieie is no pan of the administr.ttion of gnvenitneni that 
requires extensive information and a lliornujjh koowlrdap o( the 
pnnciplctof political economy vo tnuch a« the bitMiies» of taaaiion. 
The man who undcntandi those principles bc*l uill be least 
likely to report to opiKessirc eipcdienis or to vacnticeany panlcu- 
lar class of citizens u> llw procurement ol revenue. It mixlu be 
demonuralcd ihai the most piodiiclive system of 5iuncc wiV 
always tie the least Iwideiisome. There c»i be no duobt ilul h 
order to a iuilicioii^ esejrisc o( llie power ot l.iialinn, il i» neces- 
sary that the person in whose liands 11 tt should be Koquiiinieil 
wilh ihegrnei.il genius, habii«. and modes ol thinking [<le 

at large, and with lite icbouitcs ol (he cuuntiy. A>' A\ 



1 



B«UtOR) 



MTUKF.SrS OF C1.ASSF.S. 



319 



V 



ihAt can be TO.isomiWy incnnl by * knowleilgc o( th* intcic»l» and 
ItcJiii]^ □( tiK pcD|>le. In any otli«r »ei)»e t)i« ptopiuilian has 
riltier no meaning or an absurd om. And tii ihai sense lei every 
teasiderale cilieeii Ju<l{;c (or hiiuMlI wliere tlie requisJIe quidificu- 
UPn Is most lUicly 10 be found. 

I'UBLIUS. 



No. 36 (34). uv<w i'lrt Piin. janiunr >. -ii*-) HamiUoD. 

TAXATION CONSIDERED MORE ESPECIALLY 
AS REGAkUS INTERNAL TAXES. 

Tamlitn /*r tit ktaifil »/ individtiati — tSllli afittitj iitwttn 
paridMj tiiiiin e/ irtUty — Asirrliim Ikal lie HBlim (ainitl etrrtiit Ikt 
frmtr •/ lajialieu miih luttAiiii^t — Tit tame /vtutr im lit linU tt£i>t<t' 
iMitt — Vinal ntthfJ rf i^y*iS '•>"'< — Intimal taxtt dividtd iale aiittt 
taJ iitJirHl — lnJinitttxii art dHliti and txtiiti tH ttrlitUn/ tfnttimf. 
txtn-^lt lajtni Ihtu Ihjiii lit frimiful titjal mIkhIJ tt It awiJ cfjt^li 
^tajf l.iMtJ tf ftirttiutar ilalfi — Tbt rfJttlinHi ta dirnl laxfi — MttAnf 
r/ bjiKx laud laxti ~ Tht iMtifia tjn uit lit mtH.ti rf t«th ttaU — 
Oirtil taxet utuil if af/vrtifiti/ ff /v/u/atitit^ TAt «#iiir e/ dirttl 
*ufi frvindtd agaiHii inii gmardid lirtntifttliMt — Fn-/viilifri lAul 
lit nalifH ik.ill crllt<t atl iultrrtal Mxti ^y ttfmiilieu — ImpeiiiHlitf Ihal 
Itt rnvituf Utri of mlifti and ilaitt teill tlaii — A imaU land Mm 
n/utml /ft tie ilatn — Xjfntfri raiind en/ ■•/ tkit pevrtr cf in/frual 
Htatiea — DimUt trii e/ f*ir tMtiten — Prt^^Mt imftefBiml tf lUlt 
tfitiali — UiitiMihtvJe/dmHi ijxjiiiui — FM taxii. 

Tf the Picpie of tht State 0/ Nefo York: 

We Imvc sccti xhM ific Trt-till of the olMMv-jiiiaiiB lo which ibe 
b(c][<nng nuiiil>vr lias been principally (tcvoled is iImi from lite 
■Ulan) o|)CT3lioa of llic diSvrcni inlclesi» 3,n(\ views ul llic v.iiioii« 
tUues ol like comiiiuniiy, wliethcr the rejifi-M-ntiilion ut llir fimple 
be more of less nunmmit. it will coitsisi aintnst witirely i>( 
proprietor of land, of madianis. and of meinbers of the tentned 
professions, who will truly repreietit all those tliffcrcin inlcr«iift 
M»d riews. I( It shouUl be objected that we luive seen other 
destripiiona of men in the local IcgiiiUtares. 1 .in%n-cr (hat it 
H iflmitled thcte arc cxccplioru 10 the rule, but n»t in suflidenl 
nwnlicr to influence ific general conipleaion oc chnrncicr ol 
ihr gavcrdijinit. Tlirrr flre sliong minds tn every Wiillt of 
life that will rise tupciior to lire db^ulTania^-es of situalion, and 



tiO 



CO,VFUCT OF REVENUE LAWS. SStt-^'Ui 



witi command the tribute due lo iheir merit, not only tram the 
cliksSM to which ihry p.trticiibtlj- hclonf;, Itui (nwn l)ie Mckty in 
Krneral. The door ouglit to be oqualt)' open to all ; ami 1 trust. 
(or the credit of hum;in naliirc. that w« tlial) ure rxamptes of such 
vigototu plants llouiisFiiii^- in l)ic \a\\ t>\ federates well m o( State 
legisUiion ; but dCcaKicmal instances of this sofi will not render 
the reasoning loundcil upon lli« general course of llilng;s lei» 
concliHivc. 

The subject might be ptaccJ in several other tigblt that woulil 
all lead lo the same r«Milt ; and in pariicul.ir it might h« asked. 
Wliui greatef afftniiy or reUiion of iiiterest can be conceived lie* 
twecn the carpenter aiul hlocksititlh, and the linen inanufactura' or 
■toe knig- weaver, than between the mcrcliani and either of them ? 
It K( notorious (hat tliere are often as ([real rivalships tielween 
different branches of (he ntecbanic or manufacturing aMs as tlierc 
are between any vA the deparlniciils of labor and imiutlry; so 
thai, Uidess the reprcsentalivr body were lo be (al more numeroul 
than wouki lie consilient « illi any idea of regularity or wiwlom in 
its deliberations, it b impaMiblc that what scents lo )te the ipini 
of the objection we liave 1>een consideiinf; should ei-er be realiied 
fn practice. But 1 forl>cAr to dwell any longer on a matter witich 
has hitherto worn too loose a garb to admit ereii of an accurate 
taspeclion o( its real «luipe or tendency. 

There is another objection of a somewhat more precise 
nature that claim» our attention. It lias been asserted 
that a power of internal taxation in the national lejcisla- 
tttrc could never be exercised with advantage, as wetl from 
the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circunisUnceit, 
as from an interference between the revenue laws of the 
Union atid of the particntar States. 'I'he siippnsitiKn of 
a want of proper knuwle<lge teems to be entirely deslt- 
tat« of foundation. If any question is depending in a 
Stjite legislature respecting one of the (-onnitc?, whldi 
demands a Icnowledjce of local detail^ l>ow is it acquired? 
No doubt from the information of the members of the 
county. Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the 
national legi«laturc from the representatives of each 
State? And is it not to be presumed that the men who will 
generally be sent there will be possessed of the necessary 
degree of intelligence to be able to comaiunic4ite thai 
information? Is iheknowledgcuf local turcumstanccs, as 



lunilUBl INTERtfAL TAXES OF TWO K/.VDS. 



771 



applied to taxatian, a minute topoi^raphical acquiintance 
with all tfic mountains, rivers, streams, highwa'.'s, and 
bjrpaths in ucli State; or is it a general aci|iiniiitan<re 
viih its situation and resources; with the state of its 
agriculture, commerce, manufactures; with the nature 
of its products and c>n»Hmplt«ns; with the diHcrcnt 
degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry.* 

Nations in general, even under governments of the 
more popular kind, usually commit the administration of 
their finance* to single men or to tioards composed of a 
few imlividtials, who digest and pre|varc in the first in- 
stance the plans of taxation which arc afterwards [KiKSed 
into laws t>y the authority of the sovereign or legislature. 

Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen arc deemed 
vcrjrwhcrc best qualifted to make a judicious selection of 
ohject* i>roper fxr revenue; which is a clear indica* 
tion, as far as the sense of mankind can have weight in 
^thc question, of the species of knowledge of local circum- 
lances requisite !■> the purposes of taxation. 

The uixe* intended to be comprised under the general 
denomination of internal taxes may be subdivided into 
■m thOM of the direet ' and those of the imtirect 

lot. 13,91. kind. Though the objection be made to both, 
jret the reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the 
former branch. And indeed, as to the Utter, by which 
must be aoderslood duties and exci&es on articles of con> 
sumption, one is at a loss to conceive what can be the 
nature of the difficulties a(>prehended. The knowledge 
relating to them must evidently be of a kind thai will 
either be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or 
can eaUly be procured from any well-informed man, espe- 

■ li U (M^milni; (i> iiM*. Is eofinM-ilnn with the recent mnddle- 

lMdailn<^t •• I" Ihr iti9«itn« t>Pl«c»ii ilirecl mid nutirttt liim, Ihal 
iamihcKi, in 7'ke IiJftaiiit. inii ihe clrimt <Nslin':tii'n ; liul laMr, 

icn the |[oTeniiii«al Kmghl lo prcn'c ihit ■ tai on csiiitRct w» inrii. 

t. hi* tificf VIS llie irKunent whicli k<1 the courl In Ulie Ihil liew. 
Hid the }iii|>tTiBe t.'onit Uld aittlc ihe ilcliBltlun* t^ "illretl" Isioi 
(rna hy ihr i1icii<w)iiy md liy ihc |>olilicil ccononiiiii. it rfim noi wen 
fOHJlile thai Ihey miil'l hivf been \ane, >n ilflnhl at In vhat an incm»* 
ut nil aodtt Ike c»ntii<iiikin ; and Ibey wonid mtiely have atmt to 
tkcir fint, lodeciwin, and lo the dhciedilaUIe revcnal nhich foU»ir«d w 



laa 



LASD TAXES. 



CH«. M IMf 



cially of ihe mercantile clau. Tlic cifcuni!itaiice» thai 
may clistingutsh its situation in one State from its situa- 
tion in anotlivr must i>c few, sim)>lc, and easy to be com- 
prc!)eii<leii. Tlie [}rini-i|Ml thinj; to be atleiido] to would 
be to avoid tlio&c articles whicli had been previously ap- 
propriated to the use of a particular Stale; and there 
could be n» difficulty in ascenaintnjjc the revenue system 
of each. This could always be known from ihc respective 
codes of laws, as well as from the information of ilic mem- 
berk from the several States. 

The objeirlion, when applied to real property or to 
houses and lands, appears to liavc. at first sight, more 
(cnmdalion, but even in this view it will not be;ir a close 
ciaminatioH. l-tnd \at\c% are commonly laid in one of 
two modes, cither by atttuU valuations, permanent or 
[>erio<lical, or by <vc>fw>«tf/a!(«essnients, at the discretion, 
or according to the best judf-mcnl, of certain officers 
whose duty it is to make (hem. In cither case, (he t.xv.' 
CUTIOK of the business, which alone rc(|uircs the knowl- 
ed^ of local details, must be devolved upon discreet 
person* in the charai:lcr of commisaioiwrs or assessors, 
elected by ihc people or appointed by ihe government fur 
the purpose. All that (be law can do must be to name 
the per.tons or to prescribe the manner of their election 
or appointment, to fix their numbers and qualifications, 
and to dr^w the general outlines of their powers nml 
duties. .-Vnd what is there in all (his that cannulas well 
be performed by the national Icgishiturc as by a State 
legislature? The attention of either can only reach to 
general principles; local details, as already observed, 
must be referred to those who are to execute the plan. 



'Iiriukly M)<no it. A* nvllincl in lli« inlKxIiKlMiii, llic natluiial CKafacI 
tm a ploJf (• of hit dMlinj; id iKo inin<nii]r> I'b* " 'litTcl " lu cIm«>* 
n-jH|Kit «i lhik<i»reuii(. in uconluicc siih thr iiiicnii'.in uf ihi- Iiamcn 
thu xij !■! whkk could h« terial unclumr-r trnuMin, ft mntlivr woriti, 
Ihal txxi Ui wlikth omIiI lie mcil •llki:rtni i < Il-iu 

nil tc>iii« «ntl liol on iitlKn>. Uiualil lie ' to 

iwerenl thii vtrty <liu.*t<>ninali'>ii. Oiion il..^ .- ....■.; !-■■■ ..:.ii)« 

<|iieMHi» it niercljr " li the inconiB tax a liu kviF'l liy a nixi-f>axin|; 
■■■ajnniy oil Uic iniiuiTlty ^" aodiu cDoMitutioiul upcn it oIitkiu. — 
Umvok. 




1 



BuUlioBl 



aKiFo/m/ry or^ iuposts. 



«a3 



But there is a simple point of view in which this matter 
may be placed that must be altogether saltKfucior)'. The 
n;ilt(in;il l<:gi«l:iture euu mulcc u»e uf the system c/ each 
State witfiiu that Stale. The method of Laying and col- 
lecting this species of taxes in each State can, i» alt its 
pans, be adopted and employed by the federal gov- 
ernment. 

Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes 
is not to be left to the discretion of the national legisla- 
tore, but is to be determined by the numbers of each 
State, as described in the second section o( the first arti- 
cle. An actual census or en uine ration of the people muKt 
furnish the rule; a circumstance which effectually shuts 
(lie door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this 
|Mj«cr of taxation seems to have been provided ai^ainst 
■ith guarded circumspection. In addition to the pre- 
caution just mentioned, there is a provision that " all 
duties, imposts, and excises shall be umfokm throughout 
the United States." 

It has been rery properly observed, by different 
speakers and writers on the side of the Constitution, that 
if the exercise of the power of internal taxation by the 
Union should be discovered on experiment to be really 
iiieonrenient, the federal government may then forbear 
the use of it and have recourse to reiiuiNitions in its 
stead. By way of answer to this it has been trium- 
phantly asked, Why not in the first instance omit that am- 
biKuous power, and rely upon the latter resource? Two 
sulid answers may be given. The first is that the excr- 
cUe uf th;it power, if convenient, will be preferable 
bci::au9c It witl bc morc ellcctual; and it is impossible to 
prove in theory, or otherwise than by the experiment, 
that it cannot be advant:ig;eou8ly exercised. The con. 
trary, indeed, appears most probable. The second 
answer is tliat the existence of such a power in the (^on* 
stilution will have a strong inDuencc in giving efficacy to 
requisitions. When the States know that the Union can 
apply itself willioul ihcir agency, It will be a powerful 
rauiirc for exertion on their part. 



a»4 SPECTES OF DOUBLE TAXATION. tHo.M.a* 

As to the inWrference of the revenue laws of the 
Union and of its members, wc have already seen that 
there c^n he no cbithing or repugnancy of authority. 
The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense, interfere 
with each other; and it is far from impossihle to avoid 
an interference even in the policy of their different sys- 
tems. An efTcctual expedient for this purpose will be, 
mutually to abstain from those objects whieh either side 
may have first had recourse to. As neither can tontrol 
the other, each will have an obvious and sensible interest 
in this reciprocal forbearance. And where there is an 
immediaU common interest, we may safely count upon its 
operation. When the particular debts of the States are 
done away, and their expenses come to be Umited within 
their natural compass, the possibility almost of inter* 
Terence will vanish. A small land-tax will answer the 
purpose of the States, and will be tlieir most simple and 
most fit resource. 

Many specters have lieen raised out of litis power of 
internal taxation to excite the apprehensions of the 
people: double sets of revenue officers, a duplication of 
tiietr burdens by double Uxations, aiul the frightful 
forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been 
played off with all the ingenious dexterity of political 
legerdemain. 

As to the first point, there are two cases in which there 
can be no room for double sets of of&cers: one, where 
the right of imposing the tax is exclusively vested in the 
Union, which applies to the duties on imports; the other, 
where the object has not fallen undc^r any State regula- 
tion or provision, which may be applicable to a variety 
of objects. In other cases, the probability is that the 
United States will either wholly abstain from the objects 
preoccupied for tocil purpotes, or will make use of the 
State officers and State reguLaliuns for collecting the ad' 
ditional imposition. This will best answer the views 4( 
revenue, because it will save expense In the collection, 
and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to the State 
governments and to the people. At aJl «vents> here (■ 



BuUlMl 



COMMEKCtAt /.t/fOSrS. 



"S 



a practicable expedient for avoiillnf; such an inconveni- 
ence; and nothing more can be required than to show 
tliat evils predicted do not necessarily result from the 
plan. 

As to anjr argument derived from a supposed system of 
influence, it is a sulhcicnt answer to s»y that it ought not 

be presumed; but the supposition i» susceptible of a 

lore precise answrcr. If such a spirit should infest the 
councils of the Union, the most certain rond to the ac- 
complishment of its aim would be to employ the .State 
officers as much as possible, and to attach Ihcm to the 
Union by an accumulation ol their cmoluineiiis. This 
Would serve to turn the tide of State influence into the 
channels of the national government, instead of making 
federal influence flow in an opposite »nd adverse current. 
But all suppositions of this kind arc invidious, and ought 
to be banished from the consideration of the great iiues- 
tiun before the people. They <;>in answer no other end 
than to cast a mist over the truth. 

As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is 
plain. The wants of the Union arc to be supplied in one 
vay or another; if to be done by the authority of the 
federal government, it will not be to be done by that of 
ihc State government. The t|uantity of tases lu be paid 
by the community must be the same in cither case; with 
this advantage, if the provision is to be made by the 
Union — that the capiul resource of commercial imposts, 
which is the roost convenient branch of revenue, can be 
prudently improved to a much greater extent under 
federal than under Sutc regulation, and, of course, will 
render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient 
methods; and with this further advantage, that as far as 
diere may be any real difScuIly tn the exercise o( the 
power of internal taxation, it will impose a disposition to 
greater care in the choice and arrangement of the means; 
and must naturally tend to make it a lixed point of policy 
in the national administration to go as far as may be 
I'ractirable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to 
the public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity of 



2)6 



POt.L.TAXhS. 



IV».H<3<) 



those ini|>ositiuns which might create dis&ntisfaction in 
the |)oi)rer and inost numerous classes of (he society. 
Happy it is when the interest which the guvvrnmcnt has 
in llic prcsrrvatiwn uf its uwu power cunci(li-s with a 
proper (Jitiriliutioii of the public burdens, and tends to 
gfuard the least wealthy part of the community from 
oppression ! 

Ak tt> poll taxes,' I wiihoMt scruple confess my dt<uip- 
probatiou «( (hem; aoiJ (hough ihey have prevailed from 
an early period in those States * which have uniformly 
been (he most tenacious of their rights, I should lament 
to sec ihem introduced into practice under the national 
govcrnmcni. Dot docs it follow, bcrHiuse there is a 
power to lay them, that they will aciiially be laid? Every 
State in the Union has power to impose taxes of this 
kind; and yet in several of them they are unknown in 
pniciice. Arc the State jjoveritments to be sligmaliired at 
tyrannies becauite they pusscM this power? If they are 
not, with wliat propriety can the like power justify such 
a charge against the nnlional goTcrniDcnt, or even be 
urge<l as an obstacle to its adoption? As little friendly 
39 I am to the species of imposition, I still feel a thoroufih 
conviction that the power of having recourse to it uoght 
to exist in the federal governmeiil. There are certain 
emergencies of nations, in which expedients, Ihai in i!ic 
ordinary state of things ought to be fortwrne. become 
essential to the public weal. AihI the government, from 
the possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have 
Ihr option of making use of (hem. The real scart-i(y of 
objects in this country, which nwy be considered as pro- 
duc(iTc sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to itself 
for not abridging the discretion of the national councils 
in tht!t respect. There may exist certain critical and 
tempi'stiions conjunctures nf the Stale, in which a pi-'H'- 
tax may become an inestimable rovource. And as I hnoir 
oothinK to exempt this portion of ihe globe from the 

'St* ankle oil l-oll tu. hj W C. FwJ. In [.akit'a " Cyclo|Mdu U 
PuDUnl Sdra^"— BbiiOK. 




MUbsnl PIFFICVLTIES OF COXfeyr/OX. 



common L-jlamitics that hare I)«f;illi;n i»tlicr parts uf it, I 
acknowliNlgf my aversion to every projcti that is calcu* 
laled to tltsarm tlic guvcrnniciit ut a single weapon which, 
in any possible coniintccncy, might be u)»:[ulty employed 
far the general defense and security, 

1 have now gone through the examination of such of 
the powers proposed to be vested in the United Stjites 
ffhich may be considered as having an immediate relation 
to the energy of the government; and have endeavored 
lu answer the principal objections which have been 
made to them, i have passed over in silence Ibose minor 
authorities wlitcli ;ire either too inconsiderable to hare 
been tliouKht worthy of the liosiiliiics of the opponcntH 
of the Constitution, or of too manifirst propriety to admit 
»if controversy. The mass of judiciary power, however, 
iniKhi liaveclaimed aa investigation under this head, had 
it not been for the conntderation that its organization 
ind its extent may he more advantageously considered in 
connection. This has determined me to refer it to the 
branch uf uur itiquiricfi upon which we sliatt next enter. 

Publics. 



No. 37 I36). iO^lly AJnrttirr. imian ir.trO.) 



Madison. 



DIFFiCUI.TIKS OF TIIK CONVKNTION IN 

FRAMING A CONSTITUTION. 



Dificmltf tf itittHinng fiiHir ifamrri in Iki rigkl $firi$~^Prf 
ittirmiHlJ frinni$ and furmitl — 7''tf FlJfntllll <iJJrtlttJ tf mtilhtt, 
hit A> tkjtr Mfka \riik mtrtSy Ikt iapfiiarn •>/ tkf manlry — Xrtvlly 
n/ •Bfii<tiltirt tf Ihf tfork ptintfJ out — Thf tuftitilutmt «/ Htttiiity 
tut pnfrit, t«l Ikt tmntnli^H nvrtfJ teitiimt farfy fetttHg, am/ alt 
^rrtJiHaHy tafiiJltJ. 

Totkt Ptpfieoftht RMeof New Yark: 

In reviewing the defects of the existing Confederation, 
and showing that ihry rannol be supplied by a govern- 
nent of less eflcruy than that before the public, several 
of the most important principles of the latter fell of course 



ai8 SPIKir OF MODERATIOft. «•.«»» 

under consideration. But as the iiltimnte object of iheM 
papers is to determine clearly and fully the merits of (his 
Constitution, and the expediency of adopting it, our plan 
cannot be complete witbuut taking a more critical and 
thorou}:h survey of the work of (he convention; without 
examining it on all its sides, comparing it in all its parts, 
and calculating its probable elfcctK. 

That this Tcmaining ta^ may be ciccutrfl uiifter impreSHiont 
conducive loajuil hikI fair mull. M>int? irtlFCUuDJ muM (II lhi» 
place be indulged, which canilor pterioiuly suggc«l>. 

ll is a luislonunc inseparable front human aflahs thai public 
measures are tardy invetiigaicd with iliai &|>int af moderation 
wliich is evscntial to a just mimaic uf iherr real icndeikcy lo 
adrance or olMlrucI the public good : and Ihoi ihut spirit is moie 
api la be diminlslu-d than promoted l>y those occasions which 
lequtre an unuiaal exercise of tl. To those who have been led by 
experience lo allcnd )o t!ii» consideration, ii could not appear stir- 
prtsinK that the act of the conventHui, which rccomnicnds so many 
inipori.mt changes and iniiovaiions, which may tie viewed in 
so many tighls and relations, and which touches ihe sprinf^ n( «o 
inaoy pj>.«ions anil fnieresls. »liout'l liitd oi ricilc divpo^ilions 
unfriemil)'. boili un one miIc and on the other, la a l:tir iliscusiuon 
and nccuntic judgntent of its merits. In some it hss been loo 
evidenl. front their own ptdtlicatMtis, that they hare scanned the 
proposcti Const ilHlion. not only with a piedt^posiikm lo cenwit. 
but with a predetcmiination to condemn : as ilic language hetil by 
others betrays nn opposite predeicrtni nation or bias. «hich must 
render their apiniuni atio ul little momeni in lite ijurstion. In 
placing, however, these diffrreni chainclri!; on a trvrt. wiih respect 
to the vreight ol their opinron*, 1 nish not lo inainu^it^ ilui ilieie 
m»y not lie ■ niateTi.il diffrrenc*' in the purity of ihrtr inteniioos. 
ll (1 ImiI ;uu tu iimi.irk. in favor of ilie I.ilter description, thai as 
our situation is uiiivcTullyailmillcd to bn prculinrly critical, and la 
require nxlitipFnuihly that sotocthing should b« doite foi our letiel, 
the predetermined p^ition rA wh.ii hn» hrrn aciunlly done may hare 
taken his bias (rotn the weight of these consider al ions, as well 
as from conSMkralions of a simMcr nrtiure. The prprlpiertnlned 
ailversary, on ihe other hand, csn have been gmeriicil by no 
Ten>.^l motive whatever. The inicntiuns ol Ihe linii may lie up- 
right. »» ihey may. on the lonirary, be Cidpahle. Tl>«? views of 
the Ust cannot br uiiriKhl, .imt niiiit b<r culpahk. But the inith 
M Ihal these papers are not 3.iiAxe\\et\ In |u-iM>n» fjltntg nii 



ENERGY IN GOVERNMENT. 



>I9 



titbcr of (hne c)ur:icten. Thcf solicit the altcniioo of ihotK only 
who add to a sincere t»l (or the luppincu ol itirir country a 
icinper (Hvoiahlc Co s juwl Mlimale of the racaos of pTomoIin); it. 

fenion« ol this chitMier will proceed to an eiitmiitalion o( the 
pUn Bubniiiied by ihe coni-ention.nol only wiihuut s dUposiiion to 
find or to magnify fjulit. but will see the propiiciy ol icflccimg 
ikit a faultiest j>Uri wai not to be expected. Nor will ttiey biuvly 
make allourancci lor ihc errors which may be ciiargc.iblc on ihc 
Uilibility to which the convention, an a body u( men. n-eic lUble ; 
InU will kce^i in mind thai they themselves also arr but tiK-n and 
oaghi not to auuine iin inlatlibilily in rejudgiog tlic hlliblc 
opinions ol others. 

With equal readiness will it be pnceived that, besides thne 
nihicententa to cindor, many allowance;* ought to be miide lor the 
difficulties inherent in the very naiurc ol the undcrtahing referred 
to the convention. 

The novelty o( the undeiiaking immediaicly strikes us. It has 
been shown in the course of Ibc^e papers that the existing Cun- 
Icderaiion is founded on principle which are fallacious: that we 
must consequently chanj^e this lintt foundation, and with il ihe 
supcrstiuciurc icfting upon it. li has been shown that the other 
confedemcies which could be consulted as precedents hare lieen 
vitiated by titc sNn>c erroneous principles, and cnn therefore furnish 
■to aiber lijihl than th.tt of be.icons. which give warning of the 
coane 10 be shunned wtihout pointing out thai which ought to be 
pursued. The incMi that the convention could do in such a situa- 
tion was to at-oid the orrora suggested by the past experience ol 
Oikcr countnes. as well as ol our own ; and to provide a convenient 
mode of rectifying their own cirois. as future experience may 
•iiilold then), 

Amuns the difficulties eiKOuntcrcd by the convention 
a very important one must hare lain in combining the 
i«)utsiti^ stability ami energy in covcrnmenl with the 
inviobbk altentton due to liberty and to the republican 
form. Without substantially 3(.x»ni {dishing this part of 
tbeir utKlertaking, they woultl liave very itupcrfectly ful- 
filled the object o( their appointment or the expectation 
r ol the public; yet that it could not be easily acco.n- 
I plishcd will be denied by no one who is unwilling tn 
I betray his ignoraace of the subject. Energy in govcm- 
I ment is essi^ntial to that security against external and 
1 ^internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary exci U' 




330 MUTABLE tf.GlSLATlOM ODIOUS. iKo.W^Mi 

tion of tlic laws which enter into the very definition of 
good government. Stability in government is essential 
to national character and to the adrantagcs annexed to 
it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds 
of the people, which are among the chief blcs»intfs of 
civil society. An irregular and mutable legislation is not 
more an evil in itself tlian it is odious to the people; and 
it mity be pronotincetl with assurance that the people of 
this country, enlightened as they are with regard to the 
nature, and interested, as the great body of (hem are, in 
the effects of good government, will never be satisfied till 
some remedy be applied to the vicissitudes and uncer- 
tainties which characterize the State administralions. 
On comparing, however, these valuable ingredicnl) 
with the vital principles of liberty, we must perceive 
at once the difficulty of mingling them together in tbeii 
due proportions. The genius of rcpuhtican litwriy 
seems to demand on one side, not only that all power 
should be derived from the people, but that those 
intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the 
people, by a short duration of their appointmentx; and 
that, even during this short period, the tru^t should be 
placed not in a few but a number of hands. Stability, 
on the contrary, retiuires that the hands in which power is 
lodged should continue for a length uf time the same.' 

' Bj^hoi (" The Enelith Can«iitut!oii.''74) »];uc« ihx *'" ■•-'■illtj 
li9*olr«ci in ■ lixrd term iil office it a i:rnl d«(«t in llir 1 ^'-n 

|;vrciiiin«ni, u comiMml wilb \\\aX of U«iit Onliiii. wImt^ .tiy 

cia be tumeil oul at luy inomcRl. aixl *. ocw I'ailiaiMrDt ubiamni. A* 
S ■itllet oJ l*i'l, the twii vjiktemi urn iia« w> (u oiml ia prartiiv ih the/ 
uc lu |iWii>;i|ile. f'» Ihc AiiMri-:ai< r«-,itrw"l»tin. I.? ti--; ire 

RCpiwiire lo publk opinion, an. in iiDjr iTiliial muioriit. I .">n 

loaoconl with, gt al kait wit U>opp«te, the tiron|;I|r nivf"- i - m ■■\ [i« 
co«Mitiical«. Uwt even ErsMi(i|f ilui (be AmerKan. ihioueh hit hied 
lena, ii nioic liidc«nileiii ot tke nitar llun blk KmuIiA tr-Jthi, a oot* 
r«ti|i»niliii|; )-aiii n hri )-mtar iwteiwiiiilaitc* in nllivr miKL-U. Il 
» veli knoirn Ihii Ihe miniiin' in Enslantl can " wlijii ' mmlien 
Oif their own panj into siip|>aTtin|: itnluIeFBl meaHire* Iil the thraal 
of )>uttlii|; IbnE nentlien In l)ic ei^icnie aia.! rUk t>l a e<^iienl drc- 
liMu More ttiikinj; nlilL it i!jr li^t \h%\ Ih^* <nlfii\lrv to ilrraJ Uiih p*4tl< 
hiXilf lA bei»i; viiteil mil ol oflit*etbit lh*yciMiil*iill)r yiold pninli n^nd 
ibetr amn oonatukini. lo the cxicat ctch oI ontUihliiq^ the tnuram at lh« 
oy^otiajt ^tij. m» (of iiiuaucc nheo die Mtt eileiuUHMut iJie Inndilwr 



IMIml 



DURATION OF POWER. 



aji 



A frequent cliangc of men will result fruin a frequent 
retuiD of elections, and a (re(|ucnt change of measures 
frgm a frequent change of mcp; whilst energy in govern- 
ment requires not onljT a certain iluration of power, but 
tbc execution of it by a itingte hand. 

How far the convention may have succeeded in this 
part u( their work, will better appear on a more accurate 
view of it. From the cursory view here taken, it must 
clearly appear to have been an arduous part. 




In Grol Britain were MfMd Xtj ih« CoiiMrratlvc piuty, nol broiiw 
"h tp|]iiii«it (hc(n. l>ut (locauM llii* irrranl tlie iiiily '■'•y of relsininj" 
cc. KiDiii lliitfcrin u( pulilioi ilouUlc.dcaliiif- AiimHcui pirtinhava 
'II vcrf ficc; and, while " Eniriiuii^g " plnlEormk is A frequent <lcvicc, 
party liu et« ticen <it>le lo win orlice lijf iiiiliif jiiig ili tnis opinion. 
In llie few caut i>i wliidi prnticn liivc liicil lu leveiie llitii pulley, ilietr 
prompt (slittCtivil •> im^-rUiil flcturi list aluayi miillcil. 
Atide (roni Ihtv qii«iiion ol prompt ruponiB to I'cw opitiiom mil <Dn> 
itionx. tberc <aa be no doulii ihoi ilie two lyiicmi arc nol widely 
Ivctf^enl. ilDce lh« average Iciictli u( a Partia-iiicnt liat been iihuwn la 
le four frarn. wliich implin thit Ihe Itrtliih i«lcr am! hit Ainrriinn 
brotttec attain '>tty much the unie mulu by difleient methoJi. Itut 
kcre a cuiioot diverifciicc. ulilch dcierv<i> rco^nilioii. revealt iltell. 
I^iiltanxiitary mniinl. uiicr itii;. luu been lUicrilMi! at a ice-«a«,a new 
nrty tsLini; Ike iciiiv aflct nrjtly every grntral election. Kul in lh« 
United SlBtei |iiiti<« have held the pteude ncy continuoutly for ptrioda 
o( iwciili'tonr, lK«aiy, eighteen, txA lodve ycBtt. or in oih«t werdi, 
liarisj; l It rec -quartets of uui national hiMoty ue have had but Ihtee 
ch*ncr> ol cootitil. TIic reason lor ihi» reMfc in ihi* veiy teim of office, 
which kMM once il> advanla^ei and ilindvsntagea. I> Ijnal Kfilaln. 
wheB ft mtnuin ii TMed oul of oOke on a sin^e nwaaure. Ih« wvix, can 
Merer be in doalri, and thus an Knf-liih general election ii in ilin 
majocily ol anrs t<m);ht i» a liiwk i)iieslt«". 1b ihc United Slate*, how. 
ever, a nnlional elccliom usually iniolve> tlir impottant iuue) of the 
precpdiii£ (our years, and tbe mnit muil in(riiii>>!> be a letailnKlv* in- 
ilKaliunul the publk mind. In the one cate. ihe i^ltm amonnli almoti 
la a rrlcnnitunonapatricnlu bill. lutbeo4ker, ilfortcanot ancaptu- 
liM OB any wni-to n>eaMtro, but on tlie general jioJicy of a |i«t(y. The 
rnler in Gr«al Urilain. to eiprrn bii iliMi-prorat of a nicature. very oflen 
••Xei fo( men to white t^enetal polky lie it opposfid; the voter in Aniriiea 
iwalbma what he ttulikei and heept hit pariT in oiTice. The iht-it 
t<riO(l of odiM-tioMiik|; in Miig^lanil ami the long period in America are 
the logical TTwItt. When Ihf mua i* pr«unled clean-cut, and iu the 
iCMt of sreatai ciciicnieiii. the eleciut volm a^ainU ihe mcaaute ainl 
narily aitaiaii hit i>i[ly. When the iiiue are tnaay. and tbe Rnl 
rirvt «u(h a> an >liklike<l baa had time to («al. Ib« efeetor conlinvm 
blul l» hi* parly. 1 1 wmld be ilifhciilt tu tay which iy«emb«t lulfilli 
will ul tbe elector, II th« eiperieixe <>1 Kraiue i> a fair one to i:ilc. 
it ItrridenllhaKbcpowrr to VD<emiuiilrieto«l of oR^ leadt lo boiwleii 
kMabllKy. ontnB ilial power ii balanced by a alabiliiy in Ihs iDpnamia* 
Uft Unly or ia tbe eleuor.— CoiTOK. 



23' 



PARTITION OP AVTffOKITY. 



(V«. ST -Wt 



Not less arduous muitt have been the task of roafkinf( 
the proper line of partition between the authority of ihc 
Im genera) and that of th« State governments. 

R».iA. B very man wilt he sensible of this dilTicuIiy, 

in proportion as he has been accustomed to contemplate 
and discriminate objects extensive and complicated in 
th«ir nature. The faculties of tlie njiml itself have never 
yet been distinguished and defined, with satisfactory pre- 
cision, by all the efforts of Ihc most acute and meta- 
pliysica) philosophers. Sense, jwrrcplion, judgment, 
desire, volition, memory, imagination, are found to be 
separated by such delicate shades and minute gradations 
that their boundaries have eluded the most subtle investi- 
gations, and remain a prcj^nani sourtre of ingenious dis- 
quisition and controversy. The boundaries between the 
great kingdom of nature, and, still more, between the 
various provinces and lesser portions into which they 
are subdivided, afford another illustration of the same 
important truth. The most sag-icious and laborioas 
naturalists have never yet succeeded in tracing with cer- 
tainty the line which separates the district of vegetable 
life from the neighboring region of unorganized matter, 
or which marks the termination of the former and the 
commencement of the animal empire. A still greater 
obscurity lies in the distinctive characters by which the 
objects in each of thi-se great departments o\ nature have 
been arranged and 3««oried. 

When we pass from the works of nature, in which all 
the delineations arc perfectly accurate, and appear to be 
otherwise only from the imperfcrtion of the eye whidi 
surveys them, to the institutions of man, in which the ob- 
scurity arises as well from the objrct iiscif as from the 
organ by which it is contemplated, we must perceive the 
necessity of moderating still further our expectations and 
hopes from the efforts of human sagacity. Experience 
lias instructed uk that no skill in the science of govern- 
ment has yet been able to discriminate and define, with 
sufficient certainly, its three great provinces — the legisla- 
tive, executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges and 




lyrit/CAC/ES OF jurisdiction. >33 

powers of the diScrent Icgislalive branches. Questions 
daily occur in the course of practicf, which prove the 
obscurity which reiKns in these Hubiectx, and which 
puzzle the greatest adtpls in political science. 

The experience of ages, with the continued and com- 
bined labors ef the m»st eiiliKhteii«d lej^iitlators and 
jurists, has been equally unsuccessful in delineating the 
xever;il objects ami limits of different cikIks of law* and 
different tribunals o( justice. The precise extent of the 
common )aw, and the statute law, the maritime law, the 
ecclesiastical I law, the law of corporations, and other local 
Uws and custum^, reiuaitis still to t>e clearly and rmally 
established in Great Briuiin, where accuracy in such sub- 
jects bus been more industritiusly pursued than in any 
other pari of the world. The jurisdiction of her several 
courts, general and local, of taw, of equity, of admiralty, 
etc., i^ mil less a source of frequent and intricate <li»:us- 
sions, sufficiently denoting the indeterminate limits by 
whicb they are respectively circumscribed. All new 
taws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and 
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are 
considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until 
Uieir meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a scries 
of particubr discussions and adjudications. Itesides the 
obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and the 
imperfection of the human faculties, the medium thmugh 
which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each 
other adds a fresli embarrassment. The use of words is 
to express ideas. Perspicuity, therefore, requires nut 
only that the ideas should he distinctly formed, but that 
ihcy should be expressed by words distinctly and exclu- 
sively appropriate to them. But no language is so 
copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex 
idea, or so correct as not to include many, equivocally 
denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen tliat, 
however accurately objects may tie discriminated in 
i themselves, and however accurately titc discrimination 
'may be considered, the definition of them maybe ren- 
rrfcrcd inaccurate Ijy the inaccuracy of the terms in which 



•44 



EQUALITY OF STATEH. 



tif 0. » (W 



it is delivered. And thU unavoidable iiuiccuracy muu 
be greater or less, accurdinj; to the complexity and nov- 
elty of the objects defined. When the Almighty himself 
condescends to address mankind in tlieir own language, 
his meaning, luminouii as it must be, is rendered dim 
and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is 
communicated. 

Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect 
dclinittons: indistinctness of the object, imperfection of 
the organ of conception, inadec|u;itene)>s of the veiii<^Ie of 
ideas. .\ny one of these must produce a certain degree 
of obscurity. The convention, in delineating the buand- 
ary between the federal and State jurisdictiunft, must 
have experienced the lull effect of them all. 

To the difRcultics already mentioned may be added the 
interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller States. 
■at We cannot err in supposing that the former 

Bo. a. would contend for a participation in the gov- 

ernment fully proportioned to their su[>erior wealth and 
inipiirlance; and that the latter urould itoi l>e le»H tena- 
cious of the equality at present enjoyed by them.' We 
may well suppose that neither side would entirely yield to 
the other, and conseipienily that the struggle could be 
terminated only by compromise. It is extremely prob- 

■ Thk eijualttf of the tlain conailnled ihc imKt ■IIAi-ali ptohlen nt 
Ihoi* unioii. In Ilia I'oiiuimof I7;j it hm rlic bn( i|«ri>li<Hi raiwd. aiiil 
thoMch ibc Urgvr colmiio linilly L-uiKrilfit lli.-il llie pruvirK^t. tbliuukl \m 
Ct(liuin<rotinc, hwni vtilh a ilrilU<1«nlt]i on the journal thai ' i-rcccdenl 
ilioold Moi ibcrch)r l>e oinbltkhcl. 'Ilie ijactlion wiu aciiiii ttarmlf 
cnnmicit lathe rtlxawiontol ilic aiikloi of cotiltdenliuo. m ' 
Ibr mnall rfnln wttc »bixx%»(oI in i.-»r]r>n(; 'Ikii |>oii>l. Ih-" . 
tniliic KiRttnliKl the pOMlrililr of ovr-lhitil of llie |>Topk ^ .. -^ „ 
for the vbole couairy. it u-u Mip«Ui«ii ilut «1) rcvulnilmu niBki reccoe 
the TOin (A nine iltlH ; an luliiliiiioo n liKh liait )t( )«n>llr <>« ■» act) 
■* idvanli^e to the larce ttalrx. lor liy tlicii Ut^cf il«ln;alinet tlir* sna 
mora c<iii>i»nilif tcpfiT.rii[fil in ilie OMiRiot. JcHotwm teimii hnl lo 
have hit upun ihc •ipolk-nt finally >cccp«cil. wli«ii lie iu|(j;mcd in 17IU 
that a vf\Xvai iboiilcl h« ailoMcfl by wh>dh " niiy piopositinn ml|;hl H 

■ccaiircil \tj the reprcicnt»il»«» o( a laajonly ol i( .-..r.li. -.( ABorrka, 

o( of a oujorily oj tlic citlunick ol Aiariita. 1 1. -s tba 

krijcr. the laiiir tSit minllri tuJii'iicv" li w«» cu 1. iniot 

ratioui pny;vnit>a«a of K>«'t'<l|ih. Dickintnn. JcAiuon. siU l^ciij in I'lr 
feiltnl owivrnliofi. Ilia) Ihe ]>Fn|,le aaril Ihe ilAlea were lei-Hally it|irc- 
•cnMil iu ibo upp«f iDil lovcf hnino ol Ciwcteui.'-BlMlnK. 



LOCAL JEALOUSIES. 



«35 



able, also, that after the ratio of rcprcscntalioDliaO been 
■(tjiistcO, this very com|>rumise must have produced a 

Urekh struggle between the same partiea^ to t;Jve such a 
turn to the organization of the government, and to the 
distribution of its |>uwcrs, us would iticrcusc the impur- 
lancc of tlie branches, in forming which they had respect- 
ively obtained the greatest share of influence. There 
arc (eiilures in the Constitution which uitrniut each of 
these suppositions; and as far as either of them is well 
founded, it shows that the convention muet have been 
onipelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety to the force 
of extraneous considerations. 

Nor could it have been the large and small States only, 
which would marshal themselves in oppositiim to each 
other on various points. Other combinations, resulting 
from a difference of loi^d position and policy, must have 
created atklitional difficulties. \% every Slate may be 
diviilcd into different districts, and its citizens into ditfcr- 
cnl classes, which give birth to contending interests and 
locuil jealousic)., so the different )Mirts of the United States 
arc distinguished from each oilier by a vari<!ty of circum- 
stances, which produce a like effect on a larger scale. 
And althuutclt this variety of interests, for reasons suffi- 
ciently c;iplaincd in a former paper, may have a salutary 
inDucnce on the administration of \\m: government when 
formed, yet everyone must be sensible nf the contrary 
influence, which must have been ctpcricnced in the tusk 
of forming it. 

Would it be wonderful if, under the pressure of all these 
ditlicullie^, the conveniion should have been forced into 
some deviations from that artificial structure and regular 
symmetry which an abstract view of the subject might 
lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution 
planned in his closet or in his imagination? The real 
wonder is that so many diRicuItiGS should h;ivc been sur> 
mounted, and surmounted with a unanimity almost as 
unprecedented as it must have been unexpected. It is 

^impossible for any m.in of candor to reflect on this cir- 
iQistance witliout partaking of the astonishment. It is 



n^ 



mail ANIMUS OF CONVENTION. !»•. S7 (3«< 



impossible for the man of pious reflection not to [wrcciTc 
in it a linger of tliai Alinij|rhty hand which has been so 
freciuencly and Hi^nally extended to our relief in the criti- 
cal stages of the revolution. 

We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of 
the repeated trials which have been unsuccessfully made 
in the United Netherlands for reforming the baneful and 
notorious vice« ctf their constitution. The history of al- 
most ail the K^cat councils and consultations held aroonf; 
mankind for reconciling their discordant opinions, 
assuaging their mutual jealousies, and ixljustiiig thrir re- 
spective interests, is a history of factions, contentions, 
and disappointments, and may be classed among the most 
dark and degnided pictures which display the infirmities 
;ind depravities of the human character. If, in a few 
scattered instances, a brighter aspect is presented, they 
serve only as exceptions to admonish us of the general 
truth, and by their luster to darken the gloom of the 
adverse prospect to which they arc contrasted. In re- 
volving the causes from which these exceptions result, 
and applying them to the particular instances twfore us, 
we are necessarily led to two important conclusions. The 
first is that the convention must have enjoyed, in a very 
singuhir degree, an evemption from the pi^sttlential influ- 
ence of party animosities — the disease most incident to 
deliberative bodies, ami most apt to conUiminate their 
proceedings. The second conclusion is that all the depu- 
tations composing the convention were satisfactorily 
accommodated by the final act, or were intl need to accede 
to it by a deep conviction of the necessity of sacriAcIng 
private opinions and partial interests to the public good, 
and bjr a despair of seeing this necessity diminished b]r 
delays or by new experiments. 

PUBLIUI. 



S»dlHa] 



F0i-4VDEXS OF ANTIQUITY. 



y 



No. 38 t37]- i.ii^'p'i^i'M Jt*r»»i, juuurib n«<.) Madieoa 

INCOHERENCE OF THE OBJECTIONS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION. 

All gwpfrmmtnli •/ JthfiTatim anJ evHitnl kithtrla /ramtA ly 
iiuiixitJttdlr — Btamflti — Hrreri in Ikr nnp tytUm ariir from laiJt t/ 
txprrtrtut — Tht frtifnl liltuilifti f/ Aoifrka—RiutiHg n-ili ik^mi, 
aiul tht j'lttilily a/ ihi »i/tclMHi artJ rtntJitS e/ lAt ^/•/tiiltiui. 

Tc the Pcopie of iki !UaU 0/ New York : 

U a not a Milk tvin.-irk.-itil? th.il Jn every cue rcpoited by indent 
htiiory, in which government Iws been esi.iblistied tviih deliben- 
tion and cotiKnl, ihe task ol (raming it has not been comniriled 
to »Ti a&KiTibly of men. but h»s hc^n performed by tome tadtvidnsj 
citiicn ot pte-emrnent wisdom and ajiproved integrity. 

MiiHM. we tCArri. witi> the ptimilive fotimlrrof the eovernment of 
Crete, ii» Za1eucu!i was ol that o( tlic L')c< mns. Tliescus lirst, and 
a/ler him Draco and Solon. inMituted Ihe govcrninenl ot Athens. 
Lycurgua was tlie U»'j;ivei of Sp:irla. Tlic (oundalion ol the 
original govrrnmcnl of Rome was laid by Romulus, anil the work 
compleiH by two ot his c1e<:l<vc successors. Kunin itnd Tullius 
Ho«iilitit. On tb<: abolition of royally Ihe canmilar .-id m i 11 ixi ration 
was substittiled by Brutus, who stepped forward with » project for 
inch a TCtorni, which, he alleged, had been prejMred by Tullius 
HoBlilius. and to which his address ohT.iined the assent and ratifica- 
lion ol the senate And peuple. This remark ii applicable to con- 
fnleralc governments al.^o. Amphiciyon, wr ar>: told, was Ihe 
author ot th^it which bore his name. The Acha>ari league reccit'ed 
its first birth (rout .-Vchiciis. and Jis second from Araius. 

What degYce of agency thrte tepuieil l.twgirers might have in 
llieir respective niablishntents. or how (.ir Ihey might be clolhed 
Wilh the legitimate aiilhority of ibe people, r.m not in oer)' instance 
be aseeilainwl. In some, howei-er, the proceeding was strictly 
regular. Dt^co apfxars to have been intru.ste<l hy ihe people of 
Athens wilh Indefinilc power* 10 reform its government and laws. 
And Solon, according to Pluiarrh, was in a manner compelled, by 
(be univcrsat suffrage of his fellow ■citizens, to take upor) him the 
•ole and absolute powFf of new-modeling the constitution. The 
]wocccdifflgS under Lyctirgus were less regular : hut as far as 
llie aitvDcates for a regular reform could prevail, they all turned 
Ilieir ryes toward the single eRoiis of that celebrated patriot and 



'38 



GREAT LAiyCiVh/tS. 



IHo. M iTT) 



mge. iiisictul of seeking lo biing ^tlwul a temlulion by tlic iiiiet* 
vetiijun <i( ;i (Iclibtrilift; boily i>( tiliicnv 

Whence could il have pioccctletl ihat a penpte. jealous a.i ihe 
Greeks were «( their liberty, shoulil &a (ar iib.iiulun itie Tuks ol 
cnutioi) .IS lo pl.ice their detiliny in ibc hanilt of n xingle citixen ? 
Whence could il hure prucecilcd that il)c Ailietiijtig, a peojrle 
who would not iiifTcr iin army (o be cominandcil by fewer llun 
icii geiicials.and vlIio required no other (iioof of diinget to their 
llbciiies than l)ic illuMrioiu inciil of a fellow-ciliten, should eon- 
iider oiic illustiious ciiiieii d& a more e1it;iblc tlc|>o)iiar]r of the 
fortunes of tliemiiclvcs a»d their posterity than a »clect bvdy o( 
citUeiit, ((Oil) whose cominon delibcrjtloi>» mure t^i&dom. us w-cll 
as more safety, mijfht have been expected ? These qucslians can- 
not be fully answered willraut bUp|>asing llui itic fciirt of diiconi 
iind disunion anivitg a number u( counselors exceeded Ihe appro- 
IteivMon of Uc^chcty or incap-icily in .1 ;iinglc indtvidunl. I-liaiary 
infoims us, likewise, of tbc dilftculiics with which IIicm: celebrated 
icfonncrf h.id to contend, as well as the enpedienis which they 
weie obliged to employ in order to c;irry llieir tcfurms iriio tflecl. 
Solon, who seems 10 have indulged a more tenipciii/iii(; puhcy. 
confessed ihni he h;id not given to his countrymen (he govcinmeDt 
best suited 10 their Itappincu but mosi tolcr.ibie to tlKii prejudices. 
Anil Lycurgus, more true to hit object, was under (he necessity ol 
mixing a portion of violence with the aullkoiiiy of superMiiion.and 
of securing his final success by a voluntary renunciation, first of 
hts country, and then of his life. If lliese lessons teach ii», on one 
hand, to iidniiie the improccinenl made by America on llic iincicnt 
mode of prc| 1:1 ting and cslabhfching regul.ir pbins of govemnienl, 
they serve not less, on ihe oilier, Itiudnioiiisb us of llie lijiiaidsaiid 
• lilTicuIttrs iiicidenl to uch rsj<eriniriits and o4 the gical impru- 
(IciKc of unnecesviiily muUipljniji lliein. 

Is il an unicasonable conjecluie that the errors which luny tic 
contained in the plan of the cunvcntioa are such as have lesullol 
rather from tite defect of aiiteceilcni cspetience on litis complicated 
and diRicuU siibjeci than from a want of .iccuracy or care lo Ui< 
inresligalion of il ; and. cflns«<|iiently, such as will nol be ascci- 
taincd until nn aclual trial slall hare poinied Ihctn oiii ? Thia 
conjecture b lendeied piobabfe, not only by many considerations 
of a general naiuic. but by the pariiculai case of ihc Aniclcs of 
Confederal loo. It is observable that among llie numerous objec- 
tions and ametidinents »uggektcd by itie tcreral States, when tlioe 
niticIcH were subniitled for their raliAcatiun, nol one is touod 
which alludes to ilic jrcai and radical error which on acttial Uiol 



1 AMERICA COMPARED TO A PATIENT. 



n^ 



^ 



haft iliRcovrred iiulf. And if wc tt.ft\n lltr ohsrrr.iiinns whicli 
New Jersey ' w^s fcrf lo make, niilier by her local siiiuition than 
by her peculiar forcKi];ht, it may be <jii«.iioiu-rt wbi-ihci- .n single 
sugK^ilion was ol suAidcnl iDumenl to jusiify a rcvisiun u( the 
lysicni. There \% nlnimUnt mson. ncvenhelcss. lo suppose thai, 
imitiaienAJ as these objeciiaiis were, ihey woulil hare been adhered 
(i> with a vety dangerous inflexibility in some Siaies, had noi a 
*e,ij for Ibfii upiniuns ami siip|K>scd Interests been stilled liy llie 
more [inticiful icniimcni of sell- preservation. One Slate,' we may 
leincinliei, persbteU (or several yean In refusing her concurrence, 
alibough iIh! enemy reniaiiied the whole period ril our gates, or 
rjithei in tlic very bowels o( our coutitry. Nor was her pliancy in 
llie end effected by a Icm motive than the fc;ir of being chaigeable 
with prulr.Kliiig the public caUmilieS and endangering the event 
of ihcironicM. Every caiuliil reader will make the proper reHcc- 
itons on ihMC Impoiiaiii facts. 

A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse, nnil ih.tt 
aitdficacious rciiicily can no longer he deluyeil wilhout cxtieiiie 
ilangvr. after coolly revolving his siliiation and the charaelers of 
tkllercnl physiciuiu. selects and calls in such of litem as be judges 

lost capable of ail ministering relief and h»t entitled lo his conli- 
dcncc. The {fhysiclans attend ; the case of the paiieni is carefully 
esamined: a consull.ilKlii is held; they an; unanimously agreed (hat 
the syitiploms are critical, but that the c;ise. willi (iroper and timely 
relief, is m far from being desperate that it may be m;tdc to issue 
in an improvement of his cnnsiiiution. They arc equalty unani- 
Rioin in prescribing the remedy by which this happy (fli-cl is to be 
producol. The prescription is no sooner made knnwn. however, 
ihan a Dumber of persons inier[Kise. and, wiihuul <lrnying the 
reality or danger of the ditordee. assure the paticrit thai the 
picscriplion will l>e poison to his consiiiulion, aiwl forbid him, 
■lukr pain <rf certain death, lo make use of il. Might not the 
IMtient (eaMmably demand, licfore he ventured to follow this advice, 
ibal the authors ol il should at least agree among ihemsetves on 
MliC other remedy lo he sulmilutcd^ Ami if be found iheni 
diScTing as much Iruin one unuiher as froin his first counselors. 



' New JeiMj hill iiisitlol llisl cnntml uf enmnierce wat a nalionsi 

allait. and thil H sb<>iilil, wilh Iti nmillini; [Knatrs «( latation. be mlcil 

Lin the C'ongreu ol di< Confcdcriiion. See "Sciiei Journals of Con* 

■•" '■ 3S9- The iiMilivc tot tbis deanaiid \\ given at t>, J7. infra. — 

ElUTOB. 

' Miryliixl. ('<r rraMits recorded in ibo " iicciel Journals of Congress.* 
L 417, — EitiluL 



340 



CONeVSION AMONG ADVISERS. «•.«•(«) 



woulcf h« not act prwknllr in Inring the rxperimrni unnnitnouftljr 
recommended by the inller. ralhec tlian Ik iKaikening to those who 
could nriilter deny ihe DMcssiiy of a ipcolj' rcnmly nor agree in 
propoiinK one ? 

Such a pniirni and inMich asilu;<lion Ji Ani«rica ai this n>oment. 
She hu been Miiiibic u( bcr nuiUdy. SIk Ims obuincd a reguUr 
and unaninuiuii advice (rain men of her own dcJJbcratc choice. 
And she ■& wanie«l by Dt)i«ra a^ainu (ollowiitg tht& advice u&der 
pain ol the mou fatal consequences. tXi the moniton deny ihc 
reality of li^-r danger ? No. Do (hey deny ihc necessity of mhac 
speedy and powcrlul remedy ? No, Are tbey n(^ed. are any 
two of iheni agreed, m their objections to the remedy projwsed.or 
HI ttie |>rupct ont? lo lie subililuleil ? Let (bem speiik lor Ihem- 
xclvcs. This one tells UB that the proposed Conslitulinn ought 
to be Tcjrcied. licciuM: it U noi a confederation ol tlie Si:ite& UiE a 
({ovcrnmcnl oi'er individuals. Another admits lluit il otighl lobe 
3 gotcinrtient over iixlividuals lo a i.eitain exicnl, but by no ntcans 
to (he extent prajKncd. A third does not object to the govemnienl 
over itulividuals. or to tlic eitcat prupoied. but to the want ol a 
bill of rights. A fourth concun in the absolute necessity of a Irill 
of rigUls. but conicnils that il oujfht to l>e declarator}-, not of the 
persona] rights of iiKliviilunls. hut of the lighis reM-rvoi) to the 
Stales in llierr political capncily. A filth i« of opinion that a lull 
of lights of any sort would Ik siipeitluoiis and mitplacrd. and that 
(he plan wouki be uiiexccpliomiMe but (or the fatal power of 
reg)iblii>g the limes and |iiaccsof election. An obfrclorin alaige 
State cxclati 11 » loudly againU ilic unreasonable equality ol rc[itc< 
seniaiiun in (he Senate. An objector in a small Stale b equally 
loitd against (he dangerous tncqu.iliiy in ihe House of Kep't<- 
senta(ivcs. From (his qiiar(er, w-e are alanned with the amaunf 
expense Iron) the number of persons who are to adminislcr Ihe 
new goveinmeni. Front anoihei tfoarter. and soineiimcs from (he 
same qiurlrr. on another occasion, the cry is thai the CongTCM 
will be but a ahadow o( a repr»«nlatiitii. and llui (he }:;avcminenl 
would be (af less objcctiooablc i( live niiinhcT nn<l the expense 
were diHibk-il. A palrioi in a StJte thai doe:* not iiiipott or export 
diKcrns in^upi^r^ble objections against the fiower oldire<:t taia* 
lion. The |Mlrio(ic advetsary in a State ol Kreat cx|kitIs sod 
Imports is iioi less ditsaiisfiwi that the whote bunlcn ol tarns may 
he thrown on (wnsumpilon. This politician discovers In the Con- 
slllutUin a direct and irruisiible tendency (o monarchy ; (hat is 
equally sure it will end in arisiocracy, Ano(hei (s ptirikd lo My 
wych o( these shapes It will ultimately assume, but lees clearly it 




I 



VARIANCE AS TO FUtfCTlONS. 

mutt be one or utiver o( ihcm ; whilst a fourth is not w-.nniing, wlw 
with no less confitlence affirms ihai (be Consiiitiiion is so f»r from 
havingt > tHiii (o»';iiit eitlier c( ^lle^c■ (htiifiTS tlial the weight on 
thai siile will not be sufficient lo keeji it upnglir anil firm n^-iinit 
it» oppoMie propensities. With aiiolliet class ol ncivrriai its to the 
Caa3(ilutK>n the ln>>gu^i|;c is llint the IcgisUlive, executive, nnd 
judiciary (leparliiienli 4ic irilciiiiixed in such a iii:iiLiii-r as 10 Ctin- 
iridtct :tll iheiilena of reguliii gore tnmeni and all the Tcqui«iie 
jirecauliunii in hvor □[ liberty. Whilst this objection ciiculnies iii 
vague an<l general ex|ireMions. there arc but a (cw who lend iheir 
sanction to il. Let CAch one come (oiWAtd willi his particular 
rii>l.-iiiaiian. and licarcc any two ate exactly at^n-cd upon the 

ihjcct. In the eyes of one the junction of the Scniite with the 
.idem in the rcsponubic function of appointing to uffices, 

isteail of veiting this execultve power in the Executive ali>ne. is 
'ihc viciou* ]>art of the oi|;anixation. Tu anulher. the exclusion ul 
the House ol Kepi escnt^i lives, whose numbers atone could be a 
due security against carrut)lion and pailiaHiy in llie exercise of 
iuch a power, is dqually obnoxious. With another, the admission 
d( ihc President into any share of a jioner wliich ii;u»t ever be a 
da[i;;erous engiitc in the hands of the executive tn.i^isKate is an 
.nn pan tollable violation of llie maxims of republican jealousy. No 
jlpari of tbe arr«ngen*cnt, aeenrdnig to some, is ntoie Inadmissible 
than the trial of impeach men t« by the Senile, which is alternately 
T member both of the Irgislittve and executive depaitmenls, when 
ihii power so eviilenlly beloni^ed lo the judiciary drparliiieul, 
"We concur fully." reply others, "in the obje-clion to i In* pan of 
the plan, but we can never a|[ree that a reference of impeach men is 
lothr judiciary anlboriiy would bean amcndnient of the crro«. 
Out principal dishke to the oiKanizalion arises from the extensile 
powers .tlicady tiulgeil in thai department." Even among ibe 
teilous lutronsof acouncilof state the most irreconcilable variance 
ii discovered concerning the mode in which it ought to be con- 
siiiuied. The demand of one gentleman Is that ibe council should 
coBsisi of a small nnmhcr. to be appointed Ity the most numerous 
branch of tbe teglslaluie. Anoiher would prefer a larger number, 
and considers it as a fundamental comdition that the appointment 
should be made by ihc Presiiieni himself. 

As tl can give no umbrage to the writeis against the plan of the 
rat Constitution, let us suppose that, na they ate the most 
loDs. so ibey are also the most sagacious, of those who think 
ilk laic cnnvenliion were uiiri)iial to the t.isk ouigned them, unit 
thai a wiser and better plan might and ought lo be subsliiulcd. 



«4» CONSTITUTION WOHTIIY OF TRIAL. Wo-Mdll 



l.ct UK further ntippoie llut Ihdr country should coticur, bolh in 
IhiH (jivonblc opinion of (h«ir mvr>i&. nn<l in Ihrir unfjiroralite 
u|)iniDn or the convention ; and should accnrilinnly ptucreil to 
form iliem into a second convention, wiih full juiucts ikhI for the 
express purpose o( reminE am! renioUlin]; the work of ihc fini. 
\S'ere il>c Mpcriineni (o be seriously inailc. though tt TccjuimI 
some effurt to view it seriuusty ei-en in fiction, t leave ii la be 
dcci(l«l by itie »dni|rfe of opinions jusi exhibitnl, whcibci, wiili aII 
their enmity to their pretlccesiors, they woutil, In any one point, 
drp.in so widely from ibrlr exnmpk as in the discord and (eimeni 
thill woutil mark their own deiil>rtaIiom ; and nbether tli« Con* 
stittilinn now before the public would not M^nil us fair a rbance 
(or tinmurtiilily 3s LyciiiKUx ^nw to ihnl u( S|)3tia. by milking its 
change to depend on his own retiiii) from e<ilc and itrnth, ifil 
were to be iminedialely adopted, and were to continue in force; ttoi 
until o SKTrCK. but until AKOTliKK »bould be agivcd upon by 
ibis new asjembly of lawgivsrt. 

It is a matter both of wotMler and regret that tbow 
who raise so many objections ag:ainst the new Constitti- 
tion should never call to mind the (]i:fcct)> of thai which 
is to be exchuiigeJ for it. It iit nut neces&ary iliai ttie 
former should be perfect: it is sufRcient that the latter is 
more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass for 
silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in iL 
No mail would refuse to quit a shaiicrcd aod lotlcriog 
habitation for a firm and commodious building, because 
the latter hail not a por<^h to it, or beeau«e some u( the 
rooms vn\^\K be a lilllc larger or smaller, or the ceiling a 
little higher or lower, than his fjncy would have planned 
them. But waiving ilhistr;ilitins (if this sort, i» it nut 
manifest that most of the capital abjections argcd against 
the new system lie with tcnfr>ld weight agaitist the exist- 
ing tlonfeder^lton? Is an iiidertiiite power tu raise money 
dangerous tn the hands of the federal government? The 
present Congress can make requisitions to any amount 
they please, and the SL-iteit are constitutionally iMiund lu 
furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as lung as 
they will p,iy for the paper; they can borrow, both 
abroad and at home, as long as a shilling will be lent. 
Is an indefinite power to raise troops dangerous? The 
Confederation gives to Congress that power also; and 



Kt^Msl POt^ERS OF CO.VG/IESS UFStESS. 




ihcy have already bcgiia to make use of it, U it im- 
proper and unsafe to intermix the ditferent powers of 
government in ilie *ame body uf men? Congress a single 
body of men, are ihc sole depositary of all the federal 
powers. Is it particularly dangerous to give the keys of 
the treasury, and the comm.ind of the army, into the 
same hands? The Confederation places them both in 
the hands of Congress. Is a bill of rights essential tu 
liberty? The Confederation has no bill of rights. Is it 
an objection against the new Constitution that tt cm- 
powers Ihc Senate, with the concurrence of the Execu- 
tive, to make treaties which are to be the laws of the 
land? The existing Congress, without any such control, 
can make treaties which they themselves have declared, 
and mnst of the States have rccognixed, to be llie supreme 
law of the land. Is the importation of slaves permitted 
by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it 
is permitted forever. 

I shall be told that, however dangerous this mixture of 
powers may be in theory, it is rendered harmle&s by the 
dependence of Congress on the Stales for the means of 
carrying ihcm into practice; that. Imwcverlarge the m.iss 
(if powers may be, it in in fact a lifeless mass. Then, say 
I, in the first place, that the Confederation is chargeable 
with the Slill greater f<dly of declaring certain prtwers in 
the federal govcrnmcni to be absolutely necessary and 
at Ihc same lime rendering them absolutely nugatory; 
and, in the next place, that if the Union is to continue, 
and no better governmcui be substituted, effective 
powers must either be granted to, or assumed by, the 
existing Congress; in either of which evi-nt«, ihe con- 
trast just Slated will hold good. But this is not all. 
Out of Ihts lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent 
power, which tends to realii^e alt the <langerK that can be 
apprehended from a defective construction of the supreme 
gOTcrnment of the Union. It is now no lunger a point 
of specalation and hope tliat the Western territory is a 
mine of va&t wealth to the United States; and althou<th 
It is not of &ach a nature as to extricate them (rum their 



^ 




344 AUrUORlTV ASSUMED BY CONGRESS. Wo. St t>7l 



present distresses, or, for some time to come, lo yicUI 
any regular RU[>|)1ie» for the public expenses, yet must It 
Bm hereafter be able, under proper management, 

Va.T. both to cUTect a gradual di&ch^rge of the do- 

mestic debt, and to furnish, for a certain period, libera] 
tributes to the federal treasury. A very large proportion 
of this fund has been already surrendered by individual 
States; and it may with reason be expected that the 
remaining States will not persist in withholding similar 
pruofsuf their eiiuityand generosity. We may calculate, 
therefore, that a rich and fertile country, of an area equal 
to the inhabited extent of the United States will soon 
become » natiomil stock. Congress have assumed the 
administration of this stock. TUcy have begun to render 
it productive. Congress have undertaken to do more: 
they have proceeded to form new States, to erect tem- 
porary governments, to appoint officers for them, and to 
prescribe the conditions on which such States shall be 
admitted into the Confederacy. All this has been done; 
and done without the least color of constitutional 
anthortty. Yet no blame has been whispered; no alarm 
has been sounded. A ckcat and tN-Dt:Pif.vi»ENT fund of 
revenue is passing into the hands of a sinclk body of men, 
who can raise troops to an i.ndk>'imte number, and 
appropriate money to their support for an iNUKriHlT* 
PEKioD or Tiur„ And yet there are men who have not only 
b-'tn .•lilcnt spectators of this prospect but who arc advo- 
cates for the system which exhibits it; and, at the same 
time, urge against the new system the objections which we 
have heard. Would they not act with more consistency 
ill urging the cstabli^thment of the latter, as no less nee- 
cflsary to guard the Union against the future powcra and 
resources of a body constructed like the existing Con- 
gress tlian to save it from the dangers threatened by the 
present impotcncy of that Assembly? 

I mean not, by anything here said, to throw censure 
on the measures which have been pursued by CongresiL 
I am sensible they could not have done otherwise. The 
public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed npun 



M>akoa] Kf.PUBUCA/f FORM ACCEPTABLE. HI 

them the task of overleaping their constitutional limits. 
But is not the fact an alarming proof of the danger 
mulling from a government which does not pu&scM 
rcEular powers commensurate to its objects? A dissolu- 
tion or usurpation is the dreadful dilemma to which it is 
continually exposed. 

PUBUUS. 



No. 39 [38]. (/■./^■^■ryMr-M/. juury tb, ifU.) kladisoo. 

THE CONSTITUTION STRICTLY REPUBLICAN. 

Only c rt/nMiian lyittm fntiUi /*r AMtrita—Tit friaiifti of 
TifutHtn* gntrttntui sk-trtn tytLttH^tfi — Til frefatrJ ttnilitulitn tim- 
furmt If tin tUn.hr J~Prta/i nf Ikil f'tm ik* frrriliami 9/ tkt <4»fH- 
tution-^^Ntilhir wA*Uf iMtiimaJ mrr uiMty /tdtrat. 

Ttf the Ptoflt of Iht State of New Yerk: 

The last paper having concluded the observations 
which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the 
plan of giivernment reported by the convention, we now 
proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking. 

The first question that offers itself is whether the 
general form ami aspect of the (tovcrnmcnt be strictly 
republican. It is evident that no other form would be 
reconcilable with the K*^niHfi nf the people of America; 
witli the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or 
with that honorable determination which animates every 
votary of free<lom to reKt all our puliltcal ex{>eriments 
on the capacity of mankind for seK-jjovernment. If the 
plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart 
from tlie republican character, its advocates must aban- 
don it as no longer defensible. 

What, then, are the distinctive characters of the re- 
piiblic^tn form? Were an answer to this (|uestion to be 
sought, not by recurring to principles;, but in the applica- 
tion of the term by political writers to the constitutions of 
(lifTcrent Sutct, no iHttisfactory one would ever be found. 



34'' 



DEFINITION OF REPUBLIC. 



[Vo. SA <»> 



ItutlamJ, in which no particle of the saprcme authority 
is derived from the people, has p-isxed almojtt untversully 
Ditdcr the (Icnoraiiialiun of a republic. The same title 
has b«n bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over 
the ereat body of the people is exercised, in the rao&i 
absolute manner, by a small body of hereditary nobles, 
['oland. which is a mixture of aristocracj' and of mon- 
archy in their worst forms, has been dignified with the 
same appellation. The xovcrnment of Englaitd, which 
has one republican branch only, combined with an hered- 
it.-iry aristocracy and muiuirchy, has, with »)ual impro- 
priety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. 
'I'hcsc examples, which arc nearly as dissimilar to each 
other as to a genuine republic, show the eitrenic inae- 
curacy with which the term has been u&ed in political 
dis(|utsilions. 

H we rexorl for a criterion to the different principles 
on which different forms of government are eMablished, 
we may define arepublk to be, or at least may bestow 
that name on, ^ gnvprnpn-nt which d<.rivc^ all its powers 
dlr fi;'tly nr jniHr<'illy- froin tht' i;rf;il liinly ilf t ile pgnple, 
aira is adroinistcrcd by persons hDldiiig" tlieir otBCA 

'nirriTTed linwHt. UL' mu'liiij gwwl 

It i<t eaenlia} to «iicii a governnri'irf tlldl It'bc 
derived from the great body of the society, not from an 
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of It; other- 
wise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising ttteir 
oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire 
to the rank of republicans and claim (or Ihi-ir jjorcmment 
the honorable title of republic. It ts tuffidtnt fur such 
a government that the persons administering it be 
appointed, cither directly or indirectly, by the people; 
and that they hold their appointments by cither of the 
tenures just spccifii-d; otherwise every govcrnmrnt in 
the United States, as well as every other popular goveni* 
ueat that has been or can be well organized or wdl 
executed, would be degradrd from the republican charac- 
ter. Aix:ordtng to the constitution of every State in the 
Union, some or oUier of the officers of govcrament are 



Ki 



XadiMBl TE.VUItES UNDER CONSTITUTION. »47 

appointed indirectly only by the people. According to 
most of them, the chief magistrate himself is so appointed. 
And according to one, this mode of appointment is ex- 
tended to one of the co-ordinate branches of the legisla- 
turc. According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure 
of the highest oliices is extended to a derinitc period, and 
in many instances, both within the legislative and execu- 
tive departments, to a period of years. Ac<:ording to the 
provisions of must of the constitutions, ^giiin, ;ik well aa 
according to the most respectable and received opinions 
on the subject, the members of the judiciary department 
are to retain their ofBces by the firm tenure of good 
behavior. 
_Qn cointiatitig ihe (^iwirtilulion i>Ia.nne<l 1>v the conveiuion willi 

t he SI.ITi'l.il') li '-n- f uni, wi~ | n-i. 1-1 vr .i' nra r 'tiit il n in tli>. mnti 
lignj >fn!^. rc>mLHTiiiil i)i: t iril. 1 li'j llfU5C ol RtpiriCiilalircs. 
lirdhnlAI aw ri^;iiicli~l least of all llie Stair lecisbttiTr;.. is 
rlKled inimcitUit^ly liy ihc ^nM boily of ihc people. The Senate, 
like the present C<Mi);ress itnd the Senate of Mitrylanit, dfiivea 
its Appmiilinviil ini|iri-cit|' (tnin llic people. I'hc rrcsidcnl lit 
IncUrecily dcrlt-cil fiuiu ti>c ehoice ol il>c people, accorilnig (o the 
ciiimplc in inosl ol the SlatM. Ki-eo llie juilnes, willi all oilier 
officers of llie Union, will, ns in llic wvctal Stairs, bp llie choice, 
lliough a reiiiDle diuicc. ol (he [KOpIe ll)Clll^cllret. "'"^"' (llinlf''"1 
ol the ^i^ll ;>«^n^"'■•^n ^ it wmalW y iiifftnuablr ID the rcpilWican 
ManiUrd ani< tu llie mridel of Simile conslilu lions. The House ol 
Reprcsenlalik'cs i% periodk^lly elective, as ill all ibe Stales; aitd 
for ll»e period lA two yean, as in ilie State of South Carolina. 
The Senate is cleeiirc, for the period of six years; which i:i but one 
yeat more than ilie peiiuti of tl»c Senate of Maryland, and but iwu 
more than thai of the Senates of New Yu«k .nnd Virginia. Tlic 
IVeudent is (o continue in uflicc for the pciiod of four years ; as 
in New York and De1an*are the chief magistrate is elected lor 
three yeais. aitd in South Catoiina for two years. In the other 
Stales the election is annual. In teveral ol ilie Stato, liowever, 
noconstiiulional piovitton is made for the impcachmeni of ihe 
chief magitlrale. And in Delaware and Viripiiia he is not 
impeachable til) oat of oflice. The Presiilent of the Uniied Slates 
b trapeachatile at any lin>c during liis conlinuaiKe in uflice. The 
tenure by wlikh thr judge.s are to hol<l their platxs is. as il 
unqncslionalily ou];hl lo be. tlul i>l [;""d bchatioi. Tile tenuie 
of llic niinbtciul oBiccs geneially will be a subject of legal 



»4« 



KEAt. CHARACTER OF UNION. UI».»(Mt 



Kgulslion, CDiirormablr to the reason ol llie cue nn<l \\x cutnple 
of llw Stale constitutions. 

Could any (urtlier proof be fequireil of the TepuUlion compkiEion 
of lh>B system, die most decisive one might l>c found in its jbMtate 
ptoliibition of tlik's of notiility, liotli uiiikr the (etlcral an<l the 
Stale governments : and in its express giijtraniy of llie rcpvUican 
lurm (u each of the Ulter. 

"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the 
proposed Constitution, "for the convention to adhere 
to the republieiin form. The/ ought, with etiuiil care, 
lo have preserved the ffJtral fortn, which rvjranls lite 
Union as a CoHftJeraty of soverclRil states; instead of 
which, they have framed a nafwnal government, which 
regards the Union as a ttmsoiidatieit of the States." And 
it is asked by what authority this bold and radical 
innovation was undcrlakenp The Iiandle which has been 
made of this objection requires that it should be esani> 
incd with some precision. 

Without inquiring into the accuracy of the dislinctioo 
on which the objection is founded, it will he necessary to 

a just estimate of its force, firtt in J^-irtain |[n» n>al 

character of the povcrnmcnt in (| ucsliiin; secondly, to 
inquire how far_t hc co nvention tfei'c authorized lo p ro- 

~' poieMii.ti .1 tjOVernmen i; and thirdl y, h ow far the du ty 
iTiey o wed to their country could supply any de ject of 
rcuul ar a uthority! 

l-lrit. — In order to ^■tf'-t^in th^. r<-al rS\ati\rMrr r^{ (he 

»■ government, it may be considered in relation lo the 
foundation on which it is to t>c estahiished ; to the sources 
from which its ortlinary powers are to be drawn; to the 
operation of those powers; to the extent of them; anil 
to the authority hy which future changes in the govern- 
ment are to be introduced. 

On examining the first relation, it appears, on one 
hand, that the Consiitution is to he foutidcd on the 
assent and ratification of the people of America, given 
by deputies elected for the spcri^d purpose; hut, on the 
other, that this absent and ratification is to be given 
by the people, not as individuals composing one etttirt 



IbdiMii] 



COffSTtTUTION is FEDERAL. 



149 



pation, but a« composing the distinct iind independent 
States to which they respectively lielong. It 'vt to be 
the assent and ratificatioD of the several Stales, derived 
(rwfn the supreme authority tii cjicIi State — the authority 
of the people themselves. The act, therefore, t:$t»l>- 
li shiH f ; the Constitution, w j ll not br a^ni^ftiuil \\\i ■. 

in-al ar t. 

That it will be a feder;il and not a niitimial net, as 
these terms arc understood by the objectors — the atl o( 
the people, as forming so many independent States, not 
as forming one a.%^xc^A\^ nation^s obvious frnm this 
single consideration, th;it it is to reiull neither (rum the 
decision of a majority of the people of the Union, nor 
from that of a m^tjurity of the States. It must result 
from the unanimoui ai-wiW of the several Sutes tliat arc 
parties to it, differing no otherwise from their urtltiiary 
assent than in its being cipressed, not by the legislative 
authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were 
llie people regarded in this transaction as forming one 
nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of 
(he United St.ites would bind the minority in the same 
manner an the majority in each State mu»t bind the 
minority; and the wdl of the majority must be deter- 
mined, either by a comparison of the individnal votes, 
or by considering the vill of the majority of the Stales 
as evidence of the will of .1 majority of the people of the 
United States. Neither <)f these roles h;i» been adopted^ 
Rach State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as 
a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to. 
be bound by its own vdlunlary act. In this relation, then,' 
the new Constitution will, if establislied, be a federal 
and not a natianal constitution. 

The next relation is to the sources from which the onfT" 
nary powers of f^oveniment are to be derived. The 
House o f Represen tatives will dcri vr jl-j [■'■■"-" tr.^tr, t^f 
ji^nplr a^ *IW^7C3; jnrt Ttic prii[>if will be represented in 
(¥c same proportion, and on the same principle, as they 
are in the legislature of a particular State. So far \^ 
• govcfnmgH^ is tfatioaa/, not federal. The Senate, on the 




=50 



OPEXATWiV IS yATlONAL. 



(Ro. »(»> 



I other hand, will derive i ts DOWCn t tram tin- Slatri, jt 

Ipulitical and cucqual societies; und thoe will be rcpre- 
^semed on the principle of e quality io tl>c Senat e, as tliey 
low arc in the existing Cungress, So tay^T T- r'"^'''""- 
jiifiu is f(-utal. n»t nationa l. The executive (xiwer will 
be derived from a very compound source. The Lmmcdi- 
ite election of the ['resident is to b« made liy the States 
in their political character*. The votes allotted u> ihcm 
are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as 
distinct and cuctjual societies, partly as unequal members 
of tlic same society. The eventual election, again, is to 
be made liy that hrancli of the legislature which consists 
of the national representatives; but in this |>articular act 
tliey arc to br thrown into the form of individual dcle- 
Igatioiix, from no many distinct and coequal Iwdics politic. 
Wroo) this aspect of the government it appears to be of 
li mixed <:h;iractcr, nrLiij^ntii jg at le ast as many feJ ^^al slj 
yihitiiimil ic^ i I L re s. 

The difference between a federal and national govern- 
ment, as it relates to ilie o^raiian of ^ke f -aifritfiriit !■ 
supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers^ 
operaie on the pohlical bodies composinj; the Confedcr* 
acy, in their political capacities; in tlic tatter, on the 
individual citlicens compoj-ing the nation, in tbeir indi-. 
vidu^l capacities. On tr y i ng the Constitution by ttiii^ 
.■■■:i,..H.|.^ „ f.iU MTiiIrr tin.; m(ti'n\ti, ""' ""' ,'■■ '''■,>' 



character; tlion^th pcrhajis not »o compleiely as has been 
understood. In several cases, and particularly in the 
trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they 
miirit he viewtrd and proceeded uKainst in their rollrciive 
and ptiliticul L-apucities only, iio far the national cuunie< 
nance of the government on this side seems to be dts- 
rii;ured by a few (ideral features. Kut this blemish is 
perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation vi 
the government on the people, in tlirir individual caps* 
cities, iu its ordinary and most csscuiial prucecdinss,* 
may, on the whole, designate it, ID tliis relatiun, a nation^ 
government. 
But if the government be itatlooal with regard in tlic 



£XT£XT OF /,'ATIOA'AL POWERS. 



251 



operation of its powers, it changes its aspect again w hen 
we contcnipliitc it in rcli|tiM» to tin: rxUni of iis pw wc rs. 
The idea of u mitioiial Kuvcrnmcnt involves in it not 
ouly an authority over the individual citizens, but an 
indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far 
a> they are objects uf lawful government. Among a 
people consolidated into one nation, thi» supremacy i> 
completely vested in the national legislature. Among 
communities united (or particular purposes, it is vested 
partly ia the general and partly in the municipal legisla- 
tures. ]n the former case, all local authorities arc sub- 
ordinate to the supreme; and may tie controlled, directed, 
or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local 
or municipal authorities form tlistinct and independent 
portions of the )iu|>reiiiacy, no more subject, within their 
respective spheres, to the general authority than llie 
general authority is subject to them within its own 
sphere. Ifl it l '' ■— '-'■"" ! "■— | 't- n pTi i pniH gpy rnm^nr 
c anni'i be dt!cmed a nal j-^—'i '■■"■' >-i— - ii« )iiciH li<;tioii 
extends to ccrt.-iin enumerated objects only, and leave s 
tnTTir >.PVr i.il .^lalr^i a rf,ii|ii^iry ;imiI ■n vi^JlaMc sover - 
eignty over :ill "tl'^f fihji-i'tt It i^ true lliai, in contro- 
versies relating to the boundary between the twd 
jurisdictions, the tribunal which ts ultimately to decide 
i» to be tAlahlisihed under the general government. But 
this docs not change the principle of the case. The 
decision is (» be impartially nude, according to the rules 
of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual 
precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some 
such tribunal is rlearly essential to prevent an appeal to 
the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it 
ought to be established under the general rather than 
under the local g«>vernnietit«, or, to speak more properly, 
that it could be safely established under the first alone, 
is a [lositi'in nut likely to be combated. 

1 f nry tr^.tJ ic Constitution by its last relation to t he 
authorit y by which amendments are to t^ ni;>dc. wc find 
it ncitlicf wholly national nor wholly /tdii.il. Were it 
wholly 'tutiooal, the supreme and ultimate 'authority 



»S' KIGHT TO PRAMS CONHTlTVTWft. til*. «KWi 



would reside in th e wa/i^ fltof the people of the Union; 
und thi& authority ffBliTJ be competent at all times, like 
lh.ll of n majority of every national society, to alter or 
abolish its cstaMishcd g'^^'crnmcnt. Were it wlmlly 
federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each Stale 
in the Union would be exuentinl to every alteration that 
would be trinding on all. The mode provided by the 
plan of the convention is not founded on cither of these 
principles. In ■-■t.(.iii-ir... ;[[^- than a nmi'trily, and pa r- 

\ ^icularly in computin n ; ly | ) ifjijw.rti<in liy Shi iri ^ not hy 
Cj ^ns, it ri^ p,;irt-i f«ini 'hi iiiirtjHa/.iiiil jiIl. .M^nt ^ard s 
t he ftJeral cliiiQ it'''"; Jj*->:ai nli , Tin ^ tt 
less than the wliuk -tiLi ti i lmr nt i>ta u »- 
ag ain inr f'^ffg' iinil |firmlii i i f llir ififi'i iii^ i linrTrl 
The proposed Constitution, Ihcrefure, is, in slritinrss, 
^ neither a national nor a federal Constitution, t.m ■, ^t^it,. 
fliosition of bot h. In its foundation it is fede^, not 
national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers 
of the government are drairn, it is partly federal and 
partly national; In the operation of these powers, it is 
national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is 
federal, not niitiiinnl; and, finidiy, in the atiihorliaiive 
mode of iniroducins amendments, it is neither wholly 
federal nor wholly national. 

PUBLIUGL 



_.tll1' 



No. 40 [39]. <#rw K*r« /•a.m. JMWIT ■«.<;«.) MadlSOfl, 

THE RIGHT OF THE CONVENTION TO FRAME 
SUCH A CONSTITUTION. 

Tht autkeriiy mnJtr nhkk Ihe ttKVenlUm atuJ txamiittJ—Pr^^ 
tvm le Attiv rifff-M aulkffily. frrm tomiiJfrUitm mf Jmi* — Cuuli/»- 
tim Hurtlf rttammrit^til — Xtitirity f»r a raJital ttimgt — H'ielktr the 
imitmiint txttfici ill ffmrn lUrt itl nfftft tMt furili*H «/ raJiJlaithm. 

To tht Pe^f-lt t>/ tht State 0/ New JV/-*.- 

Tkn ufvtid [lolnt to be exarnlncti is, witeihn the convenlion 
net? .)utl»>n7rd 10 (time aitJ pruptnc \\>n trn iiiiitii>it. 

The powcis of Uic convcniion ou^hi. in sn > he deter- 




■I 



fiaCO.VMEXDA7-0/tY ACTS. 



»Si 



' mined by an initpccikin of ()i« cmnmlsslniis glreii lo the memlicTs 
hy xh/eit mpixlive const itueiits. A< -ill a( ilii;sc, Imwcver. hiiil 
rcfffcncc. eilhc* lo itw recomiiK-ndaiion Irom ilie nicclin^ M 
Anna|>uta. in Seplcinber, (785. ot to thai froin Ccngicss, in Feb- 
ruary, 1787. ii will br suffi<:icni to recur to ihesc p.iiiic-uiur act*. 
Tlic act (roni Anna|>olis rccoinmenits the " appiiiiitmcnl o( cnn»- 

■ intuionen tu take into coii^iiieratiori the sltuatton of (he UiiitL-d 

'Sutcs; 10 iicvii/c iitcA/ur/Afr fir,>fiti>int ;is nhiill n|)|KMr to tlicin 
Mcccnary lo render llie Cuiiitilulion oi tlie (c<le'ra1 govciritiiL'nt 
adejitalf fa (he txi^twiei of Ihe Vnian: aii<l lo nrport sgcli an 
«ct for t)i4t purpose, lo the United Statu in Coogrrss aMcmlilcd. 
u when agreed 10 by tlKin. iind aficrwjnis con tinned by the lirgis- 

llAture of r.vcry Slate. Mill cffcctuidly providr fni' the s-iiiie." 

The rrs'ommcndalnry act of Congress ■« in ttie wotiU fotlowii));: 
" WheiF^iK. there b provision iti the arlklcit of Cni>foc1ri;itii}ii .ind 
p«ipciaal Union, (or making alieinlloii^ therein, by the assent of 
a Congteu o( the United States nticl of the legisl.tlurcs <i( ihe 
several Slatrs; and whereas cKpciience hath ccinced. Ih.il lhri« 
are defects in the present Confederation; as a mean lo renicily 

bwhich, Mvcral of ihc Slates. ani] parlieiilitrly Iht Slate 0/ .VfW 
Vori, by eiptens instruction* to iheir i)eleg.-iies in Congre», have 
stSBfsitdJi convention (or ihe purposes ex presM-d in Ihe (ollnw- 
ing re*olutK>n ; and such coniYntion appejiring to he ihe niinit 
probable mean of esublishing in these States a firm Halittnal 
fmftrnmtMl : 

Resof)/ed,—J\aa. in the opinion o( Congress it is cximlient, 
lh:il on the second Moml.iy of May next a convention "f deles^ite*, 
wlw Uiall have been nppoinird by the jci'eral Slxics. he held at 
I'hiladeliiliia, (or Ihe sole and exj>re3S pgrposc ef reviu'ng Ihe 
articiti 0/ C<M/riiermiiH, and rcponiDg lo CoiigreM and (he 
9C*crail leglsUtor« swch alUratitmt and previtiam therein, as 
shall, when aKrecd lo in Congress, and confirmed by the Stalw, 
rvitrter Ihe (cderal Consiituiron adequate lo the txigenda 0/ 
gmrrrnmeni and Ihe /treservalieti ef the UnUn." 

From these two *cts. it appear^ 1st, lliai ihe object of Ihe con- 
vention <vas lo eslablisli, in these Slates, a firm naltimal gm/erti- 
mtni: id, ih.ti this government was to he such as wouki lie ade- 
yttale lo Ihe exigeneiet of gm-ernmeul and the pretet^^tltan ef Ihe 
Unton; 3d, ihjit these purposes were lo be effected by alleralions 
and pravitJOHi it the arlieles fif Cenfederaliois, as it is exprewc<l 
in the act nf Congress, or by }vtk ftirlher froviu'ons as should 
appear neeeiseiry. as It siands in the recommendatory act from 
Aiuiapolb: 4lti, liut lh« aliemiinns and provisions were to be 



»54 ADEQUATE COVERXMENT DEMANDED. OTo-tSOU 

repotted to Congttss. aiij lo the Siaics. in otder 10 be iigiced to 
by the former and confirmci] by the Uiirr. 

From a compariMn acitl fair consliuclion of thtic jevcral nxxlet 
of expression b to be deduced ihe authority under which the con> 
vcntton acted. They were to (ranw a nalivnal govrrHmtmt, ade- 
quate to the exigeitcies of gavemmtnl, and ef Ik* Uhi^h; and to 
reduce the articles of Confedetailon into such lomi as to acconi- 
pibh these putpi»es. 

There are two lulcs of con it ruction, dictated by plain rca&on. »% 
well v founded un le);a) axii>iii!i. The one it that every pan of 
the ciprcMion ought, if possible, to br allowed vom^ meanmg. and 
be made to conspire to sontv coinnion end. Tlic other b that 
where the ierrral pari* cannot be made la ciincide, the leu 
important should give way to the mure important part ; the means 
should be t-tcrilked to the end rather than the end to the meant. 

Suppose, then, that the expressions delinmg the authority: of llie 
convention were irreconcilably a< variance with each other i that 
a tutlianal and aJt^uale girvntment coahl nut positbly, in llie 
JMdjiinent of the convention, be eftrcted by aiUratwnt and ^i^ 
visions \n tlie iirlitltt of Con/fiitraliim; which part of the dcbni- 
lion ought to have been ef>ilincrd. and which rejected? Which 
was the more important, which Ihe Wss impottant part? Wliith 
the end : which (he means ? \m ihc mml scrupulous exposiiors 
of (letegated powers; let tlie most invricraic objectors againu 
lho« exercised by the convention, answer the*e quaiions. Let 
them declare wlieiher it was i>l moM importance to the liappincu 
o4 the people of America that the articlek of Confederation shuilU 
be diiregarded, and an ade<|Ujiie );iiveTniiH.'ht be prorlded. and the 
Union pfcscrved; or that an adequate gnvcrnmeiu should lie 
omitted, and the attrcle* o( Con federation prcsencd, Let them 
declare whether IIk preservation of these arlicks was the end 
fur secuniij; which a reform of Ihe governiiimt was lo l>c intro- 
duced a* the means; or whether the eslabtlihmeni al a goTeni* 
nieni. adc<|uatc to the national happiness, was ibc end at which 
these articles themselves oriipnatly aimeit, and lo which lliey 
ought, as invufbcient means, to have been sacrificed. 

Uul is it necessary lo suppose that these expressions ate abso- 
lutcly irreconcilable lo each oihei ; that no alltralitms or pra- 
visiani in lAt arlicUs of IMe Canfe.ifratii<H could possibly nwld 
ihem into a national and aileqiiaie govcmmeni; iniu xucli a 
government as has been proixn^d by the coriicnlvon ? 

No Ktrcts, U is pfcsunml, will, in ifab case, be laid on Ihe ttlh; 
« change of that could never be dccincd an eMrci»c ol ungrantetl 




/.VDir /DUALS. 



»55 



power. Alleratiotu in itie body of the inKiruineni me expreuly 
auihofitnl. Nmr prmitioHi OieiL-i(i are alw FX|>rcsBl>* uulliorJied. 
Here iheti n a (lowcr to change ihc littc ; !■> inscn new arlicles : 
(o alter old owes. Must It of ncccuiiy be ;i<lrnil(ci] that this 
power U inftingeiJ. so long ma pan of ihc oltl .inicles remain? 
Those who mBiniJiin ihc sffiimaiivi: ou^ht at least to mark Die 
boundur>' beiweeo aull>otii«d and usurped innovaiionK; between 
■hai degree of change which ties within the couip^&s ol alleralhnt 
and/nrlhrr prvtiisifni. und llint wtiicli amounts to a Iratismula- 
lion of Ihc gnvernincni. Will it be Ulid that the altcraliofii ought 
not to have touched the &ul»tance ol the Confederation? The 
States would never h.ivc appointed a convention mith so much 
soleinnit)-. nor described Its objects with so much latitude, if some 
lubitantial reform hail not been in contemplation. Will \\ be 
said tlial 1.\k /HnJamfiUal priHu'pUi ol the Conlcdemtiun were 
not within llie purview nf the convention, and ought not (o have 
been varied ? I ailc. What aic these piinci{ites ? Do they rctiuire 
ihai. in the estalilishmcnt of the Consiiiuiion. the States should 
be regarded as diMinct and inilepeiKleni sovereigns? Tliey are 
to regarded li)- the ConMiluiion projinscd. Do ihcy tcquire that 
the members of the goremint^nt should derive iheir appoinlment 
fiom the Irgisblures, not from the people ol the Slates? One 
branch o( the new govcrnnient is to be ninioinlcd liy these legisla- 
tures ; and under the ConfciJcialion, the dele^alrs to Cungiess 
tnay ail be appoininl ininiediaieiy by the people, and in (wo 
States* arc actually so appointed. Do ihcy leqobe that ihc 
powers of the go>-cmn>cnt should act on the Slates, and nut un- 
mediately on individuals? In some inst.inccs. as has been shown, 
the powers of the new goveimncnt wil! act on the Slates in their 
collective ehnraclera. In some instances, also. lhor>c of ihc exist- 
ing government aet immediately on individuals. In CJSCS of 
capture; of piracy : of the iiost olfice; of coins, weighlk. and mea^ 
ures: of trade with (he Indians: of claims under grants of land 
by diHerenI Sialics : and. above all. in the c.ise of tri.-ds by courts* 
martial in the army and iMvy, by which death may be inflicted 
wilfaont the intervcnttoii of a jury-, or even of a civil mngittnite — 
in all ibesc c.ises the powers of the Confederation operate inime- 
dUlety on the persons and interests of individual ciiiieivs. Do 
thcK fundainental principles require, |>arlicularly, that no lax 
slwuld be levied without the inlei mediate agency o] the Stales? 
Tlir Con fell era lion itself aulhoriies a direct lax. to a certain 
citenl, on the post ol&ce. The powet of coinage has been socoo* 

' Connecticut anil Rhode Island.— PuULttfS. 



ass 



POPULAR CONFIRMATION. 



iiro.40il») 



sliu«cl by CoTigiesi iu to IcTy a (ribute im)i>cclulcly from Uul 
source at«n. Dui prclrcmitiing throe inm.incn, was it not an 
acknowledged object of lite convention, and the uiiivwMl cxpecU- 
lion of lh« |ico|>Ic. ilui (he regulation oi trade ihould be mbinilted 
lo the general i;m'eniinent in such a (otm as would ietid«r it 
an immciliatr source o( gcnriAl revenue? Had not Congm* 
rcpcateilty recommended litis measure as not iiicoiisisiieni with ilie 
fundamental princip1c« of the Confederation? tl;id not every 
Siaie but one. bad not New York lierKlf, so far complied v>iih 
the |)lan <A Con};m^ as lo recn^niie the prtHcipU of the innova- 
tion ? Do lliese principles, Ln tine, rexgulre that the powers of the 
general |;overnment should be limited, and thai, beyond ihU bmit. 
the Slates should be left in possession of their sovereignty and 
independenci; ? We have seen lliat in the new |;oveniment, as in 
the old, Ihe general powers arc limiteil ; and that the State*, in all 
unenumeraieit cases, are left in lite enjoyment ol lltcir sovereifn 
and inde|>cmleat jurisdiction. 

The trtith is th.it the great principles of the Conslilulion pri- 
|)USFd by the convention may be consiiletcd leu ai absolutely new 
than as the expansion ol principles which aie found in lite articles 
of Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has 
been that these pimciples are so feeble and contiiied as to juslrfy 
all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it, 
and to require a degree of cnlargcmcnl which gives to tite ikw 
system Ihe aspect of an entire Irantfoimation of the old. 

In one particular it is admitted that the convenllon have de- 
parted from the tenor of llieir commiviion. Iniiieail o( reporlinc 
a plan requiting the conlirmation ef Ihe ItgisLtlHrti I'f all Ihi 
Sl/iUi, they liave leiwrted a plan which is lo be conArmed by the 
pfttfiie, aiul may he canie<l into effect by lUHf StaUt only. It is 
worth)' o4 remark that this objection, thougli the most ptausiUc, 
h.-ts I>een the least urged in the publications which have swarmed 
against the convention. The (otbeaiance can only have pioceedeit 
(runi an irreiislible conviclion of the absurdity nl subjectitig the 
fate of twelve Slates to the perverseness or corruption of a iblr- 
leenlh; from the example of inflexible oppoNilion given by a 
mitjarHj of one xixiielh ' of lite people of America to a measure 
H[i{iroved and chilled for by llie voice of twelve Sl-iles. comprising 
fifty'nine sixiicihs of the people—an example still fm.h in the 
memnr)' and inilii^n.ition »l every cillicn who h.ts felt tor llie 
wounded homir iind prmpeiily uf his country. As this olijection. 



' Rhode lilaad refoaed to semi delegates to Ibe Icdcnl coavemioit.^ 
KDrro*. ~ 



«*««ml SOlElfX PURPOSE OF CO!fVENT!ON. »S7 

Ihi^reforc, has been In a manner waive*! by those who linve cHlU 
eli«(t rhc powert of ilie convcniion, 1 (liKiniu ii without turlher 
obcerv.itlofl. 

The lAirti point lo be inqaited into it. how far canvideration* of 
duly arising out of the cam itself could have sii[>plicd any defect 
of regular aulhoriljr. 

la the preceding inquiries the potvcr» of (he convention have 
been aiiiilyted an<l tried wlllt the same rigor, and l)y tlie uiiie 
nilci. as if ihcy liad been real and final powers for the esiablish- 
nicnt of a Coniiitotion (or the United Stales. We liave seen in 
wrh.ll m.innrr ihry hnvr borne the trial e\'en on Ihnt siipposilioQ. 
li ii trm<' now to recutlect thai the powers were merely advisory 
anil recommrndaloiy ; Uial tiiry were sn mean) hy llie State* and 
so UMtemood by ili« convention : and (hat the Utter have acvoid- 
ingly planned ami proposed a Conttitutton which i« to he of no mare 
consequence than iIk paper on which it n written, unless it be 
tiainpcfl with lite approbation of thotc to whom it is addrrued. 
This reflection places the subject in a point of view altogether dif- 
ferent. a.nd will enable us to judge with propriety of the course 
I.) ken by the convention. 

Let us view (he grmind on which the ccinrrntion stood. It may 
be collected from their proceedings that iliey were deeply and 
unanimously impressed with the crisis which had led their 
country almost with one voice to make 90 singular and solemn an 
experiment for correcting the errors of a system by which this 
crisis had been produceil; that they were no less deeply and 
unanimously convinced that such a reform uh they have proposed 
wn» niMOfulHy neceswry (o eftect the purposes of their appoint- 
ment, II cotild not be unknown to thcin tli:it the hupet and 
ctpectaiions of the gre.1l body of ritlzrns throughout this great 
empire were turned urith the keenest unxicty tu the event o( their 
dFlDicr.iiions. They h.id ei'rry reason to liclieve that the contrary 
srniiments agitated the minds and boMtins o( every external and 
internal foe to the tlberiy and protipcriiy of the United States. 
They had seen, in the origin and progress of the experiment, the 
alacrity with which the propotilioH m.idc by a single Stale 
(V'^gini.i) toward a partial amendment of the Contnleraiion had 
been'Vitendcd lo and promoietl. They had seen the liberty 
ittitime/t by a very/tw <lcp(ities from a very fevr Slate*, convened 
at Anna|>o]is, of recommending a great and critical object, wholly 
foreign 10 their ci>mniinlon, not only jusiilied by the public 
opinion but actually carried into effect by twelve out of ihe 
tliirlcen Stales. They had seen, in a variety of instances, assutnp- 



*S* CONVENTIOtf ACTED RESPONSIBL Y. »o. « (W 

lions bjr Confims. not only ef recommendatory, Iwit of oprraliv*. 
poni'^rs, wjirTaniciI, in the public catimaiioii. by occision* anil 
objects infinitely less urgent than iboic by which titeir conduct 
wm (o br govcincd. They inuU have rclkcinl thai, in all ercai 
chjinitea o( establiihccl t;(it-cmtncnta. lorm« ought to grve way to 
sutnlancc ; itul a ri^iit adherence In Hich c(uc» to the furmct 
would rendei nominal and nu{[aiory the tranacendeiii and pre- 
cious right of the people lo"aboli()i or alter ilveir ]{ovetnment5 
BS to them shall seem mint likely to ellect titeir taiely and Itappi- 
nest."* xincc it i« impoMible for the people spontaneously and 
universally to iiim-c in concert tuwani llwrir object ; and ti is there- 
fore CMcntiol that Kuch cfianget be inttttuted by sotne iHfarmal 
and utiauiboriitd prcpatifioHt, in.tite by some |utriotic and 
rripectabk ciiiien or numl>cr oi citizens. Tlicy must have recol- 
lected that it was by this irreiiul.ii and aHun)i:d privilege «f pro> 
poi4iig to itic people plans for their safety and hui>piiic&& that the 
Stales were first untied against the danger with which lltey were 
ihtculcnciJ by their aivcicnl guvernmcnl ; that cummiltecs and 
congieuett were forincil for cone nni rating their eRorti and defend- 
ini; iheir rlnhti ; aiMl thai evnvfnfiotn were tiKleJ in the trveral 
Sld/ei fur csiablishing the conultuiions under which ihcy are now 
goveriietl : nor could it hare Ikcii forEollen that no link Ut-lHned 
MDiples. no /eal for adhering 10 ordinary forms,, were anywhere 
wen. excqn in those who wished lo indulge, under iheM ma^s. 
their secret enmity to the substance conieiulcd for. They must 
liavc borne m aiind (hat, a» ihe pliin to be framed and propwieJ 
was to Ik su1)milml to tie pioftit Iheinith'ei, the disapprobaium 
of this iiuptcnie iiutliority would destroy it forever ; its ai>p<ubai>oi) 
blot out antcc«lent crroi» aivd irregutaritirs- It might even have 
occurmi to ihcm (hat, where a disiHisition (o cavil pterailcd, iheit 
ncgteci to execute llie degiee of power vested in them, and stiU 
more their rocommendation of any meauire whatever, noi wnr- 
ranied by ihcir commisuun, n-ould not less excite nnimadverrsion, 
than a rcconimrndatioo at once oj a measure fully commensurate 
lo the national exigencies. 

Had the convention, under all these imprrvsions and In the 
midst of all these consideratious. iiiMe^id of eierciitng a manly 
conhdcnce in iht-ir cixintly. by whose confidence they had l>rrD so 
prculi.trly disiinguiiliod. and o( pointing oul a system capaUc. In 
thetr judf;nienl. ul securioK its happiness, taken (lie colli and uillen 
rcsolniion ofdistppniniing 111 anient hopes, of saolficing substance 
to forms, of committing tlie dearest inlerestsof (heir country to the 

* Dcdaruioii ol Imlepciiilaicc.— I'vBi.itn. 



■ailHBl 



KA TIPICA TtOy JUSTIFIABLE. 



259 



anccrUinlin v( delay and the haiani of ci-ents. let m« ask the 
man who Mn raise his mind 10 one elevated concrpiion, who c-in 
awaken in hb bo«>in one p.-tlriatic emoiinn. wtut judgmenl ought 
to have l»cco pronounced by ihc Imp.iiti.il woild, by the friends of 
mankind, by e>ety viituuut citiun. on Ilie coiiducl and chamclcr 
of this asscml>ly ? Or if ihcre be a man whose projieiiilly to con> 
dcmn i« Misccpiible of no control, kl mc then :i>ik what st-nicncc 
lie bai in reserve for the IweUe Stales wlio uiurped Me pt/s.vr o( 
)icn<ling deputies 10 the oonTcotion. a body uticily unknourn to 
their constilulions ; for Con^rcu, who recommended the appoinl- 
mcnt of ihin bo<ly. equally unknown to the Confederation ; and for 
the Stale of New Vork. in pariicuUr, which (Mt tirsed and then 
complied i«ilh this unauihonicd inltrpn^ition } 

But thai the objccloia may be disarmetl of every piciexl. it shall 
be granted for a moment ihai the rnnvrntion were neither 
aulhoriied by their cominisxiun. nor jusiiFicd by circunisunccs in 
proposint; a Cons.iitutian (or ihcir rouniry : Aacf. it follow that the 
Consiiluiion ou^jhi, (or that rcjion alone. 10 be rcjt'Cted ? U. 
according to Ihc not>le precept, it he lawful to accept good advice 
even from an enemy, ahall we *et the ignoble example of refusing 
such advice even when it is oRercd by our friends ? The prwlenl 
Inquiry, in all casein ought surely to be, not m much /r«m wM&m 
the advice comrs. as whether ihr advice hego^. 

Tli« sum <A what has l>een here a<lva(tced and proved is that Ihe 
thaiQC aKniitii the convention of exceeding their puwers, except in 
OIK inslunce little urf;ed by (he objectors, has nn fi>un<Iati«n to 
support it; ihal if they had exceeded their puwer». ihcy weie not 
only wartaiiicd. but required, as the confidentijil sciv.inis of their 
country, by the drcumtlaoee* in which they were placed. 10 
twrctie (he II bcny which they assumed; and ih.nt rinally. if they 
hail violated both lh«ir powers and their obligations, in proposing 
a Conslitiilion. this ought ne^Yrthclrts to he embraced, if it lie 
calculated lu aecornplbh the views and bappint-ss of ihc people of 
America. How far I hi« character it due 10 (he Constilutioti is the 
inbjecl undcj- invcsii^ation. PUULIUS. 



i6d 



ACGKEGATE POWER COA'FEMKED. ara.«li4«i 



No. 41 I40I. </iufr/r*/Hr/Mru/.jMHnrif.ii«.» Madison. 

Tllli; OKNKKAL VIKW OF THK POWERS SUP- 
POSEIJ TO BE VESTED IN THE UNION. 

TAt quality ef fivnr tfinftrnd- — Nel gnaltr fimi it liirutd it — 
Ctntral ft/teiii>nl tftiudt'tJ — Tkr ahftitt ef Iki fviiirtt ettiferrtd— 
t>n[aring war and frantiHt Irtlm t/ maefiu — frrvitliif iirmiti and 
JImIi — Hfgulatiitg ain/tal/iut fful Ikt militia— Ltvftng uxti anJ trr. 
reteing minty. . 

Te Iht Pe^^e ef the Statt af New York: 

The Constitution proposed bjr the convention may be 
considered under two general points of view. The riKST 
relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in 
the government, including the restraints imposed on the 
States. The second, to the particular sirncture of the 
government, and llic dtstribution ot this power among its 
several branches. 

Under the /'x/ view of the subject, two important 
questions arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers 
transferred (o the general government be unnecessary 
or improper? a. Whether the entire mass of them be 
dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the 
several States? 

Is the aggregate power of the general governiDcnt 
greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is 
the yft-f/ question. 

It cannot have escaped those who tiave attended with 
candor to the arguments employed against the extensive 
powers of the government, that the anthors of them have 
very little considered Iiow far these powers were neces- 
sary means of attaining a necessary end. They have 
cirosen rather to dwell on the inconvcniencns which 
must be unavoidably Ucndcd with all political advantages; 
and on the possible abuses which must be incident to 
every (Mwrrr or trust of which a benericial use ran be 
made. Tliis method nf handling the subject cannot 
impose on the good sense of the |>cople of Amcfica. 



I 



■•JiMBl fASlOUS CLASSES OF POH'Eft. afil 

It may digpU; the subtlety of tbe writer; it may open a 
boandless field for rhetoric and dcclumation; it may 
inflame the pa&siona of the unthinking;, and may confirm 
the prcjudii-cB of ihc misthinking: but cool and candid 
people vill at once reflect that the purest of huiiuiii 
blessings must have a portion of alloy in them; that the 
choice must always be made, if out of the lesser ctiI, at 
least of the creatf.k, nut the i'KKFRCT, good; and that, 
in every political inslitutioii, a power to advance the 
public happiness involves a discretion which may be mis- 
applied and abused. They will see, therefore, that in all 
cases where power is to be conferred, the point first to 
be decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the 
public good; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative 
decision, to guard as effectually as possible against a 
perversion of the power to the public detriment. 

That wc may form a correct judgment on this subject. 
It will be proper to review the several powers conferred 
<jn the government of the Union; and that this may be 
the more conveniently done, they may be reduced into 
different classes as ibi-y relate to the rollowiuj; diETerent 
objects: I, Security agjirist foreign danger; i. Kegula* 
tion of the intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Mainte- 
nance of harmony and proper intercourse among the 
States; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general 
utility; 5. Restraint of Ihe Stales from certain injnnons 
acts; 6. Provisions for giving due cfHcacy to all these 
powers. 

The powers (ailing within the firjl class are those of 
declaring war and granting letters of marque; of provid- 
ing armies and Hcets; of regulating and calling forth the 
militia; of levying and burrowing money. 

Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive 
objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential 
object of lite American Union. The powers requisite 
for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal 
councils. 

Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will 
answer this question in the negative. It would be super 



3$1 



PftOVfSIOyS FOX tVAR. 



uro.u<«) 



HuOlu, therefore, to enter into n proof of tlie affirnuitive. 
Tbe existing Confcderatiun establishes ihi& power in the 
most ample form. 

Is ttie ]>ower of riiising armies and equipping fleets 
necessary? This is involved in the foreguitig power. It 
is involved in the power of self-defense. 

But w;ts it necessary to give an indbfinite i-ower of 
raising troops as well as providtiig fleets; and of main- 
taining both in PEACE as well as in war? 

The answer to these (luestions has been too far antici- 
pated in another place to admit an extensive discussion 
Sm of them in this place. The answer indcetJ 

I***- seems to he so obvious and conclusive as 

scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place. With 
what color of propriety could the force necessary lor 
defense be limitetl by those who cannot limit the force 
of offense? If a fi^eral Constitution cuiild rhain the 
ambition or set bounds to ihc exertions of all other 
nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the dis- 
cretion of its own government, and set bounds to the 
exertions for its own safety. 

How vuuld a reailineix (or war in time of peace l>e ufcly pro- 
hibilvtl, iiiilrss we coiilij prahibil. in lihe mannn. the pteparaiiont 
and c«iabl»liment!t <i( cvrr^r hostile iialwin? I'hc means al 
lecuiiiycaii only l>c trgulnicd bj- ibe means and the danger of 
ailavk. They will, in lact. be ev«r detemiined by llir!>c rules anil 
Ify no oihcTK. It i* in vain to opiMse canstiiuiional iMnien to the 
im]MilK of self-preservation. It n woisc tlun in tsiii : bccaitse M 
(ilnnls in llic Conttltulion ilxlf ncceu;iry uiuq>atHins u( power 
every preeeileni ol which is a germ of uniiKcsv.kr>' and mutii|i[|r«l 
repciitionv If one nation inoininiiu conjtuntly a dUciplinc^ 
army, rea'ly for the srrflee of ambition or revenge. It obliges llie 
riKnt pacitic n3lion<i who may be wiiliin the reach of ilt enter- 
priitrs to take corrriporrfing precaultons. The fihcenlli cenltiry 
waa the unhappjr elioch ol military establisliments in the lime 4iil 
peace. TItcy were introditccd by Charles VII. of France. AU 
Europe has tollou'cO, ur been forced into, the example. Had ttie 
rxaniptc not been fallowed by oilier nations, all Europe must 
long ago have wofn il>e chains of a univeisal monnrch Wne 
rrery nalion rxcepl France now to dobani) its peace esubllsh- 
menis. the same oent might follow. The releran le^i^ns ol 



MullMal UNION A DBFEXSE IN ITSELF. 363 

Rome wrerc ^n ovmnatch [ot the miilisciplincil ntlor of all oilier 
nuifltu and rendered her ihe mitlmsoC tlie world. 

Not the )cs6 true is il thai the lihcrlies of Rome provcil ihc 
bnai vicliin to her niililary tnumplis; and tint ihe liFierlJcs oi 
Europe, as (ai as Ihey ever exiMcd, have, wiih (cw cicrptions. 
been ihe price o( her tnililary eslidtlishnienls. A Mmidin); lorce, 
therefore, is a ilnnKerous, al ihc same time thai il may be a neces- 
sary, piovision. Oil lite &malle»i ti-ute il h^is il» incanvciiietiota. 
On in exicntivc snie iis coii3«(|iienccx luny l>e filial. On ajiy 
scale U is ait objcci of laudable ciicumspcciion anit piecauiioD. 
A wise nation will combine all ilicsc coi»idcrai>ons : and, whilsl it 
docs Boi laslily preLlud*.- iiiclf Iroiii any lesource whiL-h may be- 
come csMiitial to ill safety, will eicrl all its ptixtcncc in diminish- 
tug boili il>e necessity anil the il.mi'crof resorting 10 one winch 
may be inauipicious lu its liberties. 

The cicnresi marks ol ihis prudence are Stamped on ihe pro- 
posed CoiiMilutwii. Tlie Uritun itself, which il ccmetiU anil 
secures, dcMrnys creiy pretext for a niililaty csublishineiii whicli 
could 1>c dani;crous. Ameticn united, with a handful of Iiuups, 
orwilltout a single soldier, exhibits a more foibiddlng poslurc to 
fotciKK aiobiiioii ihan Americ.i disunilcd. with a hundred thuuund 
veterans rr.idy for coinKii. It was remarked on a foiiiicr occa> 
siun that lite want of this pretext had saved the liberlies of one 
nation in Europe. BeinK reiiilercil by liei insuUr siluation 
and her marilin»e tcsource^ iiiiprej^iialile lo iJie attnies o( her 
neiyhbiir^, ibc luleis of (irc-at Itnlain hare never been able, by 
teal or aitilKial ddi»gcr», to chcai ibc public into an extenxii-e 
(leace establishment. The diitaiice of ilie United Stales from the 
powerful nalioDs oJ the world gives them llie sanw ha|>i>y secunty. 
A dangerous esUblishmcnt can never be necessary or plausible, 
so long as ll>ey continue a unilcd people. Tlui let il never, foe a 
inornent, be forgotten tlut lliey arc indelilcil fur thii advantage to 
the Union alone. The momcm of its dissolulion will be ihc d;ile 
of a new order of things. The (ears o( Ihe weaker, or the arnhilion 
of the sirongcr, Stairs of Ci>nfc<leracies, wdl sel the same example 
In tJie New. a.s Charles VU. did in Ilie Old World. The example 
will be followed here from the same motives which ptoduced 
univctsal tmiiaiHMi iheie. Instead of deriving from otir situation 
Ihe precious iKlvanlage whii'.h Great Britain has derived from hers, 
the face of Ameoca will be but a copy of iliat of the continent 
of t^urope. Il will pieient liberty everywhere cnislied lieiwectt 
uandinj; armies ami perpcliial laics. The fortunes of disunited 
Amenca will be even more disastrous Itian those i>f Eurofw. The 




*64 



UMIT OF RBVENUE FOR ARMY. Hl«.«(«t 



sources of evil in ilic blier arc conGned lu her own limits. No 
su|>ctior power* of nnothcr qunricr of xhv globe intrigue anions 
Iter nvfll nntluiii. Liillxnu- llicii muluitl aninwvtities. and rcndff 
them the inslnimrnts at foreign ;)ml>itian, jealousy, and revmt^. 
In AinoicA (lie miscrict s^MmsinK Itoni her iniciiMl jeal«ti&kt. 
cuiiiFnilans. and w.int. woulil fiitni a part only of her lot. A 
pkntlfilt .idititiOM of evili would h^tvc llictr source ici (li.il rrUlion 
m ^vliich Europe Mamix to this quarter tA (he earth, and v>-luch no 
oiher quarter o( (he ejirlli beiirs (o Europe. 

Tliin picture of (be conseq-jences of disurtion cannot be loo 
highly colored or loo often exhibited. Every man who lovet 
peJice. eterr man who lores his country, rveiy man who toro 
liberty, ought 10 Imvr it eirrr licfore his eyes. Iliai he may cherith 
til his heiiri a due attachment to tlte Union of America, and he 
able 10 set a due value oii ihe meant of pTr«-rring it. 

Next to (he efTcclu.tl e»tJib1i»hn)en( of lite Uiitoii. the be«l ]>o«>i- 
l>1e precaution .ij^^tiiitt danger from sl.-mding armieK i* a limtlnllon 
of the term for which retxinic may be appropriiited (o tWir sup- 
port. Thii precaution l)ie Constitution lias pruilenily adilcd. t 
will not repeat here iIk otMeri'aiioiis which 1 flatter mysHf hate 
placed llus subject in a jiitt and Mtisfaciory llghi. Hul it may 
not be Improper to t.ike itoiice tA an argument again»i this pan of 
the Omsiiltilion which has lieen drawn from (he policy and prac- 
tice of Great Bntain. Ii is s^id that the continuance o( an array 
in that kinj^iloin nrquircs an annual vote ol the Irgialature; wbems 
the American Consmution has Iciigthrncd this ciiitcal period io 
two years. This is (he fonn in which tlie cunt|>ariM)n i» miutly 
statml (o Ihe pul>lic : but is il a, just form ? Is it A fair compaii- 
MM).' Dues Ihe Brilisli Constitution resirain ilie parliamentary 
discreiton to one year? Docs the American impose on the Can- 
grets apprt^wiatioiis (or two years? On ilw coolrary, it latimot 
he unknown to the auihore of the fallacy themselves ihat ihe 
Utiiish Constitution fixes no limil wiMicver to ihe •tiscrclkm of 
the legislature, and that the Anteric.-in ties down the legulalure (■> 
two fcara, as the longest adinissibk term. 

Had Ihe argamcni from the Uriiiili ex^imple bei^n truly staled, 
il would hare stood thus : The term for w hid' siit>|ities may he 
appropri.iictl to the army est.ili4ishmeiit. tliuuch iiiitiMii[e<l by the 
British Const il til i'>n. ha« nevrrlhrless, in ptHclice. I«ccn limited liy 
parlUraeniary discieiion 10 a single war. Now, if In Gnat 
Britain, where the l]nase of Commons Is elected for term years; 
where so great a proporiton <rf the members arr elected byw 
(null a proportion of Ihe penile ; wliete Ihe electors are to cur- 



■mdUott) 



I^ECESSITY FOR A yAVY. 



ids 



nipled by ilw rrpn»i^nta(ires, an<l the rcpruentaitves »o curniiilcd 
by the Ctown,' iV feprc«eitlR(ivc body c.-iii piutrss n pntvpi In 
tn.-ilce appropnations to the «tfny (or an indetinili" Ictin. willnmt 
desiring nr without (Uriiif; to extend the lerm tieymid n Kindle 
year. ouglil not suspicion lienelf to l>lu»lt. iii piclendTii): that the 
i?pTr«:nlalii-cs of the Uiiitci) Stal». elected FKKKI.V by llie 
WHOLK ViO\ ot the |H-opk «»'ery ivxoVD year, caiiiiol be salely 
jiitnutedurith the ditciielioii ovet >uch appioptjaiions, cxptessiy 
Uiniled (o the short period o( two Vkars ) 

A bad cause seldom tails to betray ilnelf. Of this truth, the 
managemeni of the opposition lo ihe fcilcral govcmnicnt Is nn 
nnvancd exernplilicaiiun. Bui ^intori^ alt the bluiidera whidi have 
been commitiwt, none is more stnking th*ii ilic aiiempt lo ciilml 
on that »iile Ilie piuileol jealousy Fnterlainnt by tlie people, of 
KUiidiiig affiiicv Tlie attempt has ^iwakenril fully ihc public 
aile'ilioii tu that impotlanl Mlbjcct ; and has led tu invcsligallons 
which must tem)inalc In a tlio(ou>;h and iiiiivctsal convlclioo, nul 
only that the CoiiiUtuiioii has proridud ilic muM efteciual guaids 
nj^inst danger from that <iuarlcr. tiut that nolhlng short n( a Coi(- 
stiiuiioii fully aitcquate lo the national defense and t!ie pri-%en-ao 
lion of ihe Union can save America from at many ^landing armies 
as it may be split into Stales or Con fede nicies, and from such a 
progrcssire auKmenialion of the«? esl:ib1ishmcnl)i in each a« will 
tender iJicm as burdensome to the properties and ominous to Ihc 
hberlici of Ihe peof)le as any establish men I that can become 
nec«»sary. under a united and cfticient government, niusi be 
loterabic to the former and safe lo ihc lailcr. 

The palpable necessity of the power to provitlc anil 
maintain a navj- has protected that part of the Constitu- 
tion against a spirit of censure which has spared few 
other parts. It must, indeed, he numbered among the 
greatest blessings of America that, as her Union will be 
the unljr source of her maritime strength, so this will be 
a principal source of her security against danger from 
abroad. In this respect our situation bears another 
likeness to the insular advantage of Great Britain. The 
Iratteries most capable of repelling foreign enier]>rise8 on 
our safety arc happily sticb as can never be turned by a 
perfidious government against our liberties. 

'The extent tn wtikb Ihe Gn^liih kinj cotruntvd P«rfUment t* well 
ihown In the tenth Report of the Brilith llUlarlol UiM. Conunluloi^ 
ri. pp. 7-11.— Eoiro«. 



The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them 
deeply interested in tliis provision for naval protection, 
and if tlicy have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly 
in Iticir beds; if their property has reinntned safe against 
the predatory spirit of licentious adventurers; if tlicir 
maritime towns have not yet been compelled to ransom 
themselves from the terrors of a conHagration, by yield- 
ing to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders these 
instances of good fortune arc not to be ascribed to the 
capacity of the existing government for the protection 
of those from vrhom it claims alleKiance, but to causes 
that arc fugitive attd fallacious. If wc except perltaps 
Virginia antl Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable 
on their eastern frontiers, no part of the Union ought to 
feel more anxiety on this subject than New Vork. Her 
sea-coast is extensive. A very important district of the 
State is an island. The State ilscif ts penetriiicil by a 
large navigable river for more than hfty leagues. The 
great emporium of its commerce, the great reservoir of 
its wealth, lies every moment at the merry of events, anil 
may almost be rcg.irdcd as a hostage for ignominious 
compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or 
even with the rap:tcioug dcmamls of pirates and bar- 
barians. Should a war be the result of the preotrtous 
situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions 
attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from 
insults and depredations not only on that element, but 
every part of the other bordering on it, will be trnly 
miraculous. In the present condition of America, the 
States mure immediately exposed to these calamities 
have nothing to hope from the phantom of a general 
government which now exists; and if their itingle re- 
sonrccs were c<iual to the task of fortifying themselves 
against the danger, the objects to be protected would 
l>e almost consumed by the means of protecting t|)cm.' 



\\,i.. 



..h <i., , 



' TTie t«<rene of Ihb hu been Ihe eifwiont" 

ci(i» tooiiibotc cnomoiuljr to ilie diUobiI tevi i ■ ^ 

rerekuei »n cottltvlted bf ike central ilatei h^ 4n 

a<ln|uati luilinealioa. So culy u iSoO. wbcn New VuuL. Cii; |xU- 



KftdbOBl 



HXrUKXAL TAXATION. 



267 



: 



The power of regulating and calling forth the militia 
has been already sufficicntl): vindicated and explained. 

The power u( levying :tnd borrowing money, tieins; the 
sinew oi Diat which is to be exerted in the national 
Bm defense, is properly thrown into the same 

In. 30 3*. cUis» with it, Thi« power, also, has been 
examined already with much attention, and has, 1 trust, 
been clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent 
and form given to it by the Constitution. 1 will address 
one additional reflection only to those who contend that 
the power ought to have been restrained to external 
taxation — by which they mean taxes on articles imported 
from other countries. It cannot be doubted that this 
will always be a valuable source of revenue; that fur a 
comiderable time it must be a principal source; that at 
this moment it is an essential one. But we may form 
very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we do not call to 
mind rn our cidcutations, that the extent of revenue 
drawn from foreign commerce must vary with the varia- 
tions, both in the extent and the kind of imports; and 
that these variations do not correspond with the progress 
of jMjjiulalion, which must t>c the general measure of tlie 
public wants. As long as agriculture continues the sole 
field of labor, the imporution of manufactures must in- 
crease as the consumers multiply. As soon as domestic 
manufactures are begun by the hands not called for by 
agriculture, the imported manufactures will decrease as 
the numbers of people increase. In a more remote 



tranvd Cotifivti. anil detcribed in unprotMled condition, Jefferson 
ari«d upon that body ihii ibe " Ailasiic (roniicr. ftmn numbcn. WMlih. 
wtd exponte lo potent cocmi**, luve ■ piopoiiioiiale Tti;bl lo be ilcfeiuUd 
wtlh lite WeUcift (ronller. (or wb<>cn «c kccgi tip ihrc« ihoUMnd nisa." 
During ihs war ot iSll. New Yixi. tkiiton, »i\i Ni<i«|>nrt ««r« farotd 
lo lort>[]> thaaiwlm tirE^'T ■' ihiiiown Fi|xn(c. white the general gov- 
BBiBcnt even rwluscd tcoupi iq New EncUnd. The Uil app**! lo Con- 
j:mi 10 protect iU giealcd loaice ol revenue w<* from Samuel J. 
I itilen. In aa open Iclter tu ihe tpeaket ol llic Houtc o( KeptcKmtalii<c* 
< Higcluw'* *' I'ililes," ii. yjb). in which lh« caub« »( 111* oumm^rcitl citio 
■« admintblr Mated. ll*d New York rttciinp'i poiicuton ol the 
impokt fioiB tevmuet ceiiltiing in her poit. Ihcce would \a-Asj be 
Icwcr iroblk buildings in Wctlern loiriu, uiJ mae f uAt p««Icclirf her 
Ittibar.— EoiTOK. 



s68 



*t/SCOACaPTIOKS AS TO TAXES. Ut«.41tW} 



SLige, tl)c imports may consist in a considerable part of 
raw matcridl», whii:h will be wrought intu articles for 
exportation, antl will, therefore, require rather the en- 
couragement of bounties than to be loaded with dis- 
couraging duties. A system uf government meant for 
duration ought to contemplate these revolutions, and be 
able to accommodate itself to them. 

Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power 
of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against 
the Constitution on the language in which it is defined. 
It has been urged and echued, that the power "to lay 
and collect taxes, duties, imposts, ami excises, to pay the 
debts, and |)rovidc for tlic common defense and gencrnl 
welfare of the United Stales," amounts to an unlimited 
commission to exercise every power which may be alleged 
to be necessary for the common defense or general wel- 
fare.' No stronger proof could be given of the distress 
under which these writers labor for objections tlian their 
stooping to such a misconstruction. 

Hud no other enumeration or dclinition of the powers 
of the Congress been found in the Constitution than the 
general expressions just cited, the authors of the objec- 
tion might have had some color for it; though it vouM 
have been diRicult to find a reason for so awkward a form 
of describing an authority to legislate tn all possible cases. 
A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by 



■ li it BMdIcu lo Mjr ihM ihit pow«r to " provide for the ooniNion 
defenv anil gcnciil vcUrtc" hu been Ihc bMtMgriHUiil of aldkou ewj 
(|U««l)on ol national |wltlicM> [lum tlie Mtoplinn ol Ibe contthtitioa tu tb* 
imMDt Axy. AlnuiilM jnlin<>ioii i;i>cii w> fu a* \o My thai alt Imimi 
liol l»Md on (hit qunltun "haic liccn cillic* local ■nd iFinuenfy, 
or Klfikli (nd niiit*«^in(;. ai><) Ihc s*'"^'"' a(tc)>t*nr( of any isUi pMly 
diff««RCV woutH mark an unfoitunate decline in ikr |iolilir«l intellipAc* 
of the p«opk." The Bjiio* view, hrit ciiteiMd bv ''- ' ■ ha b«ld 
(wliQicnily.whiIi; m iIh op'^HHtliini. Il Iii3l louod ifr i -•'jon in 

Jellcnoe'i "Opinion on llie Cnmliluilnnnllty uf iti Elaak ' 

fijqi): MaKiliAn't ni<Riler-afilsl(Mi on tl>r um- iv t^i ihii dajp 

roniMlefcd tbu ahtnl ai^mtnl f"r '1-<- l.ntrt . . nt f-oliil af 

vieir. (S«f Apiimdit. y. 6s( ) ■ ' -ro 

ihcofttioill; in (aim of »iikl ■ 'rn 

talira as Miposlle potilinn. l-ni yr,:iy n< \--r > m.r.i -imri hn 
kfaov* vftriahilitjr on Ihi* polk;, tnlcljr aciw(tiii|- to whdbct ii held tha 



KliUOBl 



PARTICULAR POWERS. 



«69 



jury, or even to regalatc the course of descents, or the 
forms of conveyances, must be vcrjraingulariy exprcfiscd 
by the tcriim "to nuite nmney for the geiicrji! welfare." 

But what color cjr the objection have, when a specifi- 
cation of the objects alluded to by these general tcrnis 
imntediittely follows, and is not even tepanited by a 
longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of 
the same instrument ought to be so expounded as to give 
meaning to every part which will hear it, shall one part 
of the same sentence be excluded altORcthcr from a stiare 
in the meaning; nnd sh.ill the more doubtful and indefi- 
titte lermii be ret.ijned in their full extent, and the clear 
and precise expressions be denied any signification whsl. 
soever? For what purpose could the enumemtion of 
particular powers be inserted, if these and all otber« were 
meant to be includeil in the preceding general power? 
Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a 
general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a 
recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration 
of particiibrs which neither explain nor quality the general 
meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound 
and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to 
tlic dilemma of charging either on the authors of the 
objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must 
take the liberty of supposing had not its origin with the 
latter. 

The objection here it the more extraordinary, as it 



raimot povCT, nt wMMilnifln ihe oppcnllion. Thu* Ihc «ncifliK'liiDmti 
ornlW' ii»»aiiipiinin "( "e«i power cui be diviikil with r<riin«vi nmoiig 
«nr tmtitkal pari in. Tim KnlvniliKtii cli»lciivl thp tJnilcd Slitci Sank : 
Ihe |}cinixrati tmiight Louiuinn. <onil rucl«d > nAlionoJ xo»A. on<l onj-i' 
luucl (ll« Artl " t-rolccltve " IfciiUilon anil inlental im|iTO*cin«nU ; 
Ibc Wlil|pi cftriint Ibe ptotecllve ihcury to ■» ntrMnv, uid mHvucitltiJ 
[fr«r anil bBttMir lRi[iMvciiM-nU ; IliC Kciiut:1icuii:i'lraoti«dBOveni mental 
tmiMing oF railrriaiK. ciiacUid the diatt. >nil ttFiltd the irfal lender; 
the Demixriti fnr«d Ihp cmtton ot thf eletloral conniiuioti. %iu\ were 
rctpaiiijlite lor ihe fint inilltalion of bounlict by Ihe i^ilrci ixitchita Uwi : 
the Kc|iii1jtii:u)k Mleoipteil to Iei[i»lne itAtxtX iiilcitereocc in eleclioot. 
pauvH iht iiiicniitt coiiineri;* Uir, ami ([cniitrd Imuniics in direct lermi : 
ihe ttcnncrali vjii*^! to make anjncantrlai an rndirecl (m. iind, ij;iiln>t 
the p«ol(sl of n SUie BO««nuneot. lued Ibe federal lullionty to criwii 
iniufTMllon*. — EuirOK. 



77° COMMON! DEFEKSEFAtFLYC0KS7'RVED. IKo.ll'Mi 

appears that the lang:uag« uR«d by the convention is a 
copy from the articles of Confederation. The objects of 
the Union among the St.itcs, as described in article third, 
are, "their common defense, security of iheir libcrlies, 
and mutual and general welfare." The terms of article 
eighth arc still more identical; "All charges of war and 
all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common 
defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United 
States in Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common 
treasury," etc. A similar language again occurs in artieJe 
ninth. Construe either of these articles by the rules 
which would justify the construction put on the new 
Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a 
power to legislate in all cases whatsoever. But what 
would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching 
themselves to these general cspressions, and disregard- 
ing (he specifications which ascertain and limit their 
import, they bad exercised an unlimited power of provid- 
ing for the common defense and general welfare? I 
appeal to the objectors themselves, whether ilicy would 
in that case have employed the same reasoning in justi- 
fication of Congress as they now make use of against the 
convention. How difKcult it is for error to escape its 
own condemnation! 

PLtBU(;&, 




FORBIG.V lyrERCOVRSB. 



No. 42 [41]. {firm Vtrk Pnkn. }K»»Ti n. ii&.'i 

POWKRS GOVERNING INTERCOURSK WITH 
FOREIGN NATIONS AND BETWEEN THE 
STATES. 

Kffutatioa »f imltrtauru tuilk /arrign aaliftii — AmiaiiaJort, taniuti, 
jhJ irtiuui — PuHiiAMtritt a/ plroiy, fttanui *■» Ihi hi^k iioi, aad 
effiHsii •ipsinit Ikt iAset 0/ Htiliani — /tigiilalhit f/ftrd^tttfiHmrrtt—' 
Tht lanilifiH af Ikr slat^f IrnJt — OJyrtlian t>i> Ikal ftfal teitiiJrrtJ — 
M.iiMUnA'tct tf hurmtanj and fri-^ inlfrtaHrtf a»i9ng tht thtl/i — Inltr. 
ilalt ttmmrrtr anJ Ihf /nJiitn triult — Ceinagr af netity — Fttmihmtnt 0/ 
t»iaitrr/riU*t — Stand^'d ef vui^kli a»d nt^iurtt' — NaMraiitatwti — 
SaaMruftty laun~fiiiU /or f-r»viiiiti£ putiit atli — Pait rtoAi aitdfut 



Tc the Ptopit of tht Stittf of New York: 

The second clas* yf powers lodged in (he general 
government consists of those which regulate the inter- 
eourse with foreign nations, to wit: to make treaties; to 
send and receive umbassadorit, other public ministers, and 
consuls: to define and panish piracies and felonies com- 
mitted on the high seas, and offenses against the law of 
nations; to regulate foreign commerce, incliidinga power 
10 prohibit, after the year 1808, the importation of slaves, 
and to lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars per head, 
as a discouragement to such importations. 

This class of powers forms an obvious and essential 
branch of the federal administration. If wc are to be one 
nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to 
other nations. 

The powers to make treaties and to send and receire 
ambassadors speak their own propriety. Both of them 
are comprised in the articles of Confederation, with this 
difference only, that the former is disembarrassed by 
the plan of the convention of an exception, under which 
treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations 
of the States ; and that a power of appointing and rcceiv* 
ing "other public ministers and consuls," is expressly 
and Tery properly added to the former provision coo- 



*7» ADMISSION OF CONSULS. W* « <41l 

crrning ambassadors. The term ambassador, if taken 
strictly, aw sccins to be re<iuired by the second of i)te 
articles of Confederation, coniprehends the highest grade 
only of ^lublic ministers, and excludes the grades wliich 
the United States will he must likely to prefer, where 
foreign embassies may be necessary. And under no 
latitude of constnictiun will the term comprehend con- 
suls. Yet it has been found expedient, and lias been the 
practice of Congress, to employ ilie inferior grades of 
public ministers, and to send .ind receive consuls. 

It is true that where ireatieit uf commerce stipulate fur 
the mutual appointment of consuls, whose functions are 
connected with commerce, the admission of foreign con- 
suls may fall within the power of makintt commercial 
treaties; and that, where no such treaties exist, Uie 
mission of American consuls into foreign countries may 
ptrkapi be covered under the authority, given by the ninth 
article of the Confederation, to appoint all such civil 
officers as may be necessary for managing the general 
affairs of the United Slates. But the admission of cun< 
suls into the United States, where no previous treaty has 
stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere provided fur. 
A supply of the umission is one of the lesser instances in 
which the convention have improved on the model before 
them. But the most minute provisions become important 
when they lend to obviate the necessity or the pretext 
for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power. A 
list of the cases in which Congress have been betrayed, 
ur forced by the defects of the Confederation, into viola- 
tions of their chartered authorities, would not a little 
surprise those who have |Kiid no attention lu the subject; 
and would be no inconsiderable argument in favor of the 
new Constitution, which seems to have provided no less 
studiously for the lesser than the more obvious and 
striking defects of the old. 

The power tn define and punish piracies and felonies 
committed on the high «eas, and offenses against the law 
of nations, belongs with equal propriety lu the general 
government, and is a still grcittcr improvement oo tJie 



^■11 




fELOMY OM TBE ttrCR SEAS. 



^irticlcs of CoDfedcration. These articles contain no 
prorision for the case of offenses against the law of 
nations; and consequently leave it in the [>ower of any 
indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with 
foreign nations. T!ie provision of the federal arlicles 
on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further 
than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these 
offenses. The definition of piracies might, perhaps with- 
out inconveiiiency, be left to the law of nations; though 
a legislative definition of them is found in most municipal 
codes. A definition of felonies on the high sens is evi- 
dently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signilicBtioii, 
even in the common law of England; and of variotis 
import in the statute law of that kingdom. Hut neither 
the common nor the statute law of that, or of any other 
nation, ought tu be a standard for the proceedings of 
this, unless previously made its own by legislative adop- 
tion. The meaning of the term, as defined tn the codes 
of the several ijiates, would be as impracticable as the 
former would be a dishonorable and illegitimate guide. 
It is not precisely the &amc in any two of the States; and 
varies in e^ch with every revision of its criminal Uws. 
For the sake of certainty and unilormity, therefore, the 
power of defining felonies in this case was in every 
respect necessary and proper. 

The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen 
within several views which have been taken of this sub- 
bm ject, has Ijeen too fully discussed to need 

K«. 11. additional proofs here of its being properly 
submitted to the federal administration. 

Jt were doubtless to be wished th.it the power of pro- 
hibiting the importation of slaves had not been post- 
poned until the year t&oS, or rather that it had been 
suffered to have immediate operation,' But it is not 

'TbcttavB-lrxle cUuw wu iher«4ii1l otn «ini|ir<»n1ke. irillioul itltidi 
die conuinilioa would iu[(«)y hue •:i>Tniii]in-lr<l ilir viiirt uC ■ niajortty 
o((Kp rivnvM.tion a-tiRh fninirit, iiiucli l<Ti» "t Ihr lUtci; which nl't^ed 
It. Tlnit aii'l (InorcU hn^l Iml > inr^ yKtl of thrlc dn'ci hy 

Bri ' rmu durini; the rciolulioo. uDd )i<i»utinG lw|;c tt«cu nf 

inmlittaied Uni). thty iiiikcd to nuikeUlw«ucheapuj-auihlcb7|Mr 




SIA^B TKADE. 



r«o.U'4i> 



difficult to account, either for this r«slriction on thr 
general s;ovcrnmenl, or for ihe manner in which the 
Bm whole clause is expressed. It ought to be 

S4.U. considered as a great point gained in faror 

of humanity that a period of twenty years may terminate 
forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long 
and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; 
that within that period it will receive a considerable dis- 
couragement from the fe<]eral government, and may be 
totally abolished, by a concurrence of the (cw States 
which continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory 
example which has been given by so great a majority of 
the Union. Happy would it be for the unfortunate 
Africans if an equal prospect lay before them of being 
redeemed from the oppressions of their Kuropcan 
brethren! 

Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into 
an objection against the Constitution, by representing ii 
on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, 
and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and 
beneficial emigrations from Buropc to America. I men- 



Biiltins the free importalioa oE ne|[Toet. Uailed w^th then ia ihi 
lieiltc la maintain llie dan iraite were MkuachlnelU and Rb«lc liUinL 
/lit 111 llieitc tl.itn ll<r lar);rr |iaii «l lliit (XolilaLle liaiKe centernl. The 
aid n( \\i» iXhcT New En^and italn wm Mcuced lir (he claatc e>''inC '° 
Congmspawer lopusa iwvi^Kin act bjauiniiteniafMrUr. and ihynby 
lh« vol« of the tocit Nev Enclftnil stale* and o( tl>« thre« KMithcrw alaln, 
ai:ninii ihe Toie* of Nc* fti^y, Pcnntjlvanii. Dclawnre, and Vit^»a 
(Near York anfejircMninl iii ih< tnnvriiiMin), ihe alave Irxle mtt fait«ied 
upon tk* coutiirr (or iweiily ynn; IkiiI (or ihit it ia ('tolialilc thai tbr 
alSTiry qiietli>jii woul^l hanlly hiiTe aHnmrd llie tcrimit |>n>|;ur1 hmt Ihll 
It pvpntualhr itprfloMd. Alreuly. knwevet, both Virjpnia and Miff' 
Und were nadine tM bnodiDH «( alnrat for the wniheta nuuket a 
*o>im □( pntlii. inil to ifaU lact. mure than to any Inie humaailatiaa 
lenlimcnl, nsh iliic 'hrrr illilu'fr on (hit qixilion ; ('<( til* rn>tln)[ oJ ikc 
*larr Irsdr nieaiil a liigher iirice for nc^ruet. and llicrrliire ■ cr e a te 
p«alil (roa Ihoni. InAneiiceil by ihu ileure doi to cIom a tiiarliel wtlk- 
oat her own bonniliriei foe tbe slavet almdy Hnjti'>*il>lilr Ifr mgri- 
cultural iiuqHHei;, Virginia in I79t ^'"t"! >i:*'<i't ihe 11 "t 

' frnm all tlvr oeticm iciriinry. I'ltr enormoiik |>ri>£l< ' -> 

I later lefnie.!. tUrt the Mojiping ■>( ihe ilaie liatlc. ii ..i.i.-^ ... ,;. *« 
\ flic 111' in Ihe oiith and well, thfw (hit they, quite ai modi ai lh«ii 
innre wwibrni Dei|[iibori and the New EngltM Ualo, wen ratine lor 
what leewied their Imc intcieitt, rega/dltM of caonl aMuldetuloaa.— 
Eiil7oa. 



MifflMB) mTBR-STATE KEGULATfOXS S7S 

tiiin these misconstructions, not with a virw to give 
them an ansircr, fur they (t<;servc none, but as specimens 
of tfie manner and spirit in which some have thought fit 
t« coniluct their opposition to the proposed government. 

The powers included in the M/r</ class are those which 
provide for the harmony and proper intercourse among 
the States. 

Under this head might he included the particular re- 
strjints imposed on the authority of the States, and cer- 
tain powers of the judicial department; but the former 
are reserved for a distinct clasit, and the latter wdl be 
particularly examined when we arrive at the structure 
and organisation of the government. I shall confine 
myself to a cursory review of the remaining powers com- 
prehended under this thifxl description, to wit: to rcgu- 
hile commerce among the scvenil Stales and the Indian 
tribes; to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of 
foreign coin; to provide for the punishment of counter- 
feiting the current coin and securities of the United 
States; to fix the standard of weights and me;isures; to 
establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform 
laws of bankruptcy; to prescribe the manner in which 
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each 
State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in 
other States; and to establish post officesand post mads. 

The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to 
regulate the commerce between its several members is 
in the number of those which have been clearly pointed 
out by experience. To the proofs and remarks which 
former papers have brought into view on this subject, it 
may be added tliat, without this supplemental provision, 
the great and essential power of regulating foreign com- 
merce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A 
very material object of this power was l!ie relief of llie 
States, which import and export through other Slates, 
from the improper contributions levied on them by the 
latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade 
between State Ani\ Stale, it must be foreseen that ways 
would be found out to load the articles of import and 




S76 



TRAt>E OF CONFEDERATE STATES. lK<i.U.U> 



export, OuritiK tl'c pa&sattc through their jurisdiction, 
vith duties which would f;ill un the makers of (he Utter 
and the cunnumers of the foraier. We may be assured 
by pa&t experience lltat such a practice would be iDtro- 
duced by future contrivances; and both by that and ;i 
common knowledge of human affair», that it woiiM 
nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably ter- 
minate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity. 
To those who do not view the question through the 
medium of passion or of interest, the desire of the com- 
mercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revcnur 
from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear not lcs^ 
impolitic than it is unfair; since it would stimulate the 
injured party, by resentment as well as interest, to resort 
to less convenient channels for their foreign trade. Hut 
the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an en- 
larged and permanent interest, is but tuu often drowned, 
before public bodies as well jw individuals, by the clamors 
of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate 
gain. 

The necessity of a superintending authority over the 
reciprocal trade u( confederated iStaiea^ lias been illns> 
trated by other examples as well as our own. In Switzer- 
lantl, where the Union is so very slight, each c;«nion is 
obliged to allow to mcrchaiMlises a |>askage through iis 
jurisdiction into other cantons, without an augmentattun 
of the tolls. In Germany it is a law of the empire that 
the princes and states shall not lay tolls or customs 
on bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of 
the emperor and the diet; though it appears from a citio- 
tation in an antecedent paper that the practice in this, 
as in many other instances in that confederacy, has not 
followed the law, and has produced there the mischiefs 
which have l>een foreseen here. Among the restraints 
imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its meni> 
bcrs, one is that they shall nut establish imposts ilUad- 
vant^geous to tbcir neighbors, without the geocnt 
permission. 

The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is 



K*<baBi 



POWER TO COIN MONEY. 



277 



very properlj^ imfetteretl from two limitations >n the 
articles of Coafederation, vriiich remlcr tlie provision ob> 
scurc and contradictory. The power is there restrained 
to Indbos, not members of anjr of the States, and is not 
to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State 
within its own limits. What description of Indians arc 
to be deemed memt>ers of a State is not ycl settled, and 
has been a question of frequent perplexity and conten- 
tion in the federal councils. And how the trade with 
Indians, though not members of a State, yet rciiiding 
within its legislative jurisdiction, can be rctiulatcd by 
an extermil authority, without so far intruding on the 
internal rights of legiKlaiton, iti al>M>lute1y incumprehen- 
sible. This is not the only ease in which the articles of 
Confederation havt? inconsiderately endeavored to ac- 
complish impossibilities; to reconcile a partiiil sover- 
eignty in the Union with complete sovereignty in the 
States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking 
away a part aivd letting the whole remain. 

All that need be remarked on the power to coin money, 
regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin is that, 
by providing for this last case, the Contititutiun has sup- 
plied a material omission in the articles of Con federation. 
The authority of the existing Congress is restrained to 
the regulalioa of coin struek by their own authority or 
that of the respective States. It must be seen at once 
that the proposed uniformity in the value of the current 
coin might be destroyed by subjecting that of foreign 
coin to the different regulations of the different States. 

The punishment of counterfeiting the public securities, 
as well as the current coin, is submitted of course to 
tftat authority which is to secure the value of both. 

7'he regulation of weights and measures is transferred 
from the articles of Confederation, and is founded on 
like considerations with the preceding power of regulat- 
ing coin. 

The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has 
long been remarked as a fault in our system, and as lay- 
ing « foundation for intricate and delicate questions. In 




,j8 



NA rUKALlZA TION. 



tRo, 4S (« 



thfl fnurlli arliilff of lUe Confederation it is (le<:Iarr(l 
•• that the fret infiahifonts of each of these Slates, paupers, 
ragalionds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of /ret eilictnt 
in the several States; and the people of each State shall, 
in CTcry other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and com- 
merce," etc. There is a confusion of bncuage here, 
which is remarkable. Why the terms frte inhahitatih are 
used in one part of Ihc iirtiele, free tiiiseut in another. 
hxA ffeofle in another; or wtiat was meant by su|>eraddin;,' 
to "all privileges and immunities of free dtixens," "all 
the privilege* of trade and commerce," cannot easily be 
determined. It seems to be a construction scarcely 
avoiduble. however, that those who come under the 
dcnominalton of free inhabilanft of a State, alUiough not 
citizens of such State, arc cntitlH, in every other State, 
to all the privile-jes of free {iliuns of the latter: that is. 
to greater privileges than they may Ik; i-ntitled to in their 
own State; so that it may he in the power of a |>articHtar 
State, or rather every State is laid nnder a necessity, 
not only to confer the right« of citiienvhip in other 
States upon any whom it may admti to such ri);hts within 
itself, but upon any whom it may allow to become in- 
habitants within its jurisdiction. Rui were an exposition 
of the term "inhabitants" to be admitted which would 
confine the stipulated privileges to citizens alone, the 
difficulty is diminish(*d only, not removed. The very 
improper power would still be retained by each Stale of 
naturalizing aliens in every other Stale. In one Stale, 
rei«idcnce for a short term confirms alt the rights of 
citizenship: in another, qualifications of greater impor- 
tance are reiiuired. An alien, therefore, legally inr.a[ur- 
itated for certain rights in the latter may, by previous 
residence only io the former, elude his incapacity; and 
thus the law of one State Iw preposterootty rendered 
[Mramount to the law of another, within the jurisdiction 
of the other. We owe it to mere casualty that very scr. 
ious eml)iarra.4«ments on this subject have been lullierto 
eseaped. By the laws uf several States, certain descrip- 



MUiMnl 



PUBUC ACTS AND RECORDS. 



*79 



(ions of aliens,' who had rcadercO themselves obnoxious, 
were taut umler interdicts inconsistent nut only with the 
rights of citizenship but with the privilet;e of rcNicJciice. 
What would have been the consequence if such persons, 
hjr residence or otherwise, had acquired the character of 
ttitixens under the laws of another State, and then asserted 
their rights as such, both to residence and citiicnship, 
within the State proscribing them? Whatever the legal 
<:on»^qucnces mi^lit have been, other consequences would 
probably have resulted of too serious a nature not to be 
provided against. The new Constitution has accord- 
ingly, with ^xtaX. propriety, made provision against them, 
and alt others proceeding from the defect of the Con- 
federation on this head, by authorixing the general 
government to establish .1 uniform rule of luturalixation 
throughout the United States. 

The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy 
is so intimately connected with the regulation of com- 
merce, and will prevent so many fr^tuds where the piirties 
or their property may lie or be removed into different 
Stales, that the expediency of it scenis not libcly to be 
dr:iwn into question. 

The power of prescribing by general laws the manner 
in whivh the public acts, records, and judicial pruceed- 
ings of each Slate shall be proved, and the efTvci they 
shall have in other States, is art evident and valuable 
improvement on the clause relating to this subject in the 
articles of Confederation. The meaning of the latter is 
extremely Indeterminate, and can be of little importance 
under any interpretation which it will bear. The power 
here established may be rendered a very convenient 
instrument of justice, and b« particularly beneficial on 
the borders of contiguous States, where the elTecis liable 
to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated, in 
any Stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction. 

The power of establishing post roads must in every 
vi«» be u liamiless power, wid may perhaps by judi- 



'Tbt k>;r*liib.— Gbnoit. 




cious management become productive uf great public 
convcnicncy. Nuthing wtiicli tends tu facilitate the 
intercourse between the States can be deemed unworthy 
of the public care.' PiiBLitrs. 



No. 43 [42]. (/MV>^hf.*f/MnMA juHi-y li. iju.} Mudtson. 

MISCELLANEOUS POWERS. 

AfisttllamviH fwrert—Ci'pyrighlt amJ f<timlt-~T%i ftdnvt lilf— 
Pnmfkmt'tt r/ tmtioft — Admittitm tf at-w tIaUt — C-ntrpiHtml tf Urri- 
Uriti awi irHlrtI fj ftthlii frtftrljr — Cuariutljr A> rvtrr ilalt ef a rtfmt' 
hrtM /rrm r/ gurtrumml — Fi«lulir» »/ Halt iii'iiliiu/ tntmcn aiJ 
txtiail Jomfilif virtrmt — Aiiamftim uf fayiKfHt n/ cnlilatiJing dttti 
— A mfnJmtnri u lit ti-nililtili-.'m — Tii titaHiikmtnf t/ Ikii giturr*- 
mm! i«i /if .iMfrrmtf tf mint ttatii — Otjfttwn Ikul Ihi ii ti mXrAim 
e/ tif (fimftJrralifn — ttrlnlifm tflmcrn rvtifyimg itatei ami Ikttt wlutk 
rt/mt ta ratify. 

T« tike Peofie 0/ the State 0/ jVejf York : 

Tht/ffurlh class comprises the following; miscellaneous 
powers: 

t. A power "to promole the progrcu of science nnd 
useful arts, by securing, for a. limited time, to authors 



' 'rhtt <[■!*! Ion ol (lulilk or inlcnul impr me i t nt. here m> lirtfA)' 
Iniii-hal u|<oa. )»• l>«ii oat nl l]ic pmvcM quetlioai ot t<*rt)r pnlttin in 
iinlimsl hntorjr. mni] |'r"l>*)<ly hnt >I>"iie nun to JiKlrau iW iKmi o( 
Ihf general cmrctamcnl llun tttj Mbt-r kin^la t*ctoc >n onr itrtglniH lwML 
1'hi> ii oiHiiic to the f»ci that the n«iii«r ttam hate gcncnllt hm ihow 
In wbkh th« Use ikiniicrAIic ifuril vmt dniAEcM. ;r( ubiih by ibeir 
ml (•iiTity were tkc nii»l tscci In )uv« pu)i)ic lini'<>'>imi(&l> lunlti- 
Islrci t^y Ilia [cncntl ^nctBOWsl, ihuk l*n!''f nrutniuiiit; tl>rii oalan) 
jcil'-uit uf mliwul ■uani)>(ii>n 04 inwrr. Tli* liot tivr itcfi la 
Ihu ditcilioa vat thr untlntaking iW Ihc CnnlmriaBd road, a mcaCKK 
nurlrd b^ tlw wmler-i I>cmi-<r«t tn iSo9 irmf a^ipfwH tn (cflcnin. 

SoJiHWC'ii ■=•*? 'O 

tiiiml l»' antri- 

laklBJC pJi ' ' n'k^Jt iLL«n, iKuiiFi^ ■Tilt 4Li[ i\ iThiTiri ■:: i^cnv-it ]<■■ .it^L ixntUIIVf ' 

neai aa il mn ha llwntlii prafier ~ (ib<«|^ h* Ui^luel tkai ihia ahnsld 

lie preCVdril Itv Mn ■iB^nitineiM to lh< o>cmJ1iML'knl ^•\'\ Kit '^h irlarv ij 

IIIb Tica>" r etUM iaa eu ited in ' - « 

I"« tire •" !■' prMtr rmrf- « 

fMnocratk in kuupiaa aft' iitlia^iMi imi <4 U^rii >«■» 

ricndentt (Nafiaoa «»J j th« fioi ap|nf«i«UM lot 



KXlwml 



COPVfltCHT AND PATENTS. 



>Si 



and iiiTcnKir*. the exclu&Jvc rigfit lo iheir respective 
writings and discoveries," 

The utility or this power will scarcely be questioned. 
The copyright of auchorx has been sulemnly adjudged, 
in Great Britain, to be a right of conimon law. The 
risht to useful inventions seems with ctitial reason to 
belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides 
in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States 
cannot separately in;ike effectual provision for either of 
the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision 
of this point by laws passed at the instance of Congress. 

S: <*To exercise exclusive legislation, in alt cases 
whatsoever, over sucti district (not exceeding ten miles 
square) as may by cession of particular States and the 
acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the govern- 
ment of the United States; and to exercise like authority 
over all places purchased by the consent of the legisla- 
tures of the Stales in which the same shall be, for the 
erection of fortK, magaxines, arsenals, dockyards, and 
Other needful buildings." 



harbor tmproifcaatnt wu MrrJcil. am) iKc n«xt year « bill ulhoriiing 
tiirv«Ts (or ■ nuionnl aaiii wu |>jv.r<l. Willi ihe aiTCufnii tif Jackmn 
Ihe tDOTvmcnl cnciiitnlcrcil «ii •i|i|iiiiietil wli'i rlicckcil tl« f utlh«r progrcw 
foreigtil jrcai*. Sevrtal <i>-cr aiii) tiarbur bills wert ptissci] b^ luccred- 
ImC CooEmiei. only lu l)c vciocrl by ilic rrcudent hoMine office. Filtlns 
im ihii Uleinpl U cilcntion ihc Dcniociittc ponr ttwU to Allnin Ihe 
withe* ol lu nuMt*. without complclcly^ tiiihlfymi; Ittcnncciit ■>( nillniial 
poircn. I>y lUtlrlliuiiii); lo ilie 4iaio tutpliis trrtnuc. Ihal public im- 
pcowiMBU mtghl W niBilr hy Ihom. A furllifr tipnntion tnme in iSso 
with the staniotpwUiclaiitlitoentourageihe building of Tiibondi ; ihii 
Wta <)uickllr f olloocd by ihc F.ovciiiiiicHUl lUivcy ai a iciad in the P»dli<, 
\vf tike deciatailim in buih paity ptniioTiiiK iliut hikIi » imltajul vh-iiiM lie 
bniU by Ihe i;(ivcrniiicnt. xml by Ihc viilinj; of Ihe ii.iliim'i rrtdil to liclji 
^•■ild it. In 1870 a riv«r ami bnrlKir bill wai made i law ; and ihougli 
that baa b«c<»i*t an annual bill, it 11 itill likely lo \,t i-ctiicil, nol 
beouiac itx cmiUitutioiiiLliiy is lon^^r debatable, but becatiw of Ihe 
"Jofat" ll cmhadiea. t'liially. lbrou|;b Iliio vrry " piMit-nwl " clauae. 
liqietlMr with Ihc |Kiwct li> re;;iiIaED commrcit. Ihc gortrnniml b]r Ihc 
tccMll JMtanlatc oommeti'v Iaw liai practically eitendrd iti conlml lo all 
raflrr^'** 'f»r the (eiidency lq coniLilidile small n»Ai into pt%\ lystcmt 
w -.} p«l IbciH all ihoiUy uiidci iKe intertlate law). Hoir 

a<>v power hat become U kIidwii by the lair " j^ivrrii incut by 

tnJDnrtioa". by the stc n| todoral (nxipa lo pr^rd taitniwlk: am) by ihv 
ronuniiag ut Ibe inii Inul law no ai to ciwlral ih« liaffk ai^cnaent* ol 
tbc railraada.— EPiTva. 




>8a 



S£.ir OF GOy£Jt.\M£NT. 



org. u .4s> 



The iadisptnsable necessity of complete authority at 
the scat of government carries its own evidence with it. 
It is u piJWKr cjcrriscd I>y every legiKlatitrc i>f IIh: Union, 
I miglit suy uf the world, by viriui; of \\% fteitenil suprem- 
acy. Without it, not only the public authority might be 
insulted »nd its proce<;tIiii]j:s interrupted with impunity; 
but a dependence o( the members o( the general govern- 
ment on Ihc St;itc comprehending tlir sciit of the govern- 
ment, for prutectiun in the exerci>c of their duty, might 
bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or 
influence, equally dishonorable to the government and 
disHstisfactury to the other members of the Confederacy. 
This consideration has the more weight, as the (jr-uhul 
accumulation uf public improvements at th« statioitary 
residence of the government would be both too great a 
public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, 
and would create so many obstacles tu a removal of the 
government as still further to abridge us necessary in- 
dependence.' The extent of this federal district is suSi- 
cicntly circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an 
opposite nature. And as it is to br appropriated to this 
U4.e with the consent of the Slate ceding it; as the Stale 
will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and 
the conKCnl of the citixens inhabiting it; as the inhabit- 
ants will find sufficient inducements of interest to t»e- 
come willing parties tn the cession; as they will have 
had ihcir voice in the election of the governracut which 
is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal 
legislature for local purposes, derived from their own 
»uffrages, will uf course be allowed them;* and as the 



' The eipcnnin of th« Congmt ot tbp Co«ifo(lerttian pnvvd Olft 
cvili of ■ tax in a tilj onr which il hxl no jiirttrliclinn. fo> wImi 
• mull pul of the rcunirlvaniB luililia mulinird in iTSj.uid thrRatcntil 
(TiMiKrcu with ri»lcni«. llic t'cikiikj tvania CuuiKil itlattA Id dm force ID 
•iU|it'rni ihr uililirn, iBil ounipcIkO tZ(iii)p<H Is KJl-i>cain:Uoa liiiidjutm 
t" iVittiBlon. — BC'lrOR. 

'A» ■ f»ci. the hiitoijp of tt»' P " • ' ■' • I'libainn bm varyiU- 
fctcn). ['■.iiici(->» )ii»ln>: fiuiiMvl 1' capital mantim^Mt 

eieiiiluMi tluili'vct ih« irirlt»iic , -- i!ic y««» rlyi-M. wlioa 

A "l«iril<iri>r' (iq-fcv of luaU »rU'|;incmiiiaui »m aUowcd to II, whldi 





rsEjtso/f. 



authDritjr of the legislature of llie StAte, and of the tn- 
hubiUnts of ilic c«ilc<i part o( tl, lo coiKur in the ccs- 
Muu, will t>c derived from tlic whole people of the State, 
in their 3(lt^>tiuii of the Constitution, every imaginable 
objection seems to be obviated. 

The necessity of a like auttiority over forts, magazines, 
etc., cstablisbcd t>y the general gnvcrnmcnt, is not less 
evident. Tlie public money expended on such placeii, 
and the public property deposited in them, require that 
they stKJuld be exempt from the authority of the parlicu- 
bir Stitte. ' Nor would it be proper (or tlie places on 
which the security of the entire Union may depend, to 
be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. 
All obiections and M:ruple!( are here also obviated by 
requiring the concurrence of the States concerned in 
every such estatihshmcnt. 

3. "To declare the punishment of treaKon, btit no 
attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or 
forfeiture, except (Uiring the life of the person at- 
tamtcd." 

As treason may be cnmmitled against the United 
States, the authority of the United States ought to be 
enabled to punish it. Hut as newfangled and artifiiial 
treasons have been the great engines by which violent 
(ai:tions, the natural offspring of free governnicnl, have 
usually wreaked their alternate malignity on eai:h other, 
tlic convention have, with great judgment, opposed a 
tiarncr to ibis peculiar danger, by inserting a constitu- 
tional definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary 
(or conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even 



wlM la the Mtndkl* ot " Bom " Sticpti«nl. Sa fai from being allowed 
MMwKl ihtjr nwB (■■nrnimnit. Im mjilcnts ur gtunlcd no •oi<e in 
nMMiM] Dkctiont onkn Ihejr diim rendcncc niid 1i»« [onucrly notcil 
ikeirtiere ; in iliat cate. ibcr may tclum to Ibai place and catl ihdr< 
rota. — EliiTUK. 

■ Ii u-u ihii nalional ouincnJiip o4 lon% ithkh allownl Budunuu to 
nmlfy ibe .Soiilli Caioliiu wsalois llial fori SuiMcr " Ivtongcd la the 
DfiiirrI Siaio. . . aixl if auaiilltJ bylbe antliDtilM* of Souih Caintlaa, 
DO ihrm >nnild rM lb« tidiuivc icipoauiliDiir of comucncln): ditl war," 

— £lll lUK. 



»«4 



NEW STATES. 



(■•.Uittl 



in punishing it, from extending the consequences of 
guilt Iteyuml the person of it» autlior. 

4. "To admit new States into the Union; but no new 
State shall t>c formed or erected withiii the jurisdiction 
of an/ other St-ite; nor any Sute b« formed by tlie 
junction of two or mure States, or parts of States, with- 
out the consent of the legislatures of (he States con- 
cerned, »8 well as o( tlie Congress." ' 



' lender Ihc liraljr ai 17BJ a UrKc tract of tinil tmiuidal b; ihe Gnat 
lain. Ihir Mivii»tpj>i,nn<I |iinilcl ]■', uioooiifitnKil ("the I'nilrilSlilei. 

tcuion vuthiitCDinplicnlHl by uiinllktiitc rljiimt. anil rvcn b]r lli« •»«• 
(lull iif cciuin ilato ihit llieic Unds Uiily |jeIoii):cil lu lb« BUloa uid 
nul lo Ihc itiHivl'loal tlaln, 'II10 •lilliiullT tun Imaltr kCMkd bv eauh 
Mate cnliiig !■> Ill* nalJun it> riebli Knd tliiinn oinililmn&l on llie Inri- 
lorf bciii^ civniualjip made Into liiatei anJ altownl to join ihr Udiou. 
Tliit poTliculat clitiw wai iiunteil in Ibe coniitilulian, tltal Ibne roo' 
dltloni mtchi be lulfiEleiL 

TlKttauM relatinj' to |K»\Mile ilimion of tli« oM Mats **■> aiidoubl- 
edly forctfl on ibc Iruncn liv ilit friincnl in Kentucky M thii lime. ifaM 
seclion tieinc then psti «( Viivlinia. altbnuich (or lour Tran il Kad been 

Krlirinninu trtiii);mt loi •tlalrliunl. S». !<■■. tin- woKni Icmlory of 
urili Carulinuhvl rvTiilicil f mm llic )iut-nl S<alf. an-1 liud tcl ill> ■ wps- 
tXit ilatebtKHl undf r the lilk n( " Franklin.' Vcrinoftl abo had xonc'l 
iu ini!c|>cn<)Fncc from New Votl. In each c*tc tbe lepilalOK ol ilie 
paicnl tule <ra> Ixuuelit 10 coiiwkI Io mkIi wpantion, and thit wu latu 
tmi' in the crMllon of ili« time of Maine. or l|>tiially a |iait (il Hataa 
thntelli. ]l truulil hare Iwen difficult, in vi«K i>f (lindane. fnr(>>nf>ma 
end the tuprcnac cmilt to nw«( lh« pouihie thmlennt diviuon ol Ne* 
VorV slate (lee p. mvi); but prnuinably ili« lIciiLilily of our coverDincat 
miutd liarc faurM viine mtaiikof Cd'Oi: "vci IhccanMJtnlloattl illftcalty. 
Tli» crvatiun of tbe Male iif VVnl Vrijpiiia .luring lli« Cliil War ■■• 
made cmiiiiiialii>n.il by ilie rnvcntion uf a legal fidkin. The forly 
irrttem or "iner-llic-lDonnijiiii connl(e«," ufaich wvtt ilrongly anionjil. 
voltd aealntl (he aRcuioii ol tbe alalc in ibe Vircini* convcntioa of 
1B61. aiid ulicu tbr (unvcnltoa |uiuol Ihc temiiun ordlMnce, tbn 
called anoiher connoiii;* and rvpvakit it. Tliey ihcn tieelanil Ihefr 
MrfUisliMi friiin ciulpm Viri;in>a. franwtl a contliluliiHi. and asLcil rrcnc. 
nitkin by Ihe Unioa. Though ihit wai Ihe very diviuoa f iiarded aealnil 
by ihit diuie. ihc ilreu ei mu ImcoJ a TctaCDitioo, wliKh waa j^itca 
on tbe qiiibWc llitl ihe lej;iil»liife of WeMcm Virginia wai iKe iejjal 
ICRnlature ul Vii|:inn. Keraaiid'i Wncnl'ii plopoiition in )Mii thai Ne" 
York city tbi'uld trcede troni the tliiion and aaike tlxil a Irce city. 
<Mct'lirrwni'i " Hiitnty of the Rebellion," p. 41), hardly filli wiiliin lb* 
(ondilioiM of Itir cliuae. for h bu eiienlially liatcil on • fiijbt of 
force and not ol law. I'lie more recent luno ralKil I'y lire MUocacy 
of a ne* ilate made up of tbe ^ivrallc.I Ne* Vork '■ mrlinfioliian di»- 
trirt," hourvet. cmtin within tbe tinrniiun ol tbe daiiie. aoil may po*- 
tilbly prodocc a cnnuitalional qiMMKin in Ihe fiilnre. 

to Ibia ctavM tbe liamen Miade no provitiou (ut tbe acqvbhiim ol to- 




Mtdiani ADMISSION OF BRITIStt COLONIES. 



In the articles of Confederation, no provision is found 
on this impormnt subject. Omaila wr.it> to b« admitted 
of right, on her joining in the measures of the United 
Sutcs; and the other <^onUs, bjr which were evidently 
meant the othrr llritish colonies, at the discretion of 
nine States. The eventual establishment of new Stattt 
seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of that 
instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of this 
omission, and the assumption of power into which Con* 



rtlOTy by ifce Ualoe, ukI iliit kinncc oveni);lii ciu>«>l JdlmMin i^nM 
tiiib«nu*flisn1 wbm (h« pucrliiut n? IjniiiiHii.-i w^i nrrani^. for in hU 
ovn vonlt. M amle " nitilc paper " of (he co^^li1llIioIl. nnd lip wrni lo 
fit M lodrafl *n juntniimrnl to Ihp con*lilulion (wc Api-cmlii [>. 686). 
•lollBG with uhil be ui*l inLv " (he i^vc «( a i^uifilmn. ^nvotinjj the 
iiirin«y <>f hit wiril \ii puri'liitin^ mi Titiixirr^inl 3r3|:ii'riit Irtrifnry ; lAving 
10 him mkeii 'A figf. ' I di<l llin for ymir i;i""l: [ iirrtrml lo ncv rifjhl lo 
bind your ^u nuy diuirov ni«."' Some of ihc noriherrn lilies, which 
liW In Ihii ■dititioii o( lemlory n dcitniclioii of hB)iiiii:e belwftii tlie 
nritth aii'l wiilh. iinilnlril nj^xin'il the ai''{iiiiiiliiiii ; liul, »\ » fad. it oat 
frvptii the Itrrit'iry v< tccntnl lh«t (hdW lllHt'l'^t'^^^^ll iitin wrn crtalcd 
which veic ereiituAlly (o ^ivr political Mipmrmry lo the nonh in the 
wclioiia] itotnal iSici-iabu. In lime Ihe wutll <«mc lo tc«Iui! IhU. 
*nil valiiljr hmeIM. t>y the Mriicxn fat aaiX l>y the progioteit |<iir^A<>c ol 
Culi^i, ti> cMtnltfFtCt the rr-Hiilt, Siiit:r Uic ai^rpiKi1i<)n of l..n(ii>iiHna. con- 
ttant ■'Milion* hare bnrn iiiii<tc (•> uur Irrritory. Ill by {<«rmittiii|; faiejgn 
cooniriH to b«cunie ^ai« (Texas) ; (1) by conqucil (CalilorniB. etc.); 
(•d(Ohy (lunhaie (Aliika). 

A iu );iavcr conitilulkinal difficulty, for which Ihe (ninrn likririM 
■Hi no conttilidiniul pmiiiion, w the 'liiiini'l (ulinr |<m\i hi lily that 
Ihmogh Ml uniurrrvidil war thrir may c'ime n necrtiily lor the ccdinc 
ol lerritoty. Gteal Britain allcmpleH to nhuin this in 1S14, by demand- 
ini; nol ncrely the cieaiion of a neiitml Indian leniloiy in the itM. but 
CTOi tlie joining to Caniula of p«n> it Maine and New York. Vrl Imlh 
ibna lalirt iccliunt wcc* th« |tro|<crly ol ihv *tnle\, and nnl if Ihe nntion. 
and therefore it b dilKcull to lee bow nny cenion uf ihem could have 
bt«B made by treUJ, Aould our necrttitiei have compelled the Mccpt- 
•nee of tbe lemi. A* yei we tlill poueu leiiiinry owned Iiy ihe naiimt. 
■hlch mtgfcl lie legally albrnaleit, Inil lite time ik nnl fat iliunnl nhon all 
the imitiviet will he ttalrt. l'r*Kuniplit-ely. Ihe nntioit coaU llieii only 
■ect a demand foe ktritntiil ceaiion 117 illowing the foreign country Id 
take posBmion of Ihe lerrilory. leaving il solely to (he Male lo protect 
ilicll, much at New England wai Icfl to %ecii[e iltetl in llie War •>! iHig. 
T¥ro alg^nllicant fact* are (he claiite in the arllilo '>( Cnninlrcaliim 
"" thai nn ilaie tlialt lie dtpriroilof tcrriKiry fiT thir hcnrfil if tlie United 
Sutet."*bich wai omit led in the federal conttitution. and the agreement 
istheAthbunofi treaty o4 tS4J rMpeciine the diiputcdbnnndnty between 
Itnttih Amerk* and Maine, by which land claimed by the latter waieon- 
lirnRl In Gnat Rritain, and Maine wat pecuniarily liidcninilieil foi (tie 
Im*.— EMTOIt. 




986 



IVESTESN TEKRtrokY. 



grcss have b«n led by iL Wiih great pnipriciy, ihcre- 
fftre, has the new system siijipltcd llie defect. The 
general precaution that iio new States shall be formed, 
without the coDcurrcRCc of the federal autboriiy and 
thAt of the States concerned, is conHonant to the prin- 
ciples which ought to ^[overn such traosactiona. The 
particular precaution against the erection of new States^ 
by the ])artition of a State without its consent quiets the 
jealou^y of the larger Slates, as iliat of the intaller is 
quieted by a like precaution against a junction of States 
without their consent.* 

5. "To dispose of and make all needful rules and 
regulations respecting the territory or other property 
belonging to the United States, with a proviso, that 
nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as to 
prejudice any claims of the United Stales, or of any par- 
ticular State." 

This is a power of very great importance, and required 
by considcnitions simitar to those which show the pro- 
priety of the former. The proviso annexed is proper in 
itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necrssarjl 
by jealousies and (juestions concerning Uic Western 
territory sufficiently known to the public. 

6. "To guarantee to every State in the Union a 




* In 1799 Aleunder HsmiltoM, in nMliaivE aliat be thauglil (he 
Fn1vrali%i pulky tltouM be, «nilc : " «ap|^ nonUI il l>c Jl a cluas*" 
cniiM Im nidn] lo lh« cmitliliilixn. •twblin]' ConptB, on ilic ii)-|ill<'Aiii<i» \ 
of lay ransiilctahl* pnitioa of a il>l« CDSUuning nol len lliui a howlml 
llioaund pertuns. (o crrct n inio ■ >c|MirBic Mate, on lh« cMiiliiina <A 
■iiini; ihc ijwoia of conlribmiont which n iball mtkc Knranli aniccolenl 
ilcbra, l( aiif th«n iJuiU lie, ivwtrvinK lo Confcm* il>c uilintliy lu levy 
wilhia vpcli Male llic (nxn acvenajy lo the psTment »( such rgiola. ta 
i-u« lA iwf;l«i:i on Ihe put uk ibc tiaie. The nibiliviiMii al Uie errU . 
ttAi« it indispciiuhle lo ibe aecviitr or Uie ii«*enl xm-ernnienl. aadJ 
wiltt il of llie Union. Omi ttaln wiil al*ar* ''c' * 'irabhip «tlh 1 
lh« cuiiunuM licail, mill oltcn be Mip)H»cil lo iiia<:Iiiii9lc acunu il. auil la < 
i«itain liliutkirtt ullt t>r al't* lo •!" il "itli ilniilTC edixl. l*li> tut'- ' 
ilivision of Htih tUtn »<iehl to h« a laHins) |<<iant in lliir (nifnl foliiT \ 
•ixltaull tialos aic iloubllai ailililed (» llir piupoiM of liini] triptlallm 
■lid lo tlic picsrtvalioa of llic rT|iublitaii tpirii. Tliu uibie'm 
cvef, n mctclr tkrnwa onl for cooiUciallna. Il i> (p*rM tb- 1 

ba faicxpeUenl au-l even ilauiictuai i» pn,|>oac, al Uia tine, -■' .»iti.i,u- 



■idimol 



MONARCHICAL INKOVATIONS. 



a, 



republktan form of government; to proU'ct racli of Ihcm 
aguin!^! invasion; and on a|i{>lir.*itiun uf ttic I i;{;i stature, 
ur of the Gxccaiive (when the Icgisliiiure cannot be con- 
vened), against liomcslic violence." 

In a coiifcOeracy founded ou republican prim^iples, 
and con)p4>!icd of republican members, the itupcrinlcud- 
ing government ought clearly to possess authority to 
defend the system against aristocratic or m(in<irctiical 
innovalionSu The mure intimate the nature of such a 
union may be, the greater interest have the members in 
the pohltcal tnstilutiiins of ciich other: and the greater 
rit:h( to insist that the formt of governmeul under 
which the compact was eniercd into should be lud- 
itantially maintained. But a right implit's a remedy; 
and where else could the remedy be deposited than 
where it is dcjiosited by the Constitution? Govcrn- 
mentt of diMimilar jKinciples and forms have been 
found lesft adapted lu a federal coalition of any sort 
than those of a kindred nature. "As the confederate 
republic of Cjcrmany," says Montesquieu, "consists of 
free cities and petty slates, subject to diflcrcnt princes, 
experience shows us that it is more imperfect than 
lh;it of Holland and Switzerland." "Greece was 
undone," he ailds, "as soon as the king of Macedon 
obtained a seat among the Amphictyons." In the latter 
case, no doubt, ilie disproporiiunate force, as well as the 
monarchical form, of the new confederate, had its share 
of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, 
what need there could be of such a precaution, and 
whether it may not become a pretext (or ulteralions in 
the State governments, without the concurrence of the 
Slates themselves. These questions admit of ready 
answers. If llie interposition of the general government 
should not be needed, the provision for such an event 
will be a harmless sopcrHuity only in the Constitution. 
But who can say what e.'ipcriments may be produced by 
Itie i3ipricc of particular States, by the ambition of enter- 
(trising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of 
foreign powers? To the second question it may b« 



I 





PBDBXAL PROTECTtON. Ubk4ICU> 

answered that, if tlie general K^vernracnt iilioulil inter* 
fiose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will 
be of course bound to pursue the uuthority. But the 
authority extends no further tlun to a guaranty of a 
republican form of government, which supposes a pre- 
existing government of the form which is lo be guaran- 
teed. As lonj;, therefore, as the existing republican 
forms arc continued by the States, they are guaranteed 
by the federal Constitution. Whenever the States m^y 
chouse to substitute other republican forms, tJiey have 
a ri(;ht to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for 
the latter. The only restriction impoMd on tlicm is 
that they shall not exchange republican for anii-republi* 
can constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, 
will hardly be considered as a grievance. 

A protection against invasion is due from every society 
to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression 
here used teems to secure each State, not only against 
foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive 
enterprises of its more powerful iteighbors. The history 
botii of ancient aiul modern confederacies proves that 
the weaker members of the union ought not to be insensi- 
ble to the policy of (his article. 

I'rntcction against domestic violence is added wit)) 
equal propriety. It has been remarked that, even among 
the Swiss cantons, which, properly speaking, are not 
under one government, provision is made for this object; 
and the history of that league informs us that rauinal aid 
is frequently claimed an<l alforded; and as well by the 
must democratic as the other cantons. A recent and 
well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be 
prepared for emergencies of a like nature.' 

At first view, it might seem not to square with llie 
republican theory to suppose either that a majority have 
not the right, nr that a minority will have the force to 
subvert a government; and consequently, thai the federal 
interposition can never be required but when it would 

* Shiyt'* RibeltJon.— CnrroR. 



MadiMM] 



STKENGTH OF MINORITY. 



.89 



be improper. But theoretic r«a3onin£, in this as in most 
other cases, must be qnalifirif \iy the lessuns of practice. 
Why muy nut ilhcit combiiuiion.s lor purposes of vio- 
leuce be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially 
a small State, as by a majority of a cimnty, or a district 
of the same State, and if the authority of the Stale ought, 
in the latter case, to protect the local magistracy, ought 
not the feilcnil authority, in the; former, to support the 
Stale authority? Besides, there are certain parts of 
the State constitutions which arc so interwoven with the 
federal Cionstitution that a violent hloiv tannot be given 
to the one without communicating the wound to the 
other. Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a 
federal intcrjiosttion, iiiilea;< the number concerned in 
them bear some proportion to ihc friends of government. 
It will be much better that the riutcncc in such cases 
should b« repressed by the superintending power than 
that the tnajnrity should be ]eft to maintain their cause 
by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a 
right to interpose will generally prevent the necessity of 
exerting it. 

Is it true that force and right arc necessarily on the 
same side in republic^m governmi;nis? May not the 
roinur party possess such a superiority of pecuniary 
resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret 
succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior 
also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more com- 
pact and advantageous position turn the scale on the 
same side, against a superiitr number sn situated as to be 
less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its 
strength? Nothing can be more chimerical than to 
imagine that, in a trial of actual force, victory may be 
calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the 
inhabitants, or which determine the event of an ctectiont 
May it not happen, in fine, tluit the minority nf ciTizsris 
may become a majority of pf.ksons, by the accession of 
alien residents, of a c.isual concourse of adventurers, or 
of those whom the constitution of the State has not 
admitted to the rights of suUrage? I take no notice of 




99« 



QVELUMG msujtJtEcrtoy. 



r>«.4a<49> 



an untiappif specieti of population abounding in &omc u( 
the States, who, (luring the calm of regular guvrrnmcnt, 
3r« sunk I)ctow thr Irvvl of men; l>ut wlm, in ttir tem- 
pestuous scenes of civil violence, may ciner£e into the 
human character and give a superiont)- of strength to 
any p:irty n-iih which thoy may astociate themselves.' 

In ta>es where it may be doubtful on which side justice 
lies, what better umpires could be drsired by two violent 
fiicliiins, flying to arms and teiirtuK a State to pieces 
than the representatives of confederate Stales, not heated 
by tlir local flame? To tite impartiality of judges, they 
woulil unite the affection of friends. Happy would it t>e 
if such a remedy for its infirmities could be enjoyed by 
all free governments; if a project equally effectual could 
be established for the univental peace of mankind! 

Should it be asked, what ia to be the redress (or an 
insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a 
superiority of the entire force, though not a constitutional 
right? the answer must be that such a case, as it would 
be without the compass of human remedies, so it is for- 
tunately not within the compass of human protnbilily: 
and th^t it is a sufficient recommendation of the federal 
Constitution that it diminishes the risk of a calamity for 
which no possible constiltitton can provide a cure. 

Among the advantages of a confederate republic 
enumerated by Montesquieu an important one is, " that 
should a popular insurrection happen tn one of the States, 
the others are able to quell iL Should abuses creep 
into one part, they are reformed by those that remain 
sound." 

7. "To consider all debts contracted, and engagements 
entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, ts 
t>eing no less valid against the United Stales, under tins 
Constitution, than undtr the Confederation." 

This can only be considered as a declaratory proposi- 
lion; and may have been inserted, among other reasons 
for the satisfaction of the foreign creditors of the United 



'AaaUiuion tolhv loathera >!■«««. — Euitos 



A 



3 AAfEXOMEXTS. 49' 

Stat<rs, who rannot b« strangers to the prctcndcj doctrine 
that J change in the political (onn of civil society has the 
rnagical effect of dis^olvins its moral obligations. 

Among the lesser criticisms which have been exercised 
on th« ComtitutiAii, it has been remarked that the 
validity of entiaiiccments ought to have been asserted in 
favor of the United States as well as against them; and 
in the spirit which usually characterizes little critics, the 
omission has been transformed and magnified into a plot 
against the national rights. The authors of this discov- 
ery may be I'lld, what few others nerd to be informed of, 
that, as engagements arc in iheir nature reciprocal, an 
assertion of their validity on one side necessarily involves 
a validity on the other side; and that, as the article is 
merely declaratory, the establishment of the principle in 
one case is sufficient for every c,isc. They may be further 
told that every constitution must limit its precautions to 
danfrertt that are not altogether imaginary; and that no 
real danger can exist that the government would dabh, 
with or even without this constitutional declaration 
before it, to remit llie detits justly due to the public, an 
the pretext here condemned. 

8. " To provide for amendments to be ratified by three- 
fourths of the States, under two exceptions only." 

Th.it useful alterations will be suggested by experience 
could not but be foreseen. It was rcijuisite, therefore, 
that a mode fur introducing them should be provided. 
The mode preferred by the convention seems to be 
stamped with every m.irk of propriety. It gviards etjually 
against that cxtrnmi; facility which would render the 
Constitution loo mutable, and that extreme difficulty 
which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It, more- 
over, equally enables the general and the State govern- 
ments to originate the amendment of errors, as they may 
be pointeil out by the experience on one iiide or on ilie 
other. The exception in favor of the equality of suffrage 
in the Senate was probably meant as a palladium to the 
residuary suvi^reignty of the Slates, implied and secured 
by that principle of representation in one branch of the 




«9« 



RA riFlCA Tiotr, 



aM.4St«fl 



legislature; and was probably insisted on by the Stairs 
particularly attached tu that cqiialily. The other excep- 
tion must hare been admitted on the same considerations 
which produced the privilege defended by it." 

9. "The ratilicatioR of the convention of nine States 
(hall t>e KiifRcieiit for the establishment of this Constiiu* 
tion between the States, ratifying the same." 

This article speaks for itself. Tbe expreits authority 
of the people alone could give due validity to the Consti- 
tution. To have required the unanimous ratilicalion of 
the thirteen States vrould have subjected the euentia) 
interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a 
single member. It would have marked a want of fore- 
sight in the convention which our own experience would 
have rendered inexcusable. 

Two questions of a very delicate nature present 
themselves on this occasion: i. On what principle the 
Cnnfedemtion, which stands in the solemn form of a 
. compact amonK the State*, can be superseded without tbe 
unanimous consent of the ^rtics to it.> i. What rcla- 
tifin is to subsist between the nine or more States ratify- 
ing the Constitution and the remaining few who do not 
become parlies to it? 

The first question is answered at once by recurring to 
the absolute necessity of the case: to the jcreat principle 
of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of oatare 
:ind of tuiture's God, which declares lluit the safety and 
happiness of society arc the objects at which all political 
institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must 
be sacrificed. PiiKilArs, also, an answer nuiy be found 
withoat .learchinjc beyond the principles of the compact 
itself. It has been hereto/ore noted among the defects 
of the Confederntion that in many of the States it bad 
received no higher sanction than a mere IcgisLaiivc ratifi- 
cation. ' The principle of reciprocality seems to require 



' A hnlory a( the vnrioii- 1 - ^flll RitcmpW hi 

ftmeihl ili« [oii^iiiutioii wlJI F-uni'B 

''Die 1*1:11 o( aBrlinrily t>l mr .mr jr^-ninLn.-n :•! jjiif.i Uie arllriM 
4il coulcJcrallou wtlhtHil uilmuliiiB ihrm In Uic (wupla wat diie u{ 



MjUiMnl 



VAUDtTY OF COMPACT. 



193 



that its obligation on the other Slates should be reduced 
tij tile «;iine sdindard. A compact between indepen- 
dent Mivercicrut, founded on ordirary acts o{ legisla- 
tive authority, can pretend to no hishcr validity than a 
league or treaty between the parties. It is an estab> 
bshed doctrine on the subject a( treaties, that all the 
articles are mtitually conditions of each other; that a 
breach of any one article is a breach of (he whole treaty; 
and that a breach, committed by either of the parties, 
absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, 
to pronounce the comi>act violated and void. Should it 
unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths 
(or a jiistilication for dispensing with the consent of par- 
ticubr States to a dissolution of the federal pact, will 
not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to 
answer the Mt;i.TiPLit:D and iupuktant infractions with 
which they may be confronted? The time has been when 
it was incumbent on uft all to veil the ideas which this 
paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed, and 
with it the part which the same motives dictate. 

The second question \& not less delicate; and the 
flattering prospect of its being merely hypothetical for- 
bids an over-curious disrussion i>i it. It is one of those 
cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general 
it may be observed that, although no political relation 
eun subsist between the assenting and dissenting States, 
yet the moral relationit will remain uncanceled. The 
claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will 
be in force and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity 
must in all ca&es be duly and muinuily rt^spected; whilst 
considerations of a common interest, and, above all, the 
remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past* 



ihc liindiBiFuta] ohfcctlaii* niEwd ainon); ihr ihouKhtdil in*ii nf ihs 
llin*. Aiul v> crarral wh Ibe i«ic>it;n<tion lh«i ■ ttilr IccUlainra 
coalil ni« ulufil or lerminiiti! ihc txlcr Icdriil coinpacl. (hal South Cjiro- 
lias in |8;1 and i860, tnd ill ihc olher umlhcm ililn which wMdrd, 
dMiiml tcieiiion tlimush cnevcntkins of Ibe peojile - ihui my (fffClD- 
tii) ilttiirnfiiiE whal they were tlieii Ityiii]- 10 niaiiitain. tbal Ihe Uilv 
(■uvarnnMiati were Hivcrri)-!!, — EnirOK. 




and liir .inlicipatinn of a spcrdf trtampit over the 
obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain 
uoDKKATiON un ouc Side, and prudckce on the other.' 

PUBLIl't. 



No. 44 [43]. (.VtwVirtnKirt.fao^^ttu.) Madison. 

RESTRICTIVE POWERS ON THE STATES. 

fpriijjinf Ihi iilaMitimm »f Irt^liti aaJ alliaiutt htt^ttn Ihi 
ilatti — tiiuti tf Itltrri tf manfut — Cn'Ma^ ef nitwf — llint ef iillt e/ 
trrJil — Krtahliiimtitl a/ any legal tttidtr tthtr than g»U a»J tiltfr — 
BiUi a/ atlaindtr — Kx fmt /atla laan—Lttwi imfaihmt tpHtratli — 
7YA!ri 0/ itftiAty- — /mfciitiim »/ ifHiui on ri/vrli and im^vrli — Tht 
f^mr t» matt all lawt mtfiiarf ohJ piaftr la tartj Ikt frt<t<Smt 
psTttri inU txtetitiaif—h'tiemiyafttKk afatrtr'^PifhtHlitii »/ lit 
extnitt afoHj- fatftrf m/l fxprtiify dtttgatrd — P»rilivf tnunfralitit »f 
pntral fotetri JeltgaltJ^Nrpitivt fHumtralian i* tfrtifitafian a/ '*• 
ttrvtit fawm aini if liltittt — Rrairdy far am atmr ef tkit gfirral 
favcrr — Thf lufirrmaiy af Ikt tatuMuHam, ikf taattilulitnal latrt. and 
triti/irt—OiUi tf iMU and /tJeraJ cffifttt la lufpatt latutituliam — ^a 
fart af tki fiiKri dtligatiJ uaa^^aiary ar iiafn^r. 

Ta tit People of Iht State of New York: 

A fifth class of provisions in favor of the feilcral 
authority consists of the following restrictions on the 
aiiihoritjr of the several States: 

I. " No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or 
confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin 
money; emit hilh of credit; make nnylliiiie Imt golO and 
silver a legal tender in payment of debts; pass any bill 
of attainder, rx fwsl faete law, or bw impairing the obli- 
4{alion nf <:ontrart«; or grant any title of nubility." 

The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and con- 



' N«nh CiroliM U1I Rhixfe hlaad did n'li adopl iIm rriltrB) oMUUft- 
linn until llieiiew t^vcnuncol lud henivimc months hn>p*m'"it ri»H im» 
IlicrH'itP, i*i.linwiil!» kjiiTililue. (<it umr time «l ol thp IJr.i.m, Th« 
I ; ' 111 In \ift fd'ol I" * I . ' !' ' ' to ili«- 

111 <'ilt»BKV1KTIJ AX liT ' I iiim|ilc 

... :.,., k „^ be d iuneiubcictl aiul , — .•^ -..Mie t«HI 

(lain.— Eul TOR. 



STATES AND COINAGE. 



»95 



federations makes a part of the existinf; articles of Union ; 
and for reasons which need no explanation, is copied into 
the new Oinsiitutiun. Tlic prohibition o( letters of 
marque is another part of the old system, but is some* 
what extended in the new. According to the former, 
Ivtters of inarque could he granted by the Slates after a 
declaration of war; accordinf; to the latter, these licenses 
must be obUiined, as well during war as previous to its 
declaration, from the government of the United States. 
1'his alteration is fully justified by the advantage of uni- 
formity in all points whi<:h relate to foreign powers; and 
u( immediate retpoiisibility to the nation in all thuM for 
whose conduct the nation itself is to be responsible. 

The right of coining money, which is here taken from 
Uie .States, was left in their hands by the Confederation, 
as a concurrent right with that of Congress, under an 
exception in favor of the exclusive right of Congress to 
regul.ile the allny and value. In this instance, also, the 
new provision is an improvement on the old. Whilst the 
alloy and value depended on the general authority, a 
right of coinage in the particular States could have ntt 
other effect than to multiply expensive mints and 
diversify the forms and weights of the circulating )>icccs. 
The latter inconvenicncy defeats tine purpose fur whii'h 
the power was originally submitted to the federal head; 
and as far as the former might prevent an inconvenient 
remittance of gold and silver to the centra) mint for re- 
coinage, the end can be as well attained by local mints 
Cktalilis^ed under the general authority. 

The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit mu.ti 
give pleasure to every citiicn, in proportion to his love 
of justice and his knowledge of the (rue springs of public 
prosperity. The loss which America h.is sustained since 
the peace, from the pestilent effects of paper money on 
ilie necessary confidence between man and man, on the 
necessary confidence in the public councils, on the in- 
, dustry and morals of the people, and on the chamclcr of 
'rcpubticfin i;uvernnient, constitutes an enomiuus debt 
against tlic States chargeable with this unadvised measure^ 




196 



STATES AND PAPER MOXEY. 



t>a.M;Ui 



whiuh must long remain ti nsattsfied ; or rather anaccumu- 
Utioo of guilt, wliich can be expiated no otherwise ttian 
bjr a Tolanlary lacrince on the altar »f justice of the 
power which hai been the insirumcnt of ii. In addition 
to these persuasive considerations, it majr iic observed 
that the same rcnxons which show the necessity of deny- 
ing to the Slates the power of regulating coin prove 
with equal force that they ought not to be at liberty to 
substitute a paper mediuin in the place of coin. Had 
every State a right to regulate the value of its coin, 
there might be as many diRercnt currencies as States, 
and thus the intercourse among them would l>c impeded; 
retrospective alterations in its value might be made, and 
thus the citizens of other States be injured, and animosi- 
ties be kindlf.d among the Slates themselves. 'I'he sub- 
jects of foreign powers might suffer from the same cause, 
and hence the Union be discredited and embroiled by 
the indiscretion of a single member. No one of these 
mischiefs is 1e«s incident to a power in the States to 
emit paper money than to coin gold or silver. The 
poirer to make anything t>ut gutd and stiver a tender in 
payment of debts is withdrawn from the States, on the 
same principle witli that of issuing a jiapcr currency. ' 

Bills of attainder, *x p«st Jaeto l.iws, and laws impairing 
the obligation of contracts, arc contrary to the first 
principles of the social compact and tu every principle 
of sound legislation. The two former are expressly pro- 
hibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the State 
constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the 
spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our 
own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that addi- 
tional fences against these d.-ingers ought not to be 
omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the convention 
added this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal 
security and private rights; and I am much deceived if 
they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the 



■ Sm UuiFTDd't " ries tot Ike t^iuiltotlM " fo* * Utlory of UOi of 



iJffl 



b<b<ml 



SrA TBS AKD IMPOSTS. 



a97 



genuine sentiments as the undoubted interests of their 
constituents. The sober people of America arc weiiry 
of the fluctuating puticy whirh has directed the public 
coancJIs. They have seen with regret and indignation 
that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in 
cases affecting |)urso(t;d rights, become jobx in the hands 
of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to 
the more industrious and less informed part uf the com- 
niunit)r. They have seen, too, that one lejEisiaiive inter- 
ference is hut the first hnk of a long chain of repetitions, 
every subsequent interference being natunilly prudiiced 
by the eSectsof the preceding. They very rightly infer, 
therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which 
will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a 
general prudence and industry, and give a rcRular course 
to the business of society. The prohibition with respect 
to titles of nobility is copied from the articles of Con- 
federation, and needs no comment. 

a. "No Slate shall, without the consent o( the Coi»- 
grcss, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, 
except what may be absolutely necessary for executing 
its inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties and 
imposts laid by any State on imports or exports, shall 
be for the use of the trea.'iury of the United States; 
and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and 
control of the Congress. No State shall, without the 
consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep 
troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any 
agreement or compact with another Stale, or with a 
foreign power, or engage in war unless actually in* 
raded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of 
delay." 

The restraint on the power of the States over imports 
and exports is enforced by alt the arguments which prove 
the oeressity of submitting the regulation of trade to the 
federal councils. Il i« needless, therefore, to remark 
further on this head than that the manner in which the 
restraint is (|u.-)lirir<l Keem» well calculated at once to 
secure to the States a reasonable discretion in providing 




ElfABLmC CLAUSE, 

for the ronvcnicDcy of (heir imports and exports, and tc 
tbe United Statcit a reasunnblc check against the abui 
of this discretion. The rcmainiitg |Mrticiit:irs "f this 
clauu (all within reasonings which are cither mi oUrious, 
or have been su fully developed, that ihey may be passed 
over without remark. 

The ii»fh and last class consists of the several iwwcrs 
and provisions by which eRii^cy is given to alt the rest. 

I. Of these the first is the "power to mate all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the foregoing powers and all other powers 
vested by this Constitution in the guvernntrnt of the 
United States, or in any department or officer thereof," 

Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with 
more inieinpL'rance than this; yet, on a fair investigation 
iif it, no part can appear more completely invulnerable. 
Without the suf-itaHif of this power, the whole Constitu- 
tion would be a dead letter. Those who object to the 
article, therefore, as a part of tbe Constitution, can only 
mean that the /otfi of the provision is improper. But 
have they considered whether a better form could have 
been substituted.* 

There arc four other possible methods which the Con- 
stilulinn might have taken on this subject. They might 
have copied the second article of the existing Coiift^dera*^ 
lion, which would have prohibited the exercise of any 
power not i-jr/fru/r delegated; Ihcy might have allempled 
a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended 
under the general terms " necessary and proper": they 
might have attempted a negative enumeration of them, 
by specifying the powers excepted from the general 
definition; they might have been altogether silent on Ihr 
subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers tn 
construction and inference. 

Had the convention taken the first method of adopting 
the second article of Confederation, it is evident that the 
new Congress would be continually exposed, as theirj 
predecessors have been, to the alternative of vnnstnitni 
|hc term *' exfrttily " with SO mach rigor as to disarm 



ENUMERATtOff OF POWERS. 



399 



ifae gOTernmcnt of all real aitlhnrity witalcver, or with 
&o tniich latitude as to destroy ulto^ether ihe force of 
the rcBtrictioo. It would be easy to show, if it were 
uecessar)-, thut no imporlant power, dclcgnted by the 
articles of Confederation, has been or can be executed 
by Congress, without recurring more or less to the doc- 
trine of (onitrHflhH or imjtlteatwm. As the powers dele- 
gated under the tvcw system are more extensive, the 
government which is to administer it would find itself 
xttll more di»tres!ted with the aliernattve of helT;iying the 
public interests by doint; nothing, or of violating the 
Constitution hy exercising powers indispensably neces- 
sary and proper, but, at the same time, not txpreuly 
granted. 

Mad the convention attempted a positive enumeration 
of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their 
other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved 
a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the 
Constitution relates; accommodated, too, not only to the 
existing state of ihings, but to all the possible changes 
which futurity may produce; for in every new application 
f>f a general power. \he parli,ufar fimfrt, which arc the 
means of attaining the ah/eft of the general power, must 
always necessarily vary with tlwt object, and be often 
properly varied while the object rem.-iins the same. 

Had they attempted to enumerate the particular 
powers or means not necessary or proper for carrying 
(he general powers into execution, the task would have 
been no less chimerical; and would have been liable to 
this further objection, that every defect in the enumera- 
tion would have been e<|uivalcnt to a puttiiive grant of 
authority. If, to avoid this consequence, they had 
attempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions, and 
described the residue by the general termfi, not neettsary 
or proper, it must have happened that the enumeration 
would comprehend a few of the excepted powers only; 
tltat these would be such as would be lea^t likely to be 
assnincd or tolerated, because the enumeration would 
of cotrne select such as would be least necessary or 



300 



NISCONSTRVCTiON OF POWERS. [■•.44<«) 



proper: atid thai the unnecessary and improper powers 
in<:1udc<l in the resiiliiiim would he lesx rurtiUljr ex- 
cepted than If no partial enufncration had been made. 

(lad the Constitution been silent on this head, there 
ctM lie nu (tuubl thut ull the purticiilur powerit re(|Uisite 
as mcjins of executinff the general powers would have 
resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication. 
No axiom is more cleiirly exlahlished in law, nr in reuun, 
than that wherever the end is required, the means are 
autliorizcd; wherever a general power to do a thing is 
given, every |Kirtii;uliir [Kiwer nc<re»9jiry for doing it is 
included. Kad this last method, thcrerore, been pursued 
by the convention, every objection now urged against 
their plan would remain in all ttd^ plausibility; und the 
real inconvcnicncy would be incurred of not removing 
a pretext which may be sciied on critical occasions for 
drawing into question the essential powers of the 
Union. 

If it be askc<l what is to be tlie consequence, in case 
the Congress shall iniscon»lruc this piirt of the Cunslito- 
tioD, and exercise powers not warranted by its true roe»n- 
ing, 1 answer, the same as if they should misconsinic or 
enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the general 
power had been reduced to particulars, and any one nf 
these were to be violated; the same, in short, as if the 
State Ivgisliitures should violate their respective constItU' 
tional authorities. In the first instantc, the success of 
the usurpation will de^iend on the executive and judiciary 
departments which are to expound and give effect to 
the legislative acts; and in the last resort a remedy 
must l)c obtained fn>ni the people, who can, by the elec- 
tion of more faithful represenLitivcs, anntd the acts of 
the usurpers. The truth is that this ultimate redress 
may be mnrc confided in against unconstitutional acts of 
the federal tlian of the State legislatures, for this plain 
reason, that as every such act of the former will be an 
invasion of the rights of the latter, ihcte will be ever 
ready to mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the 
people, and to exert tlieir locsl influence in efia:iui| a 



1U«M«) 



COysTITUTIOS SUPREME LAW. 



301 



cliatiKe of federal representatives.' There being no 
such iatermeOiatc buily between the Suite tegJKtatiires 
and the people ioteresled in watching the conduct of the 
former, violations of the State constitutions arc more 
likely to remain unnoticed and unreilreised. 

>. "Tilts Cuiutiiution and the laws of the United 
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, nnd all 
treaties made, or which shall be made, nnder the auihor- 
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme law of 
the land, and the judges in every SLite shall be bound 
thereby, anythinfc in the constitution or taws of any 
State to the contrary notwithstanding." 

The tndi.-Kreet xeal of the adversaries to the Constitu- 
tion has betrayed them into au attack on this part of it 
Im also, without which it woiiht have been evi- 

Ho.St. dently and radically defective. To be fully 

sensible of this, we need only suppose for a moment that 
the supremacy of the Slate constitutions had been left 
complete by a Mving ilausc in their favor. 

In the first place, as these constitutions invest the 
State legislatures with absolute sovereignty, in all cases 
not excepted by the exiKtirig nnic]e& of Confederation, 
all the authorities contained in the proposed Constitu- 
tion, so far as they exceed those enumerated in the 
Confederation, would have been annulled, and the new 
Congress would have been reduced to the same impotent 
condition with their predecessors. 

In the next place, as the con«tttatton« of some of the 
States do not even expressly and fully recognize the 
existing powers o( the Confederacy, av, express saving of 
the supremacy of the former would, iu .^udi Slates, have 
brought into question every power contained in the pro- 
posed Constitution. 

In the third place, as the constitutions of the Slates 
differ much from each other, it might happen that a 
treaty or nationat law, of great and equal importance to 

' (If [« Mailiu-n pnijioifil Ihr vprjr counc pvruiH by the Vrrcinti iikI 
KcnlDckT iFcUlmliim ill i;')S-^. and by the Coiuiecunl aiu Musa- 
dMMti* IcgitlMiiret la iSit-14. — Eorroit, 



■ 






30" SUPPORT OP CONSTlTUTIOlf. IIto.M<4S» 



the SUttrs, woutil interfere with some and not with ollirr 
const it til ions, and would conticciucntly be valid in some 
of the State!), at the ume time that it would have no 
effect in others. 

In line, the world would have seen, for the first time, 
a system of government founded on an inversion of the 
fundamental principles of all government; it would have 
seen the authority of the whole society everywhere sul>- 
ordinatc to the authority of the parts; il would have 
seen a monster, in which the head was under the direc- 
tion of the mKmt>er!i. 

3. " The Senators and Representatives, and the mem- 
bers of the several State let^isLttures, and all executive 
and judiciiil oflicers, both of the United Sl.ile» and the 
several States, shall be bound by oatli or aflirmatioD to 
support this Constitution." 

it has been asked why it wag thought necessnry that 
the State magistracy should l>e bound to support the 
federal Constitution, and unnecessary that a like oath 
should be im{>osed on the officers uf the United States, 
in favor of the State constitutions. 

Several reasons mi^ht be assigned for the distinction. 
I content myself with one, which is obvimis and com lu- 
sire. The members of the federal government will have 
no agency in carrying the State constitutions into clleci. 
The members and officers of the Stste governments, on 
the contrary, will luve an essential agency in giving 
effect to the federal Constitution. The election of tlie 
President and Senate wilt depend, in all cases, on the 
legiitlaiures of the several States. And the election of 
the House of Reprcscotalivcs will equally depend on the 
same authority in the first instance; and will, probably, 
forever be conducted by Uie officers, and according t" 
the laws, of the States. 

4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the 
federal powers might be added iliose which bching to the 
executive and judiciary departments; but as these are 
reserved for particular examination in another place, 1 
jiASS tbem over in this. 




NATIONAL POWER AND STATES. 



30J 



I 



We have now revicwcti, id detail, all the arlicies com- 
{>t>siDg the sum or quantity of power dclegiitcd hy the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government, and 
are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part 
uf the power is unnecessary or improper for accomplish* 
in{[ the necessary ot>}ects of the Union. The question, 
therefore, whether this amount of power shall be grunted 
or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or 
not a covernment commensurate to the exigencies of the 
Union shall be established; or, in other words, whether 
the Union itself sliall be preserved. Publiuii. 



No. 45 [44]. t-V*- l'*r*>W4.(,;.i.u«y.t,itl«.) 



Madison. 



THE WHOLE M.ASS OF N.^TIONAL POWER IN 
REL.\TION TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS. 



Tkt titvuenttitttlitn iM daageivui If tk/ ilalf gevrrnmmlt — TVjhA 
tnty in tfnfrJtrMian it It OfatfH Ik/ intlral ^hmt — Slatt grv/m. 
nieittt aril! k^vf »r#nr inJlutHti anting Ikt pttflt — Stalt gn^rnmtnli art 
tiintlial fiarti 0/ Ikt /ftUral gtvfrnmnl — Ojfittri a/ lAt liniliJ Slatrt 
art Uii ntimtrmt than th»u af Ikr ttairt — KtttrvtJ pttat/t art ttialittfy 
grater iMan iluu JtUgalei^Pivftsid thangi (miiiti ttii in giting urn 
/Aam in slrrHglt/niHg M frtver$. 

T« Ike P«iplf 0/ thf Stuff 0/ Nfw York: 

Having «howii iliat no one of the powers transferred 
to the federal government is unnecessary or improper, 
tJie next question to be considered is whether the whole 
mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of author- 
ity left in the several States. 

The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead 
of considering in the first place what degree of pciwer 
was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the federal 
government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary 
inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed 
degree of [tower to the gorcrnraents of the particular 
States. But if Uie Union, as has been shown, be cssen- 



3M 



FALSE IMPOkrANCE OF STATES. llto.ttlM) 



tial to the xecurity of the people of America against 
foreign daoger; if it be CMenlial to their sccurity 
against contentions and wars among the dilfercnl States; 
if it be essential to gruard them iigainst those violent and 
oppressive factions wbich embitter the blessings ot 
liberty, and against those miliiary establishments wbich 
must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, 
the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of 
America, is it not prcfwstcrotis to urge sk an obje^rtion 
to a government, without which the objects of the Union 
cannot be attained, that such a gorcrnmcnt may dero- 
gate from the importance of the governroenis of the 
individual States? Was, then, the American Revolution 
effctlcd. was the American Confederacy formed, was the 
precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned 
substance of millions lavished, not that the people of 
America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that 
the government nf the individna) States, that particular 
municipal rslablisbmenix, might enjoy a certain extent 
of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and 
attributes of sovereignty? Wc have heard of llie impious 
doctrine in tlie Old \Vo«-ld ilui the i>eoplc were made 
for kings, not kings for the people. Is the wnx: iloc- 
trinc to be revived in llic New, in another shape — that 
the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the 
views of political inslilulions of a difTerenI form? It is 
too early for politicians to presume oti our fo«^«tng 
tliat the public gotxi, the real welfare of the Rrcat body 
of the |«eople, is llie supreme object to be pursm-d; and 
that no fonii of government whatever has any other value 
than as it may be 6tted for titc attainment of this object 
Were the plan of the convention adverse to the public 
happiness, my voice would be. Reject the plan. Were 
the Union itself inconsistent with tlie public happiness, 
it would be, Abolish the ITnion. lo lice manner, as far 
as the sovereignty of the Stales rannot be reconciled to 
(he happines.* nf tlve p«>(»lc. the voice of every good ctli- 
len must be. Let the former be sacrificed lo thf latter. 
How far the sacrifice is necessary lias been showti. 




MMlIIMt 



BALAKCB OP UNJOK. 



30s 



Hovr far the unsacriliced residue will be endangered is 
tile question before us. 

Several important considerations bavc been touched 
in tlic course of these papers, which discounicnanue the 
suppotiition that the operation of the federal };ovcrnnicnt 
will by degrees prove fatal to the Stale governments. 
The more 1 revolve the subject, the mure fully 1 am 
persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be dis- 
turbed by the prcpondcrancy of the last than of the hrst 
scale. ' 

We have seen, in all the examplet nf ani:i«^il and modrrn coiw 
(e<leracies. the strongest lefxleiiry cotiiinuatly heiraying itscll In 
Sm llie nieinbcTs to (le»|KHl the j'''"^'^' govetnnicnl of its 

■a. tT- iiuiliohtiics. wiih a very ineffectual cnpacity in the 

latter 10 defend iiielf :iKajnsl (he encroachments. Aldicu];li. in 
m«sl of these ruamplrs. the ^ysicm hns heen so riiMimtlsr from 
that under consHleiniioii as ((realty to wfealten any inference con- 
eernlng ihe Utter (roni the fate of the ftmner, yrl, as ihc States 
will retain, under the proposed Conaiiluiioii, a ver)- cxteniivc por- 
tion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not 10 be wholly 
distCKanled. In Ihe Achxan teajiue it is probnhle (hat the federal 
head had a degree and species of power which gave it a con- 
sideralrfe likeness to the cuveinineot framed l>y tlve convention. 
The Lycian Confederacy, as far as its piinciple« and form arc 
Iranunilled. niuit have home a still j-ieater analof;y to it. Yet 
history docs not iiifot'in us thai either nf llicm cvrr degenerated, or 



'All muter of (id the lulsnce between the ttiteiand the nalmo 
hat been admirablr iiuiii mined. While Ihe natioiiaJ govetnniCDt has 
■Miuned maay aiUilkiiial |ui>m whkh the ctimlh of communlcilinn 
has tnailc it pooihle (or It tocnloriY, ycl relslivrlr the otiilr i:iwcriimcnlii 
hare iwiDr tohc nwrc iin|<urtaBl rioiietils. aiitoin>|iareil wiih ihr imtiiiniil 
(W)t(UBUnli than in ISOO. Thti iion-ing chicllf lalhedrciKiiilancr Ihfll 
reluilWS w«lll fateitpi c<ntnlii«— ihe i;iealHl (uni-Iion ol llic £<-'<>'">' 
furcnment — kive become (ar leu «i(*l, ulth the crouin|> icnilciicy to 
peace: (or luch fiurii^n rrlalliiiit a<- innrriiu aiechicAycoiiiiiiriciiil, nnd 
iiy Ihe iwaclical ilexlnu-ii'ici ■«( Anieriran thijifiinB hare been rerliurii tn 
lillle mom (ban ((oe^linn^ of tatifl\. The importance of inletn*! aflain. 
IjDO. haiilecliMd Kilh IhcmlHiiX and eitinclinooif the Indian nnd wilh 
the •lc«ly Umeiiliii; of jMibtlc leidwry- Ceiinin ilcvciupiuciili have, of 
counte. aically idiledtolbe nalinnal lollarnco. uH> » Ihe |;icaler Impoi- 
lanco uf iKb |iu\I oHice, the umainuciital cixtlnil met railroail^ Ihe 
cr«)tian tX natimsl ti«nk> and the power Ko tKf >liat la money, tho 
Irvjiiic ol prateetire tatid and the trantiaR of boaiuici, the pi^cy of 
Iniemal ianproTeuenl. and tcvetil other niiierlal (ictori- Rut with ihe 
ile*el<i|ifltcntof aaUona] (uBUiunk bu (ume a |;ieallf Uicreaaetl impotiancc 




■ ■ •lent.' 

jrencM "f ywrw B M l lu t liBMi^ «: .ie mil 

powen rg ipeeo- Tety TvMcn >a i&eai: to 

.trnttf 'if r Ma iiyami £ntttn»- 



■jju—iill- TW laiiii iJ >— M In cMfHi miHs aaiL o*^- 
..uB pMn Bi« ■ Toai pvc i» die iUs .ii »«t iitf. 

imF JmlopM a BilitiKte out «C 

~ii« twi euMnd >4 lie 



— Ikr muilla «hI ■ um k J|M li » B» i» > 
' '•(onra nl ilw oUiaa «• tta ■ 
• hh «■». In* 'Umdki^ 



MUiMD) 



DEPEA'DEXCB ON STAISS. 



307 



and essentia) parts of the federal gavcrnmcnt ; whilst tlic 
bttcr U nowise csscntiul to the upenitimi or <>rj>imizattun 
of the former. Withiiut the inttrvcntiun of the St^tc 
lc([itilatures, the PresiOcDt of the United Stales cannot 
be elected at all.' They must in all cnscs linve a great 
^ share in his appointment, an<J will, perhaps, in most cases, 
of (hcmsclvcs determine it. The Senate will be elccleil 
absolutely and exclusively by the Slate legisl^iturctt. 
Even the Hou«e of Representative^ though drawn 
immediately from the people, will be chosen very much 
under the influence of that class of men whose influence 
over the people obtains for tliemiuilvcs an election into 
the State lexislaturcs. Thus, each of the principal 
branches of the federal government will owe its esiatence 
more or less to the favor of ihc State Eovernmenls, and 
must consequently feel a dependence which is much 
more likely to beget a disposition too obseiiuious than 
loo overlKariiig towards ihctii. On the other side, tlic 
component pans of the State {governments will in no 
instance be indebted for their appointment to tlie direct 
atftncy of the fetleral guverniuent, and very little, if at 
all, to the local influence of its members. 

The number of individuals employed under the Con- 
stitution of the United States will be much smaller than 
the number employed under the particular Slates. There 
will consequently be less of personal influence on the side 
of the former than of the latter. The members of the 
lejcislalive, executive, and judiniary de|)artments of 
thirteen and more Stales, the justices of peace, officers 
of militia, ministerial oRiccrs of justice, with all the 
county, corpora lion, and town officers, for three millions 
and more of people, intermixed, and having particniar 
acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must 



I 



' la the lint teatf yctn lh« prMldenrUI elector* were Miially n^intea 
\rt Uie (tsle Icjfltlilatm. »iiJ Soulli Can'lim fven miinl.iiiieil (hit iTklcta 
(111 lS49. Ill lSl3 a numlnT dI (liv nIMci lIiom ibcir vlci:t<in Uy nifaiii 
if p9jju]ir ivilri. 1 i^leiii lahkh \\%i i-incr brcoiiiv univcrul. aitd uh^ii 
\n ikiiv cirlwlcil (he le£Hlaturc« (rom all pulicipaiian in ihc clecllon 
uf tlic rioiUeni.— Ui>iToa. 



3o6 ADVANTAGE WITH STATES. nr«.«<Hi 

iciiitcd (o itcgrnenite. Into one consolidxttd government. On Ihe 
contmtjr. we know (h^l ihc ruin n( one of them jirncecitcfl frotnlhc 
mcapacily of tlic fedenl atiihoniy to (iierenl lite i)is»L-nskin», and 
linally Uie disunion, of the iiilioriliniie authoriiJes- These use* 
«rc the more wonliy of our ikircntion. as the excriul catises \tf 
wtikh the com pen eat parts were presMd together were much man 
numerous anil powerful lh.in in OUrCAse; tinil con s>rquei illy leis 
(jowerful lij;ument!i within would be sufficient to bind the membcts 
to the head and to each oilier. 

In (he feiitlal system we have seen a similar peopeiuiljr exempb- 
lied. Nolwiihstamling the warn of proper sympathy in every 
iiistiuice between the local soireiei{;iis and the people, und ihe 
sympathy in lomc inuancct l>elwren tlw general sovereign and 
the latter. It UMjIly happened iliat (he local Mvereii^ns preraded 
in the rival.ihip for cue roach men tt. Hod no external dnngert 
enforced Iniental harmony and sul>(>i<linjtion,and paMicul;iily. had 
(he local H>vEtei^n« possessed the ^inrctiuns of the peo|ile. tlic great 
kingdoms in Ruropc wx>uld at (hit time cofisisi oJ as many iiid 
])ciHl«nl princes as llierc were fomterly fcuilalory barons. 

The State gorcrnments will tijiee the advantage of the 
federal government, whether wc compare ihetn in respect 
to the immediate dependence of the one on the other; 
to the weiglil of peruiiial Influence vrhit-h each side will 
pos!ie«s; lo the powers respectively vested in them; to 
the predilection and probable support of the people; 
to the disposition and faculty of resitting and frustrate 
ing the measures of cjch other. 

The Statcgovernments maj' be regarded as constituent 



tA the itale MvcrameoU. The Mcra power lo charier diki and cotp»- 
niilitm. whk* now pkyi ndi a Tilal pail in die lite of every cibten. 
pivbalilr iiiiire iMknoMkll ih« aiMMiinikl pnwcrvhilhcno Hiiimeil liyihc 
gcnml eiivrnimDiil. Furlhamun, tin lUln hirc*ecBrnlcuii>|Jelecan' 
Irul •?>¥! piiMic eilimtion, ha*e <I«T«lapttl ■ ailliiia lar tnl uf )<n>pottiuu 
(o iliB reeulat anny. anil hive niaed enoonomly in (h« pomi of (uatna. 
t)irMi|^«uch Mcsni at ulrtiif public fi|tkt*, and inhcntance and iacon* 
laies. In ific lUlly Itfir nl Out cttiu«. the nealioa and contnil of tk 
■nachineiy im lupnlyinc him wiib Inncl. waiei. jtih. iriaa|io(latkiH. anil 
tidiicaliuo : for aiilin^ him in ijtfcnes. in poTniy. or ii> intaniiy : anil lu' 
protecting him frooi rioknce anil £rr. from 'liteiie. (rum virc. and (n>n< 
fraud, all >eit — wilh eiocivtiiint •circitly o-.-irlh s menlioo — in the Wale 
ftonranteBii.ar in(h<j(.-'--' - ■' - -,uBiicten>lr--- r---. -ia. Asa 
reuill ii h prufaaUa ikit >r ul Ihc i> >i- nalleaal 

ItnTcmmml. uconpairij 'i liit ilatn. I>p- j) 

isihn Lbaa tn«iea»M, in (li« laM hnad>«d ycon. — EDiroK. 




lUdiMa) 



DEPEXDEXCB ON STATES. 



3«7 



and essential partsof the federal government; vliilst tlic 
latter is uontftc essential to the operation or organization 
o{ the former. Without the intervention of the btate 
legislatures, the Presiileiii of the United States cannot 
.be elected at all.' They must in all cases have a great 
.share in his appointment, and will, perlia|):(, iti most cases, 
of themselves determine it. The Scnati; will be elected 
absolutely and cxclitsiveiy by the State legislatures, 
l^vcn the House of Representatives, though drawn 
immediately from the people, vfill be chosen very much 
under the influence of (hat class of men whose iiilJiicnce 
over the people obtains for themselves an election into 
the State legitdaiures. Thus, each of the principal 
branches of the federal government will owe its esisteucc 
more or less to the favor of the Stale governments, and 
must consequently feel a dependence which is much 
more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than 
too overbearing towards thcni. On the other side, ihe 
cumponent p;irts of the Slate governments will in no 
instance be indebted fur their appointment to the direct 
iigency uf the federal government, and very little, if at 
all, to the local inlluence uf its members. 

The number of individuals employed under the Con- 
ttilution of the United States will be much smnller than 
the number employed under the particular States. There 
will consequently Iw less of personal influence on the side 
of the former than of the tatter. The members of the 
legislative, executive, and jddiciary departments of 
thirteen and more States, the justices of peace, officers 
l^f militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all the 
county, corporation, and town officers, for three millions 
and more of people, intermixed, and having particular 
acquaintance with every class and circle of people, mnst 



' tit tliF find forty ycim th* [irir^idpnlUI riertore wm tnuall^ ttiown 
hy the >lal« IcpiUlnrci. tni soiiili Citutiiu tntn nuintninptl (h» lyttpm 
■ill ts66. In I$i3 a uuiulwr uf ilie i.iai« chose ihcir i:lciUm by nicala 
of pu)iiil>r T«4ei. * aj-ilciii hMcIi bak 'Jiti.-c licunne ui>It<iuI. *ii>t ulti<ii 
bi> iliat cu'ImIoI tb« tcfiMlaiiirn from >U paiik-!)>ati<>n >■■ llir cltLiiuii 
<dtkc Pi<maein,— Kw-nifc. 



308 NATIONAL AND STATE OFFICEKS. ll« « 1*4) 

eicced beyond all proportion, both in number and in 
inlltienc«, those of every description vbo will be employed 
in the administration of the federal system. Compare 
the members of the three great dep;irtments of the 
thirteen States, exeludinf; from the judiciary department 
the justices of peace, with the members of the corre- 
sponding departments of the single gorernmcnt of the 
Union; eomi>.-ire the militia oflicers of three millions uf 
people with the military and marine officers of any 
establishment which is within the compass of probability, 
or, I may add, of possibility, and, in this view :iliine, we 
may pronounce the advantage of the States to be decisive. 
If the federal gitrrrnmunt is to have collectors of revcnnc. 
the State Kovcrnments will have theirs also. And as 
those of the former will be principally on the sea-coast, 
and not very numerous, whilst those of the luilcr will be 
spread over the face of the country, and will be very 
numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the 
same side. It is true that the Confederacy is to posseKit, 
and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well 
as external taxes throughi)ut the Siatrs; but il is probable 
that this power will not be resorted to, except for sup- 
plemental purposes of revenue; that an option will then 
be given to the States to Supply their quotas by previous 
collections of ihcir own; and thai tlic eventual collection, 
under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally 
be made by the oflicers, and according to the rules, 
appointed by the several States. Indeed it is extremely 
prrdiable that in other instances, particnlarly in the 
organization of the judicial power, the olBcers of tlie 
Sutes will be clothed with the correspondent authority 
of the Union, Should it happen, however, that separate 
collectors of internal revenue should be appointed under 
the federal government, the influence of the whole num- 
ber would not bear a cumparison with that of the multi- 
tude of State officers in the opposite scale. Within every 
district to which a federal collector would be allotted, 
there would not be less than thirty or forty, or even morcv 
officers of different descriptions, and many of thctn per- 



Ibikonl 



JVKtr A/iD OKIGtKAt POWERS. 



309 



s<'>n5 nf character nnd weight, whole influence would lie 
OH the side of the State, 

The powers delegated by the pruposed Oiiistitution to 
the federal government arc few and (lefincd. Those 
which are to remain in the State governments are 
numerous and indcfintte. The former will be exercised 
prtiK^ipally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia- 
tion, and foreign commerce; with which last the power; 
of taxation will, for the most part, be cotinected. The ' 
powers reserved to the several States will extend to all 
the objircis which, in the ordinary course of affairs, cun- 
ccri) ilii^ livev, liberties, and properties of the people, and 
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
State. 

The operations of the federal govemmcnl will be most 
extensive and important in limes of war and danger; 
those of the State governments, in times of peace and 
security. As the fnrmcr periods will probably bear a] 
small proportion to the latter, the State governments will 
here enjoy another advantage over the federal govern- 
ment. The more adeijuatc, indeed, the fefleral powers 
may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent 
will be those scenes of danger which might favor their 
ascendency over the governments of ilie particular Sutes. 

I( the new C«n!iiiitiiion be ci.iminMl tvitli j^cfwravj and candor,^ 
It will be found tktl l)ic cliang« wlikli it pri>i)oses coiisi&li much 
leu in (be adiliiion vl NEW i-owf.rs 10 ihc Union ih;in in ilie 
invigocation d( its Oric.inai. powers. Tim rcgiiUiion of com- 
merce. It is true, is a new power; but ihai M«m9 lu be an addi- 
tion which few oppiMe. ami from which no .ipprehentions ate en- 
trnained, The powers rrUiing loWHraml peace, armies .iml flecl*,. 
treaties and finance, wilh the olhei mote considerable powtti,! 
nre all vested in ihr Misting Congrrts hy die nnicles of Con- 
federation. The ptoposeil ch^nuF doct nM entance tlieie powen; 
i| only substilules .t more rffcciual mode of ailminislrrinK thrm. 
The change relating to taxation may be reganlcil xi the most irn- 
poTtaol : and yet the pretenl Congrcu hive ns complcle .lUthoniyj 
10 REtjUiBE ol the Slates indctinitc supplies of money Vat the' 
coromon defense and general welfare as the fuluTc Congress will 
tuvc to requhc thcnt of iivdivhluiU ciiiicns ; and the latter will be 



3'o 



POPULAR SUPPORT. 



(V*.U'U) 



no more houTid llMn Ihe Statu themselvw \\.vee l»**u to pay ilie 
quoiai rf«|iectivrly inxnl on llicin. Had ihe Slairt (onipli^ 
punctually Willi ihe anides ol Coiitedemion, or could ilieir coin- 
pliancc hare been etifqrccd by at peocealilc mean* at may be iisril 
with «uccri« low.irds single [icrfioiis. our \i»s\ rxiviictice is very far 
(roo) couiiten:incin|[ an optnion that ilie Slaie f;"'"'^'"'''^"'* would 
have I<Mt llic-ircniisliluliona! pow«r^ and h.tvr graiiually uriilrrgiinc 
an rnlir« consolidation. To maintain tliat such an ci-enl would have 
eniiued would be to My at once ihal ibr cxittrnce of the SWIe 
goi-ernineni«n incoinpaiihle with any lyitcin whaiever thataccom- 
pliahex the csscniUl puiposts of the Union. 

PUBLIUa. 



No. 46 J45I. (y™ IV* «w*rf. jmiM.7 •». 'rtM 



Madison. 



THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF THE FEnERAL 
AND THE STATE GOVERNMENTS WITH THE 
PEOPLE. 

FfJtral aitJ tialt gnvrnmmli mfy Jifftrtat at;fnlt 'f Ihr mmr fn- 
iHlufBti—TAe JSril a/Uekmiml af ikt froftt ittlt tr I- tit italt g^vtnt- 
mtttlt — Pffiitarily trtil t^tmr t* lit /t^ral grpfiinimr Mitj 1/ It ti 
ttllrr aJmtHhltrti—Oh/tilitMi »tt uo't »/ feJtral militn'y famtr 
ttHiwer/J—CiimllJiiixrtmiiriietitktfrt^iilifa thai tit f^utri vf ik* 
Union wiit it Jamgenmt ta tht ilalt fpitrnnmli. 

To tht Ptoplf Pf the State of New Vort: 

Resiiming the xul}jc<!t of the last pspcr, I proceed to 
inquire whether the federal government ur Ihe Stale 
govern me nts will have the iidvaniage wtih repiril to ihc 
l>red(leoiii)n and support of the people. Notwithslandini; 
th« different modes tn which they are appointed, «c 
n)U«t <:on«tder both of them as sulMtanllally dependent 
on the great hody of the eitlxcns of the United States 
I assume this p4>S)tinn here as it rcspert« the first, re- 
serving the proofs for another place. The federal and 
State (Tovernmeiits are in fact bnt different aj{cnis and 
trustees of the people, ennstituted with different powers, 
and designed for different purposes. The advcrj^ariesof 
the Constitution seem l>i have lost sight of (he people 



Madliaal THE PEOPLB ATTACHED TO STATES. 311 

altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to 
have viewed these different establishments dot only as 
mutual rivals and enemies, but as uiicuntrollcd by any 
common superior in tlieir efforts to u»urp the authorities 
of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded 
of their error. Thcjr must be told that the ultimate 
authority, wherever the derivative may be fouml, resides 
iu the people alone, and that it will not depend merely 
un the comparative ambition or address of the different 
l^overnmenis, whether either, or whii.h of them, will be 
able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense 
of the other. Truth, no less than decency, requires that 
the event in every case whould be supposed to depend 
on the sentiments and sanction of their common 
constituents. 

Many considerations besides those snggcstcd on a 
former occasion seem to place it beyond doubt that the 
first and most natural attachment of the people will be to 
tbe governments of their respective States. Into the 
administration of these a greater number of individuals 
will expect to rise. From the gift of the^ie a greater 
number of ofRccs and cmuliimcnts will flow. By the 
superintending care of these, M the more domestic and 
personal interests of the people will be regulated and 
provided for. With the affairs of these, the people will 
he more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with 
the members of these, will a greater proportion of the 
people have the lies of personal acquaintance and friend- 
ship, and of family and |Kirly atiarhmcnts; on the side 
of thesC) therefore, the popular bias may well l>e expected 
most strongly to incline. 

Kxperieiice speaks the same language in this case. 
The federal administration, though hitherto very defec- 
tive in comparison with what may be hoped uitder a 
better system, had. during the war, and particularly 
whilst the independent fund of paper emissions was in 
•credit, an activity and importance as great as it can well 
have in any future circumstances whatever. It was 
engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for 



3>» POPULAR CONftDENCE IS JiATIOS. Ui«k«)4l> 

their objci;t the prutection of everything lltat vasUear, 
and the acquisition of cvcfytbiiiK tliat could l>c dcsirahlc 
to the people at large. It was nevertheless itivariably 
found, after the transient cnthusiu»m for the e;trly l.!nn- 
l^ressca was over, that the alteiilion and attachment i)f 
the people were turned anew to tiieir own particular 
govcrnmenis; that the federal council was at no lime 
the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to pro- 
posed enlargements of its powers and importance was 
the side usuallj' taken by the men who wished to build 
their political coniMrquencc on the preposseMiont of 
their fellow-citizens. 

If. therefore, as has l»een clstwherc remarked, the peo- 
ple should in future hecoine mure partial to the federal 
Sm than to the Slate governments, the change 

lle.4B. can only result from such manifest and 

irresistible proofs of a better administration at will 
overcome all their antecedent propensities.' And in 
that case the people ought not surely to be precluded 
from giving most of their confidence where they may 
discover it lo Km: most due; but even in that case the 
Stale sovernmcnts could have little to apprehend, be- 
cause it is only within a certain sphere that the federal 
power can, in the nature of things, b« advantageously 
administered. 

The rcmaininK points on which I propnu to compare 
the federal and State governments arc the disposition 
and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist 
and frustrate the measures ol e.tch other. 

It has been already proved that the members of the 
federal will be more dependent on the memben ol the 
State governments than the latter will \te on the former. 
It has appeared, also, that the prepossessions of tbc 
people, on whom both will depend, will b« more on the 



'Swli luaboen i1m hMory o( Ike HWUl)' ennrtli ill ri^pKl for Ihv 
nwkiiHl i;<>vgriMn«iil, and it UtiLilnln tUipknt't |iri>d|ile iliai "Bverr 
coiulilnliuB mitti firai gaim ■mhixity. dixl itien nxt aulhiHil)' ; U niut 
itit wia ilie In^lir aiKt raniiileniK n( mankind, aaJ ibcn cntplof dial 
bonu^ in rli« wmIi of gM«tMi|«ai."— I^nok. 




IbdlMM) 



lOCAC SPlRfT m COKCRESS. 



3'3 



side of ihc State governments than of the federal govern- 
ment. So far :iK ihc ilisixisttiou of each tow.mls the 
other may be inftuenced by these causes, the Slate 
Sovernmcnts must clearly have the advantage. But in a 
distinct ami very tmport;int point of view, the advantage 
will lie on the same side. The pre possess ions, which 
the members themselves will carry into the federal 
government, will generally he favorable to the States; 
whilst it will rarely happen that the members of the 
State governments will carry into the public councils a 
bias in favor of the general government. A local spirit 
win infallibly prevail much more in the members of Con- 
gress than a national spirit will prevail in the legisla- 
tures of the particular Staleii.' Everyone knows that a 
great proportion of the errors committed by the State 
legislatures |)roceeds from the disposition of the members 
to sacrilice the comprehensive and permanent interest of 
the State to the particular and separate views of the 
counties or districts in which they reside. And if tliey 
do not sulficienily cnl.irge their poIic:y tn embrace the 
collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be 
imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity 
of the Union, and the dignity and respect.-ihility of its 
government, the objects of their affection* and consulta- 
tions? For the same reason that the members of the 
Slate tegi»latures will he nnttkcly to attach themselves 
sufficiently to national objects, the members of the 



'Thfa bw I>ccn «)Mu-n In a]l wcli'initl (■miroTvrsrn •ludi » lli« 
tU*n7. taiill. luliaji, oinag*, anil otbct imiei. Ani}. iii k imillcr 
lente, id vnrf ii«nlton •>{ inicmal improvciicnl tht u<ne ipiril ii mani. 
fated ; «*ch nicBibcr i>f the legidaiivF 'tmiy diikinj; aII thouuhl «( 
HUio«ul ICMkI in ihc Uteinp< l« |^ "lOineihiiiu " tat li» ntrii iminc<tiitle 
dialtkl ot ULMe. Rollillir Rinr ami Hidiot )i<tl iim!(!irlii1l»i'[iropti!ir. 
in( inansir for p«l>lic biiiMin^s h*vf come lo be v«i( " Hirken." in whkli 
nni repiwwBtatrre or lenaiotwcuKs " wmelhinit" for hiiconilitumu, 
t>)r prcMiBiif! tiii voce to hi* fellow- mcobcra fir The apiirDiiritlJoni for 
theft loMlltla. Much of the jobbery could pcihapa be remedied 
bj ■ power criMed lo ilie Pr«»i(l«nt lo rou KMnic il«in» oj a bill, 
knilcai] d[ rc<]iimnc hiia lo rttuor ■pptovp ihc hill ai a vholv. Many of 
Ihe apiprotiriiliiHn ue tltia|>f>rii*ecl hy the uujorily ofCongrea. uiil are only 
put into wcure«noa|;h<rotnIc> pais the mcMUie, caii«c(]u«Bilytbct«t<HiiK 
e^K)«me items wonMnuelyreuili in alicmpu to repast ihcra.— EuiTOft. 



314 



PAK7ISAX LEClSLATlOlir. 



lSv.4e<tf> 



federal legislature will be likely In attacli tlicmsclvrs ton 
much to local objects. The Stales will be to the latter 
what counties and towns arc t'} the former. Measures 
wilt too often be deddei! acconling to their probable 
effect, not on the national prosperity and Itappineax, but 
on the prejudices, interests, and pnrsuits of the govern- 
ments ;ind people of the individual Stale*. What is the 
spirit that has in general ch;iraetefijtcd the procecdinj^s 
of Congress? A pcrosal of their journals, as well as the 
candid acknowledgmcnu of such 35 have had a seat in 
that assembly, will inform us that the members have but 
too frequently displayed the character rather of partisans 
of their respective States th:tn of impartial gtutrdians of 
a common interest; that where on one occasion improper 
sacrifices have been made of I0c.1l considerations to the 
ag^^tndixirmenl of the federal KovernmL-ut, the great inlcr- 
ests of the nation have suffered on a hundred from an 
undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, aikd 
views of the (larticutar States. I mean not by these reRec- 
tions to insinuate that the new federal gi>vernnicnt will 
not embrace a more enlarRed plan of policy than the ex- 
isting government may have pursne^l; much less, tttat its 
views will he ok confined as those of the State legisb' 
tures; hut only that it will partake sufficiently ii( the 
Spirit of both to be disinrlitied lo invade the rights of 
the individual St:ites or the prerogalives of their govern- 
mcnts. The motives on the part of the State jjovern- 
raenis to augment their prerogatives, by defaltations 
from the federal ijrovernment, will be overruled by no 
reciprocal predispositions in the members. 

Were it Bilmitied, however, that the federal govern- 
ment may feet an e(|tiat disposition with the State 
governments tn extend its power beyond the due limits, 
the latter would still have (he adv.inlage in the means of 
defeating such encroachments. If an act of a |>art>cular 
State, (hough onfrieodly to the natinnal government, be 
generally popular in ihat State, and shuuh) ni)l too 
grossly violate tlie oaths of the State ofEcers, it is exe- 
cuted immediately and, of course, by means on tlie fpot 



lb4lMal 



OBSTRUCTIVE POWER OF STATES. 



3«5 



and dcpcndin];; on the State alone. The opposition of 
the federal government, or the interposition of federal 
officers, would but inflnme the zeal of all parties on the 
side of ihe State, aod tlic evil could not be prevented or 
repaired, if at all, without the employment of means 
which must always be resorted to with reluctance and 
difficulty. On the other hand, shotild an unvrurrantabic 
measure of the federal government be unpopular in par- 
ticular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, ur 
even a warrantable meaiiure be so, which may »omelimcs 
be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful 
and at hand. The ilisquictudc of the people; their 
repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the 
officers of the Union; the frowas of the executive magis- 
tracy of the Slate: the embarrassments created by legis- 
lative devices, which would often be added on such 
occasions, would oppose, in any Stale, difficulties not to 
be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious 
Impediments; and, where the sentiments of several ad- 
joining Slates happened to be in unison, would present 
obstructions whith the federal government would hardly 
be willing to encounter. 

But ambitious encroachments of the federal govern- 
mcnt on the authority of the Slate governments would 
not excite the opposition nf a single State or o( a few 
States only. They would be signals of general alarm. 
Every government would espouse the common cause. 
A correspondence would be opened.' Plans of resistance 



L 



'IneimyiUmii'l io<>|ipoiparlinlytlM»titec(ivetnmenlit>>thc nminnnl 
Mnrrnnenl ihii hiu hceii th? mclhoa. isd proEiibly nolUnc btttcr pkivh 
IM nndctlyinic icnte of (he Inie naiKNulHy of ihe (Jnion. cntt aiwt tjatl 
Ikdii any enaitllHUiMuil compact, than the fact that (he Icailcn <il slalr 
•cmrvicntr '■■'" ■■"bji anp(aJc>l (or tnpport In the nllitr hlaln. m in 
reality lo Ibc m»oii1j of Ibvpeopteor lution. in ihrir rndnvun taorrf 
fide the acu ol the (cdtral [«*enini«iil. Tbe Vitginia and KeniiKiy 
Tcutuiloni nie in [cility nolhintc bat a requccl toth«"co-tl&t«i" lor 
■BplMrt. Tlie llanfoct cnnieiatton tndetl In a prcnodllofi la amcnJ lh« 
oonalittMien, wlitcti wat Inil a ny ot atkin^ lh« Mhn iil«tn to aM New 
SBg>Un>ltn tlsntypoBliontotliecenetal ijoTetBnictil. Tbe South Carolina 
conrMiHonaf tSJaisneil an aiMrra to ilie "p«»|>le"oriheU«(w. aflHrn- 
ing thai in tkii " ottis ~ thow itaic* cannol " heulUe in accntiBK lo 
lila atruigvinol." Utnt klluMialifc ot all, boneict, aaa the B|ii>cal 



3«6 gEPXESEXrAriFES VE/tSUS PEOPLE. Ot».«l«> 

nouM be concerted. One spirit woulO anituate and coo- 
duct the whole. The same combinations, in shurt, would 
result from un »p]}rehension of the federal as was pro- 
duced by the dread of a foreign yoke; and unless llic 
projected Innovations should be voUintaril)^ renounced, 
the s^me appeal to a trial of force would be made iu the 
one case as was made in the other. But what degree of 
madness could ever drive the federal government to such 
iin e^itrcmity? In the contest with Great Britain, one 
part of the empire wa.i employed againil the other. The 
more numerous part invaded the rishts of the )cs& 
numerous part. The attempt was unjust and unwise; 
but ii was not in itpeculation absolutely chimerical. But 
what would be the contest in the case we are supposinj;.' 
Who would he Ihc parties? A few representatives of the 
people would be opposed to the people ihemselres; or 
rather one set of representatives would be contending 
against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole 
body of their common coniilitucnis on the side of the 
latter. 

Tlie only refage led foi those wlio p»i>pti«y the downUti of tlie 
Stale gnvcrnmeiilt i« ibn vlxu>Ti;iry xoppasitktn that tlic IcfU-ral 
{.'oienimenl m«y previoiiiily sicfuniutjir a iiiilitaiy fiMcc for tha^ 
projecis of ainliition. The tcavMiin};^ ciinl;iiiYi:il iii llieie p^f 
niusi have l)een einplojeil to liiile purpose iitdrrd. (f il coulil he 
necessary now ia (litprove the reality of ihi>danf>eT. That Ihe 
people and llie States sliouM. for a &iittic>ri)i (x-rtod of lini^, eirci 
an tininterrupled uicccMlon of men ready 10 betray both ; tlial ib^ 
traiiora should, throughout this period, uniformty aitd lyi 



of Samh CarolW. tn iS6i. by «n aAAtva of i(t conttattoa in * 
iwofile of the tU>c-hi>)iIiii|; tialo," in ithklk il iru aiinauMced 
"SuulhCjit'>lMi>(ieti[niio<le>i<njr ■qnme (root yiMr«,"u>ilM»hiM l||ti_ 
to " i'liti u» i'l fiwmini; ■ cnnfrdrtacy of tl»ir-h«Jdin|; Matet." TIhU ■ 
•late which ha;) jiut aotfted iii cxKitnoe ai^ > free and wvcrciitn rouMiy 
ahonU at uiHC aik lo t« nude juil of ano«h«f iiapticil a> Irtilc tn 
lenw cA ihr MKn« of nati<niBlity «t if lh« ibirtecn eokiaia, ttli 

dedarJae inAeytaAeiKC In 177(1, hid pellllon— ' '■■ if ■ -' "^ '■— >'«^ 

orSfiaia. tn iIm Hhudc litauty i>l the Uni i 

to crnU* ■> aCtBil u>i«rr>uiily >a tlalrhwoJ, 

ttpti Ihc will ■>! the CO >latrv wu atyti nnn nlliiiiplnl. Vt4 *ill< 

abaohie imtrrandinice ffm each aDcl cveiy iribri <iai«, ctilc i 

«a» Rccesuiiiiy a pure fiaioa waA iiallity,— Ei>rtu«. 



KUllMBi 



MIUTJA SUPERIOR TO ARMY. 



3'? 



i 



iFtnalic.tUy puisne some fixrd plan (nr ihc extension of ihr iiiililniy 
ntabbkhineiii : thii the );'>veiiinienls und ihe people ol ilie Sixles 
sliouki Ulenllf anil palienll)* behold ihr gaihering sloim, niul con- 
linue to Mit»ply the nialeTj.-ih. until it »liould be piepiiicd (o burst 
on their own bcaiU, mu%t appear to everyone more like ilic in- 
i-oherent drniiiis of u deliiious ic;itou<iy. or l)ic(ni:ijud|{e<lex^>;^i''>' 
lton« of ,1 counlcrfeil ze.il. iliin like ihc soI>cr ;l|l|)^rll«n^)o^)^ of 
genuine ^tiiudun. £xirrf<ji)-.iiil ■■« llir »U|)pu»iliun is, let it, liotv- 
rvcr. Ix: miulc. I.el a lejfular ;i(in}- fully cqujl (o the fcsuurcck vf 
the country lie formed, Ani\ ki ii be entirely at Ihe devotion o( 
the federal (toverninenl ; Mill il wouki not be going loo (nr to 
s^y thai the Sl-ile govern rnrnt'^, with the people on their side, 
would be able to repel theitanser. Tlie Iiii;hesi niiinber lowhielt, 
according tn ihc hcM com pill at Jon. a M-inding .irmy cnn be urrwl 
in any country, doea not exceed oiic liundreiiih purt of ilie whole 
number of souU ; or one Iweoiy-tifih p,in of the number able to 
bear arms. Thin proportion would nui ) icid. in the United Sute», 
■n army of more than twrnly-fire nr thirty thomani) men, To 
'IheM would be opposed a nntilia ainouiiiing to near h.iU a million 
of ciiticns with arms in their h.-iml.s, olTicercd by men choirii liom 
aniooK lhefn»elre». figbliiij; for llieir coniiiion lilfcrlics. anil uiiiteil 
aixl CAMliKted by governments povieiMng their nffeclions and 
con6itence. Il may well be doubted whether a militia lhu» cii- 
cumstanced could eivr be conquered by such n jKoporiion of 
regular lroo|M. lliose who are be^ acqiininied with the last 
succHsftd resistance of Ihii country a){ain!i( the Hiilinh iiinii, wdl 
be ni'ni iivclined la deny the |iostibdiiy of il. He^tdrs ihe advan- 
tage cA being armnl. (vhkb the Anieritiins powesi ovi'r ihe people 
ol almost every other n.tlion, ihe existence of sijlioidinnlr govern- 
mcnis to which Ihe people arc aliiLcheil, .nnd by wliich ihe militia 
officerB ate appointed, forms a b.irrier agaiiwt the enterprises of 
ambilion moee inturmoun table ihan .my which a simple govern- 
n»eni of any (nrm can admit of. Notwiihutanding the military 
catabluhmcnta in Ibe several klagdonis at Europe, winch aic 
carried M far as the public resources will be-ir. the gm-cnimenis 
are afraid li> trust the people will) aims. And il is not certain 
thai, with this aid alone, they whhiUI not be able to shake oR their 
)-okes. But were the |>coplc to pMsess the additional advantages 
of local governtnents chosen by tbeniieWci. who could collect the 
national will anil direct the national fnrce. and of officers appointed 
out of (he mitiiia. by tbese goi' em men is. and aliached both to them 
am) lo the militia. JI may be nfRrmed with the greatnt assurance 
thai Ok throne of cverjr tyranny <n Europe would be spc<edily 



3i8 FEDERAL POWERS XOT F0R3^tDABl£. Ill«.«'«8' 

ovcrttirned in spite «l the legions wliieli surrouiKl It. Lei us not 
Insult the free and galUnt citit«i>s «< America with the ^mptcion 
IliM ihey would be less able lo delenil the fights <A whkh they 
would be in actual poMcuion than the debaoed subjects ol 
BrbilriTf power would he lo rescue ihelis (rom the hands o( iheit 
oppressors. Let as rather no lonKci iniall ihein with ihe sup- 
position that they cm ever reduce ihenistK'cs to tlie itecrisiiy o( 
making the ex|ierimenl. by a blind a.nA lante submission to ihe 
longtrdinofin^idinus mcavuirs which musl piecetlc.tiiil producett. 

The argument under the present head may be put into 
a very concise form, which appears altogether conclusiTc. 
Either the mode in which the federal government is to 
b« constructed will render it siifticientljr dependent on 
the people, or it will nut. On the first supposition, it 
will b« re&trained by that dependence (ram forming 
schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On (he other 
Kupposilioii, it wilt not possess the Confidence of the 
people, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily 
defeated by the State governments, vlio will be sup- 
ported by the people. 

On summing up the <X)nsideraiiont stated in Ibis and 
the last paper, they seem to amount to the most convinc- 
ing evidence ihai(ihe powers proposed to be lodged in 
the federal government arc as little formidable to tttose 
reserved to the individnal .States as they are indispens- 
ably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union; : 
and that all those alarms which have been sownded, of a 
meditated and consequential annihilation of the Stale 
governments, must, on the most favorable inierprctalioD, 
be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of 
them. I'ljiiuus. 



KUiMBl 



DtSTHIBUTlOlf OP POWERS. 



3'9 



SEPARATION OF THK DEPARTMENTS OF 
POWER. 

Tki maiim iJkal Ihrrr ikautJ Ar tifaialt aid Jiitiml drfartmtnti 
tetttijtrtd — Tkii maxim Irat — Tin nev ifniiitiitim Jfti nfft vi^l^U 11 — 
r** Wyw */ Mmltiquittt— The fravimii of ihe vantm lUU tmiHIti- 
Ii'mu #m Ikitftinl ejcamimJ. 

To the Pea/flf of Ihe Statref S'np York: 

Hiivtiig ri;view<;(I (he general fnrm of live proposed 
ffovcrumeo^ud the Ki^ncral m.^s^ uf power a11'>ttcd to it, 
i procrrd-flVVk-^ininc Llie pi(rtli;ular slracture of lliis 
govemiiitnL knd Ihe distribution Of lllii vaas^ of power 
ani"! itucnt pifts. 

(' irijul fibjcr v.uw-. ii.i.ilcated by the more 

iCsi : ict li> tite Constitution is its sup* 

.... .J. ilic political maxim that the te};i<ila- 
re, and jmliciary ilepartmcnls ought to be 
nd distinct. In the Kiructure of the fedc^ral 
ent, DO regard, it is said, seems to have been 
is essential pre<;autton in favor of liberty. The 
\ departments of power are distributed and 
d in such a manner as at once to destroy all sym- 
aiid beauty of form, and to expose some of the 
ntial |>arts of (he edifice to the danger of being 
islii^ by the disproportionate weight of other piirts. 
No politii-'at truth is certainly of greater intrinsic 
'aluc, or is stamped with the authority of more en- 
lightened patrons of liberty, tlian that on which the 
bjcciion is founded, •The accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, cxectttire, and judiciary, in the same hands, 
hether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, 
iaelf -appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the 
try definition of tyranny.' Were the federal Constitu- 
lon, therefore, realty ehargeable with the accumulation 
if power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangcr- 
Mia tendency to such an accumulation, no further argu- 



jao 



uoyrssQuiBU's theory. 



IXo. <7 («' 



ments would bi- neircssary to insi>irc a universal rcpruba- 
tion u[ the system. I persuade myscU, hovcTcr, thai it 
will be made apparent to everyone that the charge can- 
Cm nut be supported, aod that the tnaxiin on 

Ro.flS. which it relies has been totally misconceived 

and misapplitid. In order to rorm correct ideas on this 
important subject, it will be proper to investigate the 
sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that 
the three jrreat departments of (wwer should be sejurale 
and distinct.' 

The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this 
subject is the celebrated Monte«t|uiHI. If he be not the 
author of this invaluable precept in thvictcQc^of politics, 



tfll rerommend- 



Rieaniiig 



he has the tnerii at least of dis|>^-< 
ing it most effectually to the aitt 
us endeavor, in the first place, \'-- 
on this point. 

The British Constitution was to \' nirtqtrien t'lat 
Homer has been to the didactic writers unHf' 
As Ihc latter have considered the work of tbr 
bard as the perfect model from which the princ' 
rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by 
similar works were to be judged, so this great 



' Thii Ibraty of ihe iti*tiia«i or cppanHiMi oF i^oTcrnniaaul \ 
wKicb h>i reached iti hi|^vm nprmiiia in our consliliilkin. nrul 
ii.rte.t \ij AiitlDtlc. hill wji (irM leriouily iliKiiucd by txicke 
•■ Tnxtuc tut Cui! tlovernmcni." It 'n^ M<>iitru|iiieu, bowcver,' 

lini •IcmuKximci) llinl the Nr|ianilinn iW |>(>vci ebuI |>uaen ' 

k)I"lil>*^. V'**"!!"- 'O^ i'»l>'^l. wiih rich w> t ' I ' 

rnivl tlic FiKiooclnncnlt ol \\\r other l«ro. v-' •!! 

liliertr. *nil ffniu hii " Eiptit (tn Ij)«i" tbe fu.n^ 

ultuliniit <ircw Ihc pnncijit«s cBitxnlitil iii the viciout lUie and liiir 
toil 111 ilnli'iii. A« UihDiOS h«r ulncivci. Monlcwjiiieu lu kit <uuiii)i|i 
uJ Grr*l ftiiuiii nk a iwxlrl of mn-li >lilIririilUllnu. OHiistiVL'loI an |4m 
mniMiiiiiavallh mlhei IIimi dncnlvil thn Ittiliili [■■»>< i mm n l of lii« dsf. 
Biecliot. after mnklBt: metry ovrr iKii c»imr[ilion o/ ihe EngliMl 
lontlltutloii, »»wil» ilmt ihr " clEctnit iccitt " of flie ijilem U 

" clewc miwi", lii< m-i- :-i r_i.. (..,:,-. ,,( (h, cieculWe •nil Iq;' 

iWcpowOTv" ("Tm " W.ulu- i» ^l.M.l See 

Puior**. "'The Tin .-nen*."' NVw Vurt ^ iftOg; 

IhtVis') " Amcticin i.un*liliiiiuii> ; liic KclMioiia ol ihc TliiM II 
■nenit u iiA\ifAeA tj > Cemury," lUllimon: 1S&5. utl W. 
" The 8c|Mntloo ot Gorcmaiiciiia) Fomrt," New Vuik . 1 
Cniro*. 



lt«dl«Mll 



BRlTISti CONSTITVTIOtf. 



3>" 



critic a|ipears to liave riewed the Constitulion of Eoe< 
lanil as (he slanJard. or to use his own cxprcssiun, as the 
mirror of pMtitic^l liberty; and to tiAVc delivered, in the 
form of clemenury truths, the several oharucteriiitic 
principles of that particniur system. That wc may be 
sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case, let us 
recur to the source from which the maxim was drawn. 

On the slijihlcsl view of the British Coosiitulion, wc 
must perceive that the legislative, executive, and judiciary 
department!) are by no means totally separate atid dis- 
tinct from each other. The cxecuiivc maRistrate forms 
an integral part of the legislative authority. He atone 
ba« the prerogative of making treaties with foreign 

overeifcns, which, when made, have, under certain limi- 
tations, the force of legislative acts. At) the members of 
the judiciary department are appointed by him, ciin be 
removed by him on the address of the two Houses of 
Parliament, and form, when he pleases to consult them, 
one of his constitutional councils. One branch of the 
legislative department forms also a great constitutional 
council to the executive chief, as, on another hand, it is 
the sole depositary of judicial |>ower in cases of impeach- 
ment, and is invested with the supreme appellate juris- 
diction in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far 
connected with the legislative department as often to 
attend and participate in its deliberations, though not 
admitted to a legislitire vote. 

From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, 
it may clearly be inferred that, in saying "There can be 
no liberty where the legislative and executive powers arc 
united in the same person, or body of magistrates," or, 

"if the power of judging be not separated from the 
legtfth live and executive powers," he did not mean that 
these departments ought to have no partial agrtfj in, or 
no tfintr^ over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as 
his own words import, and still more concluuvcly as 
illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no 
more than this, that where tiie r-Ao// power of one de- 
partment is exercised by the same hands which possess 




a*.4r(4»i 

the tnW<r poircr of another depart men t, ihe fumlamental 
pnnciplcii of a free constitution arc subverted. This 
would have been the case in the coBStitution examined 
by him, if the king, who n the sole executive magistrate, 
had possessed also the complete legislative power, or the 
supreme administration of justice; or if the entire legis- 
lative body had possessed the supreme judiciary, or the 
supreme exe cutive authority. This, however, is not 
among the vices of that constitution. The magistrate in 
whom the whole executive power resides cannot of him- 
self make a law, though lie can put a negative on every 
law; nor administer justice in person, though lie has tlie 
appointment of those who do administer it. Tlie judges 
can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are 
shoots from the executive stock; nor any kxislative 
function, though they may be advised with by the Icgis- 
lative councils. The entire legislature can perfom no 
judiciary ad, though by the joint act of two of its 
branches the judges may be removed from Uicir ofliccs, 
and though one of its brancheii is possessed of the judicial 
piiwer in the last resort. The entire legislature, again, 
can exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its 
branches constitutes the supreme executive magistracy, 
nnd another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and 
condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive 
department. 

The reasons on which Montcsfjuieu grounds his maxim 
arc a further demonstration of his meaning. " When the 
legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person or body," says he, " there can be no liberty, 
because apprehensions may arise lest /ie mwc monarch or 
senate sliould rwA*/ tyrannical law^ to /xfcutt them in a 
tyrannical manner." .\gain: " Were the piiwcr of judg- 
ing joined with the legislative, Ihe life and liberty of the 
subject would tw exposed to arbitrary control, for ikfjuJge 
would then be iht leghhUr. Were it joined to the execu- 
tive power, thejudgf might behave with all the violence of 
an effreiur." Some of these reasons are mure fully Ci- 
plained in other passages; but bricHy stated as tliey are 




MkdliMi DEfAttrS/EiVrS SEPARATE /X STATES. iiS 

here, they sufficiently cslabli<;li the meaningwhich wchavc 
put on this tele br:i ted maxim of this celebrated author. 

II wc look info ihe conslimiions of ihr srviTi.il Sistci we fins' 
ihal. notwilluUmliiiic ilie emphaiicat anil, In some instances, the 
unquililieiil termf In which ihit aitotn hat been Iniil down, there 
in not * single instance in wliich the several ttepaiimenls tA power 
have been kept ibKoIiiiely tcpiirntc and disiincl. New Mampj>hire, 
whose constitution was the last loinied. sccins to havv bcirn lully 
Aware of ihc im|>.i«til>i)ii)' ^nd tnc^xpcdicncy «f avoidinjc any 
mixture whatever o( these depanments. jiiid has t)ua]iticil the 
doclrine by dcelarinf; " thai the IcKislniivc, executive, and judiciary 
powers ought to be kept as sr^arate Itoni. and in'lcpirndont of, 
each olfier ai tkt itaturf of a /ret guT^crHoienl will admit ; of iis 
If eoHiUUHl tifitk ihal tkttin of caniueliaH that hinds the vrh^r 
faerie of Ihe caHilitalian in one iuMisitluile A^itJ of unity itud 
amity." Her eon«titiition accordingly mixes these ilEpnrtmenIs 
in several resprets. The Senate, which is Ji branch of the 
legisl.-iiive de|)arlincnt. is also a judicial tribunal for the Irini of 
imjicaclimcnti. TIm; Preiident, who is the head of the cucciiitvc 
■le|Mnn>Rnl. is the prrMtliiig menihci' 3U0 of the Scn.ilc; and. 
besides an e<|ual vote in all eases, has a cisiing vote tn cusc o( a 
tic. Tbc executive head is htinsdf eventually elective every year 
hy the leglsUiivr depaitnieni. anct his council is every )rar chosen 
tiy and from Ihe meinbeis of the same d«|>artmeni. .Several of 
llic officers of stale ate also appointed by the legislature. Aim) 
tlie roerabcrs o( the judiciary de|uriincnt arc .ippointed by the 
rxectilive ilepflrtmeni. 

The constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient 
though less pointed caution, in ri[>iesMn)> thi« fundamental article 
of hberiy. It doclates "tlMit the lej;islatire department slull 
never cxetcnc the executive anil jmllcial powers, or cither of them; 
the executive shall never exeicise the legislative and judicial 
|M>wers. or eillier of them : the judicial sh.-ill never cxerci.sc the 
Ic^stalive and esccutlvc powers, or either of them." This decla- 
ration cotiesponds pieciiely with Ihe doctrine of Montev|uieu, as 
it has been explained, and is not in a single point ritjaicil by the 
pUnof the convention. It gOM no farther titan to prfihil>it any 
OIK ol (he mlire departrnents from exercising the powers «f 
another depjMinent. In tlie ver]' conslituiwn to which It is 
preltxcil. a partial mixture nl powers has l>een ailmilled. The 
etccativt: ■•>a};ihir4le has a <|u.tlilie<l nef;atlve on the tegistaiive 
body, anil ilie Smaic. which is a part ol the trgi^ilalure, is a court 
of impeachment for members both ol the executive and judiciary 



3^4 



BLBNDING OF POWKKS IN STA rf.S. I>fl. 47 <M> 



ilcpjrtmmls. The mcmfMTS o( (he judkiary depart men t, again, 
are appainlattle bjrilie executive de|iarimetii, and temovable by 
ihe same AiKhohly on the nddreu of the iwa legislative branches. 
Lastly, a nuiii'icr of ilic offtcen of goveinmcnt arc anniuLly 
3[ipoinle<i liy the legislative ilcjartmcnt. As the appointment to 
ofTices, )iai(iculariy executive ollicr». Is in Its naiuie an executive 
lunction, ilic compilers of the conxillutlon have, in this last point 
' at least, violated ilic rule established by thenisclccs. 

I pass over the constitutions of Rhode Island and Connecticut, 
bccauw ihry were foirncd prior to the Revolution, and even brfoir 
Ihe priiieipte under cxaininallon had become an object of polilical 
atiEntion.' 

The consiituiion of New Yotk contains no dectaralion «in 
(his sul>jcci, but appears very clearly to have been framed with 
an eye to (he dangi^r o( iin|>f operly blending (he different depart* 
ments. It gives, nevertheless, to the executive magisirnie, a 
partial control over the Icgislnilve (Icpartmeni; and, whai is more, 
gives a like control to the judiciary department ; and even blends 
llic executive and the judiciary departments in the exercise of (his 
control. In its coimcil of appointrncn( nvembers of the le^sbltve 
arc associ.ited with the executive authoiiiy. in the uppointment of 
ofBcers, both cxcciilire and judiciaty. And its court for the trial 
of impeachnients and conrction of errors h to consist of one 
branch of the Icgi!iUtare and the principal members of the 
judiciary dep-irtmcnt. 

The con^itution of New Jersey has blended the diflerebt 
iwwers of govcrriment more tfwn any of the preceding. The 
governor, who is (he executive miigi-urate. is appointeil by the 
leg isUt lire ; is chancellor and ordinaiy. or siini>i;aie of ihe Slate: 
is ;i member of the Supreme Court of Appeals. ^>ih1 prestitont. with 
a r.iuing votp. of one of (be legistsiive branches. The lame 
Icgisbtivc hranch acts again as executive council of ihr governor, 
ami with him constitute the Couit of A(>t>eals, The ntemltera of 
the judiciary department ate appointed bj* the icgiilntive depart- 
nicnt. and remorable by one branch of il, on the impeachment ol 
tlie other. 

According (o (he eonsttiution of Pennsylraola. ihc prttldetit. 
who is the liead of the executive department, is annuaHy elected 
by a vote in which (he legislative depiirttnrfii prc<Iominates. In 
conjunctuin with an executive council, he appoints the members 
o( the jtiiliciary depAriment and forms a court o{ (mpeachmttii 

' Rhixk Island and Conncctital mafntabed (W royal clmiiers granlsd 
tbero i«i ths MTentcrBlli centuy.^EoiTOR. 



ULJk. 



MMUMni POIfEKS DIST/XCT IN SOME STATES. 3'5 

(or irinl of all oRiceni. judiciiiry as vrell as executive. Tl>e judge* 
o( tilt Supreme Coun nnd jii«iicc« of ihe peace seem aUo to be 
removiiWc by Ihe lcic»l>lure ; and ilic exccuiive power o( patdoti- 
ing in ccruiiii cises, to he I'rfeneil lo the vimc dcpattnienl. Tlie 
members o( the cxevuiive council flic made EX orriCiO justices 
of pejicc ihii>ugli<iu[ the Sutc, 

In Dcliiwiire (tie chici executive maglsirAU is annually elected 
by the lrgi(.[»iive tlc|urtmciit. The ipcakent o( the ttvo lFKist«tive 
branclx'!! are vice presidents in the cxecutii'e dep.iiimrnt. The 
exeoiiive chief, with «x oihem. ;i]>poinie<l, three Ity e.ith of the 
legiil.ilivc liMOchcs, «in«itiilrs the Siipicme Court of Appeals: 
he is joiiiC'l xvith the lc|tiil.itive (li!|iarliiiviil in the jppuintriicnt of 
the other )u<l(;[''S. Thioiigliont Ihr States it atipe.in that Ihe mem- 
bers ol ilic Ugislxiure 'rnty at the same time be justices of the 
peace: m thi% State the membcrx of oi^e branch of it arc kx 
orriCIO justtce» of llie peace i j» aie alstt the iiicntbeis of the 
executive council. The principal oHieera of Ihe executive depad- 
ment ate appointetl by (lie legislative; and one l-(anch of the 
latter lormt a couit uf impFaehiiR'nls. All ulBiicrs may be 
removed on address of the legisl.iture. 

Maryland ha< adopted the maxim in (he moil unqualified 
terms; ileclaiini: Ih.X <he legislative, execulive. and judicial 
powers of ^vemiiienl ought to be foreiYr separate an<l dintinct 
from each oiher. Her const iiiitioit. not withstanding, makes the 
executive inai[isltate appoiniabic Ity the 1e][iilaiive (le|>artmcnt ; 
and the menibcvs of the judiciary Ity ihe executive dcpariment, 

Tlie language of Vir]-ini4 ii ittll aiore {loiiiied on this subject. 
Her conMilulion ilecUres "that tlie lrgi$lativc, executive, and 
judiciary de)iaitments shxil be se|i3iiJ1e and distinct: SO titat 
neither exercise the powers pro|«:tly beUiiiging to the other; nor 
shall any prison nxrrcifce the powers of iiioic than one of ifiein at 
the «»me lime, except thai the jmtieci of county courts shall he 
eligible lo eitl>ci" Hoiiw o( A^scmhly." Yet we lind not only this 
express exception, with rcsjircl to Ihe members of Ihe inferior 
couni, I>ui thai ihe cliicf nugisitatc. with his executive council, 
are appointdlilc b)- thu leglsUture : that two ritrndicrs of the latter 
ate iricnnially disi>l.tccd at the pleasure of the legislature ; and that 
all tl>e ptincipal offices, b»lh execulive .«iul judiciary, are filled by 
the same department. The eiecuiive prerogative of pardon, also, 
is in nne case vested in tlie |F|;iil.iiJre department. 

The conslitiiiiiHi ol North Carolina, which rieclarex "that the 
itrgotttive. rvrcui've. and supreme ^dicial fKiwers uf f;ovemment 
^ouglil to be forever separate anil distinct from each other." refers, 




3>6 



JAffE/tfECr/OXS ADMITTED. 



IRe. 47 (4«) 



at ih<: umft time, to ihe kpstniive drpanmml the )ii>]wtiainml 
not onlf of the eiecutit'e chief, but all the jtrinciiial oIKcers within 
both thni and the judicinfy itepiiTtmcnl. 

in South Carolina lli« co>i«iiiiiiioii makes the necnih-e masii- 
tncy eligilile by \\\r. I«gislali<rc itnpartnirnl. It RiveK In ihr bitrr. 
alio. lh« .t|i|ioinliii?nl o( the incmticrs o4 llic JudiL-ury ilF|iarimcni, 
inclactiiif; ei'cn }u>Iicu of tlic pc.icc and xhrriffs ; anil ihe appoint- 
mcnl of ofiicm in ihc executive <lep.triinent, down to captains 
in the army and navy irf the State. 

In the consiiiuiion of Cforgi.i. whrTc [| \% decbrrd "ihll the 
legisUtive. exectttire. and it)<liciary depaTlmenIs sh:ill be leparate 
and (litiiinct. to that neither «xciciM lite powctR properly belong- 
ing lo ill* other." we And that the executive tlepantocnt b to be 
tilled by .ipitoiiitinentt of the Irijidaiure; anit the eiecuiii'e pre- 
ro^aiii-c of |>.ir<ioii tu be finality exerciseil by iIm.- Mine auitioriiy. 
£vcn juilke* ol Ihc peace are lu l>r ap|Kiinl<.-d by llic k^itUture. 

In citing tliesft case:*, tn which llic Icgintativr, cxcca- 
tivc, and judiciarjr departments have not b<:eii kepi 
tuUlly separate and distinct, 1 wish not to be rcj:ardcd 
jis nn adv04:ale fur the particular urganizatiuns of ibc 
several Stale (("^''^''"■"■^nts. 1 am fully aware that, 
among the many excellent principles which they ex- 
iMni»lify, they carry strong marks of the hastv, and still 
stronger of the inexperience, under which Ihey were 
framed. It is but toit obvious that in some instances 
the fundamental principle under cunsideratiun has I>cen 
violated by too sreat a mixture, and even an actual 
consolidation, of the different powers; and liiat in no 
instance lias a competent pmvi.tiun bi^en made for main- 
taining in practice the separation delineated on paper. 
What I have wished tu evince is that the charge 
brought against the proposed Constitution, of violaiinf 
the sacred maxim of free government, is warrantetl 
neither by the jkhX me^aning annexed to that tnaxim by 
il« author, nor by the sf nse in nhich it has hitherto tieea 
understood in America. This interesting subject will bc 
resumed in the ensuing paper. PuBUtn. 





l.VDhFE\DEA'CE TO D£PAX I At£,vrS. 3«7 



No. 48 [47!* <-Vn Kar* I^tJM, Ftknurr •. ttni MadisOO. 

MEANS OF GIVING INDEPENDENCE TO THE 
DIFFERENT DEPARTMKNTS. 

P*mtn tf «it Jeftirlmnil, il it nmttiM, ik*uU nW tt txtreiuJty 
antlAir—OHf Jifarlmtni it&utf nM kavt an ^f^rmtiitg ihJIikihi »ver 
anelktr — Srturily a^tinil lit invaiiirn <■/ »iu il/pa'ImtHi by isnflkrr 
ifmiiArrJ — Tir UtnUmy aj Iht Usitiatitrt I* atiftt fMi flktt Jtfnrf. 
m/Kti — Htiii^ni far Ikit — An iattitatt i</ faitfmimtnti in firgima — 
Bsfrritme ia FtHmylamia. 

Ta Iht People of Iht State of New York: 

it vas shown in llic last paper that the pohtical 
apottieKia there examinct) does not require that the 
lesiglativc, executive, and ju<Iit:iary dep;trtiiicfils should 
be wholly unconnected with each other. 1 shall under- 
take, in the next place, to show that unle ss these dcpar t- 
nients he xo Tar cuiium:tcd and hlft il'— ' "* '" g'" 
each a constitutional control over the othe rs, the decree 
uf separation winch the inaxfrn requires, as essential to 
a free guvcrinnt:nt, can never in practice be duly main- 
tained. 

it is affTCcd, on all sides, that the powers properly 
hclonging tn one "( the departiiienis ought not to he 
directly and completely administered hy either of the 
other dcpartmeals. It is equally evident that none of 
ihcm ought to possess, directly or indirecUy^ an over- 
rultn]{ inducnce over the others, in the admtitt.'ilration of 
their respective powers, it will not be denied that power 
is of an encroaching nature, and tluit it ought to he 
effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to 
it. After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several 
cUsses of power, as they may in their nature be legisla- 
tive, executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult 
task is to provide some practical secu rity for cafh 
ag ainit the invasion »! Jae_9ihet^ Wiat this security 
ought to he, is the great prohtctn to be solved. 

Will it I)e sufficient tu mark with precision the 



idcr- . 




3»8 



LEGISLATIVE VSVKPATIOK. 



[Va. «• (4T) 



bounOarics of these departments in the constitution of 
tlic government, und tu tru>t lo \\\ta,c prctiinciil harriers 
against the encroaching; spirit of power? This is the 
se<:urity which atipcare to have been principally relict) 
on by the coniftilers of most of the .American consti- 
tutions. But experience assures us that the t-Hitary 
of the provision tias been greatly overrated, and that 
some more adequate defetiiw is imlispcnsibly necessary 
for the more feeble, against the mure powerful members 
of the government. The Icgisliiti vc clcp jrtmciU is eve ry- 
wh ere exlctKl ing the BllHl'I'e of'Jts jclivity, and drawin g 
alrpowcr Illt H Irs llllWHIuiE^vo rtox. ~ 

Icrs ol our republics liarc so much merit for 
the wisdom which they have displayed thiit no task can 
be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into 
which they have fallen. A respect for truth, however, 
obliges us to remark that they seem never for a moment 
to have turned their eye« from the danger to liberty from 
the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative i>t an hered- 
itary magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary 
branch of the legislative atithoriiy. They seem never 
to have recollected the danger from legislative usurpa-| 
tions, which, by assembling all power in the same tund»,f 
must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by execu- 
tire usurpations.' 



> I'hM the Iq^nlxivr dcptrtmenl hu muglit ptniilPiKty, ■■■■I lo • 
C«<tiJ(i chiCMt Mttxc^mlly, li-t cntitmLli uii llir imwcr til lliv cinuCiv^ 
(■((atlniCBl. hiMocy t>u (lUrntf •ho'^n. Tbc niiMl mMirt'.-il nvinniHH'ii* 
haT« l>««n iboH* LOnnri-lt.i wiih ihr ikoin ti tbc EiciiiIkt. wilh liti 
poBM ol apiioiiimcnl, wilb hi* veto |i«n«T, asd ruially witl> Ike Imtf ■ 
making poucr. 

It wn ihe <nicii<kiii i>l ilw tntnen fA ihc ciHHiUuikiii llui i1i« etnliinl 
eolhsc (houlil cIkhkv the I'mMciii mtd iImi C(<at;>Gt» t!>i<u)il han no 
toncern in his clectioa I'eyond.lhT n>ctF fotnxl raoniipf; if ih' •'n'rtinil 
the «naoi>n«rni«l of ibe rciiill. Willi nbtul at c u ■■\ 

by ];railiinl uioipatlon Ciwi|^e» hiu rilcndcil ii i 

claim tbc iichi tu i;-' >— >!■- i ■!— -■■■ ■ i 

chooan, llioi iiiadii.. 

hanli; thii powct ii in 

will \rf cii-inrline \\»ia i>jlii.c llic I'fcMilcsl ociuall* rlciicd. J>Mitil] 

te^reluMc ■■! ih« uiImi ol tlic mpieiiM mhiti, f<>r. In (tUcc ol mtnlt 

!■>)■ ihit >uuni|>Ii»u o| {'iiii);m->\. iIid iniiil i ! ' iriirll a \x*t\s i 

thn mm) higli-haniled |>tKcclili|[, ubdi cctt. ..i.icd *4 mnBlH 



MldiHS] 



EXECUTIVE INTRICUR. 



339 



In a government where numerous and extemive pre- 
rogatives arc placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, 
the executive department is verjr justljr regarded as the 
source of danger, and watched witjiall the jeulous^ which 
a teal for liberty ought to inspire. In a democra cy, 
where a multitude of people exercise in person the legis- 
lative funcltonB, and are continually eipoaed, liy their 
incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted meas- 
ures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive mag- 
t»tr;ite«, tyranny may well be apprehended, on sumc 
favorable emergency, to start up in the same quarter. 
But jp fl [■yprf-;fnt:itigf ^rptllll^ |-, whr re tllC executiv e 
magistracy tx carefully limited, both in the extent iind 
the 'auration of "its power; an3 where the legislative 
poarer is exercised b v an assembly, V liich is inspired , by 



«{ Ikeflcctonl commiisiuii. Nor ii thit gru|iot [louieT ilie cmlr ■llempt 
Cangttst hat raitdc U interfere in Ihe deciion of Pretidciit. Tlie rati/ 
CongiDMtof the Union n.'niinicil (lie Tt^\ to nomliialc Ihe Pmi'lenl. aii'l 
for Iliii1]r vran turcmfully f'jrcci) vi{i»n ihc jt«o|ile iranilidkles (or 
PraideM. The tt^tUlivn enmtiy to Jickinn in 1^14 led 10 (he noiaiu*- 
tfon of ■iMlher wui.vheii the popalsr bent of the people haJ declmcil 
(or Jad^uyn ; and ulnn Jackton in ihat yeai reteii't^ a phititity ihuii];h 
not ■ majoiily of the elei:tcira1 culkce. ConiJieu. when tlic elocIi'Mi oinc 
before it. rlertwl Ailanis in \\\^ Meail. By ll'ii «t. in the wotiU of (he 
conmitinn of Maryland. " the wiil of a majiiiiy of the iintei ai well ai 
of the jicople of (be Union hai been defeaied. and tu<ih a uorm aiote 
at to hveep lackMn into power tx the neit election. I'he people 
nnuned lh« r^hl nf nomlnatton \\f nicaiit of |H>|)ii1ar ccinn-nlinnit ami 
fofcver eoilecl Ihc po>H«r ttl Con|[rtn to nominate the i*reudenl of 
■h« Vai(«l States. Il is to be wiihed thnl some eqoallv unpopular 
action in the future will reiull la the people lakioc from conijie" the 
udooDMitalioaal fancllon o( canvaating the re(urii« nf ihc electoral 
Mlle^ 

The lecond clnia of anoraptiont hai eoniiTiled in ■ peniilent endeavor 
•opia (r«Mcr control ovetapiyiiDiniciiU. llie ficit evidence of thii wai 
an atMK|:4 to detiJe on the grade of oIKce of the i\n\ diplomatic ncimlna- 
tloM, but Wathin([tan refuted to allow Ihc Smile any powec in the iiial- 
tti.aave ihaiof confirmaiion or rejection. (See JeBeronS ■■ WHlingn," 
r. l6l.) A locnnd. and recurring, invauon hai been n demand for 
docuneott on vrhkh nomineei irere selected, fiitt made aa Wadiincion. 
•ad Imi on Cleveland, and alwara refuted. Htn ihe n»vi.t utinuslorm 
ha* b«ea the Inthtenceof menihen of both hootetdiat Ihey lie allowed in 
■SUM lh« ImcbI ufliciala. which hat hven leiiiled cnly by the tlrong^ett 
anil most bonot rreatdesti. and which hai done nore to corrujit both the 
ieetilalire and cucvtive bMOchet of out (oreinment than any other one 
forre. 

Th< thin) da*> of auampilont hat boa in (be direction o( teaatnlni; ihe 



4 



3JO LF.GlSr^TiVE POnEXS EXTEJ/StyE. [»•.«(«• 

a supposed influence over the people, witb an inti-eptd 
confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently 
mimerous lu (eel all the piisuiinN which actuate » multi- 
tude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing 
the objects of its p.iBsions, by means which reason 
)>re»oril)es; It ix against the enterprising umhition of this 
depariment that the people ought to indulge all Iheir 
jcaluusy and cKliaust all their prec^tutions. 

The legislative dc]wrtniciit <lerive» a superiority in our 
governments from other circumstances. Its constitu- 
tional powers being at once more extensive, and leas 
«usceplible of precise limits, it can, with the greater 
facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, 
the cncroacUmerits which ii nukes on the co-ordinate 
depart incuts. It is not unfrequently a question of real 
nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a 
particnlar measure uill, or will nut, extend beyond the 

ra1u« of Ihc Pmii^Eiilul vfIo, b; atUchi*)* what iro ntled ** rMen' to 
apptoiiriiiinn oi odifi liUK Bi a nitllHKl of cuiapcllin^ iheninwm of the 
Pictiilt^l lo nhal lie wulii cfcoiMe to vtio. Thus, tn l8(>7. in tttc am- 
flicl lielwrrii lli« Kio-Mlml uiil Coi>i>io>i. lh« Utlcf MIulIici) (o lb(»»)r 
appropriitii'ti tiill MtUiiM^ uvlnullr •icpiiriu); llic I'IcmiIcbI (■( (bo OMi- 
msnd of ihf ntTny, ami Juhnii<t>. Ili<nigh (VDIolint;. Ftll ■.vin|Kll«l W 
i>ii:n niihet ihui i-tio the vholt IhI). Harn, wiih mart reuilutkin. 
MtcMulrely vcKicil lite >p|ifo|>riiiiioD bills onyini; liilcn. am) tlttf 
> luns ttinu;'!^ ('■•i>;;icvt ylcLIcd, Dolh Ciaiil »iiil A'llml in llwir 
ncssi4;c« ol DiKvn>t«r I. lS;j. iiiiil nnenlci 5, iHSi. iiiigeJ • CDoMinh 
rinnni ■■nentlniFni. whidi tbuiil't p«rr«nl lli« <til, liibFr by reqviriiiB 
llmt eiery bill be liiiiiuJ (u mc objnt. ot llul • itlo of sepuale IIcim 
l>« prmiliir-l. 

\jm\y. ilir Iloaw fi\ RqweicnUlivct h*s Mnvnl liino •oogbl lo 
«>>Uin » \h\rv in Irfnly-mikii'E:. If snorliiijt ■ i-oiiiiiil nvcr all lieatiei 
wliirh invnlvril rjitcsIioDs of rrvrniie. Aft(( InO); <lt<l>a>F, lh'> ilaim <"■• 
ileoitKl in tbc cnnu^ertirian ai the Jay treaty of t;9<. IihI iW inirin|[r- 
iimhI wai kuiteixIctRil lo lh« reficieiilltiiei by Ticuileiit JcAtiion 
in ihr cinxt'lciaiiun of the l.anlL;iiia ir«aiy «f 1803. «hI [toin that 
limv \'K<i l<ecn frequently )>rtiiiitl«it, 'Hie iniM notablr oiw iru tha 
Jlancaiiao miptociiy ttvaly aX 1176. which contaitinl the diatliKl 
|>r«viuaa tlut it ihoulil nc4 tike rlT«i ontil Congrcu tbould pass ut 
ai.-l 10 rarrf out tfriuiii u( its pTovuinat. So, loo. CotMjtHt bas pio* 
»o (»i u tn s'lf ■■■-■■•• -.-.i— - '.. .•.■..•- « 1(1 i«(jS, when th« FniKJk 
imiy <'^'< 'Ic' r Bii ail. and by U«s «an- 

ttaireiirn; CK'i "~ti Ihey (rlnlrd to iatmul 

coiwem : an4 itii* i>ciii nas been a|iiniit by lire iJccUioM of tbe coorlt. 
A (itaaoumsd eumple «a* Itir dunese ciduBoa ad. viXikh RitiKJf 
KDMnvcnal out imtjr with Chi>a.— Emios. 



KkdiMB] 



EXAMPLE OF yiRGlXlA. 



331 



xeculive 

■y bein^l 
•iects o7" 



legislutive sphere. On the uther side, the executive, 
power being restrained within a narrower compass, 
being more simple in its nature, and the judiciary 
described by landmarks still less uncertain, projects 
usurpation by either of these departments would iinme< 
diately betray and defeat themsdves. Nor is this all: 
as the legislative de;>artmcnt alette lias access to the 
pockets of the people, and has in some constitutions full 
discretion, and in all a prevailing influence, over the 
pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other depart- 
mcuts, a dependence is thus created in the latter which 
^vcfi still greater facility to encroachments of the 
former, 

I have appealed to our own cxp«iencc (or the iroth of what I 
advance on (his suhject. W«e il nccns.i'y (o verify ihis F:iperi> 
tntr. by particul.ir proofs, the)- miRhl he muhiplied wllhout rnd, 
I niighi find a witness In every eiiiEtrn who has shared in, or l)ecn 
attenilve lo. ihc cotine of puhlic adminUi rations. I miKht collect 
vouthew in atMiTiiUnce (toiii the tcc«nl» and archives o( c»-irry 
Sialc in the UniMi. Ilui as a more concise, and at the same lime 
equally satkdactoiy evidence, I will refer to Ihe cxainple of two 
Slates, attested by two unexceptionable auihoiitics. 

The Itrst example Is itiat of Vlr<Einia. a State whicli, as we have 
seen. ?ias exprestly decUrcd in ill coii«litiition lliat Ihe three great 
dcpannwnlK r)U(;ht onl to be inieimiied, Theauthoiity in sup- 
port of it is Mr, Ji-fferson, >vho, besides hi« other advantajres for 
remarkin;; the o^ieiatton of Ihe sovernnient. was litrnseK the chtef 
magistrrite of It. In order to convey fully Ihe itica.i with which 
his experience had impressed him on this subject, tl will be neces- 
sary 10 quote a parage of some kngth from his very inteiestiiii; 
" Notes on the State of Virginia," ]>. 195. " All the powers of 
government— l«)!i»talive, executive, and jadiciarj — result to the 
hgislaltve bo<ly. The concrniraiing these in the same hands is 
precisely tlie definition of tleipotlc government. It will be no 
alteviaiion thai these powers will be exercised by a pluraliiy of 
hands, and not by a single Mie. One hundied and seventy-three 
despots would turcly be ax oppreuive as one. L.ei those who 
doubt it turn iheir eyes on the republic i>f Venice. As little will 
ii avail us ihai ihcy are chosen by ourselves. An tUclive ■/»- 
p»lism was not the government we (ought for. but one which 
sliould nol only be (ouniled on free principles, hut in which Ihe 
powers of gnvernaieiit should be so divided and balanced among 



«*. 



33* 



COVffClL OF C£ffSOKS. 



iir«.«(«) 



tevcfnl boilies of magisirncy as thai no one could trsntc^mt their 
lct:al limit) wiihoul bcriis cflcctually checked and nslraincrf l)y 
ihe others. For (Kis rcxson. (hat conventton which iusmiI ihe 
oiiliiiance o( t;uvcriiiiient laht itj> (ouiwlation on ihb h*M. (hat 
Ihe Icgiitiiiivc. cxecuiire. and judiciary dcpitrimrnit ttiouki be 
»C|>*rate and <1iti(iiicl, so thai no pason should exeteikeibe poweis 
of more tli.tn one of lliciii ai Ihe same lime. Bui «i» barrtfr wai 
pr-n'idal ivinveH /■**■« irtfral p^OMti. The judiciaiy ami the 
occuiive meiiihcrs we-re left (kpcndcnt on Ihe Icgisl.iliTr (or their 
fubsLMencc in office, aiitl Mine ol ihcfn for their continuance in tl. 
If. therefore, the Icgistatiire auunic* execulire and jodiciarf 
jioirven, no opposition ia likely to be made ; nor. it made, eari be 
cITcclual : because, in that ca.ie, they may put their procecdinf^s 
into Ihe form of acts ol AsM-mMy. which will rcn<ler ihctii obbf>a- 
lory on the other brandies. They lure accord iiiKly, in many in- 
WAnce^.iUeiJfd rights which should have been left \ojit4i(t«ry 
(anlr^utrty, mut M* tiirtclUn «/ Iht txtcutn-e, during tht vMt 
timt 0/ tktir ituion. ii beco«iiag habitual and familiar." 

Tlie Other Stale which I ^luli lake (01 an example is i'ennsyl- 
vania ; and the other authority, the Council ol Censors, which 
Mieinbtetl in the years 1783 and 17S4. A part of (he duly of (Hi 
body, as marked out by the consiiiuikm, was ~ to inquire wheiher 
(he conitilulioo lud been presctred inviolate in every part ; and 
whether Ihe )rgisl;ilit*c and executive branched of gmcrnnienl had 
peifuinied llieir duty a& guanlians of (he |>eople. or asMtmcd to 
themselves, or cxctcitetl. other or greater powers than they are 
entitled to by the consiiiuifun." In the execution of this trust iha 
council were necesaaiily led (o a cotniurison «( both the leglHUiirQ 
and executive pruccc^lings, wilh (lie const i(u(ional power» ul tliese 
dcpadmenis ; and from the facis enumerated, and to ihe irulh ol 
most of which both sides in llw council subscribed, it appears thai 
Ihe constitution had been flagramily violated by the k^isUiare in a 
variety ol im|>OTtant instances. 

A greal number ol laws had been passed, notating. without any 
apparent necessity, the rule recjuiiing iliat all bills of a public 
nature shall be previously printed for the c on sidr ration of (lie 
peopk 1 although this is one ol the piecautlons chietly )clie<l on by 
tl>c constiluliun against improper acts ol (he Icgistalure. 

The constitutional iri.il by jury had been violated, and powcn 
assumed which had not been delegated by (he constitution. 

Cxecuiire powers had been usurped. 

The salaikt of ihe judges, which (he constitulion expressly r«- 
4iiurca to be 6xcd. Iiad bcim occas*oaally raricd : and cases belimg- 



KaAlMHl 



Pe/tKSYLVA.\IA EXECUTIVE, 



333 



ing to ihc jmlici.-iry department frequently Or^wn within rgijialivc 
cognioincc ani) iletcrinriialion. 

Thtwe who with to »ce the levctal p^rttcuUrs fallini; iin<ler 
each o( iKcse hejtU may consult iHc jomn.il&of ilic council, which 
are in ptini. Some i>l Ihein. it will be [ouii<l. may he ttn|iiiiahl« lo 
peculijr circiims<Anc«t connected with the war ; but the greater 
pan o( them may be contidetcd iii the spoiilaneoits shoots oltin 
ni-cuiistiiuied govern me I) I. 

It appeals. alM), tliil the CKecutive department had hut been 
innocent o( tieqiiciii briMchcs of the coitstiiutioii. There are three 
DhieiYaliuni, however, which oujihl 'o be made on tliii hrad : first, 
a grtal proportion o( the instances were either iinmoili-Ucly pro- 
duced by the necenitiei o( the vow. or leeoinmended hy ConjjrcM 
01 the commander-in-<:hiet ; st<0H/Uy, in most of the other inManccs, 
they conformetl eithei to the decl.iretl or the known itentimcntv of 
the legislative (iep.-irlmcnt: tkirMy, the cxeculii'e departnient o( 
I'eTiniylvania is dlstinguiiihed from tliat o( the other Stales by the 
niimhcT of mcinhers ronipiuing it. In this rctvpecl. it lias as inildl 
affinity to a legisUtirc »sscrnl>ly as to an executive council. And 
being M once riempt fmin the restraint of an ir>ilindual rcsponsi- 
biliiy foe the .ictiol the body, and derivinj; confidence from mutual 
example and joint influence, im.iulhniiied meavires wnuld. of 
course, be more freely haunled than where the ejccuirve depart- 
raent is administered hy a single hand, or t>)' a few hamU. 

The concliiMon whti'h i nm warntnted in <!rawing from 
these observations is thai -Tmrr^, ilcmarration on 
pa rchmem of the const itm ^fn,i| umitt nf thr irTT-Til, 

"department)! is tw ^t ^ ffi^ffirient jTimrd ;^y aiii<t ^ho gc 

e ocr oachmcnts wbic:h l<;p d f" a tj-Tanniiai ronr'''"^^''"n_ 
of all the powers tjf governm r"* ■" '''^ camo lumie 



APPEAL rO THE PEOPLE. 




No. 49 I48I. </-*/»•*«(/•—«/. rtfcnuiT *. iiM.) Madison (?) 

PROBABLE EXCESSIVE INFLUENCE OF THB^ 
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. 

nwtfdy^ Vtry daHgermi ami ntiltii t/tta /rt^iuntlf uff-HfJ—Hnufiti 
fer Ihit — Wkm ttuk afftali art tiif/al — A/narti m grtaiiMtat itffitall 

7> /*«■ P/vfiU of the Stale «/ A'ew Ym-k: 

The author ol the *' Notes on the State of Virginia," 
quoted in the last paper, has stibjoinccl to tiMt valuatile 
work the draiiglii of a constitution which hati been pre- 
pared in order to be laid before a convention expected to 
be called in 1 jSj, by the legislature, for the establishment 
«if a ci)n»titution for that comniunwciillh, The plan, 
like cverifthing from the same pen, marks a turn nf think- 
ing, original, comprehensive, and accurate; and is the 
more worthy of attention as it equally displays a fcrTciit 
attachment to republican government and an enlightened 
view of the dangerous propensities against nhich it ought 
to be guarded. One of the precautions which he pro- 
pones, and on which he appears ultimately lc rely as a 
palladium to the weaker departments of power againtt 
the invasions of the stronger, is perhaps altogether Itis 
own, and, as it immediately relates to the subject of our 
present inquiry, ought not to be overlooked. 

His proposition is " that whenever any two of the 
three branches of government shall coucur in opinion, 
each by the voices of two-thirds of their whole number, 
that a convention is necessary for altering the conslilu- 
tion, or eo'reeting ireaehes oJU, a convention shall lie tailed 
for the purpose." 

As tlie people are the only legitimate fountain of 
power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, 
under which the several branches of government huld 
their |K>wt:r, is derived, it seems strictly consonant tu 
the republican theory to recur to the same original 



M«di*a*f1>1 OHjeCTIONS TO XECUJtffEXCE. 335 

authority not only whenever It may be necessary to 
enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of the govcrn- 
mcni, but also whcncverany unc of the (fcpartments may 
commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of 
the others. Ttic several departments bciuj; perfectly 
co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, 
none of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exritisire 
or superior rijhi of settling the boundaries between their 
respective powers; and how arc the encroachments of 
the stronger to be prevented, or the wrongs of the 
weaker to be redressed, without an appeal to the peo- 
ple themselves, who, as the grantors of the commission, 
can alone declare its true meaning and enforce its ob- 
scrrancc? 

1'here is certainly great force in this reasoning, and it 
must be all<)we<l to prove that a constitutional road to 
the decision of the people ought to be marked out and 
kept open for certain great and extraordinary occasions. 
But there appear to be insuperable objections against the 
prnpoiccd reourrenee to the people as a provision, in all 
cases, for keeping the several departments of power 
within their constitutional limits. 

In the first place, the provision does not reach the 
case of a combination of two of the drpartmcnts against 
the third. If the legislative authority, which possesses 
so many means of operating on the motives of the other 
departments, should be able to gain to its interest either 
of the others, or even one-third of its memlwrs, the 
remaining department could derive nu advantage from 
its remedial provision. I do not dwell, however, on this 
objection, because it maybe thought to be rather against 
the modification of the principle than against the princi- 
ple itself. 

In the next place, it may be considered as an objection 
inherent in the principle tliat, as every appeal to the 
IM people would carry an implication of some 

lt*.W. defect in the government, frequent appeals 

would in a great measure deprive the government o( 
that veneration which time bestows on everything, and 



336 



D/STUKBAXCS OF TRAXQUILLITY. tll«.«««) 



without which pcrhnfus the wisest and freest gavcromvnU 
waiilO nut pussess llic requisite stubilit}'. If it br trtic 
that all ijovernmenu rest on opinion, it is no Ici-s truc 
that the strength of opinion in each inttividaal, and its 
practical influence on hts conduct, depend much on the 
numher which he supposes to have entertained the tame 
opinion. The reason of man, like man himself, is timid 
and cautious when left alone, and acquires rirmness and 
confidence in proportion to the number with whicli it is 
associated. When the examples which fortify opinion 
are atuitnt as well as ntmerout, they are known to have a 
double efTect, In a nation of philosophers, this coii> 
sidcration ought to be disregarded. A reverence for the 
laws would be sufTicienily inrulcatcil by the roicc of an 
enlightened reason. But a nation of philosophers is as 
little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings 
wished (or by Plato, And in every other nation the 

roiost rational government will not find it a superSuous 
advantage to have the prejudices of the community OD 
its side. 

The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity |iy 
interestin); too strongly the public passiuns is a still 
more serious objection against a frequent reference of 
constitutional questions to the decision of the whole 
society, Not withstanding the succcks which hasattrnded 
the revisions of our established forms of government. 
and which docs so much honor to the virtue and intelli- 
gence uf the people of America, it must be confessed that 
the experiments are of loo ticklish a nature to be 
unnecessarily multiplied. We arc to recollect th.ii all the 
existing consiitulioiut were formed in the midst uf a 
danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly to 
order and concord; of an enihusiaslir confulrnce uf the 
people in their patriotic leaders which Milled the 
ordinary diversity of opinions on great national qacs- 
tiuns; of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms, 
produced by a universal resentment and Indifniation 
against the ancient government; and whilst no spirit of 
parly connected with the changes to be made, or tlie 




Mftdl»kin| COftST/TUTlOXAl EQUILIBRIUM. 3j7 



abuses to be reformed, coultl mingle its leaven in Die 
operation. The future sttautinns in which wc inu»t 
expect, tu be usually placed, do not present any equivalent 
security against the danger which is apprehended. 

But the greatest objection of all is that the decisions 
which would probably result from such appeals would not 
answer the purpose of maintaining the con^^titulional 
equilibrium of the government. We have seen that the 
tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandize- 
ment tif the k-gislative at the expense of the other 
departments. The appeals to the people, therefore, 
would usually be made by the executive and judiciary 
deparlmcnts. But whether made by one side or the 
other, would each side enjoy equal advantages on 
the trial? Let us view their different situations. The 
members of the executive and judiciary departments 
are few in number, and can be personally known tu a 
sm^ll part only of the people. The latter, by the mode 
of their appointment, as well as by the nature and 
permanency of it, are too far removed from the people 
to share much in their prepossessions. The former are 
generally the *>bjccts of je-:dou«y, and their administra- 
tion is always lia oi ^ to be discolored and rendered 
unpopular. The members of the legislative department, 
on the other hand, .ire numerous, They arc distributed 
and dwell among the people at large. Their connec. 
tions of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance em- 
brace a great proportion of the most influential part of 
the society. The nature of their public trust implies a 
personal influence among the people, and that they arc 
more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights 
ind liberties of the people. With these advantages, it 
can hardly be supposed that the adverse party would 
have an equal chance for a favorable issue. 

Hut the legislative party would not only be able to 
plead their cause most successfully with the people. 
They would probjibly be constituted themselves the 
judge*. The same inHuencc which had gained them an 
election into the legislature, would gain them a seat in 



338 



rOPUlAg REASO/f A/fD PASSIONS. liro.«f«> 



the (convention, if this shoaM not be the rase vith all. 
It woultl probably he the aise wiih many, ami pretty 
certainly with those leading characters on whom every- 
thing depends in such bodies. The convention, in short, 
would be compDud chiefly of men who had been, who 
actually were, or who expected to be, members of the 
dc[><irtmcnl whose conduct was arr.nigned. They would 
consequently be [parties to the very question to be decided 
by them. 

It might, huwevej-, somelinics happen that appeals 
would tw made tinder circumstances l«s adverse to the 
cxcculive and judiciary departments. The usurpations 
of the legislature might be so flagrant and so sudden as 
to admit o( no speciouit Coluring. A strong party among 
themselves might take side with the other branches. 
The executive power might be in the hands of a peculiar 
favorite of the people.' In such a posture of thingv, the 
public decision might be le«s swayed by prepossessions 
in favor of the legislative party. But still it could never 
be expected to turn on the true merits of the question. 
It would inevitably be connected with the spirit of pre- 
existing parties, or of parties springing out of the ques- 
tion itself. It would be connected with persons of 
distinguished character and extensive influtitce In the 
community. It would be pronounced by the very men 
who had t>cen agents in, or opponents of, the measures 
tn which the decision would relate. The/ii/i/i'W, there- 
fore, not the rtasft. of the public would sit in judgment. 
Uut it is the reason, atone, of the public, that ought to 
control and regulate the government. The passinos 
ought to be controlletl and regulatri) by the govrrnmrnt. 

We found in the Ia«t paper, that mere declarations in 
the written constitution arc not sufficient to restrain the 
several dejiartmenls within their legal rights. It appean 
in this that occ:asional appeals to the people wuuld be 



' Mr. RrfM, wMli adiainbl^ dHmntlnitina. annU llol 
tbv Ptni-lFDl n trnk ■■"' ' <npeB b«bi to t>v|Mnin(0R 

Ike Eic<uiivc Chiel. a ffOKOuiAj (Uuii^ ha MR 

Lee]) the tx£:ibtutc at l»i - l.i.->iua.. 



MtilimD) /.VFRACTIO.VS OF COXSTJTUTIOX. 



339 



neUli«r a proper nor an effectual provUion for that pur- 
pose. How far thr provifiions of a diffL-rcnt nature con* 
twined ill the plan atxive quoted might be 4(lei|iiute, I do 
not eiamine. Some of thcra arc uiMiuestionably lounded 
on sound political principles, and all of Ihcoi arc framed 
with singular ingenuity and precision. l*t;DLiiJ& 



To. 50 [49]. t-vw r*r»ys,ttt. Ptkuwy 5. ifW.) Madison (?) 

PKRIOniCAL CORRKCTINO OF INFRACTIONS 
OF THE CONSTITUTION. 



Tht mtriti and JuaJvamlagti */ i^rt mml Unf inltrmU — Bxamplt */ 
Piumxlsinia. 

Ta the Ptaffe of Ike Stale 0/ AVw Yark: 

It niay be oontemled, perhaps, that instead of 0(«tshial 
appcaU to the people, whith arc liable to the objections 
urged againttt them, ffiiiK/ual a|>pcals arc the proper and 
ude(|uate nieanH ol firevenling and eorrtding in/racthni of 
fke Conslitulwn.* 

It will be attended to that, in the examination of these 
expedienlii, I confine myself to thetr aptitude fur tnfare- 
ing the Constitution, by keeping the several departments 



' AJlhoDgli BO «(>«ciai proviHon (or peiiodlol r«iition o( ili« cooditik- 
don »a« prorided in ihM intimincnl.iippMU (or a coHvenlioH to rt^*pe 
liie j;i>i>emnc«l b(Ve been tc4iiirE<it iitlh cocli «(>|i«Enl uiitit. tlrin 
li«f»«« <bc ■cl'ipr^'ci i>l like foJi-(«J coii'ililHiifXi. iX\ c]('|u.i»cutt utgrd the 
<aUia|' 111 * oniirnliiKt in tviit« il Ivc 1-^ I'. Siiiilli'i " Th« Morelncnl 
lovutli ■ Scconi) Cmiitrlulmnnl Cnnvvnlion in 17SS~ |ln Jamcwin't 
"EusT^ in tiKConMiliilioiul llitiurrol the UniicdMun." lUq] ). In 
Iheconinttd cIcciiMiiif I So I. the KcpiiMioii* ilitcirrncil lu " invilo " a 
<QnvcnIK)n vKkh " wiiol.l lnvr rCMircil tli« (^onitlituliuii wh*re il WM 
•Irfrctive an') ornntA il tip ij^ain. ' >i<<l l!io (tar o( whnl in cvlnlvi^l 
lioily. oiifiBMinc frooi >u<h ■ call, night do to ihe (r>ine at KOvcrnmcM. 
pfoduccd a proAipl urrcnder on the pan of Ihc Fedcialiiti. Tlie Hail- 
iiird ooavcnllam, ia iSt^. fcmnunondod a tcvulon al (he conHilulion. 
Ttl« Squtli Ciiiilina rtinieeliiXi ui IS^I. m ili kIiIctu (v ibc tlato, 
annlnl that thv oidy atlcniaiit-r to ■ mtHlititaliQn of the laiifl wonld be 
" ihr call for ■ fenctal coflvrntion oi ill Ihe ital»." In 1861 the Peace 
<a(i(ercnce. called h; the bo<det il*l«. Irancd a tctiei ol araeadntnlt 
tu Uic coiiulluiion (tec AppcnUli). — Eiiiiua. 



340 



PERIODICAL REVISION. 



Ula.M(M: 



of power within their due bounds, without particuUirly 
considering tlicm as provi^ii^ns fur altering the Constitu- 
tion ilSL-lf. It) the first view, jppeals tii the jicuplc aX 
fixcil periods appear to be nearly as inelisibie ait appeals 
on puTticular occasions as they emerge If the pcriodh 
be separated by short intervals, the measures to be 
reviewed and rectified will have been of recent date, ami 
will be connected wiih all the circumstances which tend 
to vitiate and pervert the result of occasional revisions. 
If the periods be distant from each other, Ute same 
remark will be applicable to alt recent measures; and in 
proportion u» the remoteness of the others may favor a 
dispassionate review of them, this advantage is inse|>ara- 
blcfrom inconveniences which seem to counterbalance iL 
In the first place, a distant prospect of public censure 
would be a very (eehle restraint on power from those 
excesses to which it might be urged by the force of 
present motives. Is it to be imagined titat a Icsislative 
assembly, consisting of n hundred or two huttdrrd 
members, caijerly bent on some favorite object, and 
breaking thruugh the rcstrainls of the Constitution in 
pursuit of it. wonid be arrested in their career, by too- 
LSiderations drawn from a censorial revision of their con- 
duct at the future distance of ten, filteen, or twenty 
years? In Ihc next plare, the abuses would often have 
completed thetr mischievous effects before the remedial 
provision would be applied. And in the last place, where 
this might not be the case, they would be of Inni; stand- 
ing, would have taken deep root, and would not easily be 
extirpated. 

The scheme of revising d)c consiilution. in order In cotreel 
recent breacltes <A it. a* well as for Mlier j>ui{iuscs. Ims been 
Hciiiall)- tiini in one <rf the Siaies. One of Ihc objects of the 
Council of Censor* whkh met in l>cnn!irlvaiiia In 1783^1x1 n%^ 
wn». a* we Uxn %eeu. to inquire " whether (be cauuitutiiMi bail 
bent vioUleil. ant] whether the legitbOfr finil exrcuiive dcpail- 
mcnt* hill cncriMchecl uii encli otlicr." Tliii iiupunant aint nurd 
eji|>ctiineni in puUlici merits, in iievcr4l poiiio of vinv. vrtj 
paiticular aiicniian. Id some of them it may. itcth.-iju 
rtjit-ilntrni. niaJt under elrcura«a»cr« nomcwkii p- ■ .1- 



MidiMndjI COUI/CIL f/Or HARMONtOUS. 34t 

ihuught lo b« not absoiu(«ly codcIusjvc. Bui a» applied to the 
CUR uniler con uil en lion, il involves some f.icls. which I venture lo 
remark, at » compkic and aaiisbciory illuatratioa of the reasoning 
which I have employe*!. 

Firil. Il appears, from Ihe names o( itic gcnllemcn who com- 
posed tlic council, that some, M IcAti. of iiK most active and le;id- 
111^ niemlicr& had also bc«ii active and leading; chatactcisjn the 
parlie* which pfe-eiialed in the Slate. 

Sri^niify, It appcati that the same active and leading members 
of the council had been active and intlucntial members of ilie 
legislative and executive branches, within the period to be reviewed. 
;inil even patiuni Of opponent* of the very measures to be ihus 
brought to the icsl ol the Consliiuiion. Two of the nicmbers had 
iKcn vice pre>>ideoli o( ihe Stale, and several others members of 
live eieculive council, within the seen prcceilitig years. One of 
them had been speaker, and a number of others dislinHubhcd 
mi:ml>rr^. of the leeiflalivc astemhiy within the xamt^ period. 

TkirJfy. Every page ol iheir p(oceeding» witnesie* the effect 
of all these circumsiance« on the temper of their de libera I ions. 
Thrmighoui tlic continuance of the council, it waa split tnio two 
filed and violent parties. The fact is »cknowledged and lamented 
by tlw-mMlves, Had this not been ihc case, the face of tlieir pro- 
ceedings exhibits a proof equally Mtisfactor}'. In .ill qiiesi ions, 
however uninipurlaTil in ihemielvcs, or unconnected with each 
Other, the same n.imrt al.ind invariably contrasted on the opposite 
culum'i«. Evr-iy unbiased observer may infet. without danger of 
mixiakc. and at the fiante time without mc.-ining to icflect on either 
parly, or any liulivnluals of either parly, that, unfortunately, 
paitiam, not reaion. mu»l have presided over their decisions. 
When men eccrcise their reason coolly and (reely on a vaiiely of 
ilislinci qtieitioni. they inevitably fall into different opinions on 
some of them. When ihey are governe^l by a common passion, 
ibeir opinions, if they are so to be culled, will be ibe same. 

Faurlkfy. It is at lensi problematical whrlher the decisions o( 
this Imdfi do not. in several instances, niiscunslrue llic limits 
prescribed for the lc|{isla!ivc anil eiecutivr deparlmenis, instead of 
leduciivg aitd Inniiing ihem within their constitutional places. 

Fifthly. I have never understood thai ihe decisions of the 
council on const iiutional questions, wliether lightly or erroneously 
formed, have had any effect in varying the practice foundeil on 
legiUalivc consinKtIoas. Il even appears, if I mistake not. that 
in one instance the contemporary legislature dcnieil the construc- 
tions of the council, and actually prevailed m the contest, 



M» 



BALAXCE OF DE PA KT. WESTS. flTo.ftKkl) 



Ttiis cfflsorial body, tlierefote. provs aX the same lime, by '«% 
reMAfchi!s. (hi; cxisirncc of tlic illscate, and, b)r lis rxainple. ihr 
incfficaiy <i( the reiii«ly. 

This conclusion cannot be iniat'itaicit by allrging iKai th« Statr 
in wliich the exjieiiincnt wax mnde was at thai crisU. ami li»d 
b«en for a, long time before. vJolcnily heated nml ditlncierf \tf the 
rage of juirty. Is ii to be presumed ttut, at any future septennial 
eprwh, the s.imc Slnte will be free froru pnrtW? Is ll to he pic- 
*umeil lliiil any other Stale, at the »»ine or any other given penud, 
wllHic exempt from them? Siicli in ceenl ought to lie neither 
•lumeil nor desirciJ ; ber^use an extinction otpailiei neceiuatily 
hnplic^ cither a tmivcrt-tl alarm for the puUic tafety. or an abso- 
lute eitinctioh of libefty. 

Were the precaution taken of excludin£ from the 
assemblies elc<;te(l by the people to revise the preceding 
adniiiiiNlriitton of tlir government, all (>:rrtiirnK who should 
have been concerned witi) the government wiiliin ihe 
given period, the difficulties would not be ubviulcd. 
The important task would probably devolve un men, 
who, with iitferiur oipaeitieit, would in other respects l>c 
little belter qualified. Although ihcy might not have 
been personally concerned in the administration, atHl 
therefore not immediately agents In the measures to Iw 
examined, they would probably have been involved in 
the parties conncctrti with these measures, and have 
been elected under their auspices. 

Pt'BUUS. 



No. 51 I50]. (/j>AyfW>-f/wHi/.F(knMry«, ■)««.) Kfatlison (?) 

MKTIIOD OK BALANCING THE DEPARTMENTS 
OF GOVERNMENT. 

MfJti f/ M^im'i'x "uitaJ ikfttt inJ htJtiKtt—Ai/itamU/cej of Ik 
JtJtml gvprmmtiil in if.ttriiig tkt riflUi ef Ik/ fffk — Ihviiitn rf tk» 
dfltgalrd ptvtri—DifftrtHi iattretit amoaf iktftefli. 

Ta Ike Pri'ph of ihr Staff 0/ Xev Yi^rk: 

To what exjietlient, then, shall we finally resort, (or 
saini.iining in practiee the necessary partititm of p^.iwer 
imong the Mveml departments, as laid down in the Cou> 



ll»lbcn.M FSKEDOM OF EACH DEFARTMEXT. 



343 



stiuititiii? The only answer that can be given is, that a* 
all these exterior provisions art" found to be inadc<]liaI(^ 
the defect must be su|){)licc], by so conirivin); tlic intcHoA 
structure oi tht; government as that Iia several oun -1 
gut uent j>arts may, by their qiiitual rflation-t, ye tbcj 
niffS ns of keeping <l^\ other in their propt-r pla ces. 1 
WifRont presuming to undertake a fnll development ofl 
thiK im[>orlant idea, 1 will haxard a few general observa- 
tions, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light and 
enable us to form a more correct jmlgmenl of the prin- 
ciples and siruelare of the govcrnmeni planneil by th^ 
conventioD. 

In order to by a iltic foundation for that separate and 
<Ii»lin<:t exercise of the dilferciil powers of govcrnmeni, 
which to a certain extent is adniiltcil on all kinds to be 
essential to the preservation of liberty, i t is evident th at 
each dep artment should have a will of Jls own, and cOn- 
scfprentiy sliimlt i he s<i constitutpl that the ip^^bcrs ijT 
cacti should have as-JittIc ajjency a* pu9_si]}lc in the 
a npoi^twicnt of t he m cinbers of the others. Were this 
plTni'iple rigorously adTiereil to, it wuuhl require that 
all the appointments for the supreme executive, le^ift- 
lative, and jadiciary m^gislracies shoul d be drawn from 
the same fountain of authority, lJl<r^^^*-'> through 
channels havinj; no communication whatever with one 
another. I'crliaps such a plan of consiruiling the several 
dt:|>arimen(s would lie le.-u> diflicull in practice tiun il 
may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, 
and some additional expense would attend the cxceuli<m 
of it Some deviations, therefore, from the principle 
mu!(t be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary 
dcpartrocot in particular, it might be inexpedient 
to insist rigorously on the principle: lirst, because 
peculiar qualification* being essential in the members, 
the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode 
of choice which best secures these qualifications; sec- 
ondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appoint- 
ments arc held in that department, must soon destroy all 
sense of depcadeace on the authority conferring them. 




ENCKOACHUBSr OX PfeRHOCATiVE. UlftSl (M) 

I t is equally ev ident tliiU the rocmlxrit <jf ca<:li depart; 
mcpt Sliould l>e as mile clepcniJent as po^sibh: on those 
o f the o thers for the emoluments ^annexed to their 
ofliccs. Were the cxeeulivc magistrate, or the jucl]{e&, 
fRTr*tn(lct>endeHt of the legisluturc in this particular, 
their- independence in everj other would be merely 
Siotninal. 

Uut the great security against a gradual conccnlration 
of the several jxiwers in the »anic de^rtmcnt con* 
»ists ill giving to thuse wl>n adminj^jyr each Oej;^r t- 
mcnt the necessar y constiiutional means aiMJ pers onal 
iin HIVcs to resist encroachments of the others. The 
provision for defenite niiist in this, as in all other cases, be 
made corainenstiratc to the danger of attack. _Ambitiop 
must be made to counteracl ambitio n, 'flic interest of 
dT^ iiiati muttt be connected with the consiiiuiiiroafTlghta 
dI the place' It may be a reflection on human nature 
that such devices siiould be necessary to control the 
abuses of government. Hut what is government itself, 
but the greatest of alt reHections on human nature.* If 
men were angels, no government would be necessary. If 
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
Controls on government would be necessary. In framing 
3 government which is to be admhiislered by men over 
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you mtiiti first en- 
able the government to control the governed; and in 
the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence 
on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on tlrt 
g'lvirrnment; hut experience has taught mankind Ihe 
necessity of auxiliary precautions. 

This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival 



■ TbI* ImilniiT of iIm uttM-hoUw H iwlx sncnxuhntiU nn hU Mra 
ptEroguiKs, nai to eaitl«RVM 1o iDcnili* ku "irn innxi . n »• unii*ml 
lh»l 11 icMreelT ncnl* JllwiliMion. TVwfh JeBerwii' i«nir (" I'lr nr^- 
Jencv pledjpfl lo mliKc In powcn, (ionvcmeiit Mwri* \i- i 

In (mm iKe ^itiilMlnlily of bik " illumtiliiiE " ptmcr, " Wr rr-.i . ' 

iliK Ami'clkin whitli iprkiOffier, loth"' 

•Bil litnt! pnwc'l liii torrvclBpn. For - ^ 

aiUpil tu tne infliKKMoI ihc ft«ultrc. 111:1 u? oiicri :i[v<rTi(kc>i iij iiiifc* 
fen in the tcfiilttiTt ukI juJiciiJ dcjKUtmeuit. — Euiii^K. 



£ 



BtdUwttlH PREOOMINANCB OF LEGISLATURE. 345 

intercEts, the <lefc(;t*-t)f better motives, might be traced 
through itie irliule sj-Mem of tiuiiuin ulfairx, prtvale as 
well as public, Wc see it particularly displayed in all 
the subordinate distributions of power, whcrv the con- 
stantaim \% to divide and arrange ttie several offices in 
such a manner as that each may be a check on the other 
— that the private interest of every individual may be a 
sentinel over the public rights. Tlteite invrntiniix of 
prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of 
the supreme powers of the State. 

Uut it is not possible to give to each department an 
equal power of self-defense. In r^|^ );hlican i-nvi-rnmrin , 
the legislative aiH >">riiy r-— -— ^■:--'-iiy pi-^t^^imt-, — 4- 1, ,. 
remedy for t his incorivciiji^ncv j^ '," rliyiilr- iln- i<-]Tt«]^.|tiii-^ 
t ^l" ilillercnt brjnc[f ca: and to render them, by different 
modes of election and different principles of action, as 
little cohnecied with each other 3.*. the nature of ihejr 
common fancilons and their common dai>eiidence on the 
society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard 
against dangerous encroachments by still further pre- 
cautions. As the weight of the legislative authority re- 
quires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the 
executive may require, on the other hand, that it should 
be fortified. An absol 'itc n n: T'vr "n the legisla ture ap- 
pears, at first view, to be tn" lunural defense with which 
llic executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps 
it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufRcienl. 
On ordinary occasions it might not )>e exerted with the 
requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions jt 
might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an 
.ibsotute negative be supplied by some ^ i j:^lirie<l rt>q pis-- 
ti on between th is wr^lfif cl<-pi>rtiiir'fit unA \\^^ wi-^^r^ 
bra nch ')! the stro^pcr fl<- ]i;irrinrni, jiy whirh the latter 
may be led to support the consiitutioiuil rights of the 
former, without being too much detached from the rights 
of its own department? 

If the principles on which these observations are 
founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they 
be applied as a criterion to the several State constitu- 



*\ 





SiCffTS OP MiXOK/TV, 



UI«.Sli»ft 



lions, and (o the ('^;]lf^al rmmit.ni»n it will be [uund 

thai if the Utter docs ni>t perfectly currespand with 

^^ them, the former are intinilely ies§ itblc to bear such a test. 

There are, lU'ireovcr, t wo conoid era tiims iMtrliriil arlv 

applicable to the fcd^''^'^ system of ^ nirrir:>, tt-hi. I| Qltttrr 

that system in a very interesting puint of view. 
~ t-irsi. In a single repiniTic, M the power surrendered 
I* by the people is submitted to the administration uf n 
single government; iind the usurpations are guarded 
agitiiist by a division of the j{overninciit into distinct and 
separate departments. In the compound republic of 
America, the power surrcndcrt-d by the people is firsl 
divided between two drxtinct governments, and tlien the 
/ portion allotted to each subdivided amon£ distinct and^ 
separate dcp,irtmcnts. Hence a double security aris 
Ni ^}ii-. riyiils iif yhe pi-iipli*. The dllfi-retlt ^;Mvrrnq7fnl < 

'^"|| I ' " I '•'■; | t othpr , a t [til- -■>».» tin... ii...^ rn ''*\ wit 

be controlled t|y vt scl f . 

Secnitt/. U is of great importance in a republic not' 

only to guard the wiciety aj^ain^t the oppression «f its 

rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the 

injustice of the other part, Iliffrjm ) intrrnits ncrcy 

s ardy exist in dilfercnt clashes of citiacns. If a miiioHly J 

i t.be iiniteil by a c<)mnion interest, the rights of. Uie 
miiiijiity will be insecure . There arc but two methixls of 
providing against this evil; the one by creating a wiO 

■ in the community tmlependent of the majority — tliat 
is, ol the society itself; the other, by comprchemling 
in th e sf>ci civ ■^(^ jii.-inY ti-paratc descnpiiims i>f tiii^c n^ 
as will reniier an unjust rombinalion uf a ni.tinr itT "f 

ll not imprifJiratili- Thc 

all governments possessing 
an hereditary or self-appointed authority. 'I'hi«, at 
best, is but a precarious se<!urity; becaosc a power 
independent of ihc society may as well cspuuic Utc 
iinjnst views uf the major, as the rightful interests of 
(tie minor party, and may possibly be turnc<I ' 

both parties. The second mclh(«l will be cxemi ■ 

the federal republic of the Uniied States. Whilst ati 



* first method prevails in 




■ 



MkdlHBiDI JUSTICE THE END OP SOCIETY. 34? 

aulhurity in h will be derived from and dcp«ndL-nt on the 
society, the society itself wilt be broken into so in.iny 
parts, lOlcresls, and eb^cs of ^ili/cns tli.il Ihc riKhl» ~ 
of individnul^ or of tlic minority, will be in litlle d.iujfer 
from interested cumbinatiuns of the mujority. In a free 
government the security fur civil rights must be the 
Mine »*■ th;iL for rclixioun ri^bts. It consists in the one 
case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in 
the muUi pi icily of sects. ''"'— dnj-^ir" tif ■^ n'"'^''V '" ^'"' h 
gases will (Icptrnd on the nuinbcr of mti T^ ;;^^^ .^m] m:( is: 
diid this nuiy lit- iirt^Minied to drjiciul im iIil- extent of 
roiintry anil number of people Lompri.-heiuki.l qpdpr thij 
%.ittii- gnvi-riiiii<-ij . I Ins vicn- iil the subject must par- 
tiLUIai'ly r<:>:onimend a |>ropi;r federal sy.tlem to all the 
sincere and considerate friends of republican ijovcrn- 
ment, since it shuirs that in cxaet proportion as the 
territory of the Union may be formed into more circum- 
scribed Confederacies, or Slates, oppressive a>inbina- 
tions of 3 majority will be facilitated; the best sveiiriiy, 
under the republican forms, for the rights of every class 
of citiitcns will be diininii^hed; and consequently the 
stability and independence of some member of the 
government, the orily other security, must be propor- 
tionally increased. ^Justice is the end of government. 
It is the end of civil societyj It ever ha* tieen and ever 
will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be ' 
Inst in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which 
the stronger faction can readily unite and n|)preKS the 
weaker, anarchy may as -truly be said to rciKii as in a 
st^ie of niiture, where the wc.-iker individual is not 
secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, 
in the latter stale, even the stronger individuals are 
prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to sub- 
mit to a government which may protect the weak as well 
as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more 
powerful fiM^tions or parties be gradually induced, by a 
like motive, to wish for a government which will protect 
■II parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. Ji 
can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island 



«8 




HOUSE OF HEPKESENTATIVES. IB*. Bl < 



was separated from the Cu n fed e racy and \ti\ to itself, 
the insecurity of riijhis under the popular funn of 
governmetit within such narrow limits would be dis- 
played by such reiterated oppressiunx of factious ma- 
joriticK, that some power alioijethcr independent nf the 
people would w>on be called for by the voice of the very 
factions whose misrule had proved the ne<.'cssity of it. 
Ill the entendcd reimblic i>f the irmtt ;d St;itr«, aivil amflug 
the gr eat variety of intgit^sis, parties, and sects which i t 

, q WtrHccs, a cialiliMii of a mi^jnritv of ihc whole soc iety 
ciiuld seldo m take place on anv otht-r pntirni k-s than 

-t <>o]ic'fff limtice ami the gencfal good : whiUi there being 
thus less danger to a minor from the _will of a nnjor 
parly, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the 
security -of the former, by intrtMJucing into the govern- 
ment a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other 
words, a will independent of the society itself, II is no 
less certain than it is important, notntifistanding the 
contrary opinions which have been entertained, that tlic 

ilargcr the society, provided it lie within a practical 
ppherc, the more duly c^ipabte it will be of sclf-govcrn- 
gent. And happily fur the rrpuhiitan cautty the pmclic- 
able sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by 
a judicious modification and mixture of the ftderat 

printipU. PtJRUt]!^ 

No. 52 [51]. <A'f> Yr't Putrt. Ftbnifyi. >tmj Hamilton (>) 

QUALIFICATION ANO TERM OF HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES. 

ElMfrj — Tie fUdA/rd/^t «/ /if memhtri—Tkt term »f tpO— 
Bitnitiiti /littimi — I'li/ut rf frtqutnt tiiiiipii—Ttrmt ej mr*<* *» 
ifikiT gnrrniuHli^fn gtiflauj, ir/lamJ, aitJiii tit Aniriiannimia— 
Bimiaai tbiitrti itrt lAiHx'/rdiu — Sfaiitni Jtr tkit itrattn Jrtm Ut 
tuturt and f^itlirrt ef Canj;rta. 

To the Ptopie *./ the State 0/ New V^rk: 

Frum the more general inquiries pursued In the four 

last papers, I pass on to a more particular esamiualion 

of the several parts of the govcrnmcnL I shall bcfin 

.with iJlC H'iu*»r "( Kr)iri'-.r'iir.ilivi-s. 



irtil QVALlFlCATIOiVS OF ELECTORS, 349 

The first view to b« taken of this part of the govern- 
ment relates to the qualifications of the electors and the 
elected. 

Those of the former are to be the same with those of 
the electors of the most ntimeroiis branch of the State 
Icsi statu res. The defintium of the right of suffnige is 
very justly reg-.irded as a fundamental article of rcpubli* 
can jEovcrnment. It was inciimbrnt on the convention, 
therefore, to tk-fine and establish this right in the Con- 
stitution. To have left it open for the occasional regula> 
tion of the Congress would have been improper, for the 
reason just mcntionetl. To have submittal it to the 
legislative discretion of the States would have been im- 
proper for the same reason; and for the additional reason 
that it would have rendered ton dependent on the State 
governmenft that brani:h of the federal government 
which ought to be dependent on the people alone. To 
have reduced the different qualificatTons in the different 
States to one uniform rule would probably have been &s 
dissatisfactory to some of the Stales as it would haveV 
been difficult to the convention. The provision made by 
the convention appears, therefore, to ha the best that 
lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every 
State, because it is comformable to the standard alrc^ady 
established, or which may Iw established, by the State 
itself. It will be safe to the United States, because, be- 
ing fixed by the State constitutions, it is not alterable by 
the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the 
ipcople of the States will alter this part of their constitu- 
'tiuns in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured 
to them by the federal ConsiitDtion. 

The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully 
and properly defined by the SMte constitutions, and be- 
ing at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have 
been very properly considered and regulated by the con- 
vention. A representative of the United States must be 
ri( the age of twenty-live years; must have been seven 
years a citizen of the United States; must, at the time 
of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to 



35" 



FSKQUEMCr OF ELSCT/OA'S. 



1>*.BS(S1> 



represcni; and, durmx tlic time of his service, aiiist t>c 
in no office under the United StutcH. Under tliese rca- 
tnniitilr liinitiitiiiits, tlie dour nf lIiU pan of ihc federal 
go?ernfi)eril ti open to merit of every Ucscriplion, whether 
native or ;idoptivc, nhctlter yoting or old, ami without 
reganl to poverty or we;ilth, ur to any parlicuUr prufex- 
&ion of reliK>"U!t faith. 

The term for which the rcprcscnlativM arc to be 
elected fulls umlcr it second view which may he tjken of 
this branch. In order to decide on the propriety of this 
article, two questions must he considercdt first, whether 
biennial electinnH will, in this rase, he sale-, sccunilly, 
trhclher tlicy be necesiiiry or u&efiil. 

/•'inf. As it is essential to liberty that the soveru- 
ment iii general should have a common interest with the 
people, so it is particularly eSNCiitial that the brum h of 
it under considerati'm should have an immediate depend- 
ence on. and an intiin;itc sympathy with, Ihc people. 
Frv4]iicnt elections arc um|ticstionahly the only policy hy 
which this depeitdence and sympathy can he elTtctually 
secured. But what [Kirticiilar degree of frequency may 
be absolutely necessary for the purpose does not appear 
to be susceplitile of any precise rah-ulation, and must 
depend on a variety of circumstances with whiili it inav 
be connected. Let us consult experience, Ihc guide that 
nui;ht always to he fnUowcd whenever it c;m he found. 

Tl>c (chcine nf rrpmrnlAtion, m s Kiihtlitnte toi n meetmg of 
thp ciiitens in iktmmi, Ixing at mint but very inqicrfeelly hnawn 
Bl, to ancient polity, il i« in tnon raodcm limes only iliiU 

V*h li. we alc to csprcl iiulrartive cKampttv. Anil n-cn 

here. In oe<ter to nWm) a rrwjirch mo v.igu*- ami itiffwsive. ii will 
be proper t« conSne ouritclvcs to the (cw «.irnpks w^lICh at* ti«»l 
kiiiiwn, itnti wliirti bear 1l^ grrair«l jmntoj^ In our pan. 
The lint it> whi^h ihu ch.iraclrr oughi to tie appliril >% .^ 

of Commons in Great Britain. The htelory of this btnnch at tlw 
Engfiih CoostituliiHi, anterxx to ihe dale of Maipu Oiaila, n bM 
oIhcutv 10 yield (iittniclion. The very ritttnirc uf il hai Iwm 
made n question among pntilirat anliquarielk. Tlie earlint recnrrfs 
of subsequent dale prove ih« patUamcnis were U> tit only e»ery 
year; no4 ihat tbcy were to be tStittd every year. Aim! crai 




HMillM it) 1 LES'GTlt OF PARUAMENTS. 



35* 



thnc .timunl KCKsiont wvk leri so much at ihr ilUnriion of the 
iiioiMH-h ihni, uii'l^T vaiiuus ]>ri'tctis, tvry long anil i)aiigct»us 
micnniSKJonii were often contrircd by tnynl ambiijon. Tn ictncily 
tilts (grievance, tt was proniled by a staiuic. in ih« Tci«ii of Chartcs 
II., ih.-it the inicTn)i»ion» should not be prolr.iclnl bcfond a 
p«iiud ol Ihrcc years. On tIi« accession ol Williaiii (II.. wliena 
icvoliiiinn iiHik place in the i;i>vnnment, itie Mibject w.rt siill more 
ftctiuuslr tesutned. ;inil ii was declared to be among the liiiid.i- 
rurni.il rit-liu of the |kco[>k Ihul pailUinenii ought to be held 
frf^utHlfy. Bf anoihci' st^tuic. u Nidi pi,iss«d a (cw years later In 
Ike same rei}!'>> the lent) " ftequenlly," which )ui) alludcil to the 
irienaial p«riod sailed in ihc limc of Ch.irks II,. is reduced la A 
precise me:anin|; ; it being expressly cnucted ib^t n new ]>atliain«il 
sitnil be called wiihin ihrce yean afier the icrmiii»>on of the 
lariner. Tlie lu!>l cbunge, from three l<i seven yemr*. is well 
fciiDven to hivc hccn iiiiinduccil prcliy cntly in the prcscol ceniurj'. 
mulcr an ^Ucrii (or ilie Huiioverian succesiion. From these facts 
ii .ipprjrs (h.il the grmlcst frequency of elrclioni which has been 
iltvined neccsury in tli.it kiiigdoin. fur binding the icpicicnlatives 
to tlicir conslilucriis. dors not exceed a tiictinial relurn of lliem- 
And if wc may argue (roin live tlegree o( lilxrly retained even 
under sepientii^l elections, and all Ihe otiier vicious ingtedienls in 
ihe parlijineniary conUilniiot), wc cannot doubi thai a redticlion 
of the [lefiuil from seven to llirec years, with ihe other nec«miry 
lefornis, would so f.>r extendi the influence <A the people over iliciT 
lepiifienlulivei ai to sali>ly ui Ihal biennial elecliuns. under the 
lrdrr.ll systeni, caniiol potMbly be d.ingrroils to the requisite de- 
[icniknce of llie Houie o( KeprtncrilatJvoi on iheir constituents. 

Blirclions in (rcland, till of Ulc. were regulated entirely by the 
discrtliun of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on 
ihe acci^ssion of .1 new prince, or some other ronlingcnl event, 
Th« p.irlMnicni which commenced with George II. was conlinue<l 
throughout hit whole reign, a period of about tbiriy-liVF years. 
Tlic only <lcpcndcnce ol the reprrscniativc^ on the people con- 
sisted in Ihe right ol the latter lo supply prr.x^ional vacancies, by 
the election of new members, and in the chance of some event 
wliich might produce a general new election. The ability also fit 
Ihe Irish parliament to maintain the rights of their conitiluenls. iiO 
(ar as llic disposition might exist, was extremely tliacklcd by the 
control rA ihe crown over Ihr subfrrts of llieir deli beiat ion. 0{ 
Ulc. ibcse shackles, if 1 mistake nut. Iiave been broken ; and octen- 
nial parliamenit have b«udes been eaiablished. What rffeci may 
be pnxliKcd by ibis partial reform must be led 10 (under eiperi- 



«* 



COLONIAL »BPHESEh'TATlON. 



Ilo. U lU) 



ence. The example of iKland. from lliis riew ol tl, can ihrow Inil 
liiil« lighi till the ^ijl)]f<;t. As far .is we tMii dmw any roncluston 
from il. il mtiiil he that if (he people o( lllut vounlry have been 
»hlc under all these disadvnniaget lo reuin any libniy whatciw. 
the uilvan(a|{e uf biennial deviiotiii wuulU mkuic Iu ihcni eirry 
degree »( libcriy which mighl depend on a <ii>e conneciton between 
their representalivei and (heinaclves. 

Let u& bring our inquiries nearer home. The example 
of these States, when British culuntcs, cbims particular 
attentiun, ;it tlie surae time that it is so well known at tu 
require iitlle to be said on i(. The principle of rcpre- 
Kentation. in one branch of Ihe legisbtureat least, was 
est-iblislicd in all of them. But the periods of election 
were different. They varied from one to seven years. 
Have we any reasun to infer, from the spirit and con- 
duct of the representatives of the people prior lo itie 
Revolution, that biennial vkclions would have been 
dangerous lo the public liberties? The spirit wbi<-h 
everywhere displayed itself at the commencement of the 
strugifie, and which vanquished the ob^acies to inde- 
pendence, is the best of proofs that a sufficient portion 
of lilieriy had been everywhere enjuyet! to in>pire both a 
sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement. 
This remark holds good, as well with regard to the then 
colonies whose elections were least fre<iuent as tu thoK 
whose elections were most frequent. Virginia was the 
colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary 
osui^ations of Great Hritain; it was the first also to 
espousing, by public act, the resolution of independence. 
In Virginia, ncvcnhcless, if I have not been misinformed, 
elections under the former (government were scpteniiiaL 
This particular example is brought into view, not as a 
proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those 
instances was probably accidental; and still less of any 
advantage in leptftnial elections, for when compared wilh 
a greater frequency they are adini^sible; but men-ty a» a 
proof, and I conceive it to be a very substantial proof, 
that the liberties of the people can be in no danger frwn 
hiennial elections. 

The conclusion rcsultiag from these ciamplcs will be 



EuiUtaXril 



TeKU OP THE HOUSE. 



353 



not a little strenjitliencd by recotlcclinx three circum- 
stuDMS. The first is that the federal legislature will 
possess a part only of that supreme legislative authority 
which is vested completely in the British Parliament; 
and which, with a (cw exceptions, was exercised by the 
colunial assemblies and the Irish legisluitire. It is a 
received and well-founded maxim that, where no other 
cin-umstanccs affect the case, the greater the power is, 
the shorter ought to be its duration; and conversely, the 
smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be 
protracted. In the second place, it has on another 
occasion been shown that the fl^deral legislature will not 
only be restrained by iis dependence on the people, as 
other Icgtsbtive bodies are, but that it will be, moreover, 
watched and controlled by the several colUttcral legisla- 
tures, which other legislative bodies are not. And in the 
third place, do comparison can be made between the 
means that will be possessed by the more permanent 
branches of the federal gi>vernnie"t (nr nedming. if they 
should be disposed to seduce, the House of Kepresenta> 
tives from their duly to the people, and the means of 
influence over the popular branch possessed by the other 
branches of the government above cited. With less 
power, therefore, to abuse, the federal representatives 
can be le^^x tempted on one side, and will be doubly 
watched on the other. 

PUBLIUS. 



No. 53 [53]. (/-A^Mtf-f/^'— /. reiiMwy*.!?*!.) Haniilion (?) 
TKRM OF HOUSK OF REPRESENTATIVES. 



Ohjdlhni tint Bihtn anniKit tU'litmi t^ tyraiitj $ffiin, amivrrnt — 
Htmnial rUilitm mttniarr and tiu/iil^Oi}tili*in /* MtJulf ik*T{ 
t*tmt''Sita»ial tlttliant mr/ul aaJ la/r. 

7> Ihf Ptflpie of Ike Stale 0/ A'eu' JV/-*.- 

1 shall here, perhaps, be reminded of a current obser- 
vation, "that where annual elections end, tyranny 
beginft." If it be irue, as has often been remarked, that 



354 ElMCTIOff OF STATE LBGtSLATVRES. lir».B8.M> 

sayings which become proverbial arc genrrally foondi-d 
in reason, it in not tc&« tru« that, whcrn otu^e «stal>lislte<], 
they are often applied to caaeit to vliich the reason of 
thtm docs not extend. I need not loot: for a proof 
lieyiind the aisc hcfore \\%. Wh;it \% the reaKoii on which 
this priivert>i3l obicrvalion is founded? No man will 
subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any 
natural connection siihsists between the sun or the 
seasons and the period within which human virtue un 
bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, 
liberty is not, in thi« respect, conrmcd to any single 
point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford 
KuRtcicnt latitude for all the variations whirh may be 
retiuired by the various situations and circiini^iancei. of 
civil society. The election of magistrates might be. if it 
were found expedient, us in some instances it actually 
tiaii been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; 
and if circumstances may require a deviation from Ihe 
rule on one side, why not ^Iso on the other side? Turn- 
ing our attention tn the periiKis eKiat>li«hed among our- 
selves for the election of the most numerous branches of 
the State legislatures, we find ihcmby no means coinciding 
any more in thi$ instance than in ilie ele<'tions of other 
civil mat;istratc9. In Connecticut and Rhode Island the 
periods are half-yearly. In the other States, South 
Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South Carolina 
they are biennial— as is proposed in the federal govern- 
ment. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the 
Iont;est and shortest periods; and yet it would be out 
easy to show that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better 
governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty, 
than South Carolina; or that cither the one or the other 
of these States is distinguished in these respects, and by 
these causes, from the States whose election* are didereat 
from both. 

In searching for the grounds nf this doclrim- I can 
discover but one, and that is wholly inapplir^ihle to our 
case. The important distinction, so well understood in 
America, between a Constitution establisheil by the 



HwUtwdl] PAttUAMENTARY DAS'GKKS, 355 

people sful unalterable by the government, and a law 
eKtiiljti>h<Ti] by ilic t;»veriii»ent and alterable by (he 
government, seems to have been little understood and 
less observed in ;iny other country. Wherever the 
supreme power of tegi«Iutton has resided, lias been 
supposed to reside also a full power to change the form 
of the government. i%ven in Gr«it Itritaiii, where tlic 
principleN of political and civil liberty have been most 
discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the 
Constitution, it is maintained that the authority of the 
Parliament is trunvt^endcnt and un(:i>ntrollat;le, as well 
wUb regard to the Constitution as the ordinary objects 
of legislative provision. They have accordingly, in sev- 
eral instances, actually changed, hy legislative acts, some 
of the most fundamcnt.ll articles of the government. 
Tbcy have in particular, on several occasions, changed 
the period ul election; and, on the last occasion, not 
only introduced septennial in place of Irienntal elections, 
but by the same act continued themselves in place four 
years Ik yo ml thr term (or which they were elected by 
the people. An atteniiun to thrse dangerous practices 
has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of free 
goveniment. of which frequency of elections is the cor- 
ner stone; and has led thcni to kccIc for some security 
to liberty against the danger to which it is c.tposed. 
Wfiere no constitution, paramount to the government, 
either existed or could be obtained, no constitutional 
security, similar to that established in the United States, 
was lo be attempted. Some other security, therefore, 
was to be sought for; and what lietter security would 
the case admit than that of selecting and appealing to 
»ume simple and familiar portion of time as a standard 
for mi^hurinc tht-*dan);er of innovatiouN, for I'txing the na- 
tional sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions? 
The must simple and familiar portion of time, applicable 
to the subji!ct, was that of a year; and hence the doctrine 
lias been inculcated by a laudable 2cal, to erect some 
barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited 
gOTeriimcni, that the advance toward tyranny was lo be 




LEGISLATOR ttEEOS EXFEklENCE. I»«.»l(«) 



ulciilaled by the distance of tiepitrture from the lixc<I 
|>(»tnt of annual elections. But what necessity can there 
be of applying this expedient to a government limited, as 
tl>e fc<l<;r;il government wilt be. by the authority of a para- 
mount Constituijon? Or who will pretend that the liber- 
ties uf the pcuplc of America will not be more secure 
under biennial elections, unalterably fixed by siieh a Con- 
siiiulion, than those of any other nation would be, where 
elections were annual, or even more frctjuent, but subject 
to alteration)! by the ordinary power of tJie government? 

The second question staled is, whether biennial elec- 
tions be necessary or useful. The propriety of answer- 
ing this question in the affirmative will appear from 
several very obvious considerations. 

No man can be a competent legislator who docs not 
add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a ccr- 
Sae tain degree of knowledge of the subjects on 

R«.flS. which he is tole^inlate A part of this knowl- 

edge may be acquired by means of information which lie 
within the compass uf men in private as well as public 
stations. Another part can only be attained, oral least 
thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station 
which requires the use of it.' The perind of service 
ought, therefore, in all i>uch cases, to bear some propor-!! 
tion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the 
due performance of the service. The period of legisla- 
tive service established in most of the States for the more 
numerous branch is. as we have seen, one year The 
question then may be put into this simple form: does 

' With ih« ditappe«n»oe, vt ruber (utmeixcoct, of nmtrf»«io«wl < 
lory am] ikc iiicrcMcd ixxnpllculiMt of It^Ulaiivc mekturei, a tern I 
Concrat bsi btcumr iJnunt u iicc«<ul)r Imfocr aiiy fiiCBibci can aaaV 
hit Inrtunncn tinxif;!)' (dl. 1'1kin« Mal«i. (hmforr. whitli hare ■ ttad- 
ciw; (u ic-*tcti ihe mux men uc apt lo i«ciir« ■ ^lishilr ^rriirt miln- 
«IK( on lf][il!ilion. ucomj«icd oilh ibcHC mibkli frfiJU' T 

fvprwntBtivei. l>ccu>e llie ittircunlalli'n o( llw (otii<< 
kiioiaioil|ge oJ coiiicrD«*i<inal j<rjrltrr, and alhi bocauia \V^\ ubvicit.^ i rin; 
chancnof uuniltlnicHU iin cuitimiltM^. 1 1 nalliroaE't thr conitai't ir- 
■Icnion ol cfajr. Calbnua. anil Wrin:' i 'n tii, ic than By tbrlt v.-^i. 'i«, 
thai ilieic nwiitanie tnwKlJltici llil. Ti>-< ■- 

a nwsilKt <)i| CiMicreu i> kixiuii • , uiiitu lie i i 

moM ihau on* tcrM In ibal IhnI; . ~ L-iiiiua. 



H4mUt<ni (1) ] 



AFFAIRS OF THE STATES. 



557 



the period of two j^ears bear no greater proportion to the 
knowledge requisite for federal legislation than one jcar 
does to th« knowledge rectuisitc for State legislation? 
The verjr statement of the question, in this form, sug> 
gests the »n*wcr that ought to be given to it. 

In a single State the requisite knowledge relates to 
the eiisiing laws, which arc uniform throughout the 
St^ite, and with which all (he cliixens are more or less 
conversant; and to the general 3fFair§of the State, which 
lie within a small compass, are not very divcrsififd, and 
occupy much of the attention and conversation of ev